Certainty in Islamic Legal Theory: An Enquiry into its theoretical Foundations and Implications on Sharia, with focus on its effects on the development of Islamic Finance Law by Ali, Ali
 
  
The Institute of Advanced Legal Studies – School of Advanced Studies, 
University of London 
Certainty In Islamic 
Legal Theory 
An Enquiry Into Its Theoretical Foundations And Implications On Sharia, 
























I dedicate this work to my wife Ranya, who endured and supported me greatly to endure 
during three difficult years for our family, for this I am ever greatful. My gratitude is extended 
to my daughters and my parents for all their love and support. 
I also thank my supervisor, professor Barry Rider for his valuable guidance and advice which 












This research aims to critically investigate the arguments upon which the certainty of Islamic 
Legal Theory (Usul al-fiqh) is based. Muslim scholars have argued along the centuries that usul 
al-fiqh is a methodology constituted of certain sources of law: Quran, Sunna, and Ijmaʿ; there 
are other sources that are not certain. By certain, the usulis (scholars of Usul) mean that the 
sources have certain authority to produce law and, under certain conditions, this law will 
convey the certain divine will. This makes the law divine and hence, absolutely rigid and 
unchangeable. The prohibition of riba (usury or interest) and alcohol is certain, therefore, this 
prohibition cannot be changed in any time or circumstance except under the rule of necessity 
(ḍarūra) which is usually regarded as exceptional circumstances. 
The usulis along with modern Muslim scholars have always argued that Sharia is an adaptable 
system despite its divine nature which entails immutability. For this to be the case, it is divided 
into a constant (thābit) and changing (mutaghayyir) parts. The constant part is the certain 
sources and certain law derived from them; these have timeless validity, whereas the 
changing part is based on uncertain sources or mechanisms of deriving law and is thus the 
field of ijtihad (legal reasoning). This latter part forms the adaptable side of Sharia and, thus, 
gives it eternal validity.  
This research is concerned with the former part. It will critically look at the arguments made 
by the usulis to establish the certainty and unchangeability of Sharia and how this certainty 
has affected Islamic law, particularly, in finance. These effects are manifested in many areas of 
modern financial industry like the prohibition of banks interest, Insurance, and many forms of 
financial derivatives. They show how the theoretical and abstract polemics of Islamic legal 




It is the finding of this research that the arguments made by the usulis to demonstrate the 
absolute certainty of the sources of Sharia, Quran, Sunna, and Ijmaʿ, are unfounded. There is 
no agreement between them on the main pillars of certainty such as the concept of tawatur 
(concurrent testimony), the history of the written Quran, the soundness and validity of hadith, 
and the concept and authoritativeness of Ijmaʿ. Nor is there clear conceptualization or 
demonstration of this certainty in the arguments presented by the usulis, arguments which 
suffer from internal inconsistencies and unfounded conclusions. 
The law which has been derived from these sources, thus, is characteristic of unjustified 
rigidity which is a result of the perceived certainty of its sources. And throughout the history of 
Sharia, jurists have tried to circumvent the law in different ways, such as the rule of necessity, 
since they could not change the certain law. This research finds that this rigidity was manifest 
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Finding the right balance between adaptability and stability is a constant challenge in any 
system of law. A legal system requires a mechanism that facilitates changing existing laws when 
this is needed as well as the ability to legislate anew. Similarly, it will need to maintain for its 
existing laws some degree of stability, resistance to change that will allow its subjects to know 
in advance the position of the law on certain issues. In the case of Sharia, this challenge is 
amplified because its balance is heavily tilted towards resisting change, making the greater 
challenge in Sharia to find the right methods of changing its law when change is necessary. 
Unlike secular legal systems, the reasons for the relative legal rigidity in Sharia go beyond the 
quest for legal stability; this rigidity has its roots in the perceived divinity of its sources. Sharia is 
perceived to be the law of God and God’s commands cannot be changed by human legislation 
regardless of the aptitude of, or the reasons behind, the proposed change. Furthermore, with 
the precept that God has indeed decreed on His subjects rules to follow and abide by, it was 
thought imperative for the subjects, or those among them who take that challenge, to find 
God’s intent with the utmost degree of certainty. People can believe in God, but they have to 
know his law. However, and since the discovery of God’s will from revelation required an 
extensive hermeneutical process which is ultimately a human effort, it was not possible to 
ascertain that Islamic law in its entirety was the true will of Allah; creating, thus, a dichotomy of 
certain/probable or changeable/unchangeable in Sharia.  
In order to systemically classify the sources of Sharia according to their epistemological weight 
and to extract or find the will of God from the sources, Muslim scholars developed a theory of 
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law called Usul al-fiqh (the origins or the sources of fiqh (lit. understanding)). In this system, 
revelation (Quran and Sunna (traditions of the Prophet)) provided the raw material of law, qiyas 
(analogical reasoning) and other tools provided the mechanisms of inferring law; and Ijmaʿ 
(consensus) generated or sanctioned legal opinion. 
 The Quran is the ultimate source of law in Islam; its authenticity is perfect and supposedly did 
not require demonstration in usul al-fiqh. Notwithstanding the certain authenticity of the 
Quranic text, the certainty of its interpretation was limited since there are different 
interpretations for most of the Quran. Still, the usulis (scholars of usul al-fiqh) affirm that there 
are hermetic verses which are certain in their meaning. Law that is derived from a hermetic 
Quranic verse is a law derived from a source certain in authenticity and meaning; hence, it will 
be considered a certain law, one that delivers the true will of Allah and thus, one that cannot be 
changed. 
Sunna, a pre-Islamic concept that denotes tradition, which developed in Islam to denote the 
traditions of the Prophet Muhammad mostly transmitted and preserved in a corpus of oral 
reports called hadith, can only yield probable authenticity since it did not enjoy the same 
rigorous transmission as that of the Quran. Nonetheless, the usulis considered Sunna legally 
valid because they knew with certainty that the Prophet and his companions accepted the 
reports of solitary transmission and acted upon them. Hadith had only to be saḥīḥ (sound) to be 
considered trust-worthy and, thus, legally binding. Sunnaic law, therefore, is also rigid 
notwithstanding its unproven authenticity and other aspects of uncertainty that might affect its 
legal validity. 
Ijmaʿ is considered by some usulis to be a source of law, that is, it generates new law when 
there is no text revealed on the matter. Other usulis argue that Ijmaʿ can only sanction a legal 
opinion that was based on revelation. In either case, Ijmaʿ bestows certainty upon law and no 
law based on Ijmaʿ can later be changed unless, according to some usulis, it is changed by 
another Ijmaʿ. Other sources of usul like qiyas (analogical reasoning),  ͑urf, and istishab 
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(presumption of continuity) are not considered certain by the usulis1 and, therefore, will not be 
included in the analysis of this research. 
The usulis, however, have maintained that the certain part of Sharia remains limited and most 
of it is a domain for ijtihad (juristic effort). This ensures that Sharia is flexible and adaptable to 
be timelessly valid. Yet, and considering that the major works on fiqh preceded those of usul al-
fiqh, arguments about the flexibility of Sharia seem to have been written retrospectively. It is 
evident that very little, if any, have changed in fiqh since the formation of the major five schools 
of fiqh in Islam. Admittedly, the argument that ‘the gate of ijtihad was closed’ is a controversial 
one2 and the better explanation given to this stagnation in Islamic law since the fourth century 
is that it is due to the natural tendency for legal stability once the law reaches a certain degree 
of maturity.3 However, many aspects of this rigidity cannot be simply explained by the quest for 
stability since they were problematic during rather than after the formation of the classical 
schools of fiqh. For example, the jurists developed a host of methods to circumvent the law in 
matters of the penal law called hudud ‘limits’ and in the law that governs financial transactions; 
it was named the fiqh of hiyal (ruses). Law was usually formed in strict conformity to the text, 
and in the cases where the law was problematic (due to change of social or historical context 
for example) the jurists would attempt to find a way around the law instead of changing it. This 
seems to have become a legal culture in Islam as the law has scarcely departed from classical 
fiqh during fourteen centuries of Islamic history. And while the problematic nature of some 
legal issues was known since the classical period, the social changes brought about by 
modernity intensified the test of the timelessness of Sharia to breaking point. Issues of the 
status of women, slavery, human rights, and many others have shown Sharia to be extremely 
rigid and unadaptable. The chief explanatory factor for such rigidity is the certainty by which 
law is portrayed as the true law of God. Muslims could only abide by it or find ways around it, 
 
1 Ghazali argues that usul al-fiqh is constituted of three sources: Quran, Sunna, and Ijmaʿ. see: Ghazzālī, al-
Mustasfạ̄ min ʻilm al-usụl̄ (AM Muhammad Umar ed, Dar al-Kutub al- ͑ilmiyya 2008) 14. 




3 Noel J Coulson, Conflicts and Tensions in Islamic Jurisprudence (University of Chicago Press) 44. 
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but they could not change it as it was considered sacred, and it was the task of the usulis to 
demonstrate this certainty to buttress fiqh’s resistance to change. 
The objective of this research is to critically analyse the concept of certainty in the Islamic 
jurisprudential discourse: how is it justified, what evidence did the usulis give to demonstrate it, 
how did it affect the development of law, and how the rigidity of law has affected Muslims 
responses to modern issues particularly in Islamic finance. It is important to note here that the 
scope of this study will be mainly on the philosophy of Islamic law, in particular, the 
epistemological issues of certainty. The role of Islamic finance will be to provide a marginal case 
study of the effects of certainty on the development of law. The choice of Islamic finance is not 
imperative, but it is not arbitrary either. Family law or penal law would have been equally 
possible but the law of Islamic finance, in addition to being substantially affected by the 
certainty of usul (much of the fiqh of hiyal is related to contracts and transactions), gives us a 
highly advantageous viewpoint on how Islam and modernity interact. Finance is one of the 
main pillars (perhaps the main one) of the modern economic system, and Islam has very 
specific rules on finance that, to some degree, sets it apart from the global financial system of 
today. The prohibition of interest (which will be the focus of the work on Islamic finance) is the 
major distinguishing feature of Sharia from conventional finance. Yet, in practice, Islamic 
finance has always found ways to circumvent this prohibition sometimes to the point of 
rendering it ineffective and, thus, its distinction from conventional finance symbolic. It was 
viable for jurists to use legal stratagems rather than to review the law and possibly change it if 
necessary. The reason behind this legal phenomenon (this practice is not confined to finance) is 
mainly the perceived divinity of the law underscored by the certainty of that divinity. Riba is 
prohibited in the authentic Quran by explicit terms, and the prohibition was further elaborated 
by Sunna and Ijmaʿ, all of which are certain sources of law. This certainty will impede any 
attempt to change the law. But the problem is further complicated by the fact that this 
certainty is mostly epistemological; this means that the use of reason to critique the validity of 
the law will mostly be irrelevant. The prohibition was not based on reason in the first place, it 
was based, rather, on text and a presumed consensus. True, there has been some debate on 
the rationale of prohibiting banks interest and arguments have been exchanged to present the 
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virtues or vices of interest, but the crunch point in these debates will always come down to the 
point that since Allah has prohibited it there can be no debate on any benefit (maṣlaḥa) to 
society from it. No argument of reason or logic, no matter how sound, will out-weigh the 
certainty of the Quranic injunction. Therefore, the only possible way to address the issue of 




Not much literature has been written4 to critically analyse the concept of certainty in usul al-
fiqh with an eye on its effects on the development of the law, in particular, the law of Islamic 
finance. Most of the works written within the Islamic literature on certainty tend to be 
descriptive and avoided, due to the sensitivity of the subject, critical analysis. Whereas, works 
from without the Islamic tradition either share the sensitivities of their Muslim counterparts, 
are narrower in their scope, or do not include the dimension of practical legal effects of 
certainty. 
A paper written by Ahmad Habib discusses the adaptability of Sharia with focus on how it can 
and has helped the development of Islamic finance in modern times. Habib’s work, however, is 
not focused on certainty nor usul al-fiqh; it simply states that Sharia, in its domain of 
transactions (mu ͑amalat), is based on the general rule of permissibility (ibaḥa) and that 
transactions, based on this principle, are only precluded when they violate the clear injunctions 
on riba (usury) and gharar (uncertainty). Moreover, Habib does not provide a critical analysis to 
the precepts of Islamic tradition with regards to the adaptability of Sharia, he says “Shariʿah 
provides the immutable principles that jurists cannot violate. These Sharia principles can be 
considered similar to the statutory laws and codes in the civil law tradition that judges have to 
 
4 To the best of my knowledge. 
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abide by in giving Judgements. The difference between the two, however, is that while 
statutory laws can be changed by legislation, the Shariʿah principles are considered divine and 
immutable”.5   In this light, the adaptability that Sharia can provide, according to Habib, is 
mostly confined to classical nominal contracts (like salam), an adaptation of them to modern 
needs (like the case of ʿarbun), or similar methods which will not essentially add anything new 
to what already exists in classical fiqh. 
Another work that tries to examine how the concept of certainty affects the work of the jurists 
in modern times, is a study by Sami Salahat who did not depart from the familiar descriptive 
arguments about certainty in Sharia which asserts a dichotomy of certain and probable (al-qaṭ ͑ 
wa al-ẓann) in Sharia that gives it the flexibility to adapt. Salahat uses this argument to discuss 
the issue of American Muslim soldiers who fight Muslims in Afghanistan. Scholars like Qaradawi 
gave a fatwa that this can be allowed under the fiqh of necessity (ḍarūra) but they should try to 
avoid involvement in combat as much as they can. To Salahat, this fatwa was wrong since he 
did not see any possibility to circumvent the certain laws which absolutely prohibit the killing of 
a fellow Muslim.6  
A thorough study of the epistemology of usul al-fiqh was made by Aron Zysow for his PhD thesis 
in 1984.7 He analysed the epistemological mechanism of the usul system with focus on the 
school of Ahnaf and Zahirīyya. This study, however, is methodically different from Zysow’s. 
Zysow seems to take the principles of usul as givens to his work and confine his analysis to the 
conspicuous differences between the different schools of usul with regards to its mechanisms. 
His analysis of the concept of tawatur (concurrent testimony), for example, does not provide a 
critique of how the usulis demonstrated its certainty, only a brief account of some of the usulis’ 
 
5 Habib Ahmed, ‘Islamic Law, Adaptability and Financial Development’ (2006) 13 Islamic Economic Studies 79 
<http://www.isdb.org/irj/go/km/docs/documents/IDBDevelopments/Internet/English/IRTI/CM/downloads/Distan
ce_Learning_Files/Law,Adaptability & FinDevelopment(Dr. Habib).pdf>. 
6 Sami Salahat, ‘Fiqh Al-Waqi ͑ Min Manthur Al-Qat ͑ Wa Al-Zann’ [2004] Majallat al-Sharia wa al-Qanun 
<http://www.riyadhalelm.com/researches/4/330_fqh_waqie.pd>. There are other works on certainty in usul which 
do not go beyond the descriptive. See for example: al-͑abd Khalil Abu    ͑id and Abdul Jalil Dhumra, ‘Manahij Al-
Ulama Fi Ithbat Al-Qat’iyyah Fi Al-Qawa’id Al-Usuliyyah’ 32 Dirasat, Ulum al-Sharia wa al-Qanun 21 
<http://riyadhalelm.com/researches/4/431.pdf>. 




arguments. This is further evidenced by the fact that Zysow followed the usulis approach by 
starting the discussion of usul with the issue of bayan (manifestation) which is concerned with 
the interpretation of the Quran. The authenticity of the Quran was never discussed in usul as 
the usulis did not think it belonged to that field, and Zysow did not depart from this. He argued 
that Quran authenticity belonged to theology, but even the structure of the major works of 
theology did not include the demonstration of Quranic authenticity. Zysow’s work is aptly sub-
titled ‘An Introduction to the typology of Islamic legal theory’ which clarifies the scope of the 
study. Zysow provides for the students of usul al-fiqh an insightful introduction which avails a 
thorough analysis of how the different schools of usul contributed to the field; he does not, 
however, provide a critique to the main arguments and ideas which form the building blocks of 
usul al-fiqh.  
 
The book of Wael Hallaq ‘A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction To Sunni Usul al-
fiqh’ is, as the title suggests, a work of historical analysis. Admittedly, the word ‘introduction’ is 
a modest description of a thoroughly comprehensive work on usul, still, it remains faithful to its 
‘historical’ objective. He elucidates this point in his arguments about Ijmaʿ as follows: 
“Goldziher's and Schacht's results about the spuriousness of hadith literature, though quite 
illuminating and indispensable for a more accurate understanding of the early developments in 
Islam, have no bearing whatsoever on whether consensus was authoritative or baseless. 
Muslims considered (and the majority still do) the Sunna to be a pillar of Islam and as such we 
must address it in the present inquiry. It must be immediately added that the question of the 
authoritativeness of consensus must be dealt with as a subject of intellectual history. All 
propositions designated by the great majority of Muslim scholars as premises to their 
arguments must be treated as true premises”.8 This illustrates Hallaq’s approach which, like 
that of Zysow, does not question the main premises of the Islamic tradition, preferring, instead, 
to orient their analysis towards intellectual history. This, of course, is an undoubtedly legitimate 
 
8 Wael B Hallaq, ‘On the Authoritativeness of Sunni Consensus’ 18 1986 427 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/163471>., p. 430 
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approach which has its merits; but it does not negate the legitimacy of the approach taken by 
Goldziher and Schacht (and also followed in this study) in which they take aim at the arguments 
presented by the usulis to demonstrate the truth, certainty, or authoritativeness of a particular 
source. Hallaq maintained this method in other works9 on usul where he confines his analysis to 
the historical aspects rather than the intellectual. 
 
Other important works on aspects of certainty can be found in the works of Bernard Weiss. 
Weiss’s main work on usul, ‘The Search for God’s Law’, is a comprehensive analysis of the work 
of the renowned usuli Saif al-Dīn al-Amidī and his book Iḥkam. This, however, was mostly a 
work on usul al-fiqh rather than certainty in spite of the discussions of issues of certainty 
imperative to any analysis of usul. He offers more analysis of the sources of usul on his 
insightful book ‘The Spirit of Islamic Law’ but this is an analysis provided in the wider context of 
Islamic Law in general. An important, albeit limited, contribution to the issues of certainty is 
found in Weiss’s paper about tawatur.10 In this work, Weiss offers an insightful critical analysis 
of the concept of tawatur in the Islamic legal philosophy with a special focus on the arguments 
of Ghazali. This study benefited from Weiss’s work on tawatur (and to a lesser degree that of 
Hallaq’s) and built upon it to include the added perspective of modern studies on testimony as 
a source of knowledge, an important addition which was not within the scope of Weiss’s paper.  
 
 
9 Papers on: consensus (n5); Inductive Corroboration: Wael B Hallaq, ‘On Inductive Corroboration, Probability, and 
Certainty in Usul al-fiqh’ in Wael B Hallaq (ed), A history of Islamic legal theories : an introduction to Sunnī usụ̄l al-
fiqh (Cambridge UP 1994). In addition to other discussions of usul concepts in: Wael B Hallaq, Sharīʻa : Theory, 
Practice, Transformations (Cambridge University Press 2009).; Aḥmad ibn ʻAbd al-Hạlīm Ibn Taymīyah, Ibn 
Taymiyya against the Greek Logicians (Wael B Hallaq ed, OUP 1993). 






There are numerous other works that deal with different aspects of usul al-fiqh from an 
epistemological perspective11 which cannot all be discussed here, and for which the works 
already mentioned are sufficient representatives for the purposes of this study. Nonetheless, 
there are a number of aspects in which this study can still make a contribution to the wealth of 
literature already available. First, it studies certainty as an epistemological generic concept 
underlying the entire field of usul al-fiqh. Available works on usul certainty written within the 
Islamic tradition mostly avoid any critique of certainty even if the work is a critique of usul. This 
is because the use of the arguments for certainty extends beyond usul al-fiqh into matters of 
theology which includes fundamental issues of religion such as the existence of God, the truth 
of Muhammad’s prophecy and of the Quran, etc. Non-Muslim writers, on the other hand, tend 
to address certainty by analysing its particular components like tawatur, Quranic manuscripts, 
hadith, and Ijmaʿ; but there is yet to be a study, to the best of my knowledge, that approaches 
certainty as the governing theme of Islamic legal philosophy from a critical perspective.  
Second, this study tries to ground the philosophical analysis to a modern legal application. 
Using issues of Islamic finance as cases-in-point will provide the reader with real-life 
implications of how an abstract philosophical concept like certainty can affect mundane daily 
matters of Muslim societies. A detailed analysis of the modern aspects of Islamic finance law, 
however, falls outside the scope of this study. The analysis here is confined to understanding 
how certainty creates rigidity and stagnation in the law. This provides the missing prelude to a 
myriad of literature on Islamic finance that deals with how it can fit in the modern finance 
industry or, perhaps, provide a viable alternative to it. This study, therefore, refrains from 
substantive discussion of how to accommodate, particularly in a legal framework, Islamic 
finance in the modern world since there is sufficient work on this regard, and limits its objective 
to providing a bridge between the roots of most legal difficulties in Islam, that is, certainty, with 
 
11 For example, on hadith: Jonathan AC Brown, ‘Did the Prophet Say It or Not? The Literal, Historical, and Effective 
Truth of Ḥadīths in Early Sunnism’ [2009] Journal of the American Oriental Society 259 
<https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,shib&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.40593816&site=
eds-live>. And on ijma: author George F. Hourani, ‘The Basis of Authority of Consensus in Sunnite Islam’ [1964] 
Studia Islamica 13 
<https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,shib&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.10.2307.1595035
&site=eds-live>. And Hallaq’s work mentioned above n.5 
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the practical aspects where these difficulties become manifest. For this purpose, Islamic finance 
will be used to provide examples and temporal case studies at each chapter of this study but 






Knowledge has always been a concept difficult to define and more difficult to demonstrate.12 
This is related to the fact that attempts to refute scepticism have never been conclusively 
successful, which, ultimately, makes any claim for absolute certainty or knowledge 
questionable at best. Nevertheless, arguments for the certainty of some basic principles have 
always been presented and defended by philosophers; such as basic arithmetic and logical 
propositions: 2+2=4; the whole is greater than the part; etc. This concept was adopted by the 
usulis who had different classifications of what counts as certain knowledge, but they shared 
the idea that some certain knowledge was possible in some way (even by divine bestowal as 
Ghazali argued). This study accepts (with some reservations which will not be reflected in the 
analysis) that there is certain knowledge in the form of simple arithmetic and logic as well as 
knowledge from concurrent testimony such as the existence of Baghdad or the fact that Julius 
Cesar was assassinated. What will be contested here, however, is the arguments made by the 
usulis to demonstrate that the certainty of usul belongs to this genre of certain knowledge 
aforementioned. The upshot of the findings regarding certainty is that the usulis failed to 
 
12 For an introduction to the concept of knowledge see: Jennifer C Nagel, Knowledge : A Very Short Introduction 
(Oxford University Press 2014).. 
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demonstrate that the certainty of the Sharia sources is exactly the same as those of the 
existence of Makkah or Muhammad. 
 
Method of research: 
The research conducted for this study is entirely literature-based. And although this is not a 
comparative study of law, some of the discussion will contain comparisons between Islamic law 
and other systems of law. Arguments from natural law will be used in Chapter One to draw 
comparisons with Sharia on how to find ultimate sources of law that are external to humans 
rather than made by them. There is a brief comparison in Chapter Two on how constitutions, 
the ultimate sources of secular law, are changeable, unlike sources that are considered divine 
or external to humans. Moreover, H.L.A Hart’s theory of the Rule of Recognition and Rule of 
Change will be briefly used in Chapter Four to parallel with the usulis arguments on the validity 
of hadith. Clearly, this is not to judge their arguments by referring to Hart, but it shows that, 
although the logical process is quite similar, the usulis, for reasons discussed later, did not 
follow it through to the expected conclusions. With regards to certainty, the concept of legal 
certainty which is sought for stability and predictability is discussed in Chapter Two and 
compared to the concept of epistemic certainty sought by the usulis for Sharia sources. 
Although the two concepts are different in some respects, they, nonetheless, share the 
characteristic of fixity which merits the comparison between the two legal theories. However, 
and since this study is focused on epistemic certainty (with discussion extending to legal 
certainty as the context requires), the subject of adaptability of the law will not be discussed in 
a comparative manner.  
 
Critical approach: 
This is not a study on intellectual history. The objective here is to critically analyse the 
arguments presented by the usulis to demonstrate the certainty of usul. The approach 
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preferred by some writers13 where the premises advanced by the usulis are readily accepted as 
true is understandable in a study of intellectual history. This has the merit of avoiding what 
might be seen as a presumptuous judgement of people’s beliefs or cultural preferences. 
Nonetheless, and being a matter of choice, this argument does not preclude the option of 
conducting a thorough critical analysis of subjects of religious and cultural substance. 
Furthermore, the critique presented in this study will not aim at issues of faith or culture, since 
the usulis themselves deliberately avoided making their arguments on such basis, and tried to 
demonstrate their ideas with evidence from history, logic, and reason. Therefore, it is 
academically legitimate to scrutinize these arguments upon the same bases. George F. Hourani 
defended his critical approach to consensus arguing that “it needs no apology”; “[i]t seems to 
me” he adds “the only way to contribute to a further understanding of Islam, by Muslims and 
non-Muslims alike. A historical account alone will not do this, for however much it may clarify 
what Muslims in the past have actually thought, and why, it will leave us with no estimate of 
the Islamic validity of all this thought”.14  
Although Hourani did not question, in his study of consensus, the authenticity of Quran, his 
rationale applies to it nonetheless. And although this study does not accept the arguments 
made by the usulis to demonstrate the absolute certainty of the Quranic text, it is, nonetheless, 
a fact that the Quran is highly authentic in its text (few minor changes might have taken place, 
see the section on qiraʾātin Chapter Three) and the substance of its message is intact. Still, and 
as Quran is the sole proof purported by the usulis for the possibility to attain absolute certainty, 
it was important for this research to demonstrate by careful and detailed historical and logical 
analysis that this claim was unfounded. The vitality of this finding justifies, in my view, the 
lengthy analysis of the subject in Chapter Three. If the evidence provided for the certainty of 
the Quran are shown to be insufficient, it becomes much more difficult for the usulis and jurists 
 
13 Hallaq and Zysow are examples. 




to argue for the certainty or unchangeability of law. The target here is the concept of certainty 






Chapter One will provide an introduction to the concept of Sharia. Sharia, it will be argued, has 
a dual dimension: a relation to the mundane and another to the divine. Discussion of the 
former will be on how Sharia is defined in relation to jurisprudence, fiqh, and law (qanun). It 
traces the development of the concept of Sharia along the lines of social norms and state law 
which, when we add the religious dimension, makes of Sharia in the minds of Muslims a grand 
concept in religion that has no clear definition or boundaries. The second part introduces the 
epistemological problem manifested in the quest of Muslim jurists to divinize Sharia by 
divinizing its sources or arguing for a divinity from nature. 
Chapter Two introduces the concept of certainty as it is presented in the major works of usul al-
fiqh. Here the analysis targets the justification of the quest for certainty by the usulis and briefly 
compares that with the quest for legal certainty in Western legal theory. The chapter also 
discusses how the usulis attempted to define certainty (yaqīn or qat ͑) in a manner that would 
substantiate the divinity of the products of usul al-fiqh.  
Chapter Three is dedicated to studying the certainty in the Quran. The usulis pronounce a 
certain Quranic rule (ḥukm) if the text is authentic and the meaning is hermetic. Authenticity is 
based on the historical process of the collection of the written manuscripts of Quran which 
insured the perfect transmission of a written version of Quran. In addition to this, an oral 
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version was also transmitted through generations of Muslim readers and reciters via a method 
of concurrent testimony called tawatur. Both methods of transmission will be critically analysed 
in addition to the arguments of achieving certain understanding of the Quran, which includes 
issues of language, semantics and context. This completes the process of finding God’s will; 
legislation, thence, becomes possible where the law produced by this methodology will be a 
certainly divine, hence, unchangeable law. The chapter will conclude by studying how this 
Quranic law has affected the law of finance particularly, the issue of riba.  
Chapter Four looks at how Sunna and Ijmaʿ are fitted in the certainty framework of usul. The 
usulis acknowledge the probable nature of hadith authenticity, but they argue that its validity is 
nonetheless certain. They argue that we know with certainty that the Prophet and his 
companions accepted solitary reports, which justifies its place as a source of law. They failed to 
show, however, why this acceptance by the Prophet and companions justifies a universal 
validity for solitary reports with the only qualification being the trustworthiness of the reporter. 
Ijmaʿ is considered a source of certainty in usul in spite of the fact that the usulis could not 
agree on any aspect of it. It remains entirely unidentifiable in terms of definition, scope, or 
validity, yet the overwhelming majority accept that Ijmaʿ – as a concept – yields certainty. 
Moreover, the arguments for Ijmaʿ suffer from issues of circularity which will be illustrated. 
Similarly, the chapter will conclude with a discussion of how the Sunna and Ijmaʿ have affected 
the fiqh of finance.  
Chapter Five will survey some of the attempts by modern Muslim thinkers to reform or renew 
usul al-fiqh. The works of Qaradawi, Turabi, Ibn Ashur, Shaḥrūr, and Fazlur Rahman will be 
critically analysed to examine whether their contributions can provide a significant change in 
usul or Sharia in general. The discussion of their works will include an analysis of their stances 
regarding Islamic finance in light of their theoretical propositions. A discussion on the false 
dichotomy of changeable and unchangeable in Sharia will look at how even modern thinkers 




Finally, a conclusion will summarize the findings of this thesis and presents recommendations 
for further research and intellectual or social endeavours which can contribute to the 





















The Concept of Sharia 
 
 
In order to understand how Sharia affects the legal order in the Muslim world or any aspect of 
the Muslims' lives for that matter, it seems only apt to start with the simple question: what is 
Sharia? It is perhaps odd that the concept of Sharia is not as clear as it may seem first hand, 
considering the centrality of Sharia in Islam in general. It will be a misleading simplification to 
define Sharia as Islamic law, as it will be equally misleading to assign any explicit definition to it 
for the simple fact that there is none. The semantic obscurity of the term reflects, perhaps, one 
of the main characteristics of Sharia itself, whichever way it is conceived (Islamic law, Islamic 
way of life or Islam proper), that is, its richness with diversity. There is hardly an issue in Sharia 
where one can find total agreement in spite of its portrayal as a system based on certitude. 
Important to remember here, is the fact that multiplicity of opinions in Sharia is not a purposive 
feature where jurists try intentionally to differ; it is, rather, a natural outcome of the nature of 
human ideas and opinions where variety is highly expected. And while it is true in many 
respects, that plurality of opinions in Sharia provided a much-needed flexibility and margins for 
mutation, it is difficult to object to the fact that having constant variety and multiplicity of 
opinions where the mechanisms of preference are, themselves, a matter of disagreement; 
indeterminacy and obscurity are frequently an expected outcome. And indeterminacy creates a 
disturbing tension with the notion of certainty in Sharia, something evident in the concept of 
Sharia itself. 
It is not a mere academic definition that is at stake here. It is one thing to say that there is no 
one definition of 'law', for most people would have a reasonable idea of what is meant by 'law'; 
it is quite another when the meaning of a word can range between 'way of life', 'moral code', 
'law proper', 'state constitution', 'religion proper' and so on. The implications of the potential 
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indeterminacy in the latter case are far greater than they could be in the former. Take, for 
example,15 to illustrate the conceptual obscurity of Sharia, the case of a man who divorces his 
wife by saying the word 'taliq',16 presumably, by mistake. The judge (qaḍi) would rule that the 
divorce is binding because he has to rule according to the facts, whereas a jurist (mufti) would 
rule that the divorce is not binding because he takes into account the intention of the husband 
who claims he said the word by mistake. Both rulings are based on Sharia; one, however, is 
based on Sharia as a law that is concerned with regulating the community; the other is based 
on Sharia as a set of religious rulings that regulate the individual's adherence to Islam. It is not 
clear what the fate of this family would be and on what bases. But this example shows that the 
implications of the conceptual obscurity of Sharia are not contained in the philosophical 
abstract, but they penetrate into the everyday lives of people. It naturally follows that the 
implications of considering Sharia to be law or not law at all, are far greater.  
Yet, while understanding Sharia’s connection to the people, which can be manifested as law or 
as a political constitution among other things, is important to understanding the concept of 
Sharia, it is equally important to understand the connection of Sharia with God; in other words, 
understand the divinity of Sharia. The ultimate distinguishing feature of Sharia is the 
unshakable belief of its followers in its divinity. However, and as it is always the case with 
Sharia, the nature, degree and sources of this divinity are matters of much disagreement. Yet, 
the view is perhaps unanimous that Sharia provides a bridge between the Divine and the 
mundane; it is what Muslims turn to in order to learn what Allah wants from them, but the 
unanimity is lost once Muslims get to the details of the nature of this learning and how it should 
take place. The implications of the obscurity of Sharia's divine nature are not less than those of 
Sharia's relation to the mundane, if not greater. This obscurity creates a constant conflict 
 
15 This example is given by Qaradawi. He argues that Sharia rulings are two types, judicial and religious, which are 
not necessarily consistent with each other; they can be legally binding but not religiously binding 'nafith qada'an 
ghair nafith diyanatan'. This, according to Qaradawi, is attributed to the dual nature of Sharia, which is, both, 
religious and civil, this-worldly and other-worldly; a duality celebrated by Qaradawi. See: Yūsuf Qaradạ̄wī, Madkhal 
Li Dirasat Al-Shari’a Al-Islamiyyah (Mu’assasat al-Risalah 1993) 93. 
16 A word that imposes severance of marriage. Marriage is irrevocably severed if the word is repeated three times 
but according to conditions. 
26 
 
between the substantive doctrine of Sharia and the ever-changing realities of life, particularly 
evident in, but by no means limited to, the case of riba (usury).17 
This chapter is concerned with the problematization of the concept of Sharia, a subject not 
sufficiently studied in the literature. Much of the pre-modern writings were on jurisprudence 
(fiqh) and had little concern with the complexities of the concept of Sharia. In fact, the word 
‘Sharia’ was scarcely used in the titles of jurisprudential books in the time of the formation of 
the main fiqh schools of Islam. It can be argued that the introduction of the modern state was a 
major factor in obscuring the concept of Sharia. It was Wael Hallaq who argued that the "most 
pervasive problem in the legal history of the modern Muslim world has … been the introduction 
of the nation-state and its encounter with the Sharia".18 The nation-state brought with it to the 
Muslim world concepts that were ostensibly alien to it, such as state constitution and state 
positive law among other state institutions and culture. To de-alienate these institutions, 
Muslims sought to ‘Islamize’ them by making them Sharia-compliant. This expanded the 
influence of what used to be a socio-religious set of rules, to the sphere of politics, adding to 
the confusion about the concept. Thus, this chapter will show the problem of the concept of 
Sharia by looking, on the one hand, at the connection of Sharia with the mundane; that is, its 
different definitions and its role as law. On the other hand, the chapter will look at the 
perceived connection of Sharia to God, that is, where and how Sharia gets its divine authority. 
These two dimensions of Sharia manifest in the context of certainty as a probable, changeable, 
mundane part of Sharia (fiqh); and a certain, unchangeable, divine part (usul). Examining this 
multi-dimensional aspect of Sharia will help shed light on its complexities and how it has 
affected, and may affect, the development of Islamic law in general, and the principles of 




17 Coulson, Conflicts and Tensions in Islamic Jurisprudence 69. More details will follow below. 




Sharia’s relation to the mundane 
A problem of definition: 
The objective here is not to assign a precise definition to Sharia; it is, rather, to show the wide 
range and variety of Sharia definitions and how this obscured the concept of Sharia among 
Muslims. It is worth pointing out that there seems to be a tradition for providing what is called 
the logical definition (al-ḥadd al-manṭiqi) among the Muslim jurists and scholars when 
addressing an important concept. The renowned philosopher and theologian Ghazali (d. 1111) 
provided a comprehensive methodology (rooted in a Greek tradition) of constructing a logical 
definition for any concept. Ghazali did this in his introduction to his book in jurisprudence al-
Mustasfa19. His objective, it seems, was to provide a concrete logical foundation for the 
‘science’ of usul al-fiqh, and he started by defining usul al-fiqh. He did not, however, define or 
even use the word Sharia. A ‘definition’ according to the aforementioned tradition, called ‘al-
taʿrīf al-jámiʿ al-mániʿ’, is a “statement that includes those attributes belonging to a concept 
and that simultaneously excludes those that do not belong to that concept”.20 This method is 
still used today to define concepts in Sharia.21 But the attempts to define Sharia don’t seem to 
give much weight to providing such a concise definition of the concept itself despite its 
centrality to Islam. The definitions found for Sharia use a more traditional and less ‘scientific’ 
method where a literal meaning for a word is given from some accepted lexicon, then an 
idiomatic meaning is given as the proper definition of the ‘concept’ rather than just the ‘word’. 
Most of the definitions using this method are more or less discursive descriptions of the 
concept rather than a methodical attempt at a definition. 
 
19 Ghazzālī, al-Mustasfạ̄ min ʻilm al-usụ̄l (AM Muhammad Umar ed, Dar al-Kutub al- ͑ilmiyya 2008) 21–39. 
20 Hallaq, Sharīʻa : Theory, Practice, Transformations 81. 
21  A familiar phrasing for defining a concept based on this tradition is similar to: ‘by saying so and so, we exclude 
so and so’ (wa yakhruju bi qawlina…), see for example: Muḥammad Sạ̄liḥ ʻUthaymīn, al-Usụl̄ min ʻilm al-usụ̄l 
(Muʼassasat al-Risālah 2001) 8. 
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Furthermore, and when trying to understand Islamic terminology, there is, seemingly, a circular 
relationship between Arabic language and the Quran. For one looks for the meaning of a 
Quranic word in the lexicon; but the lexicons, when explaining a word – including Quranic 
words – use the Quran to give context to the word. This method, of course, is not without its 
problems, for there is a tacit presumption about the Quranic context which is not always 
justified. Take for example the meaning given by the famous Arabic lexicographer Ibn Manẓūr 
to the word ‘Sharia’. The root of the word is ‘shara ͑’ which means ‘reaching for the water’ and 
the derivative word ‘Sharia’ means ‘pathway to the water’22. He then explains Sharia (and the 
other derivative shir ͑a) as an Islamic idiom quoting the Quran: “And now have We set thee (O 
Muhammad) on a clear road of (Our) commandment; so follow it, and follow not the whims of 
those who know not”,23 and “For each We have appointed a divine law and a traced-out way”24. 
He explains ‘Sharia, shir a͑’ to be “what Allah has commanded like fasting, prayer, giving alms, 
etc.”, and shir a͑ as the religion, the road, the path, and so on. 25 
Going from ‘pathway to the water’ to ‘Allah’s commands’ is not a straightforward step. Ibn 
Manẓūr clearly had to make a semantic leap here being influenced by a cultural understanding 
of what ‘Sharia’ is, and then feeding this back into his lexicon to give a contextual meaning of 
Sharia using the Quran. It would seem to the reader that the authority of this meaning is 
coming from the Quran, giving it substance and power, while the fact is, the meaning was 
imposed on the Quran from a culturally constructed idiom.26 The fact that the Quran and Islam 
have greatly influenced the Arabic culture and language is evident, and the fact that the Arabic 
lexicon contains many religiously charged terms is acknowledged by the usulis. The problem is, 
if the Quran is made to be the source of meaning to words, these Quranic meanings will then 
bestow upon the carrier-terms a sense of sacredness which will be reflected in law. This is 
 
22 Muḥammad ibn Mukarram Ibn Manzụ̄r, Lisān al-ʻarab (Dār Sạ̄dir) 421. 
23 Quran 45:18, my italics refer to translation of Sharia 
24 Quran 5:48, my italics refer to translation of shir ͑a 
25 ibid. 
26 Notice that the Quranic English translation used the words ‘divine law’ in place of ‘shir ͑a’ which should literary 
mean ‘the way’ or ‘the road’, instead, the translation opted for the idiomatic meaning, influenced, like Ibn Manẓur, 
or possibly because of him, by the social use of the word, in this case, law. For a useful essay about the cultural 




encountered in the case of riba. The literal meaning of riba is ‘increase’ or ‘extra’, according to 
Ibn Manẓūr, but ‘increase’ will not suffice in interpreting the word ‘riba’ in Quran, for this, Ibn 
Manẓūr uses the juristic definition of riba ‘every loan that entails gain’ citing a known jurist. For 
the lay inquirer, Ibn Manẓūr will seem to have got the meaning of riba from the Quran 
overlooking, in the process, the underlying juristic substance that shaped the meaning of riba. 
This reverence for religious terminology persists in the modern day. The modern lexicon, al-
Muʿjam al-Wasīt, gives the meaning of riba as ‘increase’ but adds: “in economics it is a loan 
which is paid back in excess upon certain conditions”.27 It is possible to consider, in this light, 
the mutation of the word ‘riba’ after the invention of banks where it was assigned to banks’ 
interest. Such mutations of religious terms, however, are rigid, when compared to ordinary 
words in language, for their Quranic weight. Terms such as ‘ṣalah’, ‘Sharia’, and ‘riba’ can 
hardly be used in their literal meanings without causing confusion. But people who assign a 
certain meaning to riba give it a religious authority because riba is mentioned in the Quran.28 
One of the earliest definitions or explanations of Sharia in an Islamic context can be found in 
the exegesis of al-Tabari (d. 301 AH). Al-Tabari gives a number of meanings to the word ‘Sharia’ 
in the aforementioned verse: clear way, method, approach, Allah’s ordinances and prohibitions, 
religion, etc.29 These meanings are more or less echoed by most pre-modern scholars.30 It is 
clear that the indeterminacy about what Sharia actually means was present from early days, for 
it could easily be synonymous to religion itself, hence encompassing any other possible 
religious meaning. But the significance of this indeterminacy was not acute since the term 
‘Sharia’ was not as central or in excessive use as it became in the modern time. Evidence for 
this, is the notable fact that the term ‘Sharia’ appeared only once in the whole corpus of hadith 
(traditions of the Prophet Mohammad).31 The paucity of usage and connotation of Sharia, 
 
27 Majma’ al-lugha Al-Arabiyya, ‘Al-Muʿjam Al-Wasīt’ vol 1 326. 
28 More on this later. 
29 Muḥammad ibn Jarīr Tạbarī, Jāmiʻ al-bayān ʻan taʼwīl āya al-Qurʼān : Tafsīr al-Tạbarī (Aḥmad ʻAbd al-Rāziq Bakrī, 
Muḥammad ʻĀdil Muḥammad and ʻAbd al-Hạmīd ʻAbd al-Munʻim Madkūr eds, Dār al-Salām 2007) 7379.  
30  See: Ismāʻīl ibn ʻUmar Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr al-Qurʼān al-ʻazịm̄ (Dār al-Andalus lil-Tịbāʻah wa-al-Nashr 1987). Fakhr al-
Dīn Muḥammad ibn Umar Rāzī, Tafsīr al-Fakhr al-Rāzī : al-mushahhar bi-al-Tafsīr al-kabīr wa-Mafātīh ̣al-ghayb 
(Dār al-Fikr). Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʻ li-aḥkām al-Qurʼān (Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣrīyah). Muḥammad 
ibn ʻAlī Shawkānī, Fatḥ al-Qadīr : al-jāmiʻ bayna fannay al-riwāyah wa-al-dirāyah min ʻilm al-tafsīr ( ’Alam al-
Kutub). . 
31 See: N and Calder and MB Hooker, ‘Sh̲̲arīʿa’. 
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according to the Encyclopaedia of Islam, makes the Quran and Sunna unlikely sources for 
them.32 
By comparing the pre-modern era with the modern, the influence of modernity, namely the 
state, on the concept of Sharia is evident. Many of the modern definitions, or simply, 
understandings, for some of them are not claimed to be proper definitions, are vibrant with 
political and cultural charge. Sharia has become, according to Hallaq, “a marker of modern 
identity, engulfed by modern notions of culture and politics”.33 As an example of this, the 
Iranian Shiʿi scholar Muhammad Husain al-Tabatiba’i explains Sharia in the aforementioned 
verse in his exegesis, al-Mīzan, as ‘al-Sharia al-islamiyyah’ (Islamic Sharia) which Allah put his 
messenger Mohammad on as a special way of the divine religion, one that is different from 
what Allah gave the Jews.34 Notice here the use of the suffix ‘islamiyya’ which is a modern 
addition (rarely used in pre-modern literature) that seems to emphasize Islamic identity. Such 
emphasis was less needed when Islamic language and culture were more dominant. Apart from 
this observation, most exegeses followed, more or less, the same tradition of the pre-modern 
ones; that is, identifying Sharia as the ‘Islamic way’35. A definition that makes Sharia, more or 
less, synonymous to religion.36 
This synonymy between religion and Sharia may seem innocuous, but the political charge 
becomes evident and influential when Sharia is associated with the call for ‘implementation’. If 
Sharia is the same as religion, the call to implement religion – in this case Islam – among 
Muslims is an obscure demand. It becomes much clearer if Sharia implementation is introduced 
to simply mean the implementation of Islamic fiqh as law, or some specific rules as state 
constitution; but this notion of Sharia as a holistic concept seems obscure when considering 
how it is used in the modern time. And while it is understandable and expected that the cultural 
 
32 ibid. 
33 Hallaq, Sharīʻa : Theory, Practice, Transformations 550. 
34 Muḥammad Ḥusayn Tạbātạbāʼī, Tafsīr al-Mīzān (Nāsịr Makārim Shīrāzī ed, Bunyād-i ʻIlmī va Fikrī-i ʻAllāmah 
Tạbātạbāʼī : Markaz-i Nashr-i Farhangī-i Rajāʼ va Muʼassasah-i Intishārāt-i Amīr Kabīr) vol 18. 166 
35 See: Sayyid Qutḅ, Fī zịlāl al-Qurʼān, vol 7.136; Muḥammad al-Tạ̄hir Ibn ʻĀshūr, al-Tafsīr al-tahṛīr wa-al-tanwīr al-
maʻrūf bi-tafsīr Ibn ʻĀshūr (Muʼassasat al-Tārīkh) 365.,  




and linguistic heritage will have influenced the formation of the concept of Sharia, it is also 
quite possible that the politico-religious discourse has shaped the concept to some degree.  
 Take for example the word ‘haram’ (prohibited) in the Quranic vocabulary. Because the 
connotation of the word is quite lucid, one can hardly find any author who attempts to argue 
for the permissibility of anything that is said to be haram in the Quran, like eating pork or taking 
riba. However, when the Quran used the word ‘ijtanibuh’ with regards to alcohol, some writers, 
like Mohammad Shaḥrūr, argued that alcohol was not categorically prohibited in the Quran 
because the word ‘ijtanibuh’ literally means ‘avoid’ which carries less prohibitive weight.37 It is 
not surprising then that Shaḥrūr describes ‘al-Sharia al-Islamiyya’ expression as “essentially 
wrong and illusory”.38 
There seem to be common approaches to defining Sharia or explaining what it means among 
modern writers. One approach is defining/explaining by negation; that is, identifying what 
Sharia does NOT mean. This is usually coupled with a distinction approach where Sharia is 
distinguished from other concepts like fiqh or tashrīʿ (legislation). For example, Muhammad 
Saʿīd al-ʿashmawi, an Egyptian lawyer and Judge who is known for his fierce opposition to 
political Islam, rejects that Sharia in its linguistic or Quranic meaning refers to legislation or to 
law.39 He objects to the use of the word ‘Sharia’ to mean all the rulings in Islam whether they 
appeared in the Quran, Sunna, Ijmaʿ  (consensus), or in the exegeses; a process, he argues, 
similar to what happened in Judaism.40 Similarly, Hassan Turabi, a Sudanese political Islamist 
and thinker who wrote on the subject of Islamic jurisprudence, argues that Sharia is not the 
same as tashrīʿ (legislation), for tashrīʿ is the human activation of divine Sharia which does not 
provide detailed rulings.41 Similar arguments are given by Kamali who distinguishes, hesitantly, 
between Sharia and fiqh. He argues “Fiqh is legal science and can be used synonymously with 
Sharia, but they are different in that Sharia is closely identified with divine revelation, fiqh is 
 
37 Muḥammad Shahṛūr, al-Kitāb wa-al-Qurʼān : qirāʼah muʻāsịrah (Jaʻafar Dakk al-Bāb ed, al-Ahālī lil-Tịbāʻah wa-al-
Nashr wa-al-Tawzīʻ 1993) 477. 
38 ibid 472. 
39 Muḥammad Saʻīd Ashmāwī, Usul Al-Sharia (Dar al-Kitab al-Masri and Dar al-Kitab al-Libnani 1979) 31. 
40 ibid 31–34. 




developed by the jurists. The path of Sharia is laid down by God and His messenger; the edifice 
of fiqh is erected by human endeavour”.42 The same line of argument was taken by Burhan 
Ghulioun, a Syrian and French academic; who stressed that it is necessary to distinguish 
between Sharia as a religion attributed to Allah, and Sharia as a juristic product attributed to 
the jurist.43 The common idea in the examples above is the assertion to distinguish between the 
divine and the mundane. The naming might differ; where some would consider ‘Sharia’ to be an 
all-encompassing rubric, others may prefer to distinguish between ‘Sharia’ and ‘fiqh’ or ‘tashrīʿ’. 
But the objective is clear; they want to contain what is considered divine, hence immune from 
human interference, in Sharia as much as possible in the abstract and segregate it from the 
mundane Sharia which readily deals with life’s ever-changing details without trespassing on 
God’s domain. But the clear and persistent hurdle to this objective is the question of where to 
draw the line and who can decide on this subtle, yet paramount, distinction? 
 This problem is manifested in the arguments of Qaradawi, who uses the same approach of 
distinguishing between Sharia and fiqh, but to different conclusions. Qaradawi vehemently 
rejects the notion of the dispensability of fiqh arguing that it would lead to the rejection of 
Sharia as a whole. He rejects the distinction between Sharia as divine revelation and fiqh as 
positive law because fiqh is based on divine revelation, and the accepted way to renovate fiqh 
(tajdeed) is by juristic effort (ijtihad) in the light of the hermetic texts (nusūs muḥkama).44 The 
question of what counts as a hermetic text or how ijtihad can use it will be faced once again by 
a multiplicity of different opinions taking the discussion back to where it started; rendering, 
thus, the negation/distinction approach insufficient to give concrete meaning or definition to 
‘Sharia’.  
Another approach to define/explain Sharia is explaining its function. According to Ghulioun, 
Sharia is the constitution that defines the main values and principles for the life of the 
community.45 Kamali expands on Ghulioun’s idea and says that Sharia “regulates legal rights 
and obligations, but also non-legal matters and provides moral guidance for human conduct in 
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general… Sharia provides the individual with a code of reference consisting of moral, legal and 
cultural values that can be reassuring and purposeful”.46 Turabi, on the other hand, was 
focusing on tashrīʿ rather than Sharia. For him, Sharia was a high providence which function was 
to give guidance (hawadi) for people; any legislative process should fall under the rubric of 
tashrīʿ.47 Qaradawi once again was keen on maintaining the strong bond between Sharia and 
fiqh arguing that Sharia’s function, unlike the law, was not only to regulate matters of society 
but to create good individuals, good society and good state. Sharia according to him came to 
regulate ethics, unlike the Roman law that came to regulate customs. Qaradawi was evidently 
unapologetic about his idea of marrying Sharia and fiqh to give Sharia, henceforth, complete 
authority over Muslims lives. Ghulioun and Turabi seem to be conscious of the subtle conflict 
between the divinity of Sharia and the unavoidable human involvement in deducing its rulings, 
so they tried in their descriptions of Sharia’s function to limit its sphere and raise it. But this 
conflict didn’t seem to trouble Qaradawi, and to some extent Kamali, where they acknowledge 
the need for Muslims to be engaged in renovating Sharia to respond to the changing issues; yet 
they seem to maintain divine authority for Sharia at the same time with no clear demarcation 
between the two domains. 
Finally, some writers tried to define/explain Sharia by describing it in some generic terms. Some 
descriptions were somewhat rhetoric in nature, like the description by Ghulioun who explained 
Sharia to be “obedience to Allah”, “brotherly solidarity and cooperation” and “the method from 
which many and different rulings can be taken”48. Similarly, Ashmawi says that Sharia is 
“interaction with life…principles for realistic life”49, “the method of faith and righteousness”50 
and that the Sharia of Mohammad was ‘mercy’ as oppose to Jesus’s ‘love’ and Muses’ ‘truth’.51 
An ontological description was given by Hallaq who argued that “the Sharia defined, in good 
part (and together with Sufism), paradigmatic cultural knowledge. Enmeshed with local 
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customs, moral values and social practices, it was a way of life”.52 The only attempt, among the 
writers discussed above, to provide a definition in the juristic method ‘al-ḥadd’ for Sharia was 
Qaradawi who defined it as “ordinances decreed from Allah that are established by evidence 
from Quran and Sunna and what stems from them of Ijmaʿ and Qiyas”.53 What is meant by ‘al-
ḥadd’ is a definition that meets the criteria set by Ghazali mentioned above; that is, to describe 
the concept by all its unique essentials so that it includes those attributes belonging to it and 
simultaneously excludes those that do not.54 
Clearly, any attempt to define Sharia in this concise manner will be faced with the problem of 
drawing clear lines between the divine and the mundane in Sharia, while maintaining a bit of 
both. This distinction should allow for Sharia to be timeless and its efficiency not bound by 
place or people; a task that is, in spite of Qaradawi’s efforts, logically problematic for 
epistemological reasons.55 Coulson’s definition of Sharia may be in line with this argument; he 
says that Sharia “is a comprehensive scheme of human behaviour which derives from the one 
ultimate authority of the will of Allah. So, the dividing line between law and morality is by no 
means clear". 56 Coulson’s notion of morality and law can be equated, with little reservation, 
with our notion of divine and mundane respectively. If Sharia is to remain active in society, it 
must be so through human agency; this would immediately entail a question of authority: what 
gives a certain person authority to decide what Sharia says? This applies whether the matter in 
question was a minor one of, for example, how to pray, or a methodological matter concerning 
the structure of Sharia and how it should work. The problem of presumption is soluble only by 
denying any claim to divinity for one’s opinion which would ultimately deprive Sharia of its 
divinity as Qaradawi feared.  In this sense, the only way to attain what the majority of Muslims 
now have come to expect from Sharia is to maintain its conceptual obscurity. This is not 
suggesting that this obscurity is necessarily intentional; however, it shows that precision and 
firm definiteness will cost Sharia either its divinity or its efficacy.57 
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Sharia as Islamic law: 
It was mentioned before, that equating Sharia and Islamic law was a misleading simplification. 
Sharia is usually seen to be a wider concept than law in the strict sense. Law according to the 
Oxford dictionary is “the whole system of rules that everyone in a country or society must 
obey”; but Sharia is, almost unanimously, higher than just law because it involves, besides 
regulating one’s relation to society (in the view of many), regulating one’s relation to God. In 
the words of Schacht “Islamic law [Schacht uses it here synonymous to Sharia] is part of a 
system of Islamic duties blended with non-legal elements”;58 ‘system of Islamic duties’ is what 
is now commonly known as Sharia. In order to understand how Sharia as a concept has 
mutated in the imagination of Muslims into Islamic law, it is useful to look at three different but 
related factors. 
The first factor is terminology. It has been mentioned before that Sharia in its literal meaning 
means ‘path to water’ or just ‘the path’; the terms that were in more use in relation to rulings 
and injunctions which were deduced from revealed sources, were fiqh or aḥkam. Therefore, in 
order for Sharia to become Islamic law, it had to go through fiqh first. But fiqh had two 
elements to it; it regulated one’s relationship to society (Mu a͑malat) and to God ( ͑ibadat). Thus, 
the term ‘fiqh’ was reduced to the domain of the latter, while the term ‘Sharia’ took up the 
former. Therefore, the notion of Sharia became assigned to law (in the modern sense); while 
the notion of fiqh became assigned to issues of worship.59 If we use logical syllogism, this 
relation can be shown as follows: 
a. Sharia (at least partly) = fiqh----------premise 1 
b. Fiqh (at least partly) = law ------------premise 2 
c. Sharia = law --------------------------conclusion 
 The problem with the above syllogism lies, naturally, with its premises. Ashmawi contends that 
fiqh which is “mistakenly called Sharia is, in fact, people’s legislation for people”.60  He argues 
that there is a big difference between Sharia, which one can hypothetically accept it to be the 
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decrees in the revealed sources, and fiqh which is the collection of opinions produced by 
Muslim jurists, scholars and lawyers.61 But the problem that Ashmawi doesn’t address 
thoroughly here, is that people who call for the implementation of Sharia as law, like Qaradawi, 
and while initially accepting the distinction between Sharia and fiqh as presented by Ashmawi, 
fuse them together on the grounds that jurists who produce fiqh opinions can only do so by 
reference to the revealed sources, hence, tying the mundane with the divine. Ashmawi rejected 
this approach without clearly explaining how to make the distinction between Sharia and fiqh, 
particularly in the context of law. 
Ashmawi’s arguments also contain an objection to the second premise, the equation between 
fiqh and law. He sees no problem of fiqh, in its Mu ͑amalat part, being a source of law; the 
problem for him is that a static and historic fiqh cannot produce law for all times.62 This view is 
shared by all the authors mentioned above and it is the subject of an ongoing debate on the 
reformation of usul al-fiqh. But with regards to the two terms being synonymous, they are not; 
for fiqh created what became known as Islamic law;63 and while there is no serious objection to 
the principle of associating fiqh and law in the form of whole and part, the objection will arise 
with regards to the details: how can fiqh constantly produce law for the betterment of society? 
Ghulioun opted to hit directly at the conclusion, i.e. the equation of Sharia and law. He 
describes the mutation of the concept of Sharia as going from simply meaning obedience and 
submission to Allah, to mean an Islamic communion (millah), which happened as a result of the 
increasing aspirations of Muslims to form their independent political self. And as a result of the 
emergence of the nation-state, the concept of Sharia was ‘reduced’ to simply mean ‘the law’ 
that is deduced from Islamic values and decrees.64 But the mutation of Sharia is not a 
‘reduction’ as Ghulioun puts it; it is, rather, a change of form and shape, not a change in 
essence (an essence that is still not clear but is ever-present). In other words, Sharia never 
ceased to be regarded as religion, fiqh, or Islamic law; but the perception of Sharia seems to 
 
61 ibid 323. 
62ibid 305–333. 
63 I Goldziher, J and Schacht and J Schacht, ‘Fiḳh’ 886–891. 
64 Ghalyūn 359–360. 
37 
 
focus on a particular aspect of it depending on the circumstances; and under the pressures of 
the modern state, the focus on law is prevalent. However, and as it was discussed above, 
authors who attempt to define or explain what Sharia is, don’t tend to confine it to law, but 
usually object to this confinement. 
The second factor is history. In order for Sharia to go from being conceived as ‘the path’ or 
‘religion’ to being conceived as ‘the law’, it had to go through a long historical process. To 
understand this process, we need to look at the relationship between Sharia and kanun. 
‘Kanun’ is the modern Arabic equivalent to ‘law’.65 According to the Encyclopaedia of Islam, the 
word kanun “was adopted into Arabic presumably with the continuation, after the Muslim 
conquest of Egypt and Syria, of the pre-Islamic tax system”.66 It also, then, acquired the sense of 
state law. Matters that needed to be regulated by the state/ruler like tax, administrative law, 
penal law, etc. were considered to be within the framework of Sharia until Imam Shafiʿi wrote 
his book on the principles of jurisprudence ‘al-Risala’ which narrowed the framework of Sharia 
and the new administrative regulations were considered outside of the Sharia framework; they 
became the province of a new ‘state law’. This created an independent body of law that 
steadily developed under the authority of the ruler; a law that was increasingly taking charge of 
matters of public life that Sharia was thought to be silent on. This development was legitimized 
early on by scholars of Sharia (fuqahāʾ; sing. faqih) such as al-Mawardi (d. 463/1072) in his book 
‘al-Aḥkḥām al-Sulṭanīyya’ (The Ordinances of Government).67 During the time of the Ottoman 
Empire, the struggle between Sharia and state law (now officially called kanun) exacerbated 
and the prevalence of one over the other depended sometimes on the Sultan.68 The 
disputations which arose in Muslim societies entering upon the path of modernization 
concentrated upon the question of the relationship between Sharia and kanun. European laws 
started to find their way into the Ottoman legal system in the form of kawanin (sing. kanun) 
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exacerbating, thus, the tension between Sharia and kanun further.69 The effects of European 
laws was made all the more evident during colonial times where whole or part of English and 
French law where promulgated throughout the Muslim world.70 According to Hallaq, “between 
the early years of the nineteenth century and the second decade of the twentieth, the Sharia – 
which had dominated the legal scene for over a millennium in the central lands of Islam, and for 
centuries in other regions – was largely reduced in scope of application to the area of personal 
status, including child custody, inheritance, gifts and, to some extent, waqf”.71 But the marsh of 
the kanun into the domains of Sharia did not stop; for Turkey abandoned Sharia completely in 
favour of the Swiss civil code in 1923;72 Tunisia introduced Law of Personal Status which 
prohibited polygamy in 195773, notwithstanding its permission in Sharia; and the Muslim Family 
Laws Ordinance was introduced in Pakistan in 1961 which changed Sharia inheritance system;74 
to mention but a few examples. 
It was clear by then, perhaps earlier, that kanun or ‘law’ was a comprehensive regulating 
system that does not share its power with other systems except with tension and conflict; so, in 
order for Sharia to retain its place in Muslim society, it had to merge itself with law so that both 
will become ‘Islamic law’. This, naturally, entailed some compromise. Sharia had to surrender 
its social structure, that is, its bottom-up, society-driven method, and use the top-down, state-
imposed method; what Hallaq calls the “contaminating influence of the state”.75 
The third factor is politics. When the Muslim societies gained their independence, they were on 
a quest to affirm their Islamic identity that was, to them, distorted by colonialism. The biggest 
change brought by the colonial powers to the Muslim world was the nation-state. And while 
some sought to abolish the nation-state all together and return to the Caliphate as an emblem 
of their Islamic identity; the more realistic quest was to Islamize the nation-state. The main 
feature of the modern state which Islam could significantly change was the law; where a long 
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history of conflict between Sharia and law had already taken place and law had prevailed 
particularly under the colonialists and post-colonial secular governments. In other words, 
Islamization of the state could be achieved by gaining back for Sharia what is thought to have 
been lost to law. 
The term ‘Sharia’ was, perhaps still is, the best term to use, owing to its all-encompassing 
connotation, to indicate the Islamicness of anything. It is a safe choice to give an Islamic 
connotation to an alien concept because even if this concept was not well comprehended, the 
danger of misrepresenting it in Islam was small; for when we say we have ‘Sharia’ instead of, 
say law or constitution, it means we have Islam; a sufficient statement to fulfil the quest for 
Islamic identity regardless of the matter in question. 
Take for example the argument Qaradawi makes for the case of ‘Dawlat al-Islam’ (the state of 
Islam). He argues that the Islamic state is a civil state like all other civil states, only distinguished 
by its high reference being Islamic Sharia.76 He stresses his point by arguing that an Islamic state 
is not a theocratic state, it is governed by a civilian who is freely chosen by the people.77 
Ashmawi, on the other hand, raises the question of what is meant by an ‘Islamic government’ 
(in this context it is the same as the state). He argues that this is generally taken to mean a 
government that implements Sharia, which for him means the implementation of a political and 
legal system that developed in history; in short, the legalization of fiqh.78 Ghulioun expands 
slightly on this, but to the same conclusion, arguing that an ‘Islamic state’ could be understood 
in terms of its populous structure, the orientation and political program of its government, or, 
and this is the case in point, its paradigm for power. In this latter case, the main characteristic 
of an Islamic state is the adoption of Sharia, in its classical fiqh sense, as the sole source of civil 
legislation.79 
Thus, the ‘implementation of Sharia’ became an integral part of the political debate in the 
Muslim world. It became the principal agenda of the Islamists and the one thing that sets them 
apart from all others. But the implementation of Sharia as a political program can only be 
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significantly manifested in the form of law, and in particular, the implementation of hudud 
(limits) and the prohibition of riba; both of which are among the most controversial issues in 
Sharia in modern time. Their controversy is perhaps due to their potential impact on the 
modern Muslim society, but it nourished, nevertheless, the debate about Sharia: what it is? 
What is its function? And how should it work? 
 
2 
Sharia’s relation to the Divine 
 
Divinity from the sources, an epistemological problem: 
By virtue of their faith, Muslims are required to believe in ghayb (the unseen). The Quran says, 
“This is the Book, there is no doubt in it, a guidance to the Godwary; who believe in the Unseen, 
and maintain the prayer, and spend out of what We have provided for them”.80 This belief 
includes the belief in God, His angels, His revealed books, and His messengers. For Muslims who 
have not witnessed the Prophet Mohammad, all these will be described as ghayb except for the 
book, the Quran; but one still has to believe that the present Quran is the word of the unseen 
God. Once this faith foundation is established, a Muslim can regard the Quran as the primary 
source for religious guidance; in other words, the knowledge of what a Muslim should do in 
adherence to Islam is obtained primarily from the Quran, and this is where the epistemological 
problem lies. 
According to the principles of epistemology, there are five sources of knowledge: perception, 
introspection, memory, reason, and testimony; all of which are not indisputably infallible, some 
more than others.81 If we consider the divinity of Quran to be based on faith, it can be taken as 
 
80 Quran, v 2:2-3. 




a postulate;82 but the knowledge gained by humans from the Quran does not qualify to the 
same status because it is susceptible to the fallibility of human knowledge. This means that 
there is no logical way in which the divinity of the Quran can be transferred to the human 
understanding of the Quran. There is a serious problem that would result from this argument, 
which may explain why it is not addressed by most Muslim scholars who insist that the Quran 
and Sunna83 are the revealed, thus divine, sources of Sharia. The problem is it would render the 
divinity of Quran, in matters of practice, obsolete. The belief in the divinity of the Quran is 
irrelevant so long as this divinity cannot be manifested in practice. The human knowledge of 
the Quran cannot be purported as divine based simply on the fact that it used a divine source; 
there will always be an unbridgeable gulf between the divine and the mundane for the simple 
fact that the human understanding is inherently error-prone.  
The problem of the divinity of Sharia was recognized, but not resolved, by many authors. Khalid 
Abu El Fadl’s arguments on this can be presented as follows: God is sovereign, but his 
sovereignty can only be exercised through human agents. The instructions for his commands 
are in written form. Agents must ascertain two issues: are the instructions from God? 
(Authenticity). What do the instructions say? (Interpretation).84 He then adds “because religion, 
as doctrine and belief, must rely on human agency for its mundane existence, one runs the risk 
that those human agents will either render it entirely subjectively determined or render it rigid 
and inflexible. In either case, one risks that the Divine will be made subservient to human 
comprehension and human will”.85 Another author, Bernard G. Weiss, says “Although the law is 
of divine provenance, the actual construction of the law is a human activity, and its results 
represent the law of God as humanly understood. Since the law does not descend from heaven 
ready-made, it is the human understanding of the law - the human fiqh - that must be 
normative for society”.86 For Weiss, there is an essentially unbridgeable gap that stretches 
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between human reason and the law of God.87 Hallaq, too, acknowledges the epistemological 
problem of Sharia. He argues that law builds upon theology; that is, it builds upon Quran and 
Sunna which are established theologically.88 But in response to the apparent problem of how 
the gap between theology and reason can be bridged he acknowledge the shortcomings in this 
issue arguing that “knowledge of the law in Islam is what was seen as a happy synthesis 
between human reason and the divine word”.89 
The aim here is to problematize the supposed present link between the divine and the 
mundane, thus, the divinity of Sharia. While aware that this divinity is perceived to be the 
‘crown jewel’ of Sharia, this perception, it must be stressed, and as will be discussed 
throughout this research, is one of its main problems. It is the source of the relentless pursuit of 
certainty in Sharia and, thus, the main cause of what has come to be known as hiyal (ruses) in 
fiqh when certain law conflicts with pressing practicalities. It is the cause of what Coulson called 
the ‘conflict’ between the strict doctrine of Sharia and the realities of life, which, he argues, is 
most evident in the case of riba.90 In short, it is the reason for the lack of reason in many 
aspects of Sharia. Yet, and perhaps because of this high regard among Muslims, the divinity of 
Sharia became a taboo for Muslim writers, traditionalist and modernists/reformists all the 
same. The divinity of Sharia was not a matter of dispute among most scholars and thinkers of 
Islamic jurisprudence; they seem to agree that there is a domain for Sharia which is based 
purely on the divine sources, and thus itself a divine domain. This domain was beyond change, 
it is the equivalent of nature for natural law or the sovereign for positive law, only better for 
this is sanctioned by the will of God. The disagreement, however, was on the nature of this 
domain, what it provides for people (values, general principles, part of the law, etc.), and how 
does it provide this.  
Take for example Qaradawi (and Kamali who makes similar arguments). He argues that Sharia 
can be divided into two parts; one is based on the hermetic verses of the Quran and the Sunna, 
and this is the small part. The second part is based on the opinions of the jurists which are 
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deduced from the revealed sources, and this is the large part. His allusion is that the latter part 
being the bigger one is not divine and can be changed using the correct methods of ijtihad to 
respond to the changing circumstances of people.91 By this argument, he maintains the 
flexibility and viability of Sharia, while at the same time keeping a smaller part (so it would have 
little effect) out of the reach of change, i.e. divine. And although by the token of this argument, 
Sharia is only partly divine, divinity becomes the prominent hallmark of Sharia as a whole. But 
this argument lacks the answer to the simple question: who decides what belongs to each part? 
This is of course without going into the more complex issues of the fallibility of human 
understanding even for the hermetic revelation. Arguments like ‘what is known of religion by 
necessity’ (maʿlūm min al-dīn bi al-ḍarūra) are sometimes used by Qaradawi and others who 
follow the same line of argumentation in response to the question of authority.92 It is a 
reference to what is argued to be ‘undisputed’ religious facts. But one can easily see that these 
are contentious arguments that would regenerate the original question. 
Turabi, likewise, stresses on the distinction between Sharia and tashrīʿ. He describes all the 
human effort in finding law from the revealed sources as belonging to tashrīʿ, thus, keeping 
Sharia out of human meddling, but he gives no detailed account of what Sharia is or how what 
he calls hawadi (guidance) of Sharia can be determined.93 
Many Muslim authors follow the same line of argument in dichotomizing Sharia into 
changeable and unchangeable. They distinguish parts of the revealed sources as hermetic; 
assign them different names and functions, and then raise them beyond human reach. In the 
words of Hallaq who studied the contributions of many of these writers, this idea is “what 
Rahman calls the import of revelation, what Soroush called the essence of the law, and what 
Ashmawi dubbed as God’s pure Sharia”;94 a “familiar thesis that the Sharia is divisible into 
essential and accidental attributes, a typology that is distinctly Aristotelian”.95 
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With the mention of Hallaq to Aristotle, it is apt to say that this ‘typology’ is indeed not 
exclusive to modern thinkers of Islam. The Islamic philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroes, d. 
595/1198) a devout Aristotelian, in his book ‘Faṣl al-Maqal’ argues that Sharia cannot 
contradict what is established by ‘burhan’ (evidence, proof), and that if a contradiction is 
thought to occur, the revealed text can be reinterpreted in accordance to ‘truth’, limited only 
by the rules of metaphoric use of language.96 He argues, and this is the case in point, that this 
margin of different interpretations does not include what he called ‘Mabadiʾ al-Sharia’ 
(principles of Sharia), which he explains to be the things that all possible methods of knowledge 
will lead to, so that the knowledge of the particular matter is possible for everyone; and he 
gives the existence of God, the prophesies, and the Hereafter as examples for this ‘undisputed 
axiomatic’ knowledge.97  
Ibn Rushd is readily mixing theology with Sharia here in his attempt to anchor Sharia on 
theology. In negating any contradiction between Sharia on the one hand, and ḥikma 
(philosophy) and the use of logic on the other, an indication of his conviction that Sharia can be 
logically established, he was relying on a long tradition of Islamic philosophy that tried to prove 
theology by logical inferences.98 Regardless of the contentious axiomatic nature of Ibn Rushd’s 
‘principles of Sharia’, it does not help in the argument for Sharia’s divinity, simply because the 
fact that there are irreconcilably different ideas of what counts as divine, hermetic, or a priori in 
Sharia contradicts the very idea of an axiom.99 The insistence, therefore, on the divinity of 
Sharia in spite of its unsubstantiated arguments, can be understood as being driven by a need 
for absolutism. According to Hallaq “certainty was a juristic desideratum, at least insofar as the 
legal sources…were concerned”.100  
 
 
96 Averroes, Fasḷ al-maqāl fī mā bayna al-hịkmah wa-al-sharīʻah min al-ittisạ̄l (ʻAbd al-Karīm al-Marrāq ed, al-
Manshūrāt lil-Intāj wa-al-Tawzīʻ 2011) 97. 
97 ibid 108. 
98 Most notable is the philosophical novel ‘ḥay Ibn Yagẓan’, by Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Ibn Tufayl.  
99 In addition to the fact that an axiom will not be exclusive to Muslims. 
100 Hallaq, Sharīʻa : Theory, Practice, Transformations 81. 
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Divinity from nature: 
This need for absolutism was not unique for Islamic law, it was a need for law in general. This 
was illustrated by A. P. D’Entreves who, in making his case for natural law; argues that the most 
constant feature of Natural Law was “The assertion of the possibility of testing the validity of all 
laws by referring them to an ultimate measure, to an ideal law which can be known and 
appraised with an even greater measure of certainty than all existing legislation. Natural law is 
the outcome of man's quest for an absolute standard of justice”.101 Any legal system, according 
to this argument, needs an ultimate source to prevent an ad infinitum ascendance in search for 
a higher reference; and as Sharia is a religious law, it is endowed by THE ultimate reference, the 
Book of God. 
The quest for an ultimate source of law is part of a continuing debate in the philosophy of law 
which is beyond the scope of this research; but a distinction must be made in this regard 
between say, a natural law, and a divine law, namely Sharia. Natural law would depend on 
people’s understanding of nature or ethics, therefore, the understanding of law can change 
when the understanding of its source changes, in spite of its perceived absolute nature. People 
have been and perhaps will always be in quest of some ultimate measure of right and wrong, 
and law is arguably influenced by this idea.102 In this sense, and since people’s ideas about right 
and wrong can change in time, the law that is influenced by them, will accordingly change; and 
this phenomenon happens regardless of the bewilderment it might cause for the people. In the 
words of D’Entreves “history had indeed been the stumbling block of all natural law theories. 
Lawyers, philosophers and theologians had tried in vain to account for the apparent 
indifference of historical development to any pattern of right or wrong”.103 But the problem of 
a divine law like Sharia is that it will stand defiant in the face of any historical change; divinity is 
simply immunity from change. This is why modern Muslims are perplexed about Quranic verses 
that, apparently, permit slavery or command the amputation of the hand of a thief. This seems 
 
101 AP D’Entrèves, Natural Law : An Introduction to Legal Philosophy (Hutchinson 1951) 95. 
102 “The content of law is a moral one. Law is not only a measure of action. It is a pronouncement on its value”, ibid 
80. 
103 ibid 74. 
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like a self-imposed predicament; an ultimate source of law need not be divine, and a divine text 
need not be an ultimate source of law. Nor could a divine text be the source of a divine law for 
divinity is non-transferable through a human agent.  
It must be admitted, however, that the divinity of Sharia is not perceived in the naïve sense of a 
jurist looking in the Quran and simply producing a legal opinion claiming it to be the will of 
Allah. One way in which Sharia is said to be divine is through a sophisticated methodology by 
which rulings can be deduced from the revealed sources without, the presumption is, being 
influenced by the jurist’s caprice. In other words, the system of deducing rulings from the divine 
texts is sufficiently sophisticated to rule out any chance of human fallibility having any effect on 
the understanding of the true divine will.104  
The divinity of Sharia, moreover, does not rely solely on the mere technical aspects of a highly 
complicated methodology of textual hermeneutics; it also has hints of natural law concepts that 
are supposedly immune from the fallibilities of human-designed systems. Relying solely on the 
divine text will not suffice to produce a comprehensive body of law that is viable for all times 
and places, and while filling the lacunae has been dependent on the methodology of Islamic 
jurisprudence, the sense of the rulings produced being of diluted divinity seems to be present. 
The evidence for this is the use of natural law concepts that assume for the human/jurist a 
divine endowment which enables him to distinguish right from wrong without reference to 
revealed sources. This will reinforce the notion of divinity for Sharia even when some of its 
rulings are made with hardly any reference to the texts. 
An example of such natural law concepts can be found in the Mu t͑azila’s105 idea of nature. The 
Mu t͑azila say that God cannot do evil and thus nature is good. God has endowed humans with 
the ability to distinguish between ḥusn and qubḥ (good and evil) using only human reason. This 
provides people with an authoritative source of law when there appears to be a lacuna in the 
law and the texts seem to be silent on the matter in question. People can readily embark on a 
 
104 Detailed discussion of the sources of Sharia will follow in later chapters. 
105 An Islamic School of theology. 
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rational contemplation of what is good and what is evil and produce law on this ground with 
the conviction that it will reflect the will of God.106 
Another example can be found in the Ash ͑arite school of theology. According to the Ash ͑arites, 
God is omnipotent, thus, cannot be constrained by any external notion of good or evil; what 
God commands is good and what He forbids is evil.107 In this sense, people don’t have the 
capacity to rationally deduce God’s will from nature, and the only source for normative 
judgments is revelation.108 Yet, some notion of an innate human capacity to find the path of 
God can be found in this school of thought, particularly, the concept of fiṭra (natural 
disposition).109 
The word fiṭra appeared in the Quran in the verse “So direct your face toward the religion, 
inclining to truth. [Adhere to] the fiṭrah of Allah upon which He has created [all] people. No 
change should there be in the creation of Allah. That is the correct religion, but most of the 
people do not know”.110 The interpretations of fiṭra have varied, but a narrower meaning can be 
seen when taken in the context of the hadith of the Prophet who says: “every child is born 
according to the fiṭra. Only his parents make him a Jew, a Christian, or a Zoroastrian”.111 Using 
the context of this hadith to understand the meaning of fiṭra in the verse, some scholars put 
fiṭra to be a natural disposition that, if well preserved, will guide the person to the truth which 
is Islam.112 This is similar to the concept of humans having the capacity to rationally distinguish 
between good and evil that is found in natural law. This particular conception of fiṭra was more 
popular among modern Islamic thinkers and reformers113 for it provides ample bases for the 
use of reason in Sharia, when the need for reason is much greater than ever before in Islam. 
Under the pressures of modernity and the recurring need to find legal opinions of Sharia 
(fatwa) about different matters that face Muslim communities, it was increasingly clear that the 
 
106 For a detailed analysis of this subject see: Anver M Emon, Islamic Natural Law Theories (Oxford University Press 
2010) 25–31. 
107 Frank Griffel, ‘Harmony Of Natural Law and Sharia’ in Abbas Amanat and Frank Griffel (eds), Shari’a : Islamic law 
in the contemporary context (Stanford University Press 2007) 44. See also Emon 31–37. 
108 Griffel 45. 
109 ibid 38–61. 
110 Quran 30:30 
111 ibid 44. 
112 Qurṭubī.30:30 
113 Scholars like Mohammad Abdu, Saiyyd Qutb, and al-Mawdudi. See Griffel 47–61. 
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revealed text does not cover everything. Muslim jurists found that fatwas were relying 
increasingly more on reason and less on revelation, and although there was always effort to link 
any fatwa to revelation, this link was becoming weaker as issues became more complex and 
detached from traditional fiqh of pre-modern Islam. 
In light of this, it can be understood that some divine sanction was needed for the use of reason 
in order to maintain Sharia’s divinity. This is not a departure from the earlier argument that 
most modern jurists see Sharia as composed of two parts, and that the larger part was the 
domain for ijtihad and change. But the jurists who make these distinctions or devise a number 
of general principles for Sharia claiming them to be axioms upon which there shall be no 
disagreement, need some form of authority to make these grand assumptions. This is not to say 
that the jurist will justify his arguments about Sharia by his endowment with a pure fiṭra; it is to 
say, however, that the principle of making essential propositions about Sharia, which seem to 
be based on logic and intuition more than on revelation, is possible because of the ability of 
human reason to distinguish between right and wrong and to lead humans to Allah.  
This connection between reason and divinity can be found in the writings of the Egyptian 
scholar and theologian, Mohammad Abdu (d. 1905). Abdu argues that it is possible for 
intelligent people to establish the ‘principles of justice’ by the use of reason; however, the 
community will not respond to their arguments just because they are sound.114 Abdu argues 
that men are one in “the need to submit to a higher power”;115 this seemed like a reference to 
the need for divinity. In other words, since people will not submit to judgments of reason made 
by fellow, albeit more juristically versed, people, then there is a need for people with a divine 
endowment, i.e. Prophets, for whom people will readily respond due to a natural tendency 
towards the divine. According to Griffel, “the tendency of every community not to submit to 
rules made by itself makes Sharia a necessity”.116 This reading of Abdu, although disputed by 
some,117 can be sustained by Abdu’s idea on prophecy where he argues that Prophets who 
come with divine signs “invest the mind like a citadel that finds no option but to surrender…To 
 
114 Muḥammad ʻAbduh, The Theology of Unity = Risālat Al-Tauhịd̄ (Kenneth Cragg ed, Islamic Book Trust 2004) 89–
90. 
115 ibid 91. 
116 Griffel 49. 
117 Malcom Kerr. See endnote 54 in ibid 201. 
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submit to them is more like a necessity than a studious option of will”.118 This seems to suggest 
that at least one of the reasons for sending Prophets, was to give divine authority to what could 
have, otherwise, been known by mere reason. It then follows logically that when there are no 
Prophets present, the use of reason can suffice in distinguishing between right and wrong, 




In light of the above discussion, one can understand the eagerness of Muslim scholars – and 
even public - throughout the history of Islam for the attribution of divinity to Sharia, not only as 
an affirmation of its divine sources but also as part of a collective zeal for a supreme religious 
identity. The distinction, in the sense of supremacy, of Islam to other cultures and religions is an 
essential part of the Muslim conscious; and Sharia is an essential component of this distinction. 
Sharia is not just a legal system or a code of worship and ethics; it is an integral part of Muslims 
sense of identity and culture. And since Sharia is readily compared to legal systems from other 
religions and cultures; and since law was in many ways a measure of civility and progress; a 
divine Sharia would give immediate prominence for the Islamic civilization and way of life. The 
divinity of Sharia is a matter of pride as well as of legal authority, and while this divinity as a 
source of authority can, in theory, be critically analysed and rationally discussed, it remains 
difficult to do this in practice for it is difficult to separate the rational aspect from the emotional 
in the Muslim conscious. This difficulty is further sustained by the obscurity of the concept of 
Sharia in the Muslim conception. Sharia envelopes – in its loose use – everything that is part of 
the ‘Islamic way’; lacking in the process a clear definition. Sharia, moreover, recently became an 
emblem for the umma (Muslim community) where Muslims identify themselves as the ‘umma 
of Sharia’. All this makes it difficult to make major changes in Sharia in modern time regardless 
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of the sensibility of these changes. This sense of certitude and fixity is not only in what is 
considered divine in Sharia for that is by definition beyond change; but it is found even in the 
parts of Sharia where it is possible to practice ijtihad, where this change will cause Sharia to 
lose its distinction. This is possibly the case in Islamic finance; for if its distinguishing features 
are changed in such a way that it becomes like conventional finance, it will lose its Islamic 
identity, that is, it will be just ‘finance’. In this case, and while part of the resistance to change in 
Sharia will be driven by a genuine defence for the values it promulgates, it is important to 
consider that part of it can be driven by prejudice. That is why it is important, when studying 
the impact of Sharia on the livelihood of Muslims, to be acutely aware of the effects the 






















The Concept of Certainty in Usul al-fiqh 
 
The great predicament for Sharia scholars and, in particular, scholars of usul al-fiqh (usulis),  is 
that Sharia is meant to be timeless, viable for eternity, since, in Islam, Muhammad is the last of 
the Prophets of God; “Muhammad is not the father of [any] one of your men, but [he is] the 
Messenger of Allah and last of the Prophets” (Quran 33:40); yet, it is constrained by what is 
believed to be certainly authentic revealed text and a jurisprudence methodology that 
produces law which certainly reflects the will of God from these texts. The law is developed 
through a complex method of hermeneutics of revealed texts – the Quran and Sunna – which 
were transmitted to later generations of the Muslim community with high degrees of 
authenticity via tawatur; a theory of scholarly consensus that is divinely immune from error; 
and a complex system of analogy to expand the law where issues that don’t seem to be 
addressed by the revealed texts or consensus have some commonalities with ones that do.  
The methodology is logically developed to ensure that the will of God is found with the highest 
degree of certainty, however, it is epistemologically oriented so that its focus is essentially on 
authenticity and authority rather than equity. By making sure that the will of God is found with 
certainty, and knowing that God is just, the law will surely be just and equitable. This makes the 
methodology essentially formalistic with little consideration paid to the substance of the law. 
True, the substance of the traditions of the Prophet (hadith) are checked against some 
conditions to be used as a measure of checking authenticity.119 Ibn al-Qaiyym (d. 1350) 
mentions a number of rules by which one can reject a unit hadith (āḥād, where the chain of 
transmission has a single person at each stage, as oppose to concurrent transmission, tawatur), 
for example: inconsistency with common sense; being of language or talk not befitting a 
 
119 Zysow 41. On this Al-Shafi ͑i says that one can tell whether the hadith “is true or false if the transmitter relates 
what cannot possibly be the case, or what is contradicted by information that is better authenticated and is more 
indicative of the truth”. See: Muḥammad ibn Idrīs Shāfiʻī, Al-Imām Muḥammad Ibn Idris Al-Shafi’i’s Al-Risāla Fi Usụl̄ 
Al-Fiqh = Treatise on the Foundations of Islamic Jurisprudence (Majīd Khaddūrī ed, Islamic Texts Society 2008) 252. 
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Prophet; being contradictory to hermetic Quran; and so on.120 This rational filter, however, 
frequently fails to capture even the most absurd of traditions.  
Take for example the hadith narrated in Bukhari (regarded the highest corpus of hadiths in 
terms of authenticity) about a man called Ma ͑iz who came to the Prophet to confess that he 
committed adultery (zina) and wanted to be purified. The penalty he was facing was death by 
stoning if he persisted with his confession. The Prophet was trying to avoid applying this severe 
punishment and kept avoiding Ma i͑z who confessed four times. The Prophet asked him if he 
just kissed or looked and Ma i͑z said no. Eventually the Prophet asked him if he had sexual 
intercourse with her using, according to al-Bukhari, what is considered an obscene word “a-
niktaha?”121 and Ma i͑z said yes. Only then the Prophet ordered that he should be stoned to 
death. Other versions of the hadith narrate a longer conversation where the Prophet thought 
Ma i͑z was mad or drunk and asked him “did that thing of yours enter that thing of hers?” “like a 
kohl stick disappears into the kohl container and the bucket into the well?”122 It is clear that the 
certainty of the authenticity of this hadith which stems from its trusted transmission out-
weighed the absurdity of the vulgar language attributed to the Prophet here. True, there is the 
argument that the Prophet was trying to rule out any possible miscomprehension to Ma ͑iz’s 
confession in order to avoid the penalty, but how far does the absurdity have to go before the 
hadith is rejected as unauthentic despite its ‘reliable’ transmission? It is difficult to take the 
argument that the Prophet was being a careful judge at face value; his ‘kohl’ and ‘bucket’ 
metaphors seemed quite clear. further, it seems that the trust put in the sources and the 
methodology of usul in general is too great to be negated by any apparent absurdity in the 
texts.  
There seem to be no clear bounds to the certainty proclaimed in the usul system. Whatever is 
in the revealed texts, considered a consensus of the community, or deduced by analogy is 
 
120 This was mentioned by the editors of the Arabic version of al-Shafi’s Risala, see notes in: Muḥammad ibn Idrīs 
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certainly authentic or certainly valid, hence, timeless and unchangeable, which brings us to the 
predicament mentioned above. The possibility of a comprehensive system of law that is of 
timeless validity and, at the same time, static or very rigid is difficult to imagine. This is true 
even in modern legal theory; according to Fredrick Coudert “when rules become so fixed and 
rigid that they are difficult or impossible to change, the law is out of touch with prevailing moral 
ideas, which like all other ideas are constantly progressing”.123 Consider the example of the 
punishment by stoning mentioned above. It is difficult to see how any community would find it 
morally acceptable to punish adultery, be it the terrible offence that it is, by stoning the 
perpetrators to death. Some would argue, perhaps rightly so, that the will of God supersedes 
any human sensibilities; but the problem is how to be absolutely sure that this is indeed the will 
of God.  
This predicament can be elucidated further when considering how a law is made primarily on 
the basis of having satisfied the methodology of usul, and then every effort is immediately 
made to suspend its application. Remaining with the example of adultery (zina), the 
punishment of stoning is not mentioned in the Quran since the Quran only talks about flogging 
for adulterers.124 However, the stoning is based on a number of hadiths one of which is 
mentioned above. The hadith is not of the highest standard of authenticity, that is, it is a unit 
hadith, not a mutawatir. The authenticity of the unit hadith as a certain source of law is not a 
matter of agreement among the Muslim usul schools, the majority of which, classify it as 
probable.125 Yet, and in spite of this, the punishment by stoning stands as a valid law in 
mainstream Islam until today. At the same time, every effort is made according to the traditions 
of Sharia to suspend the exercise of the law. Firstly, the act must be witnessed by four upright 
Muslim men (ʿudūl), and secondly, they must testify that they saw at the same time his private 
parts in her private parts like a ‘bucket in the well’. These conditions seem virtually impossible 
to satisfy; yet, it is made further difficult. If someone accuses another of fornication and could 
not prove it, that is, could not get at least three more men to testify to the same effect, he is 
 
123  Frederic R Coudert, ‘Certainty and Justice and Judicial Constitutional Amendment’ 
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then liable to eighty flogs and his testimony is thenceforth invalidated;126 a strong deterrent 
against making false accusations but no less deterrent against making truthful testimonies as 
well. Furthermore, there is a tradition in Sharia called ‘talqīn al-sariq’ (prompting the thief) 
where the judge dictates to the accused what to say to deny his charge. This is found in the 
literature about ḥadd al-sariqa (limit of theft) were the punishment is amputation of the hand; 
the qadi askes the accused ‘did you steal? Say no’.127 This was actually attributed to the Prophet 
where he was brought a man accused of stealing and he asked him: “did you steal? I don’t think 
you stole”. On another occasion, the act was attributed to the caliph Omar when he was 
brought a man accused of stealing; he asked him “did you steal? Say no”, the man said no, and 
he let him go.128 
Why would any community set up a law that seems, even to them, to be disproportionately 
harsh and then make every effort to avoid exercising it? Why not set up a law where the 
punishment is regarded as proportionate so, even as every community prefers prevention to 
cure, they will apply the punishment when necessary? If the law is designed in such a way that 
the punishment is extremely severe but is very unlikely to be applied, it will not serve as a 
deterrent.129 It is true that this attitude reflects a degree of mercifulness, still, one cannot 
escape the sense of contradiction or evasiveness in the system.  
The problem is, of course, not confined to the extreme cases of ḥudūd. It is apparent in more 
subtle, but of wider consequences, issues like finance. The definition and prohibition of riba, 
and the introduction of alternative transactions like Murābaḥa, Mushāraka, and the like, is 
basically using the terminology and concepts of the Arab tradesmen in the seventh century to 
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be applied in the financial industry of the twenty-first century. The reason for this is not 
confidence in the efficiency of seventh-century financial ways and its timeless validity; it is, 
rather, confidence in seventh-century law and its timeless validity. More particularly, it is the 
belief in the authenticity of the revealed texts and the efficiency of the usul methodology in 
finding the divine law. And as with the case of the ḥudūd, we either find little compliance with 
the law combined with little, if any, sanction, or we find the use of legal alternatives that are, in 
practice, only symbolically different from the illegal ones. 130 
 The reason behind this predicament is not ambiguous. Muslim jurists cannot change the law 
because they don’t think they are the ones who made it in the first place. According to Dennis 
Lloyd, “This elementary feeling that the law is in some way rooted in religion, and can appeal to 
a divine or semi-divine sanction for its validity, clearly accounts to a considerable degree for 
that aura of authority which law is able to command”.131 The duty of the jurists is only to apply 
the law and they try to apply it as little as possible in the case of hudud. The famous hadith of 
the Prophet Mohammad says “avert the ḥudūd punishments with doubts” is evidence that 
there is nothing that can be done with regards to changing the law; we can only try to avoid 
exercising it. There are a few questions that stem from this predicament. The first question is: 
how usul methodology is seen to sustain certainty? In other words, what makes the Muslim 
jurists certain that their methods reflect the will of God? This will be discussed in the next 
chapters. The second question is about the concept of certainty in the context of usul al-fiqh. 
The third question is why does the law have to be certain? Why not settle for a probable will of 
God? The first two are about the epistemology of law, while the third is about the justification 
for it. We shall deal with the latter first. 
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Justifying the quest for certainty: 
It is important here to start by problematizing the issue of justifying certainty because most of 
the usulis seem to presuppose the justification and only a few sought to address it.132 Under the 
belief that Sharia covers all aspects of a Muslim’s life, and that every action a person takes is 
either commanded by God, prohibited, or permitted,133 it is understandable that Muslims will 
exert every effort to find the will of God with the highest accuracy; but does this have to be 
absolute certainty? Why not settle for the highest probability possible? The notion here is to 
the unchangeable nature of the usul methodology and its concomitant timelessness. If the usul 
are highly probable then there is proportionately little chance of them, and hence the law made 
from them, being changed; but if they are absolutely certain, then there is no chance of them 
or the law made from them being changed; and the difference between the two cases is not 
trivial. 
It should not be contentious to rule out any mundane justification for the insistence on the 
certainty of the law. It is quite sensible that any legal or regulatory system will benefit, indeed 
need, the flexibility of change in order to perpetuate its validity. Certainty that results in 
stagnation and rigidity is not sought; it can only be an imposition which people have to accept.  
Furthermore, probability is not strange to the Islamic law. In fact, most of the fiqh is recognized 
by most Muslim legal theorists to be based on probable knowledge (ẓann).134 Certainty is 
mostly confined to the sources (usul) for what seems to be an assumption that it can be 
transited to the law it produces or at least give it validity, that is, certainty of the obligation to 
work with what is probable as some usulis argue.135 According to Zysow “for the formalist 
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[jurists who accept probability in law, and they are the majority]…the results of his practice are 
only probable, but their validity is ensured by the fact that the framework within which he 
practices is known with certainty”.136 But the mere establishment of the obligation to accept 
probable law, in other words, validity, does not justify the quest for certainty in the sources. It 
is a logical conclusion when probability in the law is inevitable. It will not be overly presumptive 
to assume that this quest for certainty is driven, at least partly, by the assumption that certain 
sources consolidate probable sources and legal opinions; in other words, certainty is transitive. 
But this only tells us that the acceptance of probable knowledge in the law was concessive and 
the craving for certainty was always present but suppressed by the difficulty of attaining it. It is 
a concrete fact that most fiqh or Islamic law is uncertain; evidence for this, besides the fact that 
most of it is based on unit hadith and analogy which are considered by most schools to be 
probable sources, is that it is rife with conflicting legal opinions that are all deduced from the 
same sources using the same methodology.137 So if the usul system is not successfully transiting 
its certainty to the law, why seek a certain usul system in the first place? In other words, if the 
legal opinions based on certain sources and those based on probable sources are of equal 
validity, what virtue is there, from a legal perspective, in having certain sources?138 For 
example, the Quran says that riba is prohibited but gives no details;139 the unit hadiths give 
details of what transactions and commodities are usurious (rabawi). The law is, thus, based on 
the hadiths since it is just as valid despite being of probable authenticity, unlike the certainly 
authentic Quran. This perhaps implies that the Quranic certainty is made jurisprudentially 
redundant.   
To summarize the problem discussed above it can be put in the following manner: seeking 
certainty to establish Islamic law faces many epistemological hurdles and does not prevent 
probability from the law. At the same time, the claim of certainty renders the law 
 
136 Zysow 3. 
137 Ibrāhīm ibn Mūsā Shātịbī, al-Muwāfaqāt fī usụl̄ al-sharīʻah (Adnan Darwish ed, Dar al-Kitab al- ͑arabi 2006). This 
is called al-ta ͑arud bain al-adilla (conflicting evidence), which is solved by tarjeeh (preference); see for example: 
ala’ al-Din Al-Samarqandi, Mizan Al-Usul Fi Nata’ij Al-Uqul (Dar al-Kutub al- ͑ilmiyya 2004) 171,301. 
138 In the words of Bernard Weiss, “Thanks to a carefully argued probabilism, the law did not need to be certain in 




unchangeable, which adds extra difficulty since the law must be ever valid. So the question is: 
what is the justification for the quest for certainty in the sources of the law? 
Ibn Hazm’s justification: 
Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1064), the master of the ẓahiri school, was extremely brief in denouncing 
rulings based upon probable knowledge (ẓann). He said “it is not permitted to rule upon ẓann at 
all for Allah says ‘And they have thereof no knowledge. They follow not except assumption, and 
indeed, assumption avails not against the truth at all.’ And for the saying of the Prophet peace 
be upon him ‘beware of ẓann, for ẓann is the most untruthful of speech’”.140 It seems that Ibn 
Hazm is contented with the ostensible prohibition of deducing aḥkam based upon ẓann from 
Quran and Sunna. This, of course, was too brief an argument for a contentious matter like the 
one in question. Evidence for this is the fact that the editor of the book, the Egyptian scholar 
Ahmad Muhammad Shaker, made a long note to rebut Ibn Hazm’s argument.141 But a simpler 
logical objection to his arguments could be that he is using Quran and Sunna to justify the quest 
for certainty in Quran and Sunna, which causes a circular argument. Ibn Hazm did, however, 
provide a more detailed discussion of the issue of ẓann when he discussed the unit tradition 
(hadith al-āḥād). He was contending the argument of other usulis, that unit tradition is 
epistemologically only probable but obligatory nonetheless. His argument is that nothing can be 
obligatory if it was not certain; saying otherwise is tantamount to quote Allah almighty without 
knowledge and to rule on religion with ẓann, which Allah forbade us from doing. It means that 
Sharia is not preserved (maḥfūẓa), and could be changed (tabdīl) and unrecognizably mixed 
with lies; how then can Islam be complete?142 Ibn Hazm seems to be reasoning that since God 
told us that His religion is complete and that He demands of us only what we are capable of 
doing, then it must be the case that the sources available to us to achieve this, that is, to obey 
Him and follow His word, are authentic and true. Ibn Hazm, it seems, is using the necessity of 
his argument as a proof of its truth. He seems to say that since the unit hadith is the foundation 
of most of the law, then it must be authentic; otherwise, the law will collapse and what God 
 
140 ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Hạzm, al-Muhạllā (Idārat al-Tịbāʻah al-Munīrīyah 1928) 71. 
141 ibid.. 
142 ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Hạzm, al-Ihḳām fī usụl̄ al-ahḳām (Matḅaʻat al-Saʻādah 1926) vol 1. 126 
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said about preserving religion would be falsified, which is impossible.  143 Ibn Hazm uses this 
argument to raise the probable to certainty, while most usulis are contented with validating 
probable knowledge as a source of law; in either case, it is a manifestation of a juristic 
desideratum. But all this is more on how to deal with probability in the sources rather than 
justification of certainty; it is seeing probability as the problem, never certainty. And even if we 
consider Ibn Hazm’s denunciation of ẓann as a commendation, thus justification, of certainty 
(yaqīn), Ibn Hazm remains among the minority in not accepting ẓann as a source of law.144 
Shatibi’s justification: 
Another author who dealt with the issue of justifying certainty was Abu Ishaq Shatibi (d. 
790/1388). Shatibi, unlike most other authors on usul al-fiqh, sought to assert the 
imperativeness of certainty, and he embarked on this on the first sentence of his book, al-
Muwāfaqāt, saying that usul al-fiqh in religion are certain (qaṭʿīyya) not probable (la ẓannīyya); 
evidence for this is that it is rooted in the principles of Sharia (kulliyyat al-Sharia), and what is 
such, is certain.145 Ẓann, according to Shatibi, cannot be related to kullīyyāt al-Sharia, only to 
the particulars; for if it was part of the kullīyyāt it can, then, be related also to the origin (ʾasl) of 
Sharia.146 Shatibi explained what he means by kullīyyāt as the ḍarūrīyyāt (necessities), hajīyyāt 
(needs), and tahsīnīyyāt (improvements), a classification of mundane goals (maqāṣid) of Sharia. 
Also, he argues, if ẓann is accepted in ʾasl of Sharia then doubt is accepted, where Sharia should 
be undoubted, and it would be acceptable to change Sharia whereas God promised to preserve 
it. Further, if ẓann was accepted in usul al-fiqh, it would then be possible to accept it in usul-al-
Din (principles of religion), because the relation of usul al-fiqh to the origin of Sharia is the same 
as the relation of usul al-Din to it; and the preservation of both is a preservation of religion 
which is part of the necessities (ḍarurīyyāt) of Sharia.147 The origin (ʾasl) has to be certain 
because if it was probable it is susceptible to change and this, by way of induction, cannot be 
 
143 See for example: ʻAbd Allāh ibn Aḥmad Ibn Qudāmah al-Maqdisī, Rawdạt al-nāzịr wa-jannat al-munāzịr fī usụl̄ 
al-fiqh : ʻalá madhhab al-Imām Aḥmad ibn Hạnbal (Dār al-Kutub al-ʻIlmīyah 1981) 81. 
144 See n20 above. See also Al-Samarqandi 252. 
145 Shātịbī 17. 
146 The editors, Muhammad al-Iskandarani and Adnan Darwish, explain what Shatibi means by origin (‘asl) of Sharia 
as ‘theology’, ibid. 
147 ibid 18. 
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allowed to be a principle in religion. And since God has completed religion and promised the 
preservation of dhikr (devotional acts or supplications), this mentioned preservation must be 
that of usul since we know by experience that mistakes were made in probable traditions and 
the understanding of some revealed texts, therefore, usul must be certain. Furthermore, and as 
usul are the laws upon which the effecting of adilla (literary: evidence, means basically 
probable law) is based, it then follows that they must be stronger (epistemologically), hence, 
certain. In general terms, what is probable does not, by general agreement (iṣṭilāḥ), form 
principles (usul) and this is sufficient to cast aside the probable from usul completely.148 
The first thing to note about Shatibi’s arguments here is the obscurity of his terminology. One 
of his objections to having probable knowledge in usul was that it entails ẓann to be allowed in 
ʾasl al-Sharia; it is not clear what he means by this. The editors’ note that what is meant was 
theology,149 but he makes a second objection to the matter by saying it would allow ẓann in 
usul-al-Dīn. It is well known that it is usul al-Dīn that is theology, so either the editors got it 
wrong or Shatibi is making a redundant argument. And to add to the confusion he mentions in 
another section of the book the preservation of the necessities of Sharia: life, religion, intellect, 
wealth, and lineage; to be usul al-Dīn (principles of religion), qawaʿid al-Sharia (foundations of 
Sharia), and kullīyyāt al-milla (general principles of the community).150 This seems like a prose 
bordering on tautology rather than a proper description or classification. On another section he 
calls, yet again, the preservation of the three categories of ḍarūrīyya, Hajīyya, and taḥsīnīyya, 
which he coined as kullīyyāt al-Sharia before, as the origin of origins of Sharia (ʾasl usūlihā), 
which must be certain.151  
There seem to be two reasons Shatibi gives for why usul al-fiqh must be of certain knowledge. 
The first is preventive; this is to say that since usul al-fiqh, usul al-Din (theology) and kullīyyāt al-
Sharia (the three major purposes of Sharia according to Shatibi’s categorization) all share the 
same evidence (adilla), then, if we allow ẓann to enter into usul al-fiqh we allow it, thus, into 
 
148 ibid 19. 
149 ibid 17. 
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the other two; which is not possible because God promised to preserve kulliyyat al-Sharia and 
there is agreement (ittifāq) that theology is based on certain knowledge. In other words, the 
common sources that religion relies on are Quran, Sunna, Ijma ,͑ and Qiyas; therefore, if any, or 
all, of these sources are not certain, then knowledge of religion is not certain. Certainty in 
theology is beyond the scope of this research but as it is inconceivable for Muslims to treat 
theology with anything less than epistemological certainty, and as it shares the same sources as 
usul al-fiqh, it becomes understandable why the certainty of usul al-fiqh is held with such high 
regard. But this argument treats certainty of usul al-fiqh as a consequence of its sharing sources 
with theology, not necessarily as a legal requirement. We are trying to answer the question: 
why is there demand for certainty in Islamic law? Shatibi’s argument seems to answer the 
question: why is there certainty in Islamic law? 
The second reason given by Shatibi is rational. He argues that principles upon which other 
particulars (law, for example) depend, must be certain. His argument that the general 
agreement (iṣṭilāh) is sufficient to rule out probable knowledge from usul, seems to be a hasty 
intuition not a well-thought idea; as is his presumption about the agreement (iṣṭilāh) on the 
issue and the validity of this agreement should it exist. It seems to follow an intuition that any 
human construct needs a solid foundation to ensure its stability. But the persistent problem 
that distinguishes the concept of usul is that it seeks absolute certainty for, apparently, 
theological reasons, and this leads to usul being unchangeable while trying to simultaneously 
maintain timeless validity. 
One can find resemblance for Shatibi’s arguments in state constitutions. Constitutions 
represent the general principles that a nation adheres to. The law is derived from these general 
principles to regulate the details of life. This is similar to Shatibi’s idea about kullīyyāt al-Sharia 
and the derivative fiqh but with an essential difference. Positive constitutions are amendable; 
they require certain conditions and procedures to be amended but they are amendable 
nonetheless. The usul are not. Usul methodology is unamendable and must be forever valid. 
True, most legal theorists in Islam accept the need for change and they argue that ijtihad in 
62 
 
what falls outside the realm of the four sources is supposed to cover for this need;152 but as was 
discussed in chapter one, there is no clear demarcation between fiqh and Sharia, or what is 
changeable and what is not. Furthermore, and staying with the comparison with constitutions 
made above, even some of the solid principles of Islam may need to be amended supposing 
long enough time is allowed. The justification, therefore, for the rejection of any changes from 
taking place anytime in present or future ought to be absolutely solid. Of course, the 
theological justification that the will of God must be obeyed is sufficient for the believer, but 
the challenge of how to be absolutely sure of the accuracy of finding the will of God, 
considering the disagreement among the scholars even in the most fundamental issues of 
religion, remains unsolved. The different epistemological difficulties did not, however, seem to 
get the usulis to concede to the unattainability of certainty in usul nor to fetter them from 
striving for it using different methods and concepts.  
 
Justification for the quest for Certainty in Western legal theory:153 
As discussed above, justifying the quest for certainty in Islamic legal theory, while vague and 
inadequate, can be said to float around two main ideas: 1. God’s prohibition of following ẓann 
according to Ibn Hazm’s arguments; and 2. the binding of the sources of usul to theology 
according to Shatibi’s arguments. This connection to theology raises the certainty of usul to the 
absolute, rendering jurisprudence absolutely rigid and non-adaptive.  
Certainty in Western legal theory, by contrast, is sought for its stabilizing effect on the law. This 
may be similar to the effects it has on Islamic law, but the difference seems to lie in the 
 
152 Like Qaradawi’s argument mentioned in chapter one above. 
153 Certainty in Western legal theory is a legal certainty; that is, it refers to the certainty of what the law says on a 
particular case. Certainty in Islamic jurisprudence, by contrast, is epistemic certainty; that is, it refers to the 
certainty about the source of the law; in other words, being able to successfully attribute the law to a divine 
source. Certainty in Western jurisprudence is concerned with avoiding arbitrariness in the law regardless of its 
source (it could be precedent, statute, or other). Islamic jurisprudence is less concerned about the law being silent 
on a particular case; it is, however, concerned that whatever law is made anew, must be rooted in the revealed 
text or the Muslims consensus. Despite these differences between the two systems, certainty in the law results in 
a state of fixity for both, which leads to a potential conflict between certainty and the need for change in the law. 
This potential conflict will be the focus of this section.  
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awareness among the Western legal theorists of the problems of excessive stability. This is 
evident in the concomitance between certainty and justice in Western jurisprudence as two 
counter-balancing concepts. Coudert puts it thus, 
 There is in all modern states today a general conflict between certainty in the law and concrete 
justice in its application to particular cases; in other words, between the effort to have a general rule 
everywhere equally applicable to all cases at all times and the effort to reach what may seem to be 
concrete right dealing between the parties at bar upon the particular facts in each case. 154 
He then adds, 
The truth is, that the courts are constantly oscillating between a desire for certainty on the one hand 
and a desire for flexibility and conformity to present social standards upon the other. It is impossible 
that in a progressive society the law should be absolutely certain; it is equally impossible that the 
courts should render decisions conforming to the prevailing notions of equity without thereby causing 
a considerable degree of uncertainty, owing to the constant fluctuations in moral standards and their 
application to new and unforeseen questions.155 
This readily applies to the penalty of stoning to death for adultery. It is an extremely harsh 
punishment justified by the certainty of the law. But despite the similarities, the 
justification for certainty seems different between the two legal theories in some respects. 
The divinity of Islamic law is the bases for its quest for certainty; in this sense, certainty in 
Islamic law is principally concerned with finding the true will of God; how this law affects 
the wellbeing of people comes as an inferior objective. This way, if there seems to be a 
conflict between what is thought to be the will of God and any apparent benefit to society, 
the former prevails. Apologists, then, provide the necessary argument that there is no real 
conflict between the will of God and the well-being of society, indeed there cannot be any, 
and what seems to be good for society, when in conflict with God’s will, is in fact a 
disguised harm. In the context of certainty, a protest against God’s law is not sought; what 
is sought is the questioning of the divinity or validity of this law, is it really what God wants? 
 
154 Coudert 1. 
155 ibid 10. 
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For there can be laws, says Gustav Radbruch, “that are so unjust and so socially harmful 
that validity, indeed legal character itself, must be denied them”.156  
The justification for certainty in Western legal theory is consistent with its nature; that is, it 
is secular and pragmatic. Its main objective is the wellbeing of society; in this sense, when 
material benefits are in conflict with morality, in legal context, justice, however this conflict 
is settled, it will be settled by a timely societal debate. And as this debate is ongoing, there 
will not be a final settlement; in other words, society can always change the balance 
between certainty and justice or morality as it sees fit to its circumstances. In the words of 
Paul Neuhaus, “the conflict between legal certainty and justice (equity) will never come to 
an end. In different countries and at different times, the one or the other of these twin 
objectives of the law will dominate; there is no permanent solution. Especially neither goal 
can replace the other”.157 
 The problem in Islamic jurisprudence is not the imposition of law and norm upon society by 
an elite group, for this is a universal practice, it is, rather, the dogmatic assertion of the 
superiority of the past. This religious nostalgia has roots in Islamic text. It is narrated that 
the Prophet Mohammad says “the best of my people are my generation, and then the one 
that follows, and then the one that follows”. In this respect, Muslims will view the nation as 
similar to an organic being that decays in time. This sense of being inferior to the past 
reinforces the notion of certainty in Islamic law and hinders debate and revision. Unless this 
tradition changes, certainty in the law will accumulate and what was once a contemporary 
debatable matter, becomes, with the passing of time, a certain, unchangeable law; owing 
only to its position in history. Righteousness seems to be embedded in history, evident in 
the praise for ‘al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ’ (the good predecessors), while ‘bidʿa’ (innovation) is bad and 
dangerous. Certainty that springs from such conception will develop excessive stability, and 
 
156 Gustav Radbruch, ‘Five Minutes of Legal Philosophy’ 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 13, 14 
<https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqi042>. 
157 Paul Heinrich Neuhaus, ‘Legal Certainty versus Equity in the Conflict of Laws’ L aw and  C ontemporary  P 
roblems 795, 796 <https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol28/iss4/7>. 
65 
 
conflict between the static law and the changing societies is only a matter of time. There is 
no patent remedy for this, asserts Courdet, 
“It is due to changed social conditions and the conflict of new ideas with old ones, which is now at an 
acute stage. If you want to know the ideas that dominate a particular age, you must examine its 
jurisprudence. To make the law certain on subjects as to which the community itself is most 
uncertain, is a task that never has yet and never will be accomplished. If the Hindoo laws are 
unchanged and unchangeable, it is because the Hindoo himself has not changed and does not wish to 
change his opinions and ideas nor the actions which flow from them. When we reach that stage of 
development the question may become academic”. 158 
In a situation of conflict like this, Western jurisprudence has the license to change the law if 
deemed necessary. Changing what has been established and respected in the past is a 
controversial business even in secular law; but it remains mundane and hence changeable 
nonetheless. Islamic jurisprudence faces more controversy since it does not only owe stability 
to the past, it also owes an aura of divinity due to better proximity to the time of revelation. 
Furthermore, Courdet’s argument confirms that certainty in Western legal theory is not only in 
conflict with justice, it is in conflict with the need to adapt the law to the new needs of ever-
changing societies. True, on occasions of social and economic stability, certainty might be good 
for business as during the times before the two World Wars in Europe according to Paul 
Neuhaus. But after the political, economic, and social changes brought about by two world 
wars, he argues, “the idea of the completeness of existing legal orders was destroyed and 
numerous gaps were revealed by confrontation with a world which was undergoing drastic 
changes”.159 
Islamic legal theory, by contrast, does not treat certainty as a stabilizing force to law and order 
in society, albeit it has this effect on it; it, rather, treats certainty as a manifestation of the 
divinity of the law. This is the difficulty that faces Islamic finance. It is one thing to argue for the 
absoluteness or the eternal validity of general principles like justice; it is quite another to argue 
for the eternal validity of an ancient detailed body of law like Islamic financial law. The domain 
 
158 Coudert 17. 
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for change in Islamic financial law is marginal due to the certainty that shields its historical 
development. A margin that may hardly be sufficient to address the radical changes in modern 
financial industry compared to that of the seventh century. And to add to the difficulty, justice, 
seen to be manifested in the prohibition of riba for example, is seen to be in the same front as 
certainty of the law, both being in conflict with issues of modernity and functionality.  
But a final judgment on the validity of Islamic financial law is not required here. What is 
required is to show how the justification for certainty in law can impact the development of this 
law. A rational justification will yield a flexible theory of law which has better chances of validity 
in different times and places. A certainty, on the other hand, that finds justification in theology 
will produce a legal system that is rigid and extremely slow to adapt.160 
 
 
The concept of certainty in Usul al-fiqh: 
As with the case of the concept of Sharia discussed in chapter one, the concept of certainty or 
yaqīn is riddled with conflicting terminology and confusing definitions. In the Quran, the word 
‘yaqīn ’ connotes different but related meanings. On some occasions, it means certainty,161 
while in some other occasions it means death,162 and it is not difficult to see the connection 
being the certainty of death. But because yaqīn  appears in the Quran associated with different 
words and in different contexts, it bore different meanings; albeit all are forms of knowledge in 
different degrees; meaning that yaqīn  is not always an absolute certainty.163 In fact, the word 
 
160 Lloyd says “A narrow minded and rigid legal profession may fail to come to terms with the values of the society 
in which it lives, especially where that society is in a transitional state with substantial currents of social and 
economic changes gradually transforming a more traditional community”, Lloyd of Hampstead  Baron, 1915- 134.. 
On rationality in the law see: ibid 52. 
161 Quran 4:157; 27:22; 102:5 to mention but a few. 
162 Quran 15: 99; 74:47 
163 See for example: ʻAbd Allāh ibn ʻUmar Baydạ̄wī, Anwār al-tanzīl wa-asrār al-taʼwīl al-maʻrūf bi-Tafsīr al-Baydạ̄wī 
(Muḥammad ʻAbd al-Rahṃān Marʻashlī ed, Dār Ihỵāʼ al-Turāth al-ʻArabī : Muʼassasat al-Tārīkh al-ʻArabī) ch 102. 
See also: Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, Madārij al-sālikīn (Muḥammad Kamāl Ibrāhīm Jaʻfar 
and ʻAbd al-Hạmīd ʻAbd al-Munʻim Madkūr eds, al-Hayʼah al-Misṛīyah al-ʻĀmmah lil-Kitāb) vol 2. 452-456.  
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ẓann in the Quran, aside from its common interpretation as probable, is sometimes interpreted 
as yaqīn  (certain).164 The lexicons (maʿajim) give a more precise meaning for yaqīn  as the 
antonym of doubt (shakk).165 The linguist al-Jurjani defines yaqīn  as: the belief that something 
is such and could not be otherwise, that it corresponds to reality, and is impossible to 
change.166 This definition reflects to a great degree the concept of certainty in usul al-fiqh, but 
there is the suspicion that it might have its origins in usul al-fiqh or theology, which means that 
the idiom was constructed in the domain of usul and then fed back into the lexicons instead of 
the other way round. The Quran, however, is less precise with regards to its overall use of yaqīn 
and, thus, more flexible. So, in this case the lexicons were influenced by particular 
interpretations of yaqīn in Quran; the more precise ones, which are also the more rigid when 
applied in a legal context. 
 It is useful to look at the concept of yaqīn at the wider context of usul epistemology, in 
particular, the writings of Ghazali. 
 
 
Abu Hamid Ghazali (d. 505/1111):  
Human cognition (idrāk), according to Ghazali, is two kinds: cognition of unitary entities or 
concepts like ‘world’ or ‘old’; then cognition of the relationship between two or more unitary 
entities or concepts, like ‘the world is old’ or ‘the world is emergent’. Only the latter can be 
made a statement where the description of ‘true’ or ‘false’ could apply.167 The first kind is called 
taṣawwur ‘conception’ or maʿrifa ‘cognisance’; the second is called taṣdīq ‘belief’ or ͑ilm 
‘knowledge’. Conception or ma r͑ifa is two kinds: primary, which requires no process of thinking, 
that is, its meaning is effortlessly present in the mind, an axiom. The second is maṭlūb 
 
164 See for example: Tạbarī.2:46 
165 See for example: Muḥammad ibn Yaʻqūb Fīrūzābādī, Al-Qāmūs Al-Muhịt̄ ̣ (Nasṛ Abu al-Wafā Hūrīnī ed, Bulāq) 
yaqin. 
166 ʻAlī ibn Muḥammad called Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī, Al-Taʻrīfāt (ʻAbd al-Rahṃān. ʻUmayrah ed, ʻĀlam al-Kutub 1987) 
yaqin. 
167 Ghazzālī, al-Mustasfạ̄ min ʻilm al-usụ̄l 22. 
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(required) which points to something holistic and unexplained and, thus, requires explaining by 
al-ḥadd (definition). Likewise, for i͑lm ‘knowledge’ where there is primary – axiomatic - 
knowledge and required knowledge that can be explained – as true or false - by burhan 
(proof).168 
Ghazali then goes on to define ‘definition’ (hadd al-hadd). He argued that everything has four 
ontological states; the first is its actual reality, the second is the conception of this reality in the 
mind which is called  ͑ilm (knowledge); the third is the assignment of a particular sound to 
represent the vocal form of this conception; and the fourth is the assignment of a visually 
recognizable symbol to represent the written form for the word.169 In this sense, Ghazali gives 
three kinds of definitions: a synonym definition (al-hadd al-lafzi) where something is defined by 
giving an alternative word that might be clearer to the listener; a descriptive definition (al-hadd 
al-rasmi) where something is described by its characteristics; and a real definition (al-hadd al-
ḥaqīqī) where something is defined by its exclusive characteristics that are not shared by 
anything else.170 This typology entails that there can be many synonym and descriptive 
definitions for one word (thing) but only one ‘real’ definition.171 
Ghazali, being versed in Greek philosophy, is laying the epistemological foundations for usul al-
fiqh. Conscious, perhaps, of the pervasive disagreements on such a delicate subject, he seems 
to be trying to limit the undesired effects of ikhtilaf (disagreement) by founding a solid logical 
platform for usul al-fiqh whereby, any usuli who uses this platform will come to similar, if not 
identical, results. The other purpose of this effort will be to make sure that the results arrived at 
are accurate and reflect the true will of God. This is where the importance of concepts like al-
hadd (definition),  ͑ilm (knowledge), burhan (proof), and yaqīn  or qaṭʿ (certainty) come to the 
fore. For deciding on the truth or falsehood on any statement or law claiming to reflect the will 
of God is impossible without the proper use of these concepts. Yet, Ghazali was well aware of 
 
168 ibid 23–24. 
169 ibid 36. 
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the difficulties surrounding his objectives. He abstained a number of times from giving absolute 
definitions of difficult concepts like ʿaql (mind)172 or  ͑ilm (knowledge).173 
Admitting to the difficulty in defining the word  ͑ilm for it is a word that is shared by multiple 
meanings, Ghazali resorted to explaining   ͑ilm by showing what it does NOT mean. ͑ilm is not 
shakk (doubt) nor ẓann (probability) because they lack assertiveness unlike  ͑ilm which must be 
assertive and must not tolerate indecision or hesitancy.174  ͑ilm is also distinct from jahl 
(ignorance) for jahl is related to the unknown while   ͑ilm corresponds to the known.  ͑ilm is also 
different from iʿtiqād (belief) in that belief is a dogmatic assertion that does not necessarily 
reflect reality. It is a result of being exposed only to a particular doctrine. It is a circumstantial 
conviction that, in relation to reality, is equal to ignorance, for if one believes that Zaid was in 
the house, one would maintain his belief even if Zaid leaves the house, unlike the knower 
whose ‘knowledge’ is a constant reflection of reality.  Iʿtiqād is like a knot on the heart,175 while  
 i͑lm is the untying of the knot, a revelation.176  
Yaqīn according to Ghazali, in terms of feeling comfortable towards a particular issue as being 
true, has three states. The first state is where one is certain about something and in addition, 
one is certain about his certainty. What he means by this double certainty is that one’s 
certainty on some issue is immune from doubt regardless of any evidence that testifies contrary 
to one’s certain conviction. An example for this state of certainty is the logical axioms like three 
being less than six, and one person can’t be in two places at the same time. The second state, 
which might help further explain the first by comparison, is one’s sureness of something where 
one does not imagine the contrary of his conviction, and if one is made aware of the contrary 
argument or information it will be difficult for one to listen and accept this contrariety. But if 
one received persistent contrary arguments and it came from a knowledgeable trust-worthy 
source like a Prophet, one may reconsider his position on the issue. This state of certainty is the 
 
172 ibid 37. 
173 ibid 40. 
174 ibid. 
175 The word knot is ( ͑uqda) in Arabic. It shares the same root as I ͑tiqad; an indication to the fact that  I ͑tiqad or 
belief is a tie upon the heart. 
176 ibid 40–41. 
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certainty of most common Muslims, Christians and Jews in their religious beliefs or their 
theological schools. They have accepted the school and the evidence on which it was 
established by the simple trust of their childhood which was consolidated as they grew up. The 
third state is where one believes something and feels comfortable towards it. If one is made 
aware of a counter argument to what he believed, he would not impulsively reject it; this is 
called ẓann and it is found in many degrees. If one hears something from a reliable source, he 
would feel comfortable to regarding it as true; and as more trustable people confirm what the 
first told him he will feel more confident about it. His confidence will grow further if a qarīna 
(external evidence) is added, like the paleness of one’s face as a testimony to some horrifying 
news, and so on until this ẓann becomes  i͑lm (knowledge) when the testimony of people 
becomes sufficiently concurrent (tawatur).177 
Many people, contends Ghazali, consider the third state as certainty, and most people consider 
the second state as certainty, whereas, it is only the first type, according to Ghazali, that 
provides true yaqīn.178 
After explaining the three ‘states of mind’ (aḥwāl al-nafs), Ghazali introduces his typology of 
certainty which corresponds to the first and second states of mind in his aforementioned 
explanation. There are seven types of knowledge which Ghazali presents as follows:179 
1. Al-awwalīyyāt (a priori knowledge): this is the knowledge that relies only on the mind 
and does not require perception or experience, like one’s knowledge of his own 
existence and two is more than one and so on. 
2. Al-mushāhadāt al-bātina (introspection): this does not require perception nor is it based 
on reason, like one’s knowledge of himself being hungry, thirsty, or afraid and so on. 
This kind of knowledge can happen to children and animals unlike the previous 
Awwalīyyāt. 
 
177 ibid 59–60. 
178 ibid 60–61.Ghazali prepared the scene here for qiyas (syllogism) by arguing that any postulates made from the 
first state of certainty will produce certain conclusions. 
179 ibid 61–65. 
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3. Al-maḥsūsāt al-ẓāhira (perception): like the knowledge that snow is white or the moon 
is round. But this knowledge is fallible.180 
4. Al-tajrībīyyāt (experience): which can be expressed sometimes as recurrent customs 
(iṭṭirād al- ͑ādāt) like the judgment that fire burns and bread nourishes. Knowledge from 
experience, therefore, is certain to one who experiences it; and people differ in this 
knowledge because they differ in their experiences. This is different from sensible 
knowledge in that sensible knowledge can make a judgment about a single experience 
but the generalization of this judgment to all similar cases is a rational judgment that is 
based on the recurrence of the sensible experience. This shows causality and produces 
certainty. 
5. Al-mutawātirāt (concurrent testimony): like our knowledge of the existence of Makkah 
and al-Shafiʿī. This is not sensible knowledge; it is rational knowledge where hearing is 
the tool. Certainty by testimony requires the concurrence of testimony a sufficient 
number of times; but this number is not fixed, it should be sufficient to increase 
probability to the level of certainty, and this should happen without the person realizing 
when his ẓann has turned into certainty. 
6. Al-wahmīyyāt (imaginaries): like the idea that an existing thing must occupy space or the 
idea that beyond the universe there is no emptiness nor fullness. For emptiness is 
meaningless and proved wrong with evidence, and fullness must be finite, also proved 
by evidence. These ideas are testified for by fiṭra (intuition). But fiṭra is not infallible; so, 
the error in wahmīyyāt can only be revealed by evidence of the mind, and still, the truth 
of the matter will not be assured.181 
7. Al-Mashhūrāt (popular convictions): these are widely held opinions like the idea that 
lying is bad and thanking the benefactor is good. These ideas could be true or false, so 
they cannot be used as postulates in burhan (proof), and to fathom the idea, consider 
 
180 Ghazali here talks only about vision and gives examples of why it can be deceiving, but it is safe to assume he 
considers the five senses in the same manner. 
181 Ghazali’s arguments here are unclear. He is trying to argue, it seems, that imagination is a source of knowledge, 
albeit an unreliable one that needs to be checked by reason at all times. He repeatedly said that this is a complex 
issue upon which many have gone astray, alluding to the sceptics who denied certain knowledge; therefore, he 
argues, a thorough discussion of this issue was not possible there, in the context of usul-al-fiqh. ibid 63–64. 
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the statement ‘lying is bad’ by your intuition and imagine that you did not socialize with 
anyone, you were not exposed to any culture; then try to doubt the idea; it will not be 
impossible. 
These seven types represent Ghazali’s typology of madārik al-yaqīn (sources of certainty) of 
which only the first five produce certainty while the last two only yield ẓann. 
Despite Ghazali’s extended discussion of al-ḥadd (definition) and its importance in knowledge 
and, presumably, legal issues too since the book is a jurisprudence book, he did not provide a 
concise definition for yaqīn.182 He opted, rather, to explain it, first, by explaining how it feels, 
and second, by showing where it comes from, that is, its sources. Yet, it remains unclear what 
Ghazali exactly means when he speaks of certainty, particularly, from a jurisprudential point of 
view. He considers something as certain if it comes from particular sources and triggers a 
particular feeling. This should have been made clearer by the distinction Ghazali makes from 
other sources and the description of other feelings that do not constitute certainty. But on 
close inspection, these distinctions seem vague and thus, the idea of certainty itself becomes 
vague and unclear. For example, when he talks about perception, he mentions explicitly that it 
is fallible; “vision can be deceiving for a subject being too far or too close to the eye or the eye 
being weak”183 he says. Yet, he still classifies perception as one of the sources of certainty that 
can be used as premises of burhan. Also, he argues that experience (tajrībīyyāt) can be a source 
of certainty when repeated a sufficient number of times; likewise, for testimony (mutāwatirāt). 
The number of repeated experience or testimony is not specific, so the only evidence for 
certainty is one’s feeling of certainty. In other words, the experience happens the first time and 
provides ẓann only (that a particular action is the cause/effect of another, for example); then 
the experience is repeated and the probability becomes stronger until at some point, that 
cannot be determined, the person is absolutely sure of the proposition, that is, becomes 
certain. This means that there is no definite evidence for certainty in Ghazali’s theory except 
personal intuition; one’s own conviction of the truth of some proposition sustained by the 
 
182 Recall his abstention from giving concise definitions to difficult concepts like  ͑aql (mind), ibid 37. 
183 ibid 61. 
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experience that this strong conviction is seldom wrong. But is this good enough for Ghazali? 
Will he be satisfied by certainty that is seldom wrong rather than never wrong? Ghazali himself 
does not think that the personal intuition is a reliable indicator of certainty, only he expresses 
the idea differently. For instance, he mentions that “not everything testified for by fiṭra is 
necessarily true”;184 and in response to the expected question of how to distinguish between 
the true fiṭra and untrue fiṭra, he acknowledged that this is a dilemma (warṭa) where many 
people have gone astray and he cannot dwell on it.185 Similarly, he argues that mashhūrāt 
(popular or famous convictions) cannot be a source of certainty. He illustrates his point by the 
two statements: justice is good and lying is bad; the truth of these statements is accepted by a 
person because of their acceptance in his culture where he grew up; they become seeded in 
him from an early age and his conviction of their truth grows with time and repetition. This is, 
then, like the fiṭra  just mentioned, a personal conviction or intuition, but unlike experience and 
concurrent testimony, they do not provide certainty, how then, do we make the distinction 
between the two feelings? According to Ghazali, if you offer the statement: justice is good, to 
someone who was not exposed to community and culture, he may doubt the truth of this 
statement; but if you offer him the statement: two is more than one, he will not doubt it; and 
again, Ghazali acknowledges that this is a difficult subject that should be avoided.186  
There are a number of problems with Ghazali’s arguments. The first problem is that the 
distinctions in his typology are not clear. He builds certainty upon a combination of source and 
feeling (state of mind). He shows three kinds of certainty feelings of which only one is a true 
feeling of certainty and he acknowledges that the majority of people confuse between the 
three. He also shows seven kinds of certainty sources of which only five are sources of true 
certainty and, again, people easily confuse between the sources that give a sense of certainty to 
a true proposition and those that give a sense of certainty to a false proposition. The question, 
naturally, becomes: how do we make the distinctions so that we do not fall into the false sense 
of certainty? Ghazali argues that a true sense of certainty will not be shaken even if testimony 
 
184 ibid 63. 
185 ibid. 
186 ibid 64–65. 
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was made from reliable sources to the contrary (he did not mention the hypothetical case of 
experience or perception being contrary to a proposition); whereas, in the case of the strong 
conviction (but not certainty) which he calls iʿtiqād jazm, one’s convictions can be changed 
under persistent arguments from reliable sources. The problem with this argument is, the 
person who is certain about some proposition is certain only because he is not aware of any 
convincing contrary arguments; otherwise, he would not be certain. To practically make 
Ghazali’s distinction, one needs to be made aware of all the possible arguments contrary to his 
own before deciding whether this is a true sense of certainty or not, which is an impossible 
scenario. Similarly, there is no practical way to distinguish between the right sources of 
certainty and the wrong ones. For example, how can someone living in antiquity and who is 
convinced that the earth is the centre of the universe tell whether his conviction is based on a 
logical axiom, a concurrent testimony, imagination, or a popular conviction? If we take Ghazali’s 
suggestion and ask this person to imagine himself in a pure state where he is not influenced by 
culture, will he then be able to make this sort of distinction? Probably not. In fact, Ghazali’s 
classification of morals as a cultural issue is an assumption for which he gave no evidence. For 
someone who is not aware of any convincing arguments against the proposition that justice is 
good, this proposition could just as well be a logical axiom. The proposition that the sun goes 
around the earth could be based on perception just as well as testimony and popular 
convictions. Once there is more than one source for a proposition, it is not necessarily possible 
to be able to distinguish between them, hence, one is unable on these bases to tell whether 
something is certain or not. 
 The second problem about certainty being based on intuition or feeling is that it renders 
certainty subjective; ‘my certainty does not have to be your certainty’. But in Islamic 
jurisprudence, things work differently. Muslims are told what is certain and they are obliged to 
believe in the certainty of some things. It is not about feeling certain about a proposition, it is 
rather about accepting the certainty of a proposition. According to Ghazali’s theory, to be 
certain about some testimony attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, one should receive that 
testimony from numerous different sources many times until he feels certain that this 
testimony is indeed from the Prophet. But in reality, when a Muslim reads or hears for the first 
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time a Quranic verse or Hadith attributed to the Prophet, he is required to accept it at once as 
authentic because some scholar who lived centuries ago said he received this testimony by 
tawatur and is thus certain of its authenticity. The individual in question may be in doubt, but 
he must follow the certainty of another individual who is revered by the Muslim community. 
Ghazali was right in recognizing certainty as a subjective feeling, but he was wrong in claiming 
that certainty, on these bases, can be the epistemological platform for usul al-fiqh. 
There is a third problem in Ghazali’s theory which was mentioned briefly in the discussion 
above. Ghazali’s concept of certainty is obscure, for he classifies some sources of knowledge as 
sources of certainty, yet he acknowledges that these sources do not always give certain 
knowledge. He classifies perception as a source of certain knowledge, but he admits that 
perception is fallible.187 Similarly, he admits that experience and testimony are subjective. The 
only sources that give absolute certainty for Ghazali are the logical axioms (awwalīyyāt) and 
introspection which have no jurisprudential significance. This forces the question: what is the 
nature of certainty Ghazali is striving for? And recalling the question asked above, will he be 
satisfied with a degree of certainty that is seldom wrong rather than never wrong? 
In his book ‘Miʿyar al-ʿilm’ which he refers to many times in al-Mustasfa as being more 
thorough in discussing epistemology, Ghazali is no less obscure and offers nothing lucid or solid 
to understand certainty, except by involving postulates of faith, which renders epistemological 
certainty obsolete. He argues that certainty is to know that something is ‘as such’ and cannot 
be otherwise; even if told otherwise by a trustable person or by testimony from a Prophet, you 
should doubt the person or the prophecy but never the conviction that something is ‘as such’. 
Doubting this under any circumstances means that it was not known with certainty.188 Further, 
Ghazali argues that certain conclusions cannot contradict each other, like a concurrent 
testimony of the existence of Makkah and another concurrent testimony of its non-existence. 
There will be a mistake in the premises; for it is easy for people to confuse certain premises 
with probable ones. What is interesting in Ghazali’s argument, is that he thinks people can even 
 
187 ibid 61. 




consider a certain premise to be a probable one, not just the reverse. This can only happen 
when the mind deviates from the pure fiṭra by following the ideas of dogmatic philosophers 
and their corrupt doctrines (sceptics). One doubts certainties (yaqīnīyyat) when his (self) finds 
comfort (taʾnas al-nafs) in those deviant ideas. Similarly, it is possible to consider something 
that is probable as certain merely because it was repeated to the ears to the state of familiarity 
and submission (izʿān). Here, Ghazali regresses on what he said before and takes us back to 
square one. What this argument says is that, under the wrong influence, one can consider 
something that is probable to be certain, or something that is certain to be probable; this leaves 
Ghazali’s concept of yaqīn in a very uncertain position. Further, he acknowledges that achieving 
the degree of certainty he describes is a difficult task, and that it can only be achieved by a long 
and patient training and practice. The longer one engages in thinking with pure rationale and 
the more he purifies his mind from perception and imagination, he becomes more capable of 
achieving absolute certainty in knowledge. 189 At this stage, it will be difficult to explain to 
anyone how you are certain about something, you can only guide a person to the same path 
that you took so he can be in the same mental state as you are and then he can feel the 
certainty you feel. If he cannot do this, it is better not to share your experience with him, for 
‘the bosoms of freemen are the tombs of secrets’.190 
This last line of argumentation is revealing because it shows that Ghazali’s concept of certainty 
is not truly based on pure logic and rational thinking; there is, apparently, an element of Sufism 
involved. It is no secret that Ghazali is a devout sufi who thinks that pious Muslims can receive 
divine knowledge, and are, thus, capable of having certain knowledge. But he never, 
intentionally, made his case, when discussing the epistemology of usul al-fiqh, from a sufi’s 
stance. He understands that this is an exclusive club, and if he involves Sufism into the realm of 
fiqh, he will jeopardise the universal subjection of Muslims to fiqh. If certain knowledge is 
exclusive to a group of Muslims, why would the fiqh that is based on this knowledge, be binding 
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to everyone? Why should someone abide by a law that is made from probable, or even 
doubtful, sources to him, but certain to someone else? 
Scepticism is a very old concept and Ghazali was well aware of the difficulties of avoiding it in 
epistemology and striving for absolute certainty without resorting, as in the Platonic 
philosophy, to metaphysics. A quote from Ghazali’s autobiography reveals his scepticism in 
epistemology and how he thinks people can gain certain knowledge. When he thought about 
true knowledge he decided that it can only come from either perception or reason;191 and after 
serious contemplation, he realized that perception is fallible,192 which left him with only reason 
as a source for certain knowledge. But then he realized that his dreams made him doubt even 
his mind for he could not tell with certainty what is real and what is dream or imagination.193 
Then he says: “when I had this thought, I tried to find a solution but could not, for a solution 
had to be based on evidence and evidence needed a priori knowledge; if no postulates were 
possible, providing evidence was impossible also, so this illness became chronic. It lasted for 
about two months during which I was in a state of scepticism, but not a self-imposed one, until 
Allah Almighty cured me of this illness and I could trust reason and the necessities of mind 
again, with safeness and certainty. And this was not by putting together evidence or logic, 
rather, it was by light cast in my chest by Allah Almighty, and that light is the key to most 
knowledge”.194 
We can summarise our discussion of Ghazali’s concept of yaqīn  in a few points: 
• Despite his occasional inconsistency, Ghazali’s concept of certain knowledge can be 
shown to be the knowledge that can never be doubted even in the face of the strongest 
possible sources testifying contrary to it; doubt will always be on the contrary argument 
not the certain knowledge. Nor can this certain knowledge change in time regardless of 
 
191 Ghazzālī, al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl : wa-maʻahu Kīmīyāʼ al-saʻādah wa-al-qawāʻid al-ʻasharah wa-al-adab fī al-
dīn (al-Maktaba al-Sha ͑biyya) 27. 
192 ibid 28–29. 
193 ibid 30. 
194 ibid 31. 
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how much time passes, it is eternally certain. An example for this is the knowledge that 
three is more than two. 
• Having raised the bar so high with this definition of certainty, Ghazali was unable to 
show how, in the context of jurisprudence, this certainty can be achieved. The 
knowledge useful in usul is likely to be from perception, testimony, and experience, all 
of which cannot achieve the required certainty. The axioms are too abstract and can 
hardly be of direct application in usul al-fiqh. 
• His ideas taken as a whole, Ghazali is a sceptic. He doubts the ability of the mind to 
distinguish reality from illusion and so even the axioms are not certain in this light. 
However, he believes that certain knowledge can be obtained by divine enlightenment. 
This argument, having no bearing in the context of jurisprudence, was not mentioned in 
his Mustasfa, but in his autobiography and was alluded to in Miʿyar al- ͑ilm. 
Before concluding this section, it remains important to show why this study has focused on 
Ghazali’s concept of certainty and will consider it, to some degree, representative of Islamic 
jurisprudence concept of yaqīn.  
Certainty, as an epistemological issue, falls, within the Islamic circles, in the domain of kalām 
(philosophy). Therefore, to speak about epistemic certainty in usul al-fiqh, one must be 
competent in both kalam and usul al-fiqh; and before Ghazali, only very few can claim that 
stature. In general, Ghazali is one of a few scholars who wrote on usul al-fiqh with a 
philosophical bent; and his writings in epistemology in the context of usul have influenced 
many usulis after him, sometimes copying him word for word.195 Ghazali, according to Ibn 
Khaldun, was one of the four pillars of usul al-fiqh written by theologians or people of kalām.196 
Further, most of what is written about certainty in usul al-fiqh did not differ much from what 
Ghazali wrote, only Ghazali, being well equipped with philosophical knowledge, was the most 
comprehensive and thorough in his epistemology compared to the others. It remains 
 
195 See for example: Ibn Qudāmah al-Maqdisī, where his introduction on epistemology is an abridgment of 
Ghazali’s. 
196 The other three being Abu al-Ma ͑ali Abdul Malik al-Juwaini (Ghazali’s mentor); qadi Abdul Gabbar; and Abu al-
Husain al-Basri. See: Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad Ibn Khaldūn, ‘Muqaddimat’ 361. 
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important, nevertheless, to look briefly at other works on epistemic certainty from the 
literature of usul al-fiqh. This will not change our understanding of certainty in usul al-fiqh, 
which we got from Ghazali, but it might shed light on how much of a problem the usulis thought 
the issue of certainty was.  
Imam al-Haramain Abdulmalik al-Juwaini (d. 478 A.H.):  
Al-Juwaini rejects limiting knowledge to perception or reason, and argues that all knowledge is 
necessary knowledge (ḍarūrī).197 This contains knowledge from the mind only, like a priori 
knowledge, knowledge from testimony only, and knowledge from a combination of the two.198 
He rejects the ranking of different types of knowledge (like a priori knowledge better than 
perception, perception better than testimony, etc.). As all knowledge is necessary, it cannot be 
ranked; the sources of knowledge can differ in their fallibility, but once they yield knowledge, it 
cannot be ranked.199 Al-Juwaini seems to be playing on terminology here. He only gives the 
name ‘knowledge’ to what qualifies as certain knowledge to him. In this sense, all knowledge is 
necessary; which seems to be his idea of certain knowledge. There is, he argues, axiom 
knowledge where the mind attacks a particular idea without thinking. Then one can use these 
axioms as premises and combine these premises to get new knowledge, only this time much 
thinking is involved, but it still is necessary knowledge.200 What is missing from al-Juwaini’s 
arguments is the notion of fallibilism and how to distinguish between certain knowledge and 
uncertain knowledge. He does not talk about ẓann, nor does he explain his concept of certainty 
vis-a-vis probable knowledge. He rejected the classification of the sources of knowledge made 
by other usulis but did not give his own view on these sources and the type of knowledge they 
give. He talks about how miracles are testaments to the veracity of a Prophet, and how this can 
be the basis for the trueness of the Quran and Sunna; getting us into the issue of the sources of 
usul al-fiqh and their validity, without providing a clear idea of the epistemological bases for his 
usul.201 In order for us to classify Quran, Sunna, or Ijmaʿ as certain, we need to thoroughly 
 
197 ʻAbd al-Malik ibn ʻAbd Allāh Juwaynī, Al-Burhan Fi Usul al-fiqh (Dar al-Kutub al- ͑ilmiyya 1997) 24. 
198 ibid 29. 
199 ibid 28. 
200 ibid 30. 
201 ibid 32–37. 
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understand, this being a field of law, what is meant by ‘certain’ and what legal consequences 
will there be upon that understanding. All this is lacking in the work of al-Juwaini. 
Fakhr al-Deen al-Razi (d. 606 A.H.):  
Similar to al-Juwaini, certainty was not central to al-Razi’s epistemology which he discussed 
briefly in his introduction. Al-Razi provided a typology for knowledge where he gave a 
breakdown of the types of knowledge and their sources. If a mind’s judgment on a subject, he 
says, was: assertive, identical to the subject, and justified by the senses, the knowledge is 
perception or introspection. If the justification was the process of thinking, then knowledge is 
axioms or reason. If the justification is a combination of mind and senses: a combination of 
mind and hearing is concurrent testimony, while a combination of the mind with the other 
senses is experience. If the knowledge is not justified, it is imitation (taqlīd). If the judgement is 
assertive but not identical to the subject, it is ignorance (jahl). If it was not assertive and the 
hesitation was between two propositions with equal probability, it is doubt (shakk). If one 
proposition was more probable it is ẓann, and the less probable is illusion (wahm).202 Al-Razi is, 
however, conscious with regards to certainty when he talks about ‘author intention’. He says 
that language is a human construct where semantics are not of absolute certainty, therefore, 
the understanding of any text can only be probable. More on this will be discussed later; but 
what this shows in the present context, is an awareness on al-Razi’s part of the intricate issues 
regarding certainty in usul al-fiqh and the difficulty surrounding it. 
Most of the usulis preferred, in their discussion of epistemology, to discuss knowledge ( ͑ilm) not 
certainty (yaqīn ).203 The usulis who belong to the kalām school usually presented their 
epistemology as an introduction to their usul work, which seldom diverted from the classic 
typology of knowledge where it was divided into different types according to its sources. The 
 
202 Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn `Umar Rāzī, Al-Mahsul Fi    ͑ilm Al-Usul (Mu’assasat al-Risala 1997) 83–84. 
203 Whether ‘knowledge’ and ‘certainty’ are two different concepts is a matter still unresolved. According to 
Stanford Encyclopaedia of philosophy “Although some philosophers have thought that there is no difference 
between knowledge and certainty, it has become increasingly common to distinguish them. On this conception, 
then, certainty is either the highest form of knowledge or is the only epistemic property superior to knowledge”. 
See: Baron Reed, ‘Certainty’ <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/certainty/>. 
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description of certainty could be found in the midst of this typology.204 Other usulis did not find 
it necessary to write whole chapters on epistemology and only discussed it in the chapters of 
akhbār which dealt with testimony where the main discussion is about the certainty of tawatur 
and the probability of āḥād  hadith.205 
It is proper at this point to recall what exactly we are looking for in the literature of usul al-fiqh, 
in order to make more sense of our claim of its absence. It was mentioned in the beginning of 
this chapter that the sources of Sharia are thought to show, with certainty, the true will of God. 
This might have resulted in the rigidity of Sharia since the will of God cannot be amended under 
any circumstances. It is not clear, though, whether it was indeed the epistemic certainty of the 
sources that made Sharia unamendable, or it was the conception of a divine law that made the 
usulis claim certainty for its sources in spite of the great difficulty in proving it 
epistemologically. It was clear, however, from the examples shown that the law’s impunity 
from change had adverse effects while no solid justification for it was found. We are, therefore, 
looking for a clear understanding of the concept of certainty in usul al-fiqh, which can help us 
understand this predicament of Sharia; and judging by the discussion in this chapter, it is 
perhaps clear that the concept of certainty in the usul literature is consistent with, and perhaps 
even causative to, this predicament. There is a strong and persistent sense of absolutism about 
the concept of certainty in usul; unlike the modern trends on epistemic certainty, which are 
more modest in the face of scepticism and can be contented with “the highest form of 
knowledge”206 as a definition. In usul, certainty is not relative and has no tolerance for change. 
Certainty and probability, according to Zysow, were the fundamental categories with which 
Muslims approached every question of law.207 Yet, the concept of certainty as an 
epistemological foundation for usul al-fiqh was mostly ignored by the main works of usul. The 
 
204 See: ʻAlī ibn Abī ʻAlī or Āmidī, al-Ihḳām fī usụl̄ al-ahḳām (al-Sayyid Jumaylī ed, Dār al-Kitāb al-ʻArabī 1984) 9–12. 
al-Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad Ibn al-Farrāʼ, Al-Udda Fi Usul al-fiqh, vol 1 (unknown 1990) vol 1. 76-83.  
205 See for example: Muhammad ibn Ahmad Sarakhsi, Usul Al-Sarakhsi, vol 1 (Dar al-Ma’rifa). Abu Zaid Ubaid Allah 
b Umar b Isa al-Dabusi, Taqwim Al-Adilla Fi Usul al-fiqh (Dar al-Kutub al-’ilmiyya 2001). Muḥammad ibn ʻAlī 
Shawkānī, Irshād al-fuhụl̄ ilá tahq̣īq al-hạqq min ʻilm al-usụ̄l (Muḥammad Ḥasan Muḥammad Ḥasan Ismāʻīl Shāfiʻī 
ed, Dār al-Kutub al-ʻIlmīyah). 
206 See n200. 
207 Zysow 1. 
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meaning of certainty seems to be taken for granted. Even when usulis who were philosophically 
competent like Ghazali and, to a lesser extent, al-Juwaini, did write about the concept of 
certainty, and despite their acknowledgement of the epistemic difficulties in achieving it, 
absolute certainty was their epistemological choice for usul al-fiqh. The outcome is a Sharia 





















Certainty in the Quran 
 
 
The Quran in Islam is the word of Allah revealed to the Prophet Muhammad between 609-632 
A.D. As the divine word, the Quran became, especially after the Prophet died, the ultimate 
connection of Muslims to Allah. It represents the embodiment of Allah’s eternal message to 
humanity. There are, however, some essential aspects regarding the Quran that are not entirely 
clear in spite of its centrality in Islam. One aspect is the theological labyrinth regarding the 
nature of the Quran: is the Quran the creation of Allah or is it his speech, hence, a 
manifestation of a divine characteristic? Was it revealed to Muhammad in its literal Arabic form 
or was it revealed as divine inspiration and expressed in human language by Muhammad? Did 
Allah speak in sound? Is a translated Quran a divine Quran? And so on. Another aspect is the 
function of Quran in Islam. Quran is thought to have many roles in a Muslim’s life beside ritual 
recitation. It is thought to be the ultimate reference in history, language, science, ethics, and 
most importantly, law. And while the legal epistemology aspect of the Quran will be the focus 
of this chapter, it is important to note that the conception of revelation can, and often does, 
cause confusion. For example, and with regards to the function of Quran, a distinction between 
prohibition and dissuasion or between an imperative and a recommendation remains difficult 
not only semantically, but sometimes due to the confluence of the sphere of ethics with that of 
law in the Quran. The implications of this obscurity are more salient in matters of law where 
Muslims attach great demand for certainty with regards to God’s will. 
As far as Quranic certainty is concerned, both concepts of nature and function of Quran are 
influential. The concept of Quran as a divine lingual revelation entailed that its authenticity is 
one of letters, syllables and vocals. Had Quran been conceived, for example, as a divine 
inspiration for the Prophet with the language being only human, the authenticity of its letter 
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would have been of less importance as is the case in hadith. The divinization of Quran’s letter 
entailed the arduous job of demonstrating the certainty of each character in the muṣḥaf as 
being perfectly transmitted from the mouth of the Prophet, and thus authentic. Arguments 
were made to demonstrate that the written form of Quran was perfectly preserved through a 
process of writing, collecting, editing, and collating what the Prophet has uttered as Quran. 
Further arguments were made to demonstrate that an oral form of Quran was preserved 
through the method of concurrent testimony (tawatur) where every Quranic vocal uttered by 
the Prophet was delivered perfectly along the generations of Muslims. 
Combining this with a conception of Quran being a source of law, we have a legal text 
enshrined in eternity. And when the certainty extends to hermeneutics, the law becomes 
absolute, with evident implications in crime and punishment, family, finance and others. 
Certainty does not only rigidify law by the ossification of its text, the very idea of a successful 
perfect authentication process coupled with the claim for perfect deciphering of God’s will 
legitimizes legal absolutism. Absolute law sits well with the idea of the absolute God who does 
not change nor fault, and thus the Muslim jurists find themselves facing the enigma of trying to 
harmonize between an ancient rigid law and an ever-changing social life where each seem to 
pay no regards to the other. 
Analysing the Quranic law, therefore, requires the analysis of all the arguments underpinning its 
certainty. This means carefully scrutinizing the history of Quran in both its written and oral 
forms and the historical and logical arguments made by the usulis to ascertain its authenticity. 
Similarly, an examination of the arguments for perfect hermeneutics is required with regards to 
semantics and context. Finally, the chapter will look at how Quranic certainty affected the 
development of a Quranic law of finance. 
Recalling Khalid Abu Elfadl’s observations from chapter one,208 there are two issues that must 
be ascertained regarding the Quran: authenticity, are the instructions from God? And 
interpretation, what do the instructions say? As for the latter, it has been the tradition of the 
 
208 See n84 in chapter one. 
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pre-modern usulis to discuss linguistic issues like semantics, abrogation and the role of context 
in understanding God’s intention. Authenticity, on the other hand, has been based, in the 
literature of jurisprudence, almost solely on testimony particularly on concurrent testimony 
(tawatur). This tradition had a salient problem as it completely neglects the written Quran as a 
form of transmission on the basis, perhaps, that it had little role in the transmission of Quran. 
209 This argument, however, has recently been challenged with the renovated interest in 
Quranic manuscripts, an interest aided by new discoveries of manuscripts and new methods 
and technologies to study them more accurately.210 Studying certainty in Quran, therefore, can 
be categorized as follows: 1. Authenticity (written and oral Quran (testimony)); 2. 














209 See for example Keith E Small, Textual Criticism and Qur’ān Manuscripts (Lexington Books 2011) 144,150. 












Authenticity of the Quran 
 
Written form:  
The fact that certainty of the Quran has been based in the usul literature mainly on the oral 
tradition with conspicuous neglect of any role of written manuscripts in substantiating the 
certainty of Quran is peculiar. It is well documented that the Prophet, every time he received a 
revelation of the Quran, had instructed his companions to write it down.211 This attests to his 
recognition of the importance of having a written form of the Quran alongside the, then, more 
traditional oral version. Furthermore, when fears were raised of losing the Quran due to the 
death of the reciters (qurra )͗ in battle, the companions sought to collect the written Quran, 
which was then written fragmentally on leaves, animal shoulders, and other primitive 
materials; these were collected and kept in the house of Hafṣa, the Prophet’s wife.212 A similar 
effort was done during the reign of Uthman (23-35 A.H./644-656 A.D.) when, again, fears were 
raised of losing the Quran this time due to the growing variation in reading the Quran which 
threatened, according to the companions, its uniformity. Once again, they turned to the written 
record of the Quran, with the aid of what was memorized by the companions, in order to codify 
the Quran.213 Uthman (d.35/656) then ordered copies of his master Quran to be sent around 
the caliphate and all other versions to be destroyed;214 which again emphasizes the reliance on 
the written Quran in preserving the revelation and hence ensuring its authenticity. The 
question, thus, naturally becomes: why was the authenticity of Quran, in the rare instances in 
which it was mentioned by the usulis, based mainly on the oral tradition with no regards to its 
written manuscripts? Why was the story of the collection of the Quran (qiṣṣat jamʿ al-Quran) 
 
211 For example: or Abū Dāʼūd Sulaymān ibn al-Ashʻath al-Sijistānī, Kitāb al-Masạ̄hịf (Muḥammad Ibn ʻAbduh ed, al-
Fārūq al-Hạdīthah 2002) 39–45. 
212 ibid 53. 
213 ibid 66. 
214 ibid 88. 
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confined to the field of history (sīra) and had no bearing on usul al-fiqh where it could have, 
perhaps, substantiated the authenticity of the Quran?  
Referring to Quranic manuscripts might have been counter-productive for the usulis in the – 
rare – discussion of the authenticity of the Quran. Until the time of Ibn Mujāhid (d.324/935), 
there was a great degree of flexibility in the reading of the Quran which was due to the flexible 
orthography then, before diacritical marks were developed in the Arabic script limiting the 
possibility of variation. Before the tenth/fourth century, according to Small, “the text was 
simply not in a state containing the degree of precision required to record and transmit one 
precise reading system, much less numerous systems…The growth represented by the 
development of the eight eventual versions of each of the Ten recitation systems occurred 
when the script was developed enough to contain and preserve a precise recitation of the 
text”.215 This – the fourth century – is the time when usul al-fiqh began in earnest.216 For the 
usuli trying to establish the perfect authenticity of Quran, to rely on a written text which, in 
terms of a developed precise form is still in its infancy, will not seem conducive. Even if the usuli 
had a complete, diacritically marked, manuscript of the Quran, he will face a question of 
authority; for a manuscript to be used as a document that proves the authenticity of Quran, it 
will have to be an authoritative copy, like the original Uthmanic master or at least one of its 
recognized copies. This draws attention to another problem. The trace of authoritative 
manuscripts of the Quran, ones that belongs to great companions like the four caliphs or Ibn 
Masʿud, seems to have been lost very early.217 It was reported that Imam Malik (d. 179/795) 
was asked about the master Uthmanic copy and he replied “zahab (gone)”.218 Further, al-
Sijistani (d. 316/929) and al-Dani (d. 444/1053), the most notable scholars on the history of the 
written Quran, did not refer to authoritative Quranic manuscripts but relied mainly on oral 
traditions from formative sources who claim to have seen an authoritative copy or to have met 
 
215 Small 154. 
216 Wael B Hallaq, ‘Was Al-Shafiʿi the Master Architect of Islamic Jurisprudence?’ (1993) 25 - International Journal 
of Middle East Studies 588. 
217 Small 167. 
218 Abū Dāʼūd Sulaymān ibn al-Ashʻath al-Sijistānī 135. 
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an authoritative figure, a companion or the Prophet himself.219 They used oral traditions to tell 
the history of the Quranic manuscripts. Similarly, the historian Ibn al-Nadim (d. 384?) mentions 
that he saw a number of Quranic manuscripts all their scribes claim them to be that of the 
Prophet’s companion Ibn Masʿud; not two of them were in agreement.220 
There are two kinds of manuscripts that can be studied when discussing the authenticity of the 
Quran: extant manuscripts, that is, all manuscripts that are physically in existence and available 
for study; and manuscripts that are mentioned in the literature but are not available for 
physical examination. The first type is interesting in that it provides physical material that can 
be examined with modern technology to get reliable results. The problem with this type is that 
it is very rare – particularly the old ones – and thus, is difficult to tell from them the complete 
history of the Quran. The second type is interesting because it contains a great number of 
variations that allows, when analysed objectively, for a narrative about the history of the Quran 
different from the conventional one which presents the Quran as a sealed, ahistorical text.221 
The problem with this type however, is that it relies on historical reports (testimony). This is not 
to discredit testimony as a source of historical knowledge (which will be discussed later), but it 
acknowledges that in the process of studying these manuscripts, the sphere of uncertainty 
becomes two-fold: the non-extant manuscripts and the reports about them.  
 
Extant manuscripts: 
The study of extant Quranic manuscripts could not attest to the certain authenticity of the 
current Quran for lack of an authoritative copy as well as lack of copies that are plenty enough 
and old enough to corroborate in testimony for this objective.222 It is safe to say that the 
question of authenticity comes top among the interests of studying Quranic manuscripts, being 
 
219 For example: al-Dani refers to the Uthmanic master through a chain of transmission of four people, the fourth 
claiming to have seen the manuscripts. See: Ùthman ibn Saìd or Dānī, Kitāb al-muqniʻ fī rasm masạ̄hịf al-amsạ̄r 
maʻa kitāb al-niqat ̣ (Otto Pretzl ed, Matḅaʻat al-Dawlah (Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft -in kommission 
bei FA Brockhaus) 1932) 15. 
220 Muḥammad ibn Ishạ̄q Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist (Ibrāhīm Ramadạ̄n ed, Dār al-Maʻrifah 1994) 44. 
221 Small 6. 
222 François Déroche, ‘Qur’ans of the Umayyads : A First Overview’ 6,136. 
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the most controversial (in comparison to, say, palaeography). In light of this fact, every 
manuscript ranks in importance according to the information it can provide with regards to 
authenticity, hence the importance of age and authority; but most importantly, conformity to 
the current Quran. For, it takes a single non-conforming manuscript, other measures being 
equal, to cause doubt regardless of how many conforming manuscripts there are.  
An authoritative manuscript must, in the case of Quran, be an old manuscript.223 For, a 
relatively recent manuscript, even if perfectly dated and attributed to a known owner, will itself 
face the question of authenticity, how can we be certain it conforms to the Quran of the 
Prophet? The older the manuscript, the closer it is in time to its original source, and the less 
uncertain it is. And although we cannot eliminate uncertainty entirely by the mere age of the 
manuscript, age seems to be the best measure of authoritativeness. If a manuscript is dated 
back to the first century, particularly to the time of the Prophet, the manuscript is likely to be a 
companion’s property,224 the best measure of authoritativeness at our disposal. There is, of 
course, the chance that a manuscript maybe old but not authoritative in the sense that it 
belongs to someone not recognized historically as an authority in Quran, but when it is not 
possible to accurately attribute a manuscript to an owner, we have to rely on age as a measure 
of authoritativeness. This is founded on the great importance usually given to first-century 
Quranic manuscripts,225 particularly, the recent University of Birmingham Quranic Manuscript 
which is thought to be contemporary to the Prophet making it likely to belong to a companion 
of the Prophet, hence, authoritative.226 
 
223 Small defines authoritative text-form as: a form of text that acquired a degree of local geographic consensual 
authority. Small 7. 
224 Some definitions of ‘companion’ include anyone who accompanied the Prophet for even a short while. See: 
Aḥmad ibn ʻAlī Ibn Hạjar al-ʻAsqalānī, al-Isạ̄bah fī tamyīz al-sahạ̄bah (̣ ʻAlī Muʻawwad and ʻĀdil ʻAbd al-Mawjūd eds, 
Dār al-Kutub al-ʻIlmīyah 1995). 4-5 
225 According to Sadeghi and Goudarzi, the San ͑a’ 1 “is at present [the Birmingham discovery was not made yet] the 
most important document for the history of the Quran. As the only known extant copy from a textual tradition 
beside the standard Uthmanic one, it has the greatest potential of any known manuscript to shed light on the early 
history of the scripture”. Behnam Sadeghi and Mohsen Goudarzi, ‘Ṣanʿā’ 1 and the Origins of the Qur’ān’ (2012) 87 
i-ii (2 Der Islam 1, 1 
<https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,shib&db=ich&AN=ICHA457070&site=eds-
live>. 
226 For more on the attention this manuscript received see: ‘Birmingham Qur’an Manuscript Dated among Oldest in 
the World - University of Birmingham’ <https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/impact/original/quran-
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It has already been established that extant manuscripts do not constitute a source of perfect 
authenticity for the standard version of the Quran, which is the main objective of our 
discussion; however, this should not terminate the discussion since extant manuscripts might 
play an opposite role as mentioned above; that is, to question the authenticity of the standard 
Quran should there be variation between them, and there is plenty.227 But before discussing 
the implications of these variants, it is apt to restate the objective of this discussion in the 
context of the research. 
The fact that what Allah commands must be considered absolute law which cannot be changed 
and must be obeyed by all believers is not disputed here; what is a matter of dispute is how to 
be sure that a command or law is certainly Allah’s word. The argument here, and throughout 
this research, is that there is some form of correlation between uncertainty and changeability 
of the law; the more certain a law is (certainty here being authentic divinity), the less 
changeable it is, and absolute certainty means absolute rigidity. So, what can extant Quranic 
manuscripts, in this context, tell us about the highest source of law in Islam, the Quran? 
On the issue of authenticity of the Quran, extant manuscripts are a double-edged sword. On 
the one hand, they attest to the standard Quran for being very similar to it. According to 
Deroche “[t]he evidence they [manuscripts] provide, when confronted with the accounts 
transmitted by the Islamic tradition about the writing down of the Quran, confirms that these 
reports contain without doubt a historical core and … that a text compatible with the canonical 
version was transmitted”.228 Similar arguments are made in the Encyclopaedia of the Quran 
that, with the exception of few peculiarities, “most of the manuscripts currently known are very 
close to the canonical text”.229 Furthermore, Small argues that “[t]he variants that can be 
observed in extant manuscripts are relatively minor revolving around a consonantal text that 
 
manuscript.aspx>. See also the BBC report at: @BBCNews, ‘“Oldest” Koran Found in Birmingham’ 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-33436021>. 
227 For variants in Quranic manuscripts see: Small 31–105. See also: Alphonse Mingana, Leaves from three ancient 
Qurâns possibly pre-’Othmânic with a list of their variants (Alphonse Mingana and Agnes Smith Lewis eds, CUP 
1914). . 
228 Déroche, ‘Qur’ans of the Umayyads : A First Overview’ 136. 





even at the time of the earliest manuscripts, shows a remarkable degree of fixation”.230 Extant 
manuscripts, according to these arguments, provide strong support to the standard Quran. On 
the other hand, extant manuscripts, do have some variants from the standard Quran; and 
although these variants are described as ‘minor’ or somewhat insignificant, they are sufficient 
in disrupting the argument for perfect transmission. Extant manuscripts provide people who 
argue for perfect transmission of the Quran with a dilemma. If they accept the manuscripts, 
they greatly improve the evidence for the authenticity of the standard Quran by the scientific 
material evidence the manuscripts represent, rather than relying solely on the debatable oral 
transmission. But this, on the other hand, means accepting the variants in these manuscripts as 
well, surrendering in the process the claim for perfect transmission and opening the door for 
doubt to be cast on the divine text. The choice taken by the main voices in the Muslim world 
was to stick to the method of oral transmission as the sole method for transmitting the Quran 
reliably;231 while cherry-picking from the extant manuscripts what supports the traditional 
claim.232 
When extant manuscripts are used as evidence for or against the authenticity of standard 
Quran they give inconclusive results; the manuscripts are scarce and the dating methods are 
still mostly uncertain or unprecise although rapidly improving. This, however, should not be 
seen as evidence for the superiority of oral transmission let alone its independent sufficiency. 
The fact that the Prophet explicitly ordered his companions to write down the Quran as he 
dictated it to them is proof that the written form of Quran is not, as some have tried to 
argue,233 a redundant method of preservation and transmission. Therefore, contradictions 
between oral Quran and written Quran cannot simply be disregarded in favour of oral Quran. 
Nor can the variants and discrepancies of extant Quranic manuscripts be dismissed as negligible 
 
230 Small 173. 
231 Muḥammad Ghazzālī, Nazạrāt fī al-Qurʼān (Bayt al-Qurʼān 1993) 35. Yūsuf Qaradạ̄wī, Kayfa Nataʻāmalu Maʻa 
Al-Qurān Al-ʻAzịm̄? (al-Tạbʻah, Dār al-Shurūq 2000) 30. . 
232 ‘Birmingham Qur’an Manuscript Dated among Oldest in the World - University of Birmingham’. Last seen: 
15/1/2016 
233 Mohammad Ghazali, see n231 above.  
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in relation to the certainty of perfect transmission. Arguments that variants in Quranic 
manuscripts are scribal mistakes and not different Quran, only reinforces uncertainty. 
Traditional accounts of Quranic manuscripts: 
The most important Quranic manuscript in history is the Uthmanic Quran or what is known as 
al-Muṣḥaf al-Imām. According to the traditional literature, this is the standard manuscript that 
was written as the result of a collection process carried out by a committee appointed by 
Uthman. Copies were then made and distributed around the caliphate, but neither the master 
nor the copies survived, and they seem to have been lost very early on.234 It is the general view 
among Muslims today, however, that the contents of the Uthmanic Quran were orally and 
perfectly transmitted to the present, vouching for the authenticity of the current Quran.  
Yet, the literature speaks about Quranic manuscripts that have considerable variation from the 
Uthmanic consonantal text, far greater, in fact, than what is found in extant manuscripts.235 The 
most famous non-Uthmanic, non-extant manuscript is the Ibn Masʿud manuscript. The 
importance of Ibn Masʿud’s manuscript is that the variation it contains from the Uthmanic 
consonantal text goes beyond the minor. Accepted traditions tell that Ibn Masʿud denied that 
al-Fatiha (The Opener) which is considered ummul Kitāb ‘The Mother of the Book’ and the 
Muʿawwizatān (verses of refuge) are part of the Quran, and that he used to scratch them off his 
muṣḥafs (codices).236 Al-Suyūṭī called this issue a ‘problem’ (mushkil) and this is apparently for 
two reasons. One is that the sources telling this are, in the Muslims view, reliable, namely, al-
Bukhari. The second is that Ibn Masʿud is such an authority in Quran that it is very difficult for 
anyone to doubt his competency or to simply ignore his views regarding the Quran. Evidence 
for this is an anecdote about the second caliph Umar who was angry when he heard that 
someone was dictating the Quran from his memory (another evidence for the importance of 
writing the Quran), but when he knew it was Ibn Masʿud he said, “if one person has the merit to 
do that it is Ibn Masʿud”.237 The debate on the ‘problem’ of Ibn Masʿud’s Quran has never been 
 
234 See n216 above. 
235 Small 124. 
236 Jalāl al-Dīn Suyūtị,̄ al-Itqān fī ʻulūm al-Qurʼān (Dār al-Kutub al-ʻIlmīyah 1987) 172–173. 
237 Abū Dāʼūd Sulaymān ibn al-Ashʻath al-Sijistānī 310,315. 
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settled. Many scholars have tried to interpret his actions and opinions while others dismissed 
the traditions as untrue despite them being in Bukhari (considered the most authentic book 
after the Quran).238 But the problem remained in the Muslim collective conscious as traces for 
the ceaseless quest for Ibn Masʿud’s manuscripts are found throughout history.239 
There is further evidence in the literature for variants in Quranic manuscripts for which whole 
chapters were written to account for.240 But the fact that there are or were manuscripts with 
variants is not contested, the contention lies in how these variants are explained with reference 
to a consonantal text that became dominant and fixed very early on.241 There is a number of 
different responses to these variants in the literature. One is to reject the truth of the reports 
and this can be problematic if they come from a reliable source as in the case of Ibn Masʿud 
mentioned above.  Another response is to interpret the arguments of the companion (it is 
usually a companion’s manuscript or a presumed manuscript based on oral accounts; in other 
words, when a companion recites the Quran in a certain way it is presumed that this is how it is 
written in his muṣḥaf).242 Some scholars who could not reject the accuracy of the accounts 
about Ibn Masʿud resorted to interpreting his position; for example, by saying that his exclusion 
of al-Fātiḥa from his muṣḥaf was not a denial that it was Quran, rather, he thought that writing 
the Quran was essentially to preserve it from being forgotten, and al-Fātiḥa could not be 
forgotten because it was the most recited sūra in Quran, thus he did not write it in his codex.243 
This interpretation is evidently weak since many sūras in Quran are much shorter and equally 
easy to remember. A third response is to attribute the variants to scribes’ mistakes.244 But 
scribes’ mistakes are presumably possible in the consonantal text as well. In fact, it was 
reported that Aisha, the Prophet’s wife, when asked about a verse that seemed to be 
grammatically incorrect - in the standard text - said it was a scribe’s mistake.245 And the 
 
238 Suyūtị ̄172–173. 
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argument that the consonantal text is preserved by tawatur will then generate the more 
pressing question: how did this tawatur elude the house of the Prophet himself? 
A last resort response is abrogation. Variants in the manuscripts of authoritative companions 
are simply said to have been abrogated by the last version, the Uthmanic one, thus, are 
rendered invalid.246 The variants reported in the Shiīʿa literature mostly speak about the 
supremacy of Ali and the Prophet’s descendants; an argument evidently driven by ideological 
motives and, therefore, rejected by most Muslims even Shīʿa.247  
These are responses that reject the variants found in non-Uthmanic manuscripts. Accepted 
variants, however, constitute what is known as Qiraʾāt (readings); which will be discussed later. 
Our attention should now be on a short examination of the history of the written Quran. As our 
objective is to examine the basis of the proclaimed certainty of the sources, namely, the Quran, 
it will be apt to look in some detail at the process of writing the Quran and identify areas of 
uncertainty. 
 
The process of writing, collecting, and transmitting the Quran: 
The sources on this subject are unfortunately scarce, particularly from the period of Makkah. 
But, and although this may somewhat impede the enquiry into the lurking uncertainties in the 
process of writing the Quran, the lack of historical reports is doubtlessly a greater impediment 
to the argument for certainty regarding the writing of the Quran. The available historical 
reports, scarce as they are, and notwithstanding being reported by people presumably 






246 Suyūtị ̄167. Interestingly, he mentions abrogation and the consensus of the companions. We will look at 
consensus later. 




Writing the Quran in the early days of Islam: 
A conspicuous area of uncertainty for the written Quran is the early Makkan days. The Prophet 
could not write himself248 and he would not have thought, in any case, about writing the first 
revelations he received; for it, surely, took him some time before he could comprehend the 
idea of being a Prophet.249 It is safe to assume, therefore, that he did not immediately ask 
someone to write the first revelations he received. It is, thus, safe also to assume that he relied 
on his memory to memorize these first revelations until he started calling his close family and 
friends to the new religion and perhaps then dictated to some of them, who could write, these 
early revelations from memory.250 He must have been worried, with the continuing revelation, 
that he might forget some of it and resorted, thus, to dictate it to his companions.251 It is 
possible that he did forget some Quran as 2:106 indicates; 252 and as indicated in a report from 
Bukhari where the Prophet heard someone reciting the Quran and he said “Allah give him 
mercy! He reminded me of verses so and so from sūrah so and so which I forgot”.253 It must be 
the case, nevertheless and according to the traditions, that writing the Quran started in 
Makkah, possibly the early years. The famous report about the convertion of Umar (in the sixth 
year of the advent of Islam)254 where he read verses of the Quran which were written on paper 
or parchment that he found with his Muslim sister, is a testimony to this effect. But writing the 
Quran during that time must have been a difficult and dangerous task. It is reported that the 
Prophet started, secretly, calling close family and friends to Islam for three years before going 
public. When he declared his message, he and his few, vulnerable followers were persecuted by 
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the people of Quraish and many Muslims had to keep their Islam secret. Any possession of 
written Quran would put one in danger of persecution. This is in addition to the fact that few of 
the Prophet’s followers could write and writing material was scarce and expensive. It is difficult 
to imagine how, under these conditions, which lasted for thirteen years, the process of writing 
the Quran could have been flawless. 
 
Writing materials, preservation and transportation of the written Quran: 
There are indicators of limited spread of literacy in pre-Islamic Western Arabia.255 According to 
Peter Stein, the writing materials used were (in order of wide usage): rocks and stones; wood; 
and pottery.256 According to Islamic sources, when Zaid was asked to collect the Quran, he 
traced it in riqaʿ (parchments), ʿuṣub (palm-leaf stalks), likhāf (splinters of limestone), and the 
breasts of men.257 Other sources also mention adīm (leather), qirṭās (papyrus), aktāf and aḍlāʿ 
(shoulder bones and ribs of camels). Palm-leaf stalks (ʿusub) and bones were the most easily 
accessible among the genuinely Arabic writing materials. By contrast, leather and parchment 
required an extended production process.258 
It is possible to discern from these, seemingly concurring, reports that the Quran, whole or part, 
was written fragmentally on all these types of materials. The material used is probably 
dependent on circumstance. The Prophet gets a revelation and asks for a scribe; the available 
scribe comes with whatever writing material he had at hand at the time. There were difficulties, 
however. Writing on wood was by inscription which was laborious, almost impossible, with 
lengthy text.259 The use of ink and parchments was expensive; and although the Prophet had 
wealthy companions from the early days who could perhaps provide this material (there are 
 
255 For a general treatment of the topic see: Peter Stein, ‘Literacy in Pre-Islamic Arabia: An Analysis of the 
Epigraphic Evidence’, The Qur’ān in context: historical and literary investigations into the Qur’ānic milieu. Ed. 
Angelika Neuwirth, Nicolai Sinai and Michael Marx (Brill 2010) 
<https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,shib&db=ich&AN=ICHA452893&site=eds-
live>. 
256 ibid 257. 
257 Abū Dāʼūd Sulaymān ibn al-Ashʻath al-Sijistānī 54. 
258 Stein 260. 
259 Hạmmādī Masʻūdī, al-Wahị ̄min al-tanzīl ilá al-tadwīn (Kullīyat al-Ādāb wa-al-ʻUlūm al-Insānīyah ; Dār al-Sahạr 
lil-Nashr 2005) 69. 
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extant parchment manuscripts which date to that period), the fact that other, more difficult, 
writing material was used is evidence that better writing material was not always available. 
The difficulty in writing the Quran must have been much greater during the Makkan period. For 
example, surat al-Anʿām (chapter six, The Cattle) is a long Makkan sūrah which runs twenty-two 
pages in the modern standard muṣḥaf (muṣḥaf al-Madīna). It is reported that this long sūrah 
was revealed in one batch (jumlah) and not piecemeal as the case for other long sūrah s.260 
According to Ibn Abbas, it was revealed in one night and the Prophet called the scribes who 
wrote it all on that night.261 In a community where literacy was extremely limited to the extent 
that no surviving document preceding the Quran exists today, it is difficult to imagine how, 
especially in the hostile Makkan environment, this sūrah was written. The amount of writing 
material that was required at one night was not a common finding in these circumstances, nor, 
one could assume, was the skill, speed, and accuracy of the scribes. 
Another difficulty must have been the preservation of the writing material. Considering the 
nature of the writing material and the volume of the Quran, every scribe must have had big 
piles of bones, parchments, stalks and the like, which he had to provide safe storage for. Again, 
this would have been a greater problem in Makkah. These primitive materials had to endure, 
while being mostly hidden, the harsh environment of the desert, while the primitive script had 
to remain legible. All this had to be done while the materials remain accessible. It must be 
remembered that these materials were fetched when a new revelation that belonged to an 
existing sūrah (piecemeal revelation) was to be written; or at least when the companions 
wanted to revise and study the Quran from them; after all, that was the main purpose of 
writing the Quran.  
Another issue with regards to writing materials of the Quran, is the question of how these 
materials where transported from Makkah to Madinah during the Hijra. It is known that the 
Hijra from Makkah to Madinah was opposed by Quraish and Muslims had to travel in secret,262 
even the Prophet and Abu Bakr were pursued but managed to arrive at Madinah safely. The 
written Makkan Quran must have been a large amount of cargo even when considering that it 
 
260  Ibn ʻĀshūr ch 6. 
261 ibid. 
262 Muḥammad Abū Zahrah, Khātim al-nabīyīn (Dār al-Fikr al-ʻArabī 1972) 649. 
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was distributed among the scribes and companions; considering the bulky nature of the writing 
material. Transporting this cargo safely and in secret would have been an immense task when 
we remember that many companions had to leave all their belongings behind either to avoid 
attention or in exchange of liberty to travel.263 In such circumstances one can assume that 
people, in order to travel light, will only carry with them parchments or paper of Quran, if they 
carry any Quran at all; the bones and wood would have had to be left behind. And as we 
established that the former material was scarce and thus less used, we can assume that the 
majority of the written Makkan Quran was not transported to Madinah.264 
 
Dictation and editing265 of the Quran: 
The scarce reports about this crucial process in the writing of the Quran give a patchy picture 
which we can only attempt to complete by inference. The hypothetical process is as follows. 
The Prophet receives a revelation; he calls for a scribe to write it down.266 Sometimes the scribe 
is present when the revelation comes.267 The scribe must come with his writing materials which 
might differ from time to time or from one scribe to another. The Prophet dictates to him the 
Quran and the scribe writes it down. The Prophet asks the scribe to read back what he wrote,268 
which seems to be his only checking mechanism since he, according to general Muslim 
conviction, cannot read. After checking in this manner, the Prophet tells the scribe/s to write 
the revealed verses with sūrah so and so, or with the sūrah that mentions subject so and so.269 
This is what the reports tell about the process and there is evidently a number of issues at hand 
which need to be examined.  
 
263 The story of the companion Suhaib;  see: ʻAbd al-Malik Ibn Hishām, al-Sīrah al-nabawīyah (Ṭāhā ʻAbd al-Raʼūf 
Saʻd ed, Dār al-Jīl) vol 2. 87  
264 Muḥammad ʻĀbid Jābirī, Madkhal Ila Al-Quran Al-Karim (Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-Arabiyya 2006) 219.Also 
see: Abdulrahman Umar and Muhammad Isbindari, ‘Kitabat Al-Quran Al-Karim Fi Al-’ahd Al-Makki’ 97–107 
<http://elibrary.mediu.edu.my/books/SDL0796.pdf>. 
265 Only the editing during the Prophet’s life is discussed here, editing after his death will be discussed with the 
discussion about the collection of the Quran. 
266 Ibn Hạjar al-ʻAsqalānī, Fath ̣al-bārī sharh ̣Sạhịh̄ ̣al-Bukhārī. Number 4990. 
267 ibid. numbers 4592-95 
268 Sulaymān ibn Aḥmad Tạbarānī, ‘al-Muʻjam al-kabīr’. Number 4888, 4889 
269 Muḥammad ʻIzzah Darwazah, al-Tafsīr al-hạdīth : tartīb al-suwar hạsab al-nuzūl (Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī 2001) 
vol 1. 78 
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First, given the primitive nature of the writing skills and materials at the time, the legibility of 
the text might have been undermined. There is material evidence now in the shape of extant 
manuscripts that date to the first century which shows the defectiveness of the text, partly 
because of the materials and partly also due to the absence of diacritical marks.270 It is possible 
that the scribe who wrote the text might read it differently if he comes back to it after a while. 
It is, therefore, more likely that a different person will read it differently from what was actually 
dictated, even if the writing was error-free. There is, furthermore, strong evidence that the 
current Quran contains scribal mistakes.271 Same words have been spelt differently in different 
parts of the Quran; for example ‘Ibrahīm’ (Abraham) is spelt in chapter two ‘al-Baqara’ without 
the letter ‘ya’ (i), whereas, it is spelt with the ‘ya’ in the rest of the Muṣḥaf.272 This seems to be 
a result of the way different scribes spelt the word; and when the final Uthmanic version was 
prepared, the committee, perhaps, did not wish to change what was quite likely a simple 
variation on how scribes spelt the word and preferred to keep, out of reverence to the original 
copies, the variant spellings without change.273 More serious, possible, scribal mistakes are 
ones where grammatical errors were made, and there are a number of these in the Quran.274 
The significance in this latter case is that the words are pronounced as they are written, that is, 
if it is indeed a mistake, pronounced erroneously; whereas in the former case the word is 
pronounced without regards to the variant spelling, (‘Ibrahīm’ in both cases).275 A whole body 
of apologetic literature, hence, emerged to justify the possible errors claiming them to be more 
subtle and sublime than the presumed correct words, and thus, even stronger evidence, of the 
divinity of the Quran.276 
 
270 For example: the San ͑ā and the Birmingham manuscripts 
271 Muḥammad ʻAbd al-Latịf̄ Ibn al-Khatib, al-Furqān (1948) 41–45, 54–90. Also: Nöldeke 443–447. 
272 Dānī 98. More on the spelling issues on: Ibn al-Khatib 71–90. 
273 Ibn Khaldūn 330. Similar case did occur for a supposedly abrogated verse which the scribe chose not to omit 
upon his own discretion. See: Darwazah vol 1. 78 
274 Ibn al-Khatib 41–45. 
275 There  هس an exception in one of the less known readings of the Quran where it is read ‘Abraham’. 
276 See for example: Muḥammad Bakhīt Mutị ̄̒ ī, al-Kalimāt al-hịsān fī al-hụrūf al-sabʻah wa-jamʻ al-Qurʼān (Dār al-
Rāʼid al-ʻArabī 1982) 61–86. Dānī 126. And for a comprehensive analysis of how these linguistic discrepancies can 
be accepted in the Arabic language see: Rāzī, Tafsīr al-Fakhr al-Rāzī : al-mushahhar bi-al-Tafsīr al-kabīr wa-
Mafātīh ̣al-ghayb v 20:63. al-Tabari for the same verse; Muḥammad ibn al-Tạyyib Bāqillānī, Al-Intisar Li Al-Quran 
(Dar al-Fath Dar Ibn Hazm 2001). The whole book is written in triumph of the Quran (its title), but for the subject of 
linguistic issues see: 531-566;   
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There is also the case of forgery. It is reported that  a͑bdullah Ibn Abi al-Sarh, one of the 
Prophet’s scribes (one of his first in Makkah), had doubts about Mohammad’s prophecy and 
sometimes wrote things differently from what the Prophet dictated to him.277 Later he 
renounced Islam and fled to Makkah as the Prophet issued a death sentence against him. He 
was later pardoned by the Prophet for the intercession of Uthman and accepted Islam again.278 
A slightly different report tells the same story but with an anonymous scribe who, when 
interred, was ejected by the earth, as a sign of God’s indignation.279 It is not clear whether 
these are two different, but very similar, incidents; or the same incident wrongly reported after 
being sensationalized and cleared from the indictment of a companion.280 It is not even clear on 
what bases can we trust the other scribes on what they have written. The mere fact of being a 
companion in the loose sense seems, at least, questionable after the actions of Ibn Abi al-Sarḥ. 
It is known that Muʿāwiya, a controversial figure who is accused of usurping power and ending 
the ‘guided caliphate’ to establish the Ummaiyyad’s dynasty, was among the Prophet’s 
scribes.281 Thus, it is evident that the process of recording the revelation in writing suffered 
from defective Arabic script, defective writing materials, limited literacy and writing skills, and 
the questionable trustworthiness of some scribes. 
Second, it is known that most sūrahs of the Quran were revealed piecemeal, that is, different 
verses were revealed at different times and a number of sūrahs were being revealed in the 
same duration. This is why the Prophet had to specify to his scribes to which sūrah a particular 
revelation belonged, and the scribes had to do the editing to organize the Quran in the right 
manner. The probable scenario, therefore, is that when a scribe answers the Prophet’s call to 
 
277 Tạbarī v 6:93. 
278 Qurṭubī v 6:93. 
279 Abū Dāʼūd Sulaymān ibn al-Ashʻath al-Sijistānī 38. 
280 The story of Ibn Abi al-Sarh is embarrassing for Muslim scholars and historians because he died a Muslim and is 
considered a companion of the Prophet. Some have abstained from mentioning what he did with the Quran and 
simply said that he used to write for the Prophet and was deceived into sin by the devil ‘azallahu al-shaitan’; see: 
Ibn Hạjar al-ʻAsqalānī, al-Isạ̄bah fī tamyīz al-sahạ̄bah vol 4. 95. The story about changing the Quran, however, was 
conveniently attributed to a Christian who became a Muslim and wrote Quran for the Prophet. He changed what 
was dictated to him, then returned to Christianity and told people that ‘Muhammad knows only what I wrote for 
him’. This unknown person was the one ejected by the earth. See: Ibn Hạjar al-ʻAsqalānī, Fath ̣al-bārī 
sharh ̣Sạhịh̄ ̣al-Bukhārī. 3617.  




write some revelation, he comes with any writing material – fresh or used – because it is likely 
he would not know what sūrah the new revelation belongs to unless the Prophet tells him 
beforehand. It could also be the case that the scribe available is not the same scribe who has 
the written material for the sūrah to which the new revelation belongs. These complications, 
and possible others mean that the scribe writes the revelation in the writing material available 
to him at the time without regard to organization. Editing the revelation by putting the new 
verses in their respective sūrahs must have been done at a later time, possibly at home where a 
scribe would, perhaps, bundle the material that contains a particular sūrah together. This could 
be a collection of wood, parchment, and paper all put together as a single sūrah. But there is 
further complication. If one sūrah was recorded in different occasions by different scribes the 
material that contains the whole sūrah would be dispersed among a number of scribes; and if 
the sūrah was to be organized properly, the scribes should have come together with their 
material containing the sūrah in question and made the required edition which would mean 
either making more copies or redistributing the written material among themselves; a process 
of which there is no record at all. In fact, there is no record of any systematic copying of the 
written Quran during the life of the Prophet. There are some reports that personal copies of 
some Quran were made but those were for personal use and do not collectively constitute a 
comprehensive record of the Quran.282 This means that some, perhaps most, of the written 
Quran was reserved on a single copy; in which case if a copy was damaged or lost, that Quran 
will be forever lost from the written records (oral record of Quran will be discussed later). 
Third, and in relation to the editing process, some sūrahs of the Quran are partly Makkan and 
partly Madinian. This means that the time span for the revelation of a single sūrah could 
measure in years. And although the methodology of defining which sūrah is Makkan and which 
is Madinian is obscure and contentious among scholars, it is considered a fact that many sūrahs 
were revealed partly in Makkah and partly in Madinah. The distinction is sometimes 
straightforward, like sūrah al-Nahl (The Bee, chapter 16) where it is claimed to be Makkan from 
its beginning to verse forty, then Madanian to the end.283 Other sūrahs, however, are more 
 
282 As mentioned above about a piece of written Quran found with Umar’s sister, or the mushaf of Ibn Mas ͑ud. See 
also: Jābirī 215. 
283 Suyūtị ̄29. 
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complex in their mixture. For example, Suyūṭī says that sūrah Hūd (chapter 11) is Makkan 
except for verse 12, verse 17, and verse 114 out of a total of 123 verses.284 The latter verse has 
a stronger case of being revealed in Madinah because a saḥīḥ hadith, which relates it to 
Madinah, is narrated as its occasion; and there are many other examples of sūrahs where an 
exceptional Madinian verse or two is found amidst a whole Makkan sūrah.285 
For the Quran to be thus organized, it needed a complex level of editing by the standards of 
that time. There had to be a clear and organized record of all the written Quran: which sūrahs 
were written on what material and where were they kept. So that when a verse is revealed in 
Madinah but belongs to a Makkan sūrah, the scribe can easily fetch the right record, which 
could be more than twenty years old, and then put the verse in its right position. And since 
sometimes the verses are placed in the middle of the sūrah, not simply added to the end of it, 
the scribe would have to find space on the stone, wood, or parchment where the new verse 
should go.286 Considering the nature of these materials, this might not be possible, so the 
scribe, perhaps, writes the new verse on new material but makes reference to its position in the 
sūrah, perhaps by a numbering system or re-writing the previous or following verse, and then 
bundles the new material with the rest that contains the sūrah. This cannot be the only possible 
scenario of how the Quran was edited during the life of the Prophet, and it is very likely that 
some editing depended on memory. But it is difficult, in light of the above discussion, to 
imagine any scenario that is much improved, considering the historical circumstances, to the 
degree that perfect editing was possible. In the words of Burton “The circumstances in which 
the task was first taken up were such in which loss of Quran materials is very easily conceivable, 
yet the task is presented as having been executed with such supererogatory care that the 




284 ibid 28. 
285 ibid 27–33. 
286 Zaid commented that he remembers an addition to verse 3:95 the Prophet dictated to him, saying “I know the 
position where it is added by the crack on that tablet (of bone). See: Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāyah wa-al-nihāyah vol 5. 
301 
287 Burton 230. 
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The collection of the Quran 
Shortly after the Prophet died, his first deputy and caliph, Abubakr, embarked on a mission of 
collecting the Quran and he chose Zaid Ibn Thabit for this mission. The well-known reports 
attribute this action to the advice of Umar who feared that parts of the Quran could be lost 
with the death of the reciters in battle. And although this justification has been disputed on 
different, sometimes opposing, grounds,288 it seems generally accepted that every collection of 
the Quran was driven by the objective of some sense of preservation and a fear of loss. This 
shows that the first generation of Muslims, including the Prophet himself, did not rely on divine 
preservation of the Quran but exerted their efforts to preserve it and make sure it does not get 
lost or changed. This human effort, no matter how earnest and well-performed, entails 
uncertainty. Any attempt to divinize the process by referring to verses of the Quran (15:9) is 
question-begging; and using the hadith will be using a weaker source in aid of a stronger one. 
The insistence of the Prophet to have a written record of the Quran and of his companions to 
preserve this record is a testimony to the uncertainty of the transmission of the Quran, not its 
certain perfection. 
Zaid, when asked to collect the Quran by Abubakr and Umar, raised an important point, which 
was also raised by Abubakr before him; how could he do something the Prophet did not do 
when alive?289 This question was important for the companions because they were always 
conscious of innovation (bidʿa) or introducing something in religion which is not sanctioned by 
Allah. But there is a deeper historical significance to the question, and it goes back to the time 
of the Prophet. It seems difficult with the myriad evidences available to doubt the importance 
the Prophet put on the Quran; indeed, the Quran speaks of its own essentiality to the Muslims 
on many occasions.290 It seems, therefore, odd that the Prophet did not supervise a 
comprehensive process of editing and preserving the Quran when he was alive; a process that 
would have rendered the posthumous collection unnecessary. The very act of collection 
embeds uncertainty as it means bringing together what was otherwise scattered or dispersed. 
One would think that the Prophet, particularly after settling in Madinah, would have asked his 
 
288 Nöldeke 252–255. 
289 Abū Dāʼūd Sulaymān ibn al-Ashʻath al-Sijistānī 52. 
290 For example: 17:9; 17:82; 17:88; 59:21 
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most trustful companions to be in charge of regular revision of the written Quran with the 
Prophet’s presence as insurance against mistakes. They would have had a proper registry and 
storage where the Quran can be organized, and proper editing could be made when new 
revelation comes. If not any of this, one would think the Prophet would have, at least, ordered 
his companions explicitly to collect and edit the Quran in a certain manner when he was on his 
death bed, but this was not the case either.291 The explanation to this problem given by Islamic 
discourse is that the Prophet was always expecting new revelation, or abrogation, and the only 
confirmation of the end of revelation was the death of the Prophet;292 but this does not answer 
the issues raised above. The hypothesis of Burton that the Prophet was the one who organized 
the Quran in its current shape before he died, relies on pure speculation. It goes against the 
available historical evidences and provides none of its own; it relies basically on filling the 
vacuum left by a notable, but unanswered, question.  
An alternative, perhaps better grounded, explanation can shed light on the certainty of the 
process of collecting the Quran and it is related to the nature of the Quran. It is possible that 
the Quran was not intended to be a composed, unit book, muṣḥaf, but rather, a series of 
individual articles/chapters. The fact is, every sūrah in the Quran is an independent, self-
contained entity. In this sense, the Quran is not a book; it is a generic name given to the 
revelation received by the Prophet on different times and occasions to address different issues. 
Grouping these articles in one book is a convenient editorial work that facilitates access to the 
entirety of the revelation in the manner we are familiar with in today’s authorship and writing. 
The muṣḥaf is not the Quran and it bears no divine authority. If this was indeed the case, then it 
becomes understandable why the Prophet was not worried about the collection of the Quran. 
The Quran was available in individual possessions and memories and was being passed around 
in the same manner. The Prophet asked his companions to write it down, memorise it if they 
could, and organize its individual chapters; that was all which was needed as a necessity. The 
collection of these articles together was not a necessity, but a logical outcome driven by mere 
convenience. The collection of the Quran in the muṣḥaf was inevitable just as was the 
 
291 Contrary to Schwally’s argument (Noldeke 239), the Prophet did not die suddenly. See: Ibn Hishām 212–224. 
292 Suyūtị ̄126. Ibn al-Khatib 36.  
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development of the Arabic script with the introduction of the diacritical marks, both facilitated 
the reading of the Quran, but neither was an essential part of it. 
The uncertainty in the process of collecting the Quran can be explained by the suggested fact 
that the Quran was not meant to be collected in the first place. This confirms that the process 
of writing and editing the Quran was not done with an eventual collection in mind, which 
explains the many uncertainties and short-comings which associated the process in the manner 
discussed above. This argument could be extended using the same line of reasoning to examine 
how the concept of revelation (mafhūm al-waḥy), namely, whether the wording of the Quran 
belongs to Allah or to Muhammad, might have affected the certainty of the Quranic text in any 
way, but this needs a separate study.293 What needs to be stressed here is that the ambiguous 
nature of the concept of revelation has, in turn, obscured the arguments upon which the Quran 
is considered perfectly complete and authentic. In other words, one of the reasons behind the 
uncertainties surrounding the text of the Quran is the uncertainty about its nature; how is it 
related to the divine and what is its function in the mundane. 
Zaid described his work saying, “I traced the Quran in riqaʿ (parchments), ʿusub (palm-leaf 
stalks), likhāf (splinters of limestone), and the breasts of men”294. This is a strong indication that 
the Quran was not preserved independently in written or oral form, where one form only acts 
as a back-up to the other. It was preserved, rather, in the combination of the two where parts 
of the Quran were only found in oral form, other parts in written form, and perhaps other parts 
in both forms. Zaid’s condition for accepting anything as Quran was to have two witnesses 
testifying to the verses being Quran. There is a debate whether Zaid was collecting only written 
material and therefore the witnesses will testify that they saw this particular written material 
(parchment, wood, etc.) being written from the dictation of the Prophet. Or, that the collection 
was a combination of oral and written form, in which case the witnesses will testify that they 
 
293 Al-Suyuti mentions three opinions: 1. The Quran is from Allah word and meaning; 2. Gabriel revealed the 
meanings to Muhammad and Muhammad expressed them in Arabic; 3. Allah revealed the meanings to Gabriel 
who expressed them in Arabic to Muhammad. See: Suyūtị ̄96. See also: Nöldeke 25. For a comprehensive 
treatment of the subject see: al-Quran Kalam Allah (Quran is the Word of Allah), Aḥmad ibn ʻAbd al-Hạlīm Ibn 
Taymīyah, Majmūʻ Al-Fatāwā (Musṭạfā ʻAbd al-Qādir ʻAtạ̄ ed, Dār al-Kutub al-ʻIlmīyah) vol 12. 
294 Stein 260. 
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saw the Quran written by the dictation of the Prophet or heard it from him directly.295 Having 
two witnesses in addition to the scribe to testify to the authenticity of a written Quran seems 
extremely difficult for it means having three people, who can read and write, present for every 
revelation that was written. This is inconceivable for the reasons discussed above about the 
difficulty and uncertainty of the writing process of the Quran. Having two people to testify that 
they heard Quran from the Prophet is more conceivable, and thus, the more probable scenario; 
but it relies on memory to achieve perfect transmission where an error in a single syllable is 
unacceptable. Here again, achieving this level of transmission for a text as lengthy as the Quran 
relying only on memory seems inconceivable. 
Zaid, after collecting what he found of the Quran, realized that he was missing two verses; he 
looked for them and eventually found them only with a companion called Khuzaimah. There 
was no second witness to satisfy Zaid’s condition but it happened that Khuzaima’s testimony 
was sufficient.296 This is related to an anecdote about Khuzaimah testifying in favour of the 
Prophet for something he did not actually witness, he justified this by saying he believed the 
Prophet in getting revelation from Heaven, so he will readily testify to the Prophet’s veracity in 
any case, thus, the Prophet made his testimony the equivalent of two.297 This seems to be a 
fabricated anecdote inspired by a similar one about Abu Bakr vouching for the Prophet’s 
veracity about his trip to Jerusalem (Isrāʾ) in a single night using almost the exact words.298 A 
fabrication to justify the violation of the two witnesses test. It is difficult to conceive that the 
one man who had the missing verses of the Quran happened to be the one whose testimony 
equals that of two men, conveniently satisfying the condition for accepted Quran. Further, the 
story about Khuzaima is historically confused. In one report he is Khuzaima Ibn Thabit and he 
testifies to the verses (9:128-129) for Zaid’s first collection for Abu Bakr.299 Another report gives 
the same name and verses but for the second collection for Uthman.300 A third report hesitates 
 
295 Suyūtị ̄128–129. 
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297 Ibn Sa`d vol 4.379 
298 Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr al-Qurʼān al-ʻazịm̄ vol 3. 9. 
299 Abū Dāʼūd Sulaymān ibn al-Ashʻath al-Sijistānī 54. 
300 ibid 62. Zaid was not mentioned in this report; Khuzaima told Uthman about the missing verses and Uthman 
said that he testifies to second him. Interestingly, Uthman asked Khuzaima where he thought the verses should be 
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on the name, Khuzaima or Abi Khuzaima, and gives a different verse (33:23).301 Furthermore, 
the testimony of two does not qualify as concurrent testimony (tawatur) which is a necessary 
condition for authentic Quran. Therefore, even if some other person came to second 
Khuzaima’s testimony for the two verses, it does not reach tawatur. In fact, accepting Quran 
upon the testimony of two, according to Zaid’s condition, falls short of being concurrent 
(mutawatir), which makes Zaid’s method incapable of achieving the status of tawatur. All this 
shows the uncertainty about the reports and, should the reports be considered, the uncertainty 
of the process of the collection itself. 
Another problem about the collection of the Quran lies in Zaid’s method. Zaid called upon 
anyone who had any Quran in his/her possession to come forward with it and then they looked 
for two witnesses to testify as mentioned above. The problem is that, even supposing the 
sufficiency of this test (it is not sufficient), it vouched only for the authenticity of the Quran that 
is found; it does not account for any Quran that is missing. It was designed to make sure that 
the Quran was authentic but could not confirm that the Quran was complete. In the words of 
Burton “Zaid’s test was negative”.302 There are numerous reports about Quran that was 
forgotten, eaten by chicken,303 abrogated, or lost some other way.304 Sometimes the claimed 
Quran is known but could not be accepted for not being concurrently testified for; like the 
verses mentioned by Umar about the stoning of the adulterers.305 Other times it is not known; 
like the claim that the sūrah Ahzab (chapter 33) was longer than al-Baqarah (chapter 2, the 
longest in the Quran) but most of it was lifted.306 These reports might not be all accurate in 
their detail; but considering their number and the fact that they go against the views of main 
stream Islam regarding a perfect Quranic text, they must have historical substance. If Zaid’s 
 
put, and Khuzaima said after the last verses revealed. This gives an indication of the freedom they had editing the 
Quran. This report, however, is classified as weak (da ͑eef). 
301 ibid 89. See also: Ibn Hạjar al-ʻAsqalānī, Fath ̣al-bārī sharh ̣Sạhịh̄ ̣al-Bukhārī numbers 4986 and 4989 where he 
mentions Abi Khuzaima and verses 9:128-129 for Zaid’s first collection for Abu Bakr; and number 4988 where he 
mentions Khuzaima and verse 33:23 for Zaid’s second collection for Uthman. He mentions the confusion around 
the name in 4679. See also: Nöldeke 248.  
302 Burton 129. 
303 ʻAlī ibn ʻUmar Dāraqutṇī, Sunan al-Dāraqutṇī (ʻAbd Allāh Hāshim Yamānī Madanī and Muḥammad Shams al-
Hạqq ʻAzịm̄ābādī eds, Dār al-Mahạ̄sin 1966) vol 4. 179 
304 Suyūtị ̄vol 2. 52-56 
305 ibid. 55; ibid 1. 129 
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collection of the Quran, argues Montgomery Watt, “was dependant on chance writings and 
human memories, parts may easily have been forgotten”.307 Zaid, therefore, could not account 
for some of these verses or sūrahs of the Quran using his negative method, nor can Muslims be 
sure that his testimony-of-two test is sufficient in authenticating the Quran with zero-error 
accuracy.  
Zaid copied down the Quran he found in suḥuf (leaves, sing. Saḥīfah), and gave it to Abu Bakr. It 
remained in Abu Bakr’s possession until his death, where it went into the possession of the 
second caliph Umar. After Umar’s death, it went to his daughter, the Prophet’s widow, Hafṣah. 
This inconsistent chain of possessing the suḥuf requires attention. If the suḥuf were a property 
of the state it should have gone from Umar to Uthman, the third caliph. If it was a personal 
property as Noldeke suggested, it should have gone from Abu Bakr to Aisha, his daughter and 
also the Prophet’s widow.308 These suḥuf are of great importance; as most reports agree that 
when Uthman decided to collect the Quran, he mainly just made copies of them.309 If these 
suḥuf where the property of the state, then the objective of the collection would have been to 
make a formal muṣḥaf for the entire Muslim community. If, however, the suḥuf where for 
personal use, then there is no confirmation that it contained the entire Quran (even one that 
was available), nor that it was free from personal notes or prayers that was not Quranic. 
The collection that was done by the caliph Uthman is the most notable in the Muslim literature 
for being the final edition that produced the Quran we still have today. But there are many 
issues concerning the significance and accuracy of the Uthmanic muṣḥaf. It is reported that the 
objective of Uthman’s collection was to unite the Muslim community on one reading of the 
Quran after differences between Muslims on how to read the it reached alarming levels.310 
Burton argues that Uthman collated the Quran rather than collected it.311 The word jamaʿ can 
mean collect, but when used in ‘jama ͑al-nās  ʿalā qiraʾa waḥida’, it means united people on one 
 
307 Richard Bell, Bell’s Introduction to the Qur’ān (W Montgomery Watt ed, Edinburgh University Press 1970) 56. 
308 Nöldeke 252–256. Noldeke argues that the most reliable reports on this issue are the ones about Uthman 
getting the suḥuf from Hafṣa; so, he worked backwards to discern that Hafṣa inherited them from Umar as private 
property, and that Abu Bakr’s involvement is historically incorrect.  
309 Abū Dāʼūd Sulaymān ibn al-Ashʻath al-Sijistānī 88. Suyūtị ̄130.  
310 ibid 132. 
311 Burton 139. 
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reading of the Quran. It is known, however, that there are ten readings of the Quran that are all 
considered authentic and valid; which raises the question about the objective of Uthman or the 
success in his objective, hence the question about significance. 
Uthman appointed a committee of four people headed by Zaid to make copies of the Quran 
from the suḥuf of Hafṣah; he then sent the copies to the main cities of the caliphate and 
ordered the adherence to these master copies and the destruction of any others. This is how 
we have the Quran today from the written records. If Zaid only copied the suḥuf of Hafsah, then 
the discussion of accuracy would be confined to the accuracy of the copying process where the 
chances of perfection are better while errors are still possible; and the focus should go back to 
that first collection, with account of any possible damage or loss during the decade between 
Abu Bakr and Uthman.  
There are reports that some editing was done by the committee in the organization as well as 
the content of the Quran. Some argue that the first collection contained many different 
readings or versions and when the committee came to write the master copy, they wrote it in 
the dialect of Quraish which suggest that some editing of the content did take place.312 If the 
changed Quran was authentic it means the current Quran is incomplete or changed. If it was 
not authentic it means the first collection was flawed and makes the second collection without 
a reliable written reference. Either way, it raises serious questions about the certain 
authenticity of the Quran in the manner purported by the usulis. 
The notable example of this uncertainty regarding the work of the committee is the issue of the 
basmalah (short for the phrase: In the name of God, the most Gracious, the most merciful) 
which is found at the beginning of every sūrah except one. There is an unsettled debate on 
whether the basmalah is part of the Quran or not (just a separator between sūrahs).313 The fact 
that it is still undecided whether part of the muṣḥaf belongs to the Quran or not, collides 
directly with the proclaimed certainty of the Quran. It is argued in mainstream Islam that the 
Quran is certain in its entirety; all its verses, characters, order and organization is sanctioned 
beyond doubt by Allah via the Prophet;314 how does this claim stand along with the fact that 
 
312 Abū Dāʼūd Sulaymān ibn al-Ashʻath al-Sijistānī 89. 
313 Ghazzālī, al-Mustasfạ̄ min ʻilm al-usụ̄l 133–137. 
314 Al-Baqillani in Suyūtị ̄134. 
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the basmalah, which is written a hundred and fourteen times in the muṣḥaf, is not known for 
sure to be Quran (except for one occurrence)? The question here is not about which of the 
different opinions about the basmalah is right or even more plausible; the very fact that there is 
a debate on it entails uncertainty. What is important to note about the issue of the basmalah is 
that the claim for certainty in the Quran is made in spite of the undeniable debate about it. This 
conspicuously contradictory discourse draws attention to the religious desideratum driving it.   
Further, the mandate given by Uthman to Zaid’s committee is not clear. Could they change 
something from the ṣuḥuf of Hafsa? Did the ṣuḥuf contain the order of the sūrah  or did the 
committee make this organization themselves? What if there was a contradiction between the 
Quran they knew orally and what they read in the ṣuḥuf, which one yields to the other? There 
are no clear answers to most of the questions regarding the details of the work of the 
committee, but the available reports draw some picture about their work. For example, and 
with regards to the issue of the basmalah, it is reported that Uthman was asked by Ibn Abbas 
about why they – Uthman and his committee – have juxtaposed between sūrah Anfal and sūrah 
Baraʾa without the separating basmalah. Uthman thought the two sūrahs were similar in the 
subject they address so he thought they were the same sūrah. He, therefore, joined them 
without the basmalah.315 According to this report, Uthman and his committee could decide on 
the order and organization of the sūrahs, they could decide on where a sūrah begins or ends, as 
well as whether to write or omit the basmalah which may or may not be Quran. All this is done 
based on common sense if not simple intuition; like the consideration of the subject of the 
sūrahs or their time of revelation. Further, the objection of Ibn Abbas indicates that the process 
was known to be a human effort (ijtihad), thus, objectionable and open to criticism. In fact, 
Uthman himself did not think the work of the committee was perfect. It is reported that he 
said, when brought the muṣḥaf after the committee finished their work, he sees errors in the 
manuscript but the Arabs will put it right when they read it.316 Apparently, it was too revered 
for the Arab Muslims to change as the numerous reports about mistakes in the muṣḥaf show.317 
 
315 ibid 1. 132; Abū Dāʼūd Sulaymān ibn al-Ashʻath al-Sijistānī 114. 
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111 
 
One of these reports tells that Ali commented on a scribal mistake in the muṣḥaf, and when 
asked why not change it he said “the Quran is not to be changed now”.318 
There are other reports about further editing that took place after Uthman such as the addition 
of the letter A (alif) by Ubaidillah Ibn Ziad (d. 67).319 But the most notable post-Uthmanic 
edition of the Quran is reported to have been done by al-Hajjāj Ibn Yūsuf (d.95).320 It is not clear 
whether the changes made by al-Hajjāj had any oral Quranic roots, or he relied basically on his 
sharp linguistic sense; but the conspicuous question is why, since he found the liberty to change 
some words in the Quran, did he not change the ‘errors’ that still remain in the muṣḥaf till 
today? There is no answer to this problem, and we can follow the traditionalists and completely 
reject those reports about al-Hajjāj’s editing of the Quran,321 or we can suppose that further 
editing took place after al-Hajjāj; editing that went unreported but traces of which are present 
in the Quran today.  
 
To recap; the written Quran has gone through many stages in history before it reached us, and 
the historical evidence about its writing and transmission diminish as we go back in time. This 
means that the foundations upon which the history of the written Quran is built are the 
weakest in terms of evidence. All the later editions and collections of the written Quran – for 
which there are some reports – are dependent on the earlier writing process, for which the 
evidence is extremely scarce. It must be stressed, however, that mainstream Islamic discourse, 
although not accepting the idea that the history of the written Quran does not entail a certainly 
authentic text, did not make their claims for the certainty of the Quran mainly on its written 
record. Rather, most usulis base it on the theory of tawatur, a form of concurrent testimony 
that assures of perfect transmission.  
 
318 Tạbarī v 56:29. 
319 Abū Dāʼūd Sulaymān ibn al-Ashʻath al-Sijistānī 271. Also see a whole chapter dedicated to the variation between 
Uthman’s master Quran and the copies made from it and sent to other cities (amsar), 144-158 
320 ibid 272. Ibn al-Khatib 50–52. 
321 Abū Dāʼūd Sulaymān ibn al-Ashʻath al-Sijistānī 175 note 140. Similarly, many of the reports that allude to 
uncertainty regarding the Quran are rejected upon different grounds; sometimes, simply, upon the question-
begging argument that the reports causes uncertainty in the Quran. See notes on 120-131. Notes and comments 
are made by Mohammad Ibn Abduh.  
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Oral transmission via concurrent testimony (tawatur): 
The second method of transmission for the Quran beside the written form is the oral form 
where there is unanimity among the usulis that the Quran is transmitted orally through the 
ages in a concurrent manner that guarantees absolute authenticity. To establish this certainty, 
the usulis defined tawatur as an infallible method of transmission for any report or testimony 
and asserted that Quran is indeed transmitted by tawatur. 
 
Definition and conditions of tawatur: 
The concept of tawatur is shaped around the idea of certain knowledge by testimony. The 
examples usually given by the usulis of a mutawatir knowledge are the knowledge of the 
existence of Makkah or that there was someone called al-Shafiʿi.322 This is borrowed from the 
philosophical tradition which emphasised the importance of testimony to know about distant 
lands and past events.323 There is, however, a significant difference between the treatment of 
testimony in philosophy and the treatment of tawatur in usul al-fiqh. In the former case, the 
philosophers used what is known with high degree of certainty, the existence of Athens for 
example, to make the case for its epistemic source, which is testimony (for someone who 
hasn’t been to Athens).324 But since the Quran is the subject of enquiry, it cannot be used to 
prove the reliability of tawatur if the usulis are to avoid a circular argument. Even if tawatur is 
proved to be a source of certain knowledge independent of the Quran, proving that Quran is 
mutawatir remains a challenge. For in order to know whether Quran is mutawatir the usulis 
 
322 Ghazzālī, al-Mustasfạ̄ min ʻilm al-usụ̄l 62. 
323 Mentioned in a video for a lecture by Suheil Laher discussing his Harvard PhD, see: Dr Suheil Laher, ‘Twisted 
Threads: Concept of Tawatur (Perpetuation) in Islamic Thought - YouTube’ 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=baJrRsI1cuo>. Last seen: 12/08/2016 
324 According to Adler Jonathan, “There will be certain historical truths like that Caesar was assassinated, that serve 
as Wittgensteinian ‘hinge’ or groundless propositions which are exempt from doubt. They are to be default-
accepted for those who participate in these historical inquiries, serving to confirm a historical chain’s accuracy, 
rather than conversely. But they need not be taken for granted in other contexts of inquiry”, Jonathan Adler, 




need to identify what constitutes tawatur besides its production of knowledge (to avoid 
question-begging). 
Tawatur is defined by al-Qarafi as “the report of something sensible by a group of people whom 
experience precludes from acting in concert”325, and by al-Sarakhsi as the report “transmitted 
by a group of people whom one cannot imagine their collusion on account of the greatness of 
their number and the distances of their habitations”.326 Many similar definitions are given by 
the usulis without significant difference.327 The main idea that seems to capture the essence of 
the numerous definitions of tawatur is, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, a report (khabar) that 
imparts knowledge.328 And although marks of question-begging the argument for tawatur are 
already evident in Ibn Taymiyya’s remark, they become clearer in the analysis of the conditions 
for tawatur set by the usulis. 
According to Ghazali, there are four conditions for tawatur:329 
1. The report must be based on knowledge not on probability (ẓann);  
2. The report must be of necessary sense-knowledge;  
3. The number of reporters must be sufficient that they could not collude on lying; 
4. These conditions must be met at each stage of the transmission. 
These conditions are more or less echoed by most usulis with little variation.330 Conditions 1 
and 2 are mainly concerned with the nature of the reporter’s knowledge. If the reporter was 
uncertain about his report or if he was reporting a mere opinion the report would not count as 
mutawatir. Condition 4 simply ensures the consistent strength of the report from its origin to 
its destination. The main feature of tawatur which distinguishes it from the unit report (aḥād) 
and prevents it from over-relying on the veracity of the reporters is the number of reporters – 
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327 For example: ̣ Aḥmad ibn Alī Jasṣạs̄, Usụ̄l al-fiqh al-musammá bi al-Fusụl̄ fī al-usụl̄ (Ujayl Jāsim Nashamī ed, 
Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-al-Shu’ūn al-Islāmīyah 1994) vol 3. 37; Āmidī vol 2. 14;   
328 Aḥmad ibn ʻAbd al-Hạlīm Ibn Taymīyah, Majmūʻ Fatāwá Shaykh Al-Islām Aḥmad Ibn Taymīyah (ʻAbd al-Rahṃān 
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condition 3.331 The very word tawatur implies recurrence of the report such that, it is assumed, 
it is consolidated by the sheer number of its reporters.  
In order to decide, therefore, whether a report is mutawatir, we should be able to check 
whether or not it meets these conditions. Conditions 1 and 2 cannot be checked objectively 
since they rely on the word of the reporter. However, even if we accept the word of the 
reporter, checking condition 3 is problematic as most usulis agree that the number of reporters 
sufficient to render a report mutawatir cannot be determined; the only determinate for the 
number is the sufficiency for imparting knowledge. It is by having necessary knowledge that we 
know the complete number of reporters was met, argues Ghazali, and not by meeting a certain 
number do we infer that we have knowledge.332 The circularity of this argument may have 
seemed less stark for the usulis when considering the example of knowledge of distant lands. 
One cannot tell precisely how or when he became certain that there is a country called Egypt 
which he did not visit. But because he knows with certainty that it exists, he infers that the 
number of reports which he received about Egypt is so great with no realistic probability of 
collusion or chance that it must produce knowledge; in usul terminology, the report about 
Egypt is mutawatir. This line of argument cannot, however, be followed for the case of the 
Quran as it is argued repeatedly that Quran is certainly authentic because it is mutawatir. 
Tawatur is one of the three conditions333 for accepting something as authentic Quran and there 
are numerous reports about verses or variants that did not feature in the muṣḥaf because they 
were reported by a single companion.334 If we accept the usulis’ claim that we know Quran is 
authentic because it is mutawatir rather than we know it is mutawatir because it is authentic, 
then condition three for tawatur cannot be checked and the argument that any report is 
certain by tawatur will be invalid. We cannot deduce knowledge from tawatur when tawatur is 
still not confirmed and it cannot be objectively confirmed when it requires an unknown number 
 
331 Hallaq, ‘On Inductive Corroboration, Probability, and Certainty in Usul al-fiqh’ 7. 
332 Ghazzālī, al-Mustasfạ̄ min ʻilm al-usụ̄l 175. 
333 Conformity to the Uthmanic consonantal text; correctness of its Arabic; and sound transmission, for earlier 
periods. See: Makki Ibn Abi Talib, Al-Ibanah    ͑an Ma ͑ani Al-Qira ͗at (Books-Publisher 2001) 150. Later periods 
however, scholars became adamant on tawatur, sound transmission was not enough.  
334 See n303 above.  
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of reporters. The usulis wanted to prove that tawatur proves certain knowledge; what they 
argued for instead was that certain knowledge proves tawatur. 
Another problem with tawatur is the usulis’ concept of the knowledge it produces and the 
concept of knowledge in general. Overlooking the blatant circularity for a moment, the 
conditions set by the usulis for tawatur requires us to be able to identify the occurrence of 
knowledge (ḥuṣūl al-ʿilm) which requires a clear idea of what knowledge actually is. But the 
usulis – featuring no better than modern epistemologists335 – don’t have a clear definition for 
knowledge, yet some of them insist that it should not be confused with the psychological 
feeling of content towards a proposition (sukūn al-nafs).336 Epistemologists consider 
‘psychological certainty’ to be one of three kinds of certainty where it is distinguished from 
epistemic certainty.337 Psychological certainty is not epistemic and it does not necessarily 
convey truth, but personal dogma many a time. The usulis, while seemed to be aware of this 
distinction by their reference to the less certain sukūn al-nafs, did not provide a thorough 
description of their required epistemic certainty, ʿilm or yaqīn. It was only Ghazali who offered 
such a study with a serious attempt to identify epistemic certainty and how it differs from other 
forms of belief.338 This was addressed in detail in chapter two to the conclusion that Ghazali 
was inconsistent and inconclusive in his attempt to set out a solid epistemological framework 
for usul al-fiqh. This was attested for by Ghazali’s admission in his autobiography to his 
abandonment for epistemic certainty.339  
 
Does tawatur impart certainty? 
The usulis attempt to equalize between tawatur and testimony that gives us knowledge of 
distant lands and past events is problematic at best. Knowledge which one just finds in himself, 
 
335 Since the ‘Gettier problems’ which refuted the definition of knowledge as ‘true justified belief’, there has been 
no agreement on the definition of knowledge. See: Matthias Steup, ‘The Analysis of Knowledge’, Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008). 
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according to the usulis concept, is more of an ontological phenomenon than it is a conclusion of 
any process of enquiry. Testimony can only explain knowledge’s existence, but it cannot be a 
process for checking it. Therefore, using tawatur to prove the authenticity of Quran is 
problematic because, like knowledge, it could not be normatively defined. Any definition of 
tawatur that conditions the imparting of knowledge or the impossibility of colluding on a lie is 
question-begging since it embeds the conclusion into the premise. This does not imply that 
tawatur does not impart certainty, it only states that tawatur cannot be used to prove the 
authenticity of Quran. It can explain its authenticity, however, if Quran was known otherwise. If 
Quran was psychologically certain in the mind of someone, it is possible to explain his 
conviction by tawatur. If, however, we wanted to convince a sceptic about the certainty of 
Quran, telling him it is mutawatir will not necessarily work. This subjective nature340 of tawatur 
helps explain why it is a source of knowledge exclusive to Muslims only. Even among Muslims, 
there is the suspicion that Quran sits in the grey area between knowledge and belief.341 In the 
words of Hobbs “for no man is a witness to him that already believeth, and therefore needs no 
witness; but to them that deny or doubt or have not heard it”.342 
Subjective knowledge, therefore, is not conducive to organized religion. One finds in the 
writings of the usulis a hint of enforced knowledge particularly in principles of theology and law. 
For example, al-Baqillani made a long argument to assert that the existence of Muhammad and 
the authenticity of Quran were both proven by tawatur and thus enjoy the same degree of 
certainty.343 One, therefore, is necessitated (muḍṭṭarrun) to know the truth of the Quran once 
he hears the reports of reporters from the Prophet.344 In other words, every Muslim should 
know that Quran is authentic because it is mutawatir. The subjectivity of certainty seems to be 
an alien concept in the arguments of usulis like al-Baqillani. He pays no attention to the fact 
 
340 Weiss argues “We are presented with a knowledge which is simply there, which we simply "find" within 
ourselves, without really being shown how the knowledge got there. The "conditions of tawatur" do not really 
explain this. Hence the theory seems to be locked into an essentially subjectivist stance. Knowledge is, of course, a 
subjective state; we do "find" it within ourselves; but if some sort of objective underpinnings cannot be pointed 
out it ceases to be knowledge”, ibid 96. 
341 This is considering that its authenticity is not discussed in the usul, but rather, according to Zysow (referring to 
Ibn Hazm), in theology. See: Zysow 8. 
342 CAJ Coady, ‘Testimony a Philosophical Study’ 30. 
343 Bāqillānī 101. 
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that many people did not know that Muhammad existed, some knew but with different 
degrees of probability, just as some uninformed people or children today do not know, or can 
easily doubt, the existence of Australia. But to apply this concept to religion implies that people 
will be at liberty to deny the authenticity of Quran, which will jeopardise the current structure 
of Islam. Alternatively, the authenticity of Quran could be established on faith alone. This, 
however, going against the nature of how human convictions are generally formed,345 was not 
the methodology in theology where the bigger question of the existence of God was treated. 
Some form of demonstration (burhan) is always needed, and difficulties arise when burhan is 
required for absolute certainty. 
A sense of juristic, and even theological, desideratum can already be detected in al-Baqillani’s 
argument. But he makes it evidently clear further in his defence of the Quran. He argues that if 
we accept that some changes did take place in Quran, then it would be possible that most of it 
was changed and only less than a tenth of it remains. He then goes on to say how this entails 
the possibility that the main features of Islam in law and worship could all be different (read: 
lost); this is delivered in a tone that meant to demonstrate the absurdity, if not impossibility, of 
the suggested scenario.346  
Ibn Taymiyyah, while more vigilant to the problem of the subjectivity of knowledge than al-
Baqillani, was just as adamant in seeing the absolute certainty of Quran as a sine qua non to its 
function in Islam. He argued that tawatur is defined only by its ability to impart knowledge.347 
Having knowledge could be due to the great number of reporters, their religious credentials, or 
due to supporting evidence (qarāʾin) that accompany the report; or it could be due to some of 
these reasons and not the others. In short, knowledge according to Ibn Taymiyyah is not 
constrained in its causes to the number of reporters.  Ibn Taymiyyah, realizing that this 
indeterminacy in the concept of tawatur renders it a ‘subjective stance’, sought to resolve the 
problem by dividing tawatur into two kinds: generic (ʿām) and specific (khāss). Scholars who 
specialize in hadith or fiqh have received via tawatur knowledge that is not known to the 
laymen. Knowledge in general could happen to some people and not others. Therefore, 
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whosoever has knowledge, is obliged to believe and practice accordingly; and whosoever does 
not have that knowledge, has to submit to the people of consensus (ahl-ul Ijmaʿ ͑) who agreed 
on the reports’ truth. The Muslim community (ummah) is preserved by Allah from consenting 
on error, and this consensus is brought about by the religious concession of non-scholars to the 
scholars.348 
Ibn Taymiyyah essentially acknowledges that the idea that every Muslim equally receives 
reports from the Prophet by tawatur is false, hence, their knowledge about Islam will not be 
the same either. This, however, does not mean that Muslims differ in their religious obligations 
as they differ in their religious knowledge. Religious obligations for the less informed are 
grounded, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, in another source of usul al-fiqh, which is Ijmaʿ. But it is 
important to note that Ibn Taymiyyah discusses tawatur in his discussion of hadith not 
Quran.349 His argument that gaps in tawatur can be filled by Ijmaʿ is directed towards hadith 
where he was trying to give the corpus of hadith – which is not mutawatir – a stronger degree 
of authenticity. Quran is beyond doubt and there seems to be no discussion of its authenticity 
by the usulis in general. It is repeatedly asserted that Quran is absolutely certain because it is 
mutawatir, but discussion of tawatur, in addition to being relatively brief, is confined to the 
section on akhbār (reports) which is mainly concerned with the hadith not Quran. This leaves 
an important question unanswered: where is the discussion about the certain authenticity of 
Quran? It is not in usul al-fiqh as we just mentioned, nor is it in usul al-dīn (theology) which 
focuses on the nature of Quran (a created being or a divine word, etc.).350 To simply assert that 
it is mutawatir is not sufficient since the case for tawatur is inconclusive once it is devoid of its 
circular definition as knowledge. 
Further, there is a problem with the concept of tawatur being generally perceived as multiple 
independent chains of transmission which start with first witnesses and reach the receiver 
giving him immediate knowledge stemming from their multiplicity and independence. The 
 
348 Ibn Taymīyah. 48-51 
349 Volume 18 of the Ibn Taymiyah’s Fatawa series is on hadith only. 
350 Zysow argues: ”That the authenticity of the Quran is not treated in the usul texts is, however, not surprising, for 
the controversies about the Quran were, as Ibn Hazm notes, the province of the theologian” Zysow 8. But among 
the controversies discussed by theologians, there is no mention of authenticity. It is evidence that authenticity was 
not seen as a controversy in the first place. 
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problem with the transmission via multiple chains of reporters is that they can only be checked 
– for the receiver – from the final interface. Generally speaking, a network of a hundred 
reporters that make up ten chains of transmission – ten reporters each – will deliver the report 
to the receiver via ten reporters only, ninety will be unknown to him. The ten supposedly 
independent and veracious reporters may be enough to make him certain of the truth of the 
report, but he is in no position to check the independence and veracity beyond his interface of 
ten. Dependency in one or more chains may have occurred at some stage in the transmission 
making the probability of delivering a false report higher. The same can be said about the 
veracity of reporters. The problem is not in the idea that transmitting a report via multiple 
independent channels by veracious people merits certainty of the report; the problem only lies 
in the difficulty for the subject who receives the report to check that these conditions have 
indeed been met.351 The same logic applies to written material. A historical book published in 
modern times is likely the work of an editor who used historical manuscripts for the book as 
well as the required historical analysis and cross-checks. His sources may be many and 
independent making him confident of the historicity of the publication; but the ordinary reader 
depends almost entirely on his confidence on the editor or the publisher. In short, any report 
which is being transmitted from the distant past or is impossible to check all its stages of 
transmission is vulnerable to its dependence on its final stage to convey certainty to the 
receiver.352 
Another problem with tawatur is its evident historical and contemporary failures. Tawatur, 
even for the usulis, is an unbiased method for transmitting testimony. It delivers knowledge to 
hearers regardless of their background or faith. In this sense, tawatur should assure non-
Muslims, who are exposed to the same sources of information as Muslims, of the truth of the 
Quran, which is evidently not the case. Similarly, non-Christians, Muslims in particular, who are 
exposed to the same sources of information as Christians should know/believe that Jesus was 
crucified since Christians have this information ostensibly by tawatur; but Muslims deny it. The 
usulis argue that the tawatur of reports that Jesus was crucified is only putative; but their 
 
351 For more on corroborative reports see: Coady 211–223. 
352 ibid; the diagrams given by Coady offer a better understanding of this analysis. 
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justification for this claim is again circular. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ argues that since the Quran, which is 
proven authentic with true evidence, affirms that Jesus was not crucified, then we know that 
the reports about his crucifixion are not mutawatir.353 He ignored that he used Quran, which 
relies for authenticity on tawatur, to make the case for tawatur. Ghazali was slightly more 
subtle but equally unconvincing when he argued that the people who reported seeing Jesus 
being crucified where deluded because the likeness of Jesus was put on someone else who was 
crucified. Ghazali then responded to the possibility of this kind of delusion undermining any 
report or knowledge; he argued that this was only possible in the time of miracles which is now 
gone.354 
Other examples of tawatur failure where given by al-Juwaini who tried to respond to them. His 
first example was the disagreement of reports about how the Prophet performed his pilgrimage 
(hajj). This disagreement is clearly problematic since the Prophet performed the hajj among 
thousands of Muslims who were mostly following him to learn the rituals; how is it, then, that 
this remarkably witnessed event was reported in disagreement? Al-juwaini’s response was to 
argue that both – reported – ways of hajj were valid. This of course was beside the point; and 
he seems to realize this when he remarked that we should not doubt the necessities because of 
delusions. The second example was the miracle of the cleft of the moon. This was supposed to 
be seen by many people in the planet and, being such a miraculous phenomenon, to be 
reported so widely that most, if not all, people will know about it and it would be recorded in 
history as an unforgettable event. None of this actually happened and al-Juwaini argued that it 
could be because it happened at night when most people were sleeping, and he alternatively 
dismissed the event as an optical delusion. Again, he remarked that what is necessary should 
not be doubted by delusion. The final example he gave was the different reports on how the 
second calling for prayer (iqāmah) was done. This was done five times a day to call for the 
prayer which most Muslims performed together with the Prophet. How can there be two 
different reports about this extremely regular call? In fact, the call for prayer is more regularly 
performed and heard by Muslims than any part of the Quran (less al-fātiḥa perhaps) as 
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different verses of the Quran are read in prayer, and only in three prayers a day is Quran read 
aloud. The same words, on the other hand, are said for iqāmah five times a day making it 
extremely likely to be well known by heart and thus, accurately reported. Al-Juwaini’s response 
to this was that the iqamah was a trivial matter in religion and so the companions did not pay it 
much attention or care.355  
It should not be contentious that al-Juwaini’s responses to the problems he raised only affirm 
the doubts about the reliability of tawatur rather than dismiss them. His apologetic remarks 
that some knowledge is necessary and should not be doubted is echoed by other usulis.356 It 
only reveals an appeal to authority and lack of objective analysis. 
 
Is Quran mutawatir? The problem of Qiraʾat 
Variation in the reports of how the Quran was read by the Prophet Muhammad naturally raises 
doubt about the authenticity of some, or all, of the reports about the Quran itself. It is natural 
to assume that some of the variants reported are only mistakes that occurred during 
transmission, and not necessarily all said by the Prophet. In response to this possible doubt the 
‘Science of Readings’ (ʿilm al-qiraʾat) was developed in the Muslim discourse about the Quran. 
The cornerstone of this science is a hadith that was narrated in many versions about the Quran 
being revealed in seven letters ‘sabʿat aḥruf’. The report tells that Umar Ibn al-Khaṭṭāb heard 
Hishām Ibn Hakīm recite part of Quran in a way different than what he learned from the 
Prophet. Umar took Hisham to the Prophet to enquire which reading was correct and the 
Prophet told them that both were correct, that the Quran was revealed in ‘Seven Letters’ 
(sabʿat aḥruf), and they should read as they could.357 Other versions of the hadith tell that the 
Prophet was given the Quran in one letter, but he asked for more to make it easier for his 
community, so he was eventually given seven letters.358 
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The concept of the seven letters is a mystery in Islam; there is no clear idea about what they 
mean. Suyūṭī enumerates thirty-five different opinions on their meaning.359 But the context of 
the hadith indicates that the differences on how the Quran is read are attributed to the 
multitude of its aḥruf; emphasis being on multiplicity rather than aḥruf, thus neutralizing its 
ambiguity. In fact, even the specificity of the number seven is made pointless since the nature 
of what is numbered is not known. This explains the debate on whether all the valid readings of 
the Quran are only one of the aḥruf as argued by al-Tabari,360 or some of the aḥruf as argued by 
Makki Ibn Abi Talib.361 It seems from the different arguments that, in any case, all existing 
Quran does not exhaust all seven aḥruf. This makes it possible to accommodate Quran that was 
soundly transmitted but not canonized, as authentic but invalid, that is, abrogated by the Ijmaʿ 
on the consonantal text362 and the final revision (al-ʿarda al-akhīrah).363 
The historical accounts of the development of qiraʾāt differ slightly in the Muslim literature, but 
the common theme can be summarized as follows:  
When the companions realized that they read the Quran differently, they consulted the 
Prophet who assured them of the legitimacy of their different readings and that the Quran was 
revealed in seven ‘letters’. Thenceforth, the companions did not fault each other on their 
different readings. Some of them travelled to different cities ‘amsār’ and taught the people in 
these cities to read the Quran in their way (reading). The people of different cities, thus, read 
the Quran differently according to their teaching companion. Uthman decided to make an 
official copy of the Quran because he feared that the variation in Quran could grow out of 
control and the Quran could be lost. The Uthmanic master Quran lacked diacritical marks and 
thus was still readable in different ways. The people of the cities, when receiving their copies of 
the official Quran, read it in the way that conformed to the consonantal text as well as to their 
specific reading. The parts of their reading that did not conform to the consonantal text were 
dropped.364 This perhaps reduced the number of variants between amsār readings, but it did 
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not unify them on one reading. The differences were still great and Uthman’s attempt to unify 
Muslims on one Quran seems to have failed; so, some scholars attempted to ‘choose’ a few 
readings upon which the Muslim community could finally agree. Ibn Mujāhid  wrote his book 
‘Kitāb al-Sabʿa fi al-Qiraʾat’ (The book of Seven in Readings) on which he seems to select the 
seven most prominent readers in amsār who enjoyed the Ijmaʿ of the local community of 
readers.365 Makki, after Ibn Mujāhid , devised three conditions only by which is Quran accepted 
as valid.366 Ibn al-Jazari, based on the conditions set by Makki, added three readings to Ibn 
Mujāhid ’s seven bringing the total number of valid Quranic readings to ten.367 Scholars later 
added four readings that did not have the same status as the ten but were considered 
authentic Quran nevertheless; they were called shādhdhah ‘anomalous’.368 
 
 
Historical inconsistencies of qiraʾāt: 
The historical accounts of qiraʾāt start with the hadith of the seven letters and historically 
develop thenceforth. However, as the traditional claim is that the qiraʾāt are all said by the 
Prophet, it is fair to assume that there is much more history for it, and that this history should 
be directly integrated into the history of Quran in general; that is – without being exhaustive -, 
revelation, dictation, writing, collecting, and collating. No reports of such history are available, 
which leaves the concept vulnerable in many respects; this is analysed in what follows. 
First, it is not clear, assuming that all the different qiraʾāt were revealed to the Prophet, 
whether he said the verse with all its different variants to his companions in one occasion or in 
different occasions. There is no report of him reading the Quran in different ways except by 
inferring this from the documentation of the qiraʾāt. In other words, there is no body of reports 
where companions mention that they heard the same verse of Quran in different ways from 
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the Prophet. It is not even reported that the Prophet read the same verses differently in his 
prayers. There is no historical context for the documentation of qiraʾāt; it is usually claimed by 
every reader to have learned his reading from someone in a chain that goes back to a 
companion and that the companion naturally learned it from the Prophet.369 But unlike legal 
matters ‘fiqh’, there is no historical setting where this learning took place and no mention of 
any enquiry about why they are receiving the Quran in different forms.  It is possible that the 
Prophet only revealed a different reading of Quran to legitimize what would have otherwise 
been a mistake by a companion. This would explain the hadith of the seven letters. But, in any 
case, the problem is that we have a huge number of variants in the Quran (thousands) that are 
all attributed to the Prophet, either said or legitimized by him, all existing in a historical 
vacuum. That is, it is not known when, where, in what occasion, or in who’s presence the 
variants of the Quran were given by the Prophet. Something extremely odd considering the 
status of Quran and the importance of its absolute authenticity for Muslims. 
Second, some sources claim that the qiraʾāt only started to be revealed in Madinah.370 This is 
probably due to the fact that Hishām Ibn Hakīm who was mentioned by Umar in the hadith of 
the seven letters only became a Muslim in the day Makkah was conquered by the Prophet, i.e. 
8 A.H.371 What seems to be inexplicable is how the Quran was read in different versions by the 
companions for more than twenty one years without someone realizing the variants in readings 
before then. Even if variants started to be revealed and propagated by the Prophet after Hijra, 
it took eight years for someone, Umar in this case, to realize these variants and enquire the 
Prophet about them. It is unrealistic to assume that the variants only began to be revealed in 
the last two or three years of the Prophet’s life (so as to be historically consistent with the 
hadith of Umar) for how would thousands of Quranic variants be revealed by the Prophet and 
 
369 The method of Ibn Mujahid was to show the teachers of his seven readers as part of his biography of them, 
teachers ending up with a companion. Then he shows how his own reading links to the chosen reader; this 
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example: Nafi ͑was taught by al-a ͑raj who was taught by the companions Abu Huraira and Ibn  ͑abbas. Ibn Mujahid 
was taught by A. Rahman Ibn Abdus who was taught by Hafs al-Azdi who was taught by Ismail Ibn Ja ͑far who was 
taught by Nafi ͑. This is one chain of many between Ibn Mujahid and a companion through one of the seven 
readers. See: Ibn Mujahid, Kitab Al-Sab ͑a Fi Al-Qira ͗at (Dar al-Ma ͑arif 2010) 54,55,88. 
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learned by the companions in this short period, when a single reading of the Quran was 
revealed in twenty-three years? In fact, even if we ignore the hadith of Umar and assume that 
the variants were revealed from the beginning, the huge number of them makes it difficult to 
imagine how they could all be learned by the companions without causing serious confusion. It 
is similarly odd that the Prophet did not mention anything about the multiple versions of Quran 
to his companions until they started faulting each other’s readings and came to him for an 
explanation. One could argue that some earlier enquiries did take place but went unreported; 
but it is extremely unlikely that someone of the stature of Umar will be among the last to know 
about the multiple versions of the Quran. In other words, if the variants in Quran were known 
early on but the reports about them did not reach us, Umar should have known about them 
from the beginning, and the incident between him and Hisham would not have taken place. 
Third,372 it is known that the Prophet was keen on the writing of the Quran immediately after 
he receives a revelation, yet, it has not been reported that the Prophet dictated to his scribes 
the Quran in different readings. We can safely assume, if we follow the traditional discourse on 
the history of the Quran, that the Prophet was consistent with regards to the dictation of 
Quran. This means that he either dictated all different readings of Quran to his scribes to be 
written down, or he only dictated one reading and left the others undocumented; it is unlikely 
that he dictated some readings. The former case seems unrealistic considering the vast number 
of variants and the difficulty of recording even a single version of Quran which was discussed 
above; in addition to the lack of evidence in extant manuscripts. The latter case raises more 
questions. Writing a single version will give it immediate preference over the others which 
would have been a well-known preference, for which there is no historical evidence. It is also 
theologically problematic, for how could God’s words be unequally valued? One could argue 
that all the readings were contained in the primitive text that was flexible due to its lack of 
diacritical marking. This, however, would entail the literacy of the Prophet, which is not 
acceptable in mainstream Islam. More problematically, it would increase the doubt over the 
historicity of qiraʾāt, for it seems more logical that the qiraʾāt conformed to the primitive text 
than that the primitive text incidentally contained all the qiraʾāt. 
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Fourth, all the reports about Zaid’s collection of the Quran during Abu Bakr’s caliphate bear no 
mention of qiraʾāt. Zaid talks about his multiple commissions to write and collect the Quran 
where he had to settle for two witnesses to accept Quran and had, in one occasion, to take 
Quran from one companion only.373 Zaid had difficulties finding a single version of Quran; if he 
was looking for countless versions, his difficulties would have proportionately multiplied and 
would have, thus, been reported. Further, the justification given for Uthman’s commission for a 
master Quran was that the Muslims of Syria and those of Iraq have quarrelled over their 
differences on reading the Quran and this could lead Muslims to differ over their book like the 
Jews and Christians.374 This entails that the greater number of Muslims in these regions (a small 
number would not cause concern) were completely oblivious to the concept of qiraʾāt. These 
quarrels happened around the year 25 A.H.,375 which is seventeen years after the hadith of 
qiraʾāt; one would expect that at least the news of the existence of multiple readings of the 
Quran would have been known to Muslims if not the actual qiraʾāt themselves. The people who 
quarrelled over Quran were allegedly students of Ubai and Ibn Masʿūd;376 both companions 
feature in the hadith of the seven letters377 and, thus, their students would be expected to 
know about the seven letters of Quran. Furthermore, when Uthman decided to unify the Quran 
in one form to prevent these quarrels, he never mentions the seven letters. When he 
commissioned the committee, he told them, in case they disagreed on the language of Quran, 
to write it in the dialect ‘lisān’ of Quraish.378 His terminology does not support the idea of a 
perverse concept of qiraʾāt. This might seem like a trivial point, but it adds to the growing 
suspicion that the concept of multiple divine readings of the Quran which were all to be 
revered and preserved with the same attention, was not present in the early decades of Islam.  
The key to understanding the phenomenon of qiraʾāt in Quran is to acknowledge that Quran 
does not have multiple versions (readings) that constitute the divine revelation;379 Quran, 
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rather, is a text constituent of a number of independent chapters which used to have some 
degree of flexibility in its wording.380 One of the versions of the seven letters hadith mentions 
that one could read Quran with different synonyms as long as one does not change the 
meaning; just like saying ‘hallumma’ or ‘taʿāl’ which both mean ‘come’ in the imperative.381 This 
means that the Prophet himself could have read the Quran, intentionally or not, in slightly 
different ways where he changes a letter or a word. If we give more weight in the concept of 
revelation to meaning rather than wording, it becomes understandable how the Prophet could 
say the same verse with slight difference in the expressions; this licence could have been 
extended to the companions as well.382 This will explain the variants of some companions’ 
Qurans like Ibn Masʿūd and Ubai. If we assume that these variants were very rare during the 
time of the Prophet, and were only due to flexibility in the text rather than divine versions 
which must be known and propagated to all Muslims, we can then understand why Umar only 
realized it in 8 A.H. If we consider Quran in its right context, that is, a seventh century text in a 
primitive milieu, then the potential sources of variation are plenty: scribes’ mistakes; illegible 
script; bad copying; bad memory; misreading or mishearing; and possible others. These variants 
would naturally accumulate in time, and be concentrated in amsār where there, away from the 
main Islamic centres of Makkah and Madinah, would be shortages in resources for learning the 
Quran whether manuscripts or companions. This will explain the quarrel between the Syrians 
and Iraqis which lead to the commission of Uthman’s master copy (al-muṣḥaf al-imām). 
Uthman must have been aware of the few variations in Quran that existed since the time of the 
Prophet as would have been other high-ranking companions and the caliphs before him. These 
variants where mostly tolerated, but the quarrel between the people of amsār perhaps worried 
Uthman, as it did Huzayfa who told him about it, that they might have grown too many, and 
that it might be wise to write a consonantal text that would provide a frame – a limit – for 
variation in Quran so that it would not grow ceaselessly. From then on, all variants that existed 
or developed had to conform to the consonantal text. The variants that did not conform to it 
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did not survive to become canonized Quran but remained as troubling historical Quranic 
anomalies for which a body of apologetic literature was developed.383 The consonantal text still 
could not unify the reading of Quran, so scholars tried to number the canonical readings giving 
Muslims seven, ten, or at most, fourteen readings accepted as authentic Quran. This limitation 
survives until today although the reading of the ‘Hafs ʿan ʿasim’ became dominant in recent 
times. 384 
 
Tawatur of qiraʾāt: 
There is no contention that the Quran we have today is the fruit of a selection process carried, 
not by the Prophet, but mostly by Ibn Mujāhid in the fourth Islamic century. The completion of 
the ten was made by Ibn al-Jazarī in the eighth century. The selection criteria were also a 
matter of opinion (ijtihad). According to Nasser, Ibn Mujāhid chose the readers whom he 
thought were the most prominent and enjoyed the Ijmaʿ of the community of readers in the 
main cities of Islam,385 namely, Makkah, Madinah, Damascus, Basrah, and Kufa; and because 
Kufa had more than one prominent reader he chose three readers bringing the total to 
seven.386 
Until that time, qiraʾāt were authenticated by Ijmaʿ rather than tawatur. They were regarded as 
a form of Sunnah not hadith; Sunnah depended for authenticity on local Ijmaʿ that was 
presumably inherited from the previous generations back to the Prophet.387 But the 
prominence of the Hadith school since the time of Shafiʿi gave more appeal to the method of 
isnad (reports transmission). A combination made by al-Tabari between Ijmaʿ and isnad paved 
the way, according to Noldeke, to the development of the concept of tawatur388 which, being a 
method for obtaining certainty, was used for Quran. Al-Tabari himself, however, did not argue 
that qiraʾāt were mutawatir. Nor did prominent qiraʾāt scholars like Ibn al-Arabi, al-
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Zamakhshari, Ibn Atiyyah, Abu Hatim al-Sijistani, Makki al-Qaysi and others who held the view 
that the canonical readings were the result of the ijtihad and interpretations of the readers 
themselves and are not of divine nature.389 The need for tawatur in qiraʾāt comes, according to 
Nasser, from the fact that, being the primary source of law, the Quran’s authenticity must not 
be questionable or doubted.390 In other words, Quran must be divine and its divinity must be 
absolutely certain; hence the claim for tawatur. 
We have already discussed the flaws in the concept and methodology of tawatur, all of which 
affect qiraʾāt directly. But qiraʾāt suffer further from not being mutawatir even in the eyes of 
scholars who advocate the putative epistemic power of tawatur. This seems to indicate that a 
distinction between Quran and qiraʾāt is possible, since no scholar in mainstream Islam argued 
that Quran was not mutawatir. Nasser called this distinction a ‘dilemma’391 as he seems not to 
have found a convincing argument in the literature about qiraʾāt or Quran to resolve it. A 
possible understanding of the distinction is that what is meant by the mutawatir Quran is the 
consonantal text, while the qiraʾāt are not mutawatir. How the consonantal Quran can be 
mutawatir will still be contentious, but suppose the suggestion is accepted hypothetically, it will 
only give us a certain number of probable individual readings. In other words, arguing for the 
tawatur of a distinct consonantal Quran only affirms the uncertainty of the individual qiraʾāt. 
We will have a probable divine word and a probable source for God’s law. This is perhaps why 
later literature on qiraʾāt was adamant on the tawatur of each of the qira a͗t.392 Absolute fixity, 
authenticity, and divinity are the dominant features of Quran today; a far cry from the flexibility 
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Certainty in interpreting the Quran 
 
Ambiguity of language 
The unknown origins of language 
Bernard G. Weiss identified five principal positions in the pre-modern Muslim thinking about 
the origin of language: 1. the naturalist theory, which attributes the origins of language to a 
natural affinity between expression and the natural things they signify; 2. The conventionalist 
theory, which says that language is an arbitrary choice of names made by a social convention; 3. 
The revalationist theory, which says that language was revealed to man by God; 4. The 
revalationist-conventionalist theory, which says that God revealed the necessary part of 
language to make collaboration possible among people who, thereafter, made up the rest; 5. 
The non-committal (waqf) theory, which regards conventionalist and revalationist as equal 
possibilities.393 
The upshot of the usulis various positions on the origin of language is one of uncertainty; in 
Ghazali’s words, it is “rajm al-ẓann” which is casting uncertain opinions on the matter.394 This is 
no different from the position of modern linguistics, which is still debating the issue; both 
positions being affected by a persistent lack of evidence.395 The Muslims’ uncertainty, however, 
was not confined to lack of scientific evidence but of textual evidence as well. The only Quranic 
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verse which the revalationists rely on is a short statement: “and He taught Adam all the 
names”;396 this could only serve as a speculative allusion to language but not concrete 
evidence.397 And although the position of the revalationists might have been strengthened by 
Genesis which is more lucid about the heavenly origins of language,398 yet, the position of many 
usulis and Muslim linguists remained one of hesitancy and uncertainty.399 Uncertainty about 
the origins of language had indirect implications on hermeneutics. It is indirect because in the 
absence of other factors the origin of language alone is not sufficient in rendering the author 
intent certainly clear. If language was revealed by God it will still have to be transmitted 
perfectly to all human generations before using its divinity as basis for any hermeneutical 
activity. If language was a human construct then it is inherently error-prone, hence, uncertain. 
The origin of language has indirect effects on hermeneutics, however, because it strengthens or 
weakens, depending on one’s position, the claim for understanding author’s intent. A language 
revealed by God is a perfect method of communication, therefore, the process of 
communication: source – medium – destination, will put the onus of perfect communication of 
meaning on the destination, the hearer, as God is a perfect speaker and language is a perfect 
medium. If language was wholly or partially human, then even a perfect receiver cannot 
guarantee perfect communication of meaning. 
 
Uncertain transmission of meanings of words: 
Another problem with language according to the usulis is the uncertain transmission of the 
meanings of words. A non-contemporary exegetist needs to be sure that the Arabic of his time 
is the same as that of the time of revelation, that is, words have kept the same meaning 
through time. For example, the word kalb (dog) must refer in all ages to the same animal. This 
 
396 Quran 2:31 
397 Juwaynī, Al-Burhan Fi Usul al-fiqh 44. Al-Samarqandi 25. 
398 “Out of the ground the LORD God formed every beast of the field and every bird of the sky, and brought them 
to the man to see what he would call them; and whatever the man called a living creature, that was its name. The 
man gave names to all the cattle, and to the birds of the sky, and to every beast of the field, but for Adam there 
was not found a helper suitable for him.” Genesis: 19-20 
399 See: ʻUthmān ibn ʻAbd Allāh Ibn Jinnī, al-Khasạ̄ʼis ̣ (Muḥammad ʻAlī Najjār ed, 1992) i,s,m. 
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consistency is guaranteed, according to some usulis, by tawatur.400 Meanings of common words 
are just too widely used and spread that a radical change in meaning (dog then is cat now) is 
very unlikely. But the problem of inconsistent meaning does not lie mainly with the original 
meaning of the word, it lies, rather, with the use of the word (istiʿmal).401 The word kalb might 
have initially been used to refer to beast, but its use changed in time to be confined to a 
particular animal. It is narrated that the Prophet used the word kalb where the animal in 
question was a lion.402 If the word kalb was used today to refer to a lion it will be misleading if 
not downright wrong. If the hadith of the Prophet, along with any other similar references 
about the word kalb which we can assume to be few, failed to reach us then the use of the 
word kalb to refer to lion would not have been correct in Arabic in any degree despite the 
matching, but disconnected, origin. This means that every time we find the word kalb in any 
text we will understand (dog) while it is possible that the author intended (lion).  
The usulis realized this ambiguity in language caused by the unrestricted istiʿmal (use) of 
expressions; that is, we cannot be sure that the meanings were transmitted to us without 
distortion. For al-Razi, the claim of tawatur of the meanings is unfounded, for scholars have 
disagreed even on the most common words in Islam like Allah, salah (prayer), and zakah (alms); 
other expressions, therefore, have weaker claims for tawatur of meaning, he argues.403 This 
readily applies to Shariah. When Allah says in the Quran that riba is haram (forbidden), how can 
we be absolutely sure that the word riba used in the time of revelation corresponds to what it 
means today? Same question applies to the word haram and all the expressions of the 
imperative and prohibition. This undermines the certainty of discovering author intent in legal 
hermeneutics, something realized not just by Muslim jurists. Gerald L. Bruns argues that 
hermeneutics “can emerge only in a space that is logically anarchic, what Gadamer calls a place 
of “open indeterminacy” where the thing is suddenly otherwise than we thought…The law, like 
most subjects (justice, the good life, politics, philosophy, the right decision, Hamlet, whatever 
 
400 Weiss 62. 
401 Zysow 110. 
402 Tạbarānī.number: 1060 
403 Rāzī, Al-Mahsul Fi    ͑ilm Al-Usul 204–205. 
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makes us think, or anyway think twice), belongs to this place; that is, it is always contested, 
always in question.”404 
 
Types of ambiguity in an expression 
 
In his theory of semantics, Ghazali divides expressions, in their relation to meanings, into four 
types: a) synonyms (mutarādifa), where different expressions give the same meaning; b) 
different (mutabāiyna), where different expressions mean different things (and this is most of 
language according to Ghazali); c) collaborative (mutawāṭiʾa), where one expression refers to 
things that are different in number but have the same meaning like ‘man’ which refers to Zaid 
and  ͑amru and Khalid; d) equivocal (mushtaraka), where one expression refers to different 
things like the word ‘ʿain’ which refers to ‘eye’, ‘scale’, and the place on earth where water 
springs.405 
With the exception of the mutabāiyna type, all these types of expression are ambiguous and, 
thus, further typologies were derived by usulis to the possible ambiguities that can occur in an 
expression. Al-Razi gives five types of ambiguity that can shadow the intended meaning of an 
expression: a) an equivocal expression (mushtarak) which is the same as the one mentioned by 
Ghazali; b) a shift (naql) of the meaning of an expression by way of custom or Sharia (to mean 
something different than what it originally meant in language); c) a figurative expression 
(majāz); d) ellipsis (iḍmār); and e) specialization of a general expression.406 He elaborates on 
this typology arguing that, if the possibility of equivocation and shifting is omitted, then the 
expression has only one literal meaning; if the possibility of figurativeness and ellipsis is 
omitted, the expression has only one intended meaning; and if the possibility of specialization is 
omitted, the expression includes all that falls under its intended meaning; and this should make 
the expression unambiguous, according to al-Razi.407 
 
404 Gerald L Bruns, ‘Law and Language: A Hermeneutics of the Legal Text’ in G Leyh (ed), Legal Hermeneutics: 
History, Theory, and Practice (University of California Press 1992) 32. 
405 Ghazzālī, al-Mustasfạ̄ min ʻilm al-usụ̄l 47. 
406 Rāzī, Al-Mahsul Fi    ͑ilm Al-Usul 351. See also: Zarkashī vol 1. 57 
407 Rāzī, Al-Mahsul Fi    ͑ilm Al-Usul 352. 
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Further from the ambiguities that occur in a single expression, ambiguity can occur in an 
extended expression as in texts, speech, discourse, etc., for example, abrogation; omission; 
disposition; contradiction of reason or Sharia and so on.408 But the more critical ambiguity from 
a legal perspective is the ambiguity in prohibition and imperative expressions. The most 
common form of the imperative, ifʿal (do), has, according to al-Zarkashi, more than thirty 
different uses besides obligation, for example: recommending; guiding; permitting; warning; 
etc.; the only way to distinguish between these uses is context.409 Similarly, al-Zarkashi lists 
fourteen different uses for the prohibition form la tafʿal (don’t do), like requesting; 
supplicating; warning; etc., where a distinction between them needs contextual evidence.410 In 
short, expressions do not have the capacity to convey divine commands or prohibitions, that is, 
divine law, without the aid of context.411 
This undermines the concept of a kalam qaṭʿi al-dalāla (hermetic text) which is meant to assure 
the certain divinity of parts of the law. Many usulis don’t think the Quran contains hermetic 
text or contains very little (ʿizzat al-nuṣūṣ).412 Even the usulis who argue for the abundance of 
nuṣūṣ admit the need of context for most text to qualify as naṣṣ.413 Context will be discussed 
below, but it is important here to stress that linguistic expressions are indecisive in matters of 
law because of their unavoidable ambiguity. “The mujtahid is stymied in the presence of an 
ambiguous expression and may not attempt to formulate the law” argues Weiss, “[l]iteral 
meanings considered apart from the context all have an equal chance of being the intended 
meaning”.414 A statement like the verse ‘la taʾkulū al-riba’ (don’t eat riba) remains ambiguous in 
terms of prohibiting riba until further evidence shows whether ‘don’t’ is prohibitive or not and 




409 Zarkashī v.2 356-363. 
410 ibid  428-429. 
411 Weiss 109. 
412 Juwaynī, Al-Burhan Fi Usul al-fiqh 151. 
413 ibid 
414 Weiss 98. 
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Deciphering the speaker’s intent using context:415 
The most important tool used among the exegetists to disambiguate the expression is context. 
A typology of two kinds of context is usually used: a) linguistic context (siyāq al-maqāl); b) 
context of situation (siyāq al-maqām).416 Both types of context are equally capable of 
disambiguating an expression, however, the use of context cannot always disambiguate 
expressions to the level of certainty. According to Ghazali, different kinds of contextual 
evidence (qaraʾin, sing. qarīna) could have been given by the companions, having witnessed the 
Prophet and understood the divine intention from him, to the following generations of Muslims 
so that they too can understand the divine intention from the texts.417 These qara i͗n, regardless 
of their type, could yield, in relation to the divine intention, necessary knowledge or ẓann 
according to Ghazali.418 It is not clear, however, how to distinguish between the two outcomes. 
The usulis more or less agree that expressions are either naṣṣ (certain, non-probable), ẓāhir 
(more than one meaning is possible with one more probable than others), or mujmal 
(ambiguous) where different meanings are equally possible,419 with differences between the 
usulis on the proportion of language/Quran that belongs to each type.420 They agree further, as 
mentioned above, that ambiguous expressions can be disambiguated with the aid of context. 
But the usulis, in spite of the many and different typologies they constructed in semantics and 
context, have not paid similar heed to typify context in terms of the certainty it yields to 
understand an expression and decipher an author’s intent. For example, if one says: “I saw a 
lion in battle”, one can be fairly certain that ‘lion’ refers to a brave man – context (in this case 
linguistic, qarina) being ‘battle’ –; the possibility of there being a real animal lion in battle is 
quite remote but not entirely impossible. However, if the statement was: “Zaid was a lion in 
 
415 Not all usulis used the word siyāq (context) when discussing the disambiguation of expression; but some of the 
subjects they did discuss like qara ͗in can fall under the rubric of ‘context’. Other usulis spoke directly about the 
importance of siyāq. See: Zarkashī 54. Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, ‘Bada i ͑ Al-Fawa ͗id’ vol 4 
<http://shamela.ws/browse.php/book-12003#page-777>. p. 9. 
416 ʻAwātịf̄ Kanūsh Musṭạfá, al-Dalālah al-siyāqīyah ʻinda al-lughawīyīn (Dār al-Sayyāb lil-Tịbāʻah wa-al-Nashr wa-al-
Tawzīʻ 2007) 52,76. also Juwaynī, Al-Burhan Fi Usul al-fiqh 133. 
417 Ghazzālī, al-Mustasfạ̄ min ʻilm al-usụ̄l 295. 
418 ibid 296. 
419 ibid 294. 
420 Juwaynī, Al-Burhan Fi Usul al-fiqh 150–156. 
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battle” one becomes more certain – absolutely certain in the common-sense world – of the 
metaphorical use of the word ‘lion’. This disparity in the degree of certainty produced by 
context is not typologically structured by the usulis in a similar manner to that of akhbār (oral 
reports) where the hadith is classified strictly according to the degree of authenticity. True, 
examining the certainty of authenticity is far less complicated than finding the real intention of 
an author with demonstrable certainty as the latter has a metaphysical dimension, but the 
problem remains unresolved. 
The problem can be reiterated as follows: the interpreter, in his quest to find Allah’s intention 
from what He says in the Quran in order to promulgate the divine law, is impeded by the 
ambiguity of language. The interpreter uses, mostly, the Quranic context to understand exactly 
what Allah wants. This understanding, however, cannot be uniform in terms of certainty; it is 
inescapably disparate. The classification given by the usulis (certain, probable, ambiguous) is for 
general expressions, and the use of context is supposed to elevate the expression in the 
direction of certainty so the ambiguous becomes probable or certain, and the probable 
becomes more probable or certain. However, there is no normative classification for the post-
context understanding of the expressions/text. The understanding is improved by the context, 
but the question is: how much improved?421 
The importance of this classification stems from the direct correlation between epistemic 
certainty of the text and the changeability of the law.422 This classification relates to the basic 
epistemic dichotomy made by the usulis where cognition is either certain or probable (yaqīn or 
ẓann). This concept is evident in the slightly more elaborate classification of expressions into 
certain, probable, ambiguous. It seems, however, that using context to disambiguate 
expressions in the text does not change this structure nor does it normatively classify the text 
according to the basic dichotomy. The usulis seem to treat the post-context text on a case by 
case bases where classifying the text as being certain or probable is totally subjective. This 
relaxed attitude towards hermeneutical certainty stands in sharp contrast to the complex 
 
421 An example of how context might change the epistemic status is given by the school of Aḥnāf which argues that 
if a general expression (ʿām) is particularized – became khāṣṣ -, it becomes semantically probable (ẓannī). See: 
Muḥammad Abū Zahrah, Abū Hạnīfah : hạyatuhu wa-ʻasṛuh - ārāʼuhu wa-fiqhuh (Maktabat ʻAbd ALl6aMh Wahbah 
1946) 243–250. 
422 Discussed in detail in chapter two. 
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system of classification of text according to the certainty of its authentication process. Every 
text is given a precise classification and every classification is defined and conditioned. 
Hermeneutics, like authentication, springs in a quest for certainty in understanding Allah’s will, 
but it falls short of having its outcome methodologically classified. The basis upon which an 
expression is classified pre-context as certain, probable, or ambiguous is the knowledge of the 
original meaning and use of it in common Arabic. In the linguistic milieu common to most 
usulis, any Arabic speaker can give an uncontentious classification of a common expression. In 
other words, the literal meaning of a commonly used decontextualized expression can easily be 
classified as certain, probable, or ambiguous in relation to that expression. The use of context, 
however, notwithstanding its disambiguating effect on expressions, moves the single 
expression from the particularity of a single word carrying a more or less direct lexical meaning, 
into the more complex sphere of comprehension. So, while the interpreter’s understanding for 
an expression is improved by context, his basis for classifying this understanding as certain 
becomes less objective. 
An example will help clarify the idea. In the verse “O you who have believed, indeed, intoxicants, 
gambling, [sacrificing on] stone alters [to other than Allah], and divining arrows are but 
defilement from the work of Satan, so avoid it that you may be successful”,423 the word 
ijtanibūh (avoid) can be classified as ambiguous in its prohibitive sense as it could mean total 
prohibition or mere dissuasion to the use of intoxicants. This classification of the expression 
‘ijtanibūh’ as ambiguous is straightforward and is made on the basis of common knowledge of 
Arabic; in other words, it is certainly ambiguous. Most interpreters used the mentioning of 
‘work of Satan’ as context to consider ijtanibūh as a prohibition. This understanding will either 
be certain or probable, but the classification in either case will not be made normatively, an 
element of subjectivity will be involved. Admittedly, even the classification of the 
decontextualized expression is not wholly objective, however, asserting a difference between 
the two cases should not be contentious. Context improves our understanding of an ambiguous 
expression, but it also distorts the normativity of classifying this understanding on the scale of 
certainty. 
 
423 Quran 5:90 
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To understand the importance of the normative classification of the interpretation process or 
product, we need only to consider the debate among the usulis and exegetists on what in 
Quran is muḥkam (hermetic) and what is mutashabih (intricate). Juwaini gives a simple 
definition for them: muḥkam is what has a known meaning, and mutashabih is what has an 
obscured meaning and the intention of its speaker is not known;424 and there is further a 
myriad of definitions which do not essentially differ from Juwaini’s.425 
The general usulis rule is that a muḥkam Quranic text produces absolute law. Being in Quran 
means it is certainly authentic, and being unambiguous means knowing Allah’s will with 
certainty; this equals absolute law which cannot be changed under any circumstances. The only 
way for an interpreter to assert the unambiguity of a Quranic text without falling into the trap 
of his own subjectivity, is to be able to normatively classify the meaning of a text as certain or 
ambiguous. Such a system is evidently lacking in usul al-fiqh, hence, claims for absolute law 





Effects on finance law 
 
 Authenticity of the Quran: 
 
The law of Islamic finance, like the rest of Sharia, relies most on Quran for its divinity and 
general guiding ethos but relies on it least for its content and details.426 One can find many 
verses in the Quran that can be indirectly related to what is today known as finance, these will 
 
424 ibid 155. 
425 Tạbarī. 3:7 
426 See chapter 1 for discussion on the proportion of Sharia taken from the Quran. 
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be in the form of ethical traits like honesty, kindness, fairness, etc. But there are a few verses 
that deal directly with finance, these are the verses that prohibit riba, and they will be the focus 
of our enquiry on the effects of certainty in Quran on Islamic finance. 
We have concluded in our above discussion of the authenticity of Quran that the claims for 
absolute certainty regarding its authenticity are unfounded; the most we can say is that it is 
highly probable. The question here is: how does this affect the law of Islamic finance if at all? 
One obvious effect is that anything that relies on Quran as a source cannot exceed it in terms of 
certainty. Sharia, therefore, can be highly probable at best, in relation to it being the intended 
law of Allah. Once the seal of certainty around the Quran is broken, the whole of Sharia 
becomes open for question and criticism; and while this could be theologically troublesome, it 
is jurisprudentially healthy as it allows for adaptation and extended relevance. It helps 
overcome all the constraints that are external to human reason. This does not require proving 
particular verses as being unauthentic, it only requires the atmosphere of openness and the 
allowing of constructive scepticism which is provided by breaking the seal of certainty. 
A more direct effect of the disproving of the certain authenticity of Quran on finance is not 
evident. The verses that mention riba fall outside the controversial areas in Quran like variants 
in manuscripts and different Qiraʾat.427 Therefore, nothing with regards to riba and Islamic 
finance in general can be overturned on the basis of unauthentic or less authentic Quran unless 
the whole of Quran is questioned, in which case the whole of Sharia is questioned. Yet, it is 
important to stress that the concept of an absolutely authentic Quran, universally believed 
among Muslims, provides the backbone for every claim of absolute law in Islam, and the 
prohibition of riba falls under this category. Therefore, it is essential for the analysis of Islamic 
financial law, that we analysed certainty, not merely as a characteristic of some verses, but 
rather, as a concept underpinning the law’s most distinguishing trait, its divinity. 
 
427 A note worth making here is that the word riba is written in Arabic as ربا, but the Uthmanic rasm of Quran, 
which is the standard scripture today, has the word riba written sometimes as ربوا, with the addition of the  و 
syllable. This according to one scholar quoted by al-Tabari is to distinguish riba ربا from zina زنا which means 
adultery, the difference being on the dotting which was absent in the Uthmanic muṣḥaf. This means that the two 
words have exactly the same rasm (script). This confusion was avoided by the context where the expression 
appeared, however, the question of whether this sort of mix up could have happened in other areas of the text 
with legal implications is one worth noting. 
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Absolute certainty for an authentic Quran does not only endow Quranic law with legitimized 
rigidity, but it also legitimises the very idea of epistemic absoluteness. It confirms its possibility, 
and thus, rationalises the quest for it not only in authenticity but in all aspects of religion. It 
becomes presumably possible to demonstrate with certainty, the existence of God, the veracity 
of His Prophets, the authenticity of His books – since at least one of them is certainly authentic, 
it is possible that they all are – and thus, the divinity of His law. Certainty becomes an 
achievable goal and hence, a commendable juristic objective. Therefore, by questioning the 
claim of certainty at its highest level, the authenticity of Quran, it becomes possible to question 
any claim for absoluteness in law, here, financial law. 
 
Interpretation of the verses of riba: 
 
The prohibition of riba stands on the back of four verses (or set of verses) in the Quran. In the 
order of their revelation they are the following: 
a. “And whatever you give for riba to increase within the wealth of people will not increase with 
Allah. But what you give in zakah, desiring the countenance of Allah - those are the multipliers.” 
30:39 
b. “For wrongdoing on the part of the Jews, We made unlawful for them [certain] good foods 
which had been lawful to them, and for their averting from the way of Allah many [people]; And 
[for] their taking of riba while they had been forbidden from it, and their consuming of the 
people's wealth unjustly. And we have prepared for the disbelievers among them a painful 
punishment.” 4:160-161 
c. “O you who have believed, do not consume riba, doubled and multiplied, but fear Allah that you 
may be successful” 3:130 
d. “Those who consume riba cannot stand [on the Day of Resurrection] except as one stands who is 
being beaten by Satan into insanity. That is because they say, "selling is [just] like riba." But 
Allah has permitted selling and has forbidden riba. So whoever has received an admonition from 
his Lord and desists may have what is past, and his affair rests with Allah. But whoever returns 
to [dealing in riba] - those are the companions of the Fire; they will abide eternally therein. Allah 
destroys riba and gives increase for charities. And Allah does not like every sinning disbeliever. 
Indeed, those who believe and do righteous deeds and establish prayer and give zakah will have 
their reward with their Lord, and there will be no fear concerning them, nor will they grieve. O 
you who have believed, fear Allah and give up what remains [due to you] of riba, if you should 
be believers. And if you do not, then be informed of a war [against you] from Allah and His 
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Messenger. But if you repent, you may have your principal - [thus] you do no wrong, nor are you 
wronged. And if someone is in hardship, then [let there be] postponement until [a time of] ease. 
But if you give [from your right as] charity, then it is better for you, if you only knew.” 2:275-280 
 
Our concern here is to examine the degree of certainty by which the prohibition of riba, as it is 
understood in mainstream Islam today, can be supported by the above verses. In other words, 
we are trying to see whether what the verses say with certainty and what the law of Islamic 
finance says give an exact match. It is apt to start by looking at the literal and semantic meaning 
of the word riba. 
The root r+b+ long vowel (a, o, i), from which the word riba is derived, refers to ziyadah 
‘increase’.428 Etymologically, it could share the same Semitic origin with the Hebrew word ribbit, 
also used to refer to usury in the Old Testament.429 Literally, riba is not ambiguous as it does 
not share the same word for unrelated meanings like the word ‘bank’ in English or ‘ʿain’ in 
Arabic; ambiguity, however, comes from the use ‘istiʿmal’ of the word. Fazlur Rahman lists six 
uses for the root r+b+ (a, o, i) in Quran: to grow (22:5); to increase (2:276; 30:39); to rise (23:50; 
2:265); to swell (13:17); to nurture, to raise (17:24; 26:18); and augmentation, increase in 
power (69:10; 16:92).430 This variance in meanings, albeit sharing a common original meaning, 
makes riba ambiguous relative to each particular use. Context, therefore, is used to point the 
reader to the intended meaning. Let us consider the verses above in turn. 
Verse (a): the words ‘wealth’ and ‘zakāh’ (alms) are contextual evidence ‘qarā ͗in’ that riba here 
is money related. However, this verse only speaks of the preference of zakāh, which is a 
charitable giving, to riba which is some form of money given with expectation of some return, it 
does not prohibit riba. It is argued that this Mekkan verse was a prologue to the prohibition of 
riba; a method in Quran for gradually prohibiting practices which were prevalent in society.431 
 
428 Ibn Manzụ̄r riba. ربا 
429 Lewis N Dembitz Executive Committee of the Editorial Board. and Joseph Jacobs, ‘USURY’ 
<http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/14615-usury,>.last seen 03/10/16  
 
430 Rahman Fazlur, ‘RIBĀ AND INTEREST’ [1964] Islamic Studies 1, 1–2 
<https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,shib&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.20832724&site=
eds-live>. 




But riba in this verse does not resemble the usurious practice that was generally considered as 
unethical and prohibited by religions. Riba here was referring to wealth which was given to 
others, sometimes as gifts, not in a charitable manner but with some expected future gain.432 
This verse, therefore, is not, according to some scholars, and cannot be, used as a Quranic 
prohibition of usury or interest. 433 
Verse (b): the reference to the prohibition of riba to the Jews and the mention of “consuming of 
the people's wealth unjustly” is sufficient context to point riba in the direction of a form of 
unethical money transaction practiced by the Jews. As no elaboration was given, the verse 
tacitly implies that riba was known and presumably practiced by the Arab community. The 
verse, however, does not give a detailed description of the practice nor does it explicitly 
prohibit it. It only tells of the prohibition to the Jews. 
Verse (c): riba here is contextualised slightly less lucidly than in other verses by the words 
‘consume’ and ‘doubled and multiplied’. The general context of the verses around it, siyāq, is 
not lucid either, with a brief mentioning of charitable giving, infāq, four verses later. Yet, it 
remains the most pertinent meaning relative to any possible other. Here, we have a ‘do not’, la, 
expression standing as a potential prohibition. But the weak context around and within the 
verse makes it difficult to decide with certainty whether the ‘la’ expression is prohibitive or 
merely dissuading. Further, the implication of ‘doubled and multiplied’ (adʿafan mudāʿafa) is 
not clear. Does it confine the ruling on riba – prohibition or otherwise – to excess (over capital) 
that reaches a hundred percent or more, or is it merely an expression to denote excessiveness? 
This ambiguity stands behind the debate about the distinction between riba and fa ͗ida (usury 
and interest) that has been ongoing in Islam, Christianity, and Judaism for centuries.434 
Verses (d): these five verses are the cornerstone for the prohibition of riba in Islam. The 
description of being beaten to insanity by Satan is meant to give a graphical condemnation to 
those who consume riba, giving a strong indication of prohibition but still not explicit. The use 
of the expression harrama (forbade), however, is an explicit prohibition as the word haram is 
unambiguous in its prohibiting notion. Further evidence for this prohibition are found in the 
 
432 Tạbarī.30:39 
433 This is the conclusion of Rahman’s arguments. See also: Abdullah 16. 
434 ibid 4–10. 
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threat of entering hellfire and more emphatically in the threat of war against Allah and his 
messenger. This puts the prohibition of riba beyond any doubt. 
 As for its meaning, an allusion to what could be a description of riba is found in the distinction 
Allah makes between riba and selling. This distinction is made in response to the Arabs’ claim 
that selling and riba-making are the same as both involve surplus value. To explain this, the 
exegetists explain the Arabs’ practice that was called riba at the time of jahiliyyah (ignorance, 
before Islam). When one is indebted to another (possibly a deferred payment for a sale) and 
the debt is due, the debtor could be offered another deferment in exchange for an increase in 
payment. The Arabs argue that this is a surplus over the original value of what is being 
exchanged, hence, like selling, only the surplus value is put after the transaction is made while 
in selling it is put beforehand.435 Allah made it clear that they are not the same and that He 
prohibited riba and allowed selling. This elaboration relies on historical accounts and is only 
alluded to by the Quran, so, even if it gives a concrete definition of riba, which it does not, it will 
not be a purely Quranic definition. 
Another comparison is made between riba and sadaqāt (alms) and it is made in three of the 
four occasions where riba is mentioned in Quran. This comparison gives context to understand 
riba as being some form of giving to the people in need, only in riba a return with surplus value 
is expected or conditioned whereas sadaqa is a charitable giving with no return from the 
recipient, only reward from Allah is hoped for. Moreover, the notion of ruʾūsu amwālikum (your 
principal or capital) is further evidence that riba is an increase over an original valuable. 
Similarly, the notion of postponing for someone in hardship until a time of ease is evidence that 
riba is a form of lending to someone in need. It is difficult, considering this context, to 
understand riba as being completely independent of the needy nature of the receiver of the 
loan. In modern terms, postponement until a time of ease for a multi-billion petroleum 
company would not seem virtuous even if it was in financial difficulty.  
Contextualising riba should not be selective. Riba got the notion of being an increase over a 
loan only from context, therefore, the context that ties riba to the exploitation of the needy 
should not be ignored in favour of the notion of a universal surplus paid in exchange for time. 
 
435 See: Tạbarī. 2:275;  
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This violates the context and surrenders the clear objective of preventing exploitation and 
profiteering.  
In summary, riba in Quran is an ambiguous expression. Context directed the understanding of 
riba towards a certainly prohibited, but ambiguous form of lending to someone in need. The 
universal prohibition of surplus value in exchange for time which defines riba in fiqh and Islamic 
financial law today seems to be an excerpt only from what the Quran says about riba. It ignores 
the circumstances of the loan, the nature of the borrower, and the objectives of the 
prohibition, all indicated in the Quranic verses. While its prohibition in Quran is certain, a clear 
definition of riba cannot be proclaimed. Therefore, the rigidity of the definition of riba in fiqh 
cannot be attributed to a hermetic Quran. What the Quran tells us about riba remains, as the 
















Certainty in other sources 
 
1 
Certainty in Sunna 
 
The term ‘Sunna’ has evolved in time from a generic term referring to the traditions and 
practices of a community, to a more concise term referring to the traditions and practices of 
the Prophet Muhammad, a development attributed mostly to Shafiʿi.436 However, remnants of 
the original concept of Sunna can still be found in usul al-fiqh in the form of the law of the 
people of the book (shar ͑ man qablana), the legal opinions of the companions (qawl al-ṣaḥābī), 
and the consensus of the scholars or the community (Ijmaʿ). This had implications on the law as 
inherited ‘traditions’ were no longer the main source of law in Islam, but only traditions from 
the Prophet had that legal status along with the Quran.437  
For law to be derived from Sunna, the usulis had to overcome the obstacle of their unanimous 
position that the authenticity of Sunna is only probable and does not share the degree of 
absolute certainty they assign to Quran. Their argument is that, despite its probable 
authenticity, Sunna remains a valid source of law, and to ignore a probable hadith in a matter of 
law would be imprudent and flies against the face of ḥikma (wisdom).438 This complicates the 
issue of certainty in the sphere of Sunna; for the Sunnaic law is, overall, not less rigid than the 
Quranic law. In fact, Sunnaic law does not yield to Quranic law when they are in conflict despite 
 
436 Joseph Schacht, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (OUP 1950) 71. 
437 Schacht, ibid, p. 94 
438 Zysow 25. 
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the undisputed superior authenticity of the Quran.439 So, where does the Sunna get this degree 
of legal certainty? Or, to phrase it differently, on what basis is the rigidity of the Sunnaic law 
justified? This chapter will discuss these questions, but first, it is important to determine where 
and how certainty is claimed in Sunna. 
For the jurists to extract a legal opinion from Sunna, and as was discussed in the case of Quran, 
they need to assert that: a) the text is authentic; b) they understand its meaning; c) it is valid, 
that is, not abrogated or circumstantial; d) it is a legal ruling, not a mere ethical 
recommendation. The certainty of law positively correlates with the certainty of these issues. 
However, and since the Sunna is only probably authentic, the jurists had the added task of 
demonstrating that the probable authenticity of the Sunna does not invalidate its legal 
authority albeit its legal authority relies on some degree of authenticity.  
 
Validity of a probably authentic Sunna: 
It is agreed among scholars that Sunna in the form of the recorded sayings and actions of the 
Prophet are not mutawatir, that is, it is transmitted through a chain of persons less than the 
number of tawatur required to yield certainty. Solitary hadith (khabar al-wāḥid, ḥadīth al-āḥād) 
therefore, does not yield certainty and has probable authenticity at best. Sunna, however, 
remains legally valid and the usulis provided two types of arguments to demonstrate this 
validity; arguments from reason (ʿaql) and arguments from traditions (naql) which include 
Quran, Sunna and Ijmaʿ.440 
The arguments from reason, mostly taken by Hanafis and Muʿtazila, state that if a hadith is 
reported solitarily from the Prophet and decrees a rule to Muslims, and as the obedience of the 
Prophet leads to Heaven and disobedience leads to Hellfire, it is only prudent to abide by the 
 
439 Shāfiʻī, Al-Risala 138–143. 
440 The argument that solitary reports are valid despite being only probable is the position of the majority of usulis 
from all schools. See for example: Ghazzālī, al-Mustasfạ̄ min ʻilm al-usụ̄l 187–190. Al-Samarqandi 250. 
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hadith so long as it is more likely to be authentic than not.441 As the case where we are told 
some action is harmful and we could not qualify this warning with certainty, we are, 
nonetheless, obliged to take the cautious route by not doing the action.442  
The main arguments for the validity of Sunna, however, came from traditions where the work 
of Shafiʿi was most influential. Later works by the usulis were elaborations on Shafiʿi’s efforts 
where they organized the evidence to fit the classical usuli’s structure (Quran, Sunna, Ijmaʿ), but 
the substance of the arguments remains the same.443 Shafiʿi provided numerous examples 
where the Prophet sends single men to deliver messages to people or teach them Islam. He 
sends a single messenger expecting him to be believed by the people he is sent to. For example, 
when the qibla (direction) for prayer changed from Jerusalem to Makkah, a man called out at a 
group of people praying towards Jerusalem that the direction for prayer has been changed to 
Makkah, and they immediately changed their direction towards Makkah.444 Similarly, he tells of 
the case where Quran was revealed to prohibit alcohol (khamr) and the Prophet’s messenger 
went around Madinah informing people of the new prohibition, people immediately spilt the 
khamr they were drinking.445 This tradition of sending and accepting solitary messages was 
continued by the companions.446 And although the usul literature is rich with polemics on this 
issue, where counter-examples are given to show that the Prophet and his companions did not 
simply accept the word of a single person and demanded some form of confirmation,447 Shafiʿi’s 
argument prevailed and the solitary hadith was given legal authority.  
Shafiʿi’s arguments need further qualification, however, for to simply say that we can believe 
and act upon the report of others even when we are not absolutely certain of its truth, seems 
 
441 Comments made by al-Farra ͗, see: Brown, ‘Did the Prophet Say It or Not? The Literal, Historical, and Effective 
Truth of Ḥadīths in Early Sunnism’ 280. 
442 Al-Samarqandi 254. 
443 The dominant view is that Shafiʿi is the founder of usul al-fiqh; see for example: Daniel W Brown, Rethinking 
Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought (Cambridge University Press 1996) 7. For a different view see: Hallaq, ‘Was Al-
Shafiʿi the Master Architect of Islamic Jurisprudence?’ 
444 Shāfiʻī, Al-Risala 270. 
445 ibid 271. 
446 The circularity in the argument of accepting solitary hadith using evidence from solitary hadiths is overcome by 
arguing that the evidence, although solitary in text, are corroborated in meaning (tawatur ma ͑nawi), see: Rāzī, Al-
Mahsul Fi    ͑ilm Al-Usul vol 4. 376 Al-Samarqandi 264. 
447 Ghazzālī, al-Mustasfạ̄ min ʻilm al-usụ̄l 196. Al-Samarqandi 264–265. 
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to be a statement of the obvious. In this sense, proving the epistemic reliability of the 
testimony of others by showing historical examples where the Prophet and his companions 
accepted and used solitary reports, is similarly pointless. But the problem Shafiʿi and the usulis 
were tackling was, apparently, to determine whether solitary reports were acceptable in 
matters of religion, in particular, matters of law. This explains the distinction made between 
usul (roots) and furu  ͑(branches, i.e. positive law) where solitary reports are only accepted in 
the latter. It makes the arguments from reason obsolete as it does not deal exclusively with the 
particular problem of religious epistemology but make the case for testimony in general. The 
remaining support, therefore, for the validity of solitary reports are the historical precedents 
from the Prophet and his companions.  
But the problem goes deeper and needs to be better formulated. How do the usulis know that 
the actions of the Prophet and his companions were a sanctioning of solitary reports as a 
source of law and not just a natural response to testimony regardless of the nature of the 
matter being reported? In other words, rather than to argue that the acceptance of the Prophet 
and his companions for solitary reports in matters of religion justifies their use as a source of 
law, we could argue that this acceptance only negates the distinction of religious matters with 
regards to testimony. But if there is no difference between accepting testimony in daily matters 
and in matters of Sharia, why would the usulis take the trouble of making that distinction and 
then try to prove that testimony can still be accepted in matters of Sharia? Why create a 
problem then solve it? 
To understand this, we must consider the possibility that the usulis, particularly since Shafiʿi, 
were influenced by the certainty of the Quran. The perceived certainty of the Quran gave the 
Quranic law a great degree of certainty. Muslims were anxious about not finding the true paths 
to, and the true will of, Allah, and Quran, perceived as demonstrably certain, legitimized the 
quest for certainty for it was considered an achievable goal.448 But the Quranic law was quite 
limited and did not provide society with a comprehensive body of law. More sources were 
needed, and before the prevalence of the Prophet’s Sunna with Shafiʿi, a mixture of ijtihad and 
 
448 This was discussed in chapters 1 and 3. 
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Ijmaʿ of local communities provided the main sources for law.449 These sources, however, had 
not the divine sanctioning nor the certainty of the Quran, and, thus, inject uncertainty in Sharia 
and the true path to Allah. Shafiʿi, therefore, resorted to the closest source to the Quran, the 
Sunna of the Prophet. Shafiʿi assured us of the divinity of Sunna by giving evidence from the 
Quran and Sunna that the Prophet does not “speak of [his own] inclination. It is not but a 
revelation revealed”.450 He still had to solve the problem of authenticity before Sunna can be a 
divine source of law, but could not vouch for Sunna being authentic as by his time forgery was 
already rife and there was agreement that it could not be used without serious scrutiny,451 thus, 
it would not reach certain authenticity. So, Shafiʿi argued instead for the validity of hadith if it 
reached the level of ẓann (more than 50% probability).452 By combining divinity and certain 
validity, Sunna was the best additional source of Sharia because it was vast and diverse, and 
with the use of qiyas, the jurists were supposedly able to cover the occasional lacunae. 
The evidence given by Shafiʿi in support for hadith do not seem substantively different from the 
evidence used by epistemologists to assert the reliability of testimony, but Shafiʿi wants 
different results from them. Testimony, according to epistemologists, is very reliable and 
indeed indispensable as a source of human knowledge.453 Yet, and as the case with other 
sources of knowledge, it remains fallible and must not be taken for granted, which is, according 
to Coady, actually how people receive testimony. He argues that “the reception of testimony is 
normally unreflective but is not thereby uncritical”.454 This concept is not candidly rejected by 
usulis, but its application is mostly superficial. Usulis claim for hadith all the merits of 
testimony, that is, its reliability as the source behind most people’s beliefs and the validity for 
their actions. On the other hand, they deny testimony’s shortcomings in hadith without 
 
449 Schacht, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence 21–58. 
450 Quran 53:4 
451 GHA Juynboll, Muslim Tradition : Studies in Chronology, Provenance and Authorship of Early Hạdīth (Online 
Cambridge Books ed, Cambridge University Press) 75. Ignáz Goldziher, Dirāsāt Muḥamadīyah (al-Ṣiddīq Bashīr Naṣr 
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453 See also: David Hume, ‘An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding’ 84. Coady 9.  
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showing how the reliability of hadith can be demonstrated differently to that of normal 
testimony. This can be illustrated further by a few examples. 
First, testimony can sometimes be checked, and actions taken based upon it can be reversible. 
Someone can ask a stranger in the street for directions and, believing him, take the route he 
described. In the event these directions were wrong (whether he was intentionally deceiving or 
simply mistaken is irrelevant here), the lost enquirer can return to his initial position or ask 
again, this time with more attention to who he asks and the information he receives. The same 
can be said about testimony regarding the day’s weather or stock prices. Hadith, however, is 
testimony about past events which cannot be checked from their original source nor can the 
actions (namely legislation) made on its account be reversed or changed if the original basis on 
which the testimony was accepted did not change. Again, this is different in normal testimony. 
Testimony is accepted in the casual daily interactions of people as well as in formal settings like 
science and law, but there is no dogmatic attachment to its validity. The advancement of 
science is in many respects a correction of historical misconceptions: people have believed 
since ancient times that the earth is the centre of the universe, but when new evidence were 
found, new conceptions were adopted. Similarly, a retrial is possible for a legal case should new 
evidence appear.455 Validity of hadith, however, cannot be rejected so long as its authenticity is 
considered probable by the scholars. Any exogenous evidence, that is, evidence external to the 
framework of hadith criticism, namely isnad, will have no effect on its validity.456 This explains 
the absurdity of some conceptions held by many Muslims today like the idea that Earth is static 
or that Epilepsy is caused by the devil. Effects on the law are graver. Slavery and child marriage 
are permitted in Sharia on the basis of hadiths (and Quran in some cases); this not only goes 
against universal modern values, but also against what many modern Muslim thinkers consider 
as the core Islamic principles of human rights.457 To reconcile between seemingly contradicting 
 
455 ‘Retrials of Serious Offences: Legal Guidance: Crown Prosecution Service’ (The Crown Prosecution Service) 
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texts or a text with a general principle, the usulis use a number of different methods such as the 
particularization of a general principle. The main objective of these methods is to make sure 
that no text, Quran or hadith, is made obsolete for contradicting another text or going against 
reason or common sense.458 The uncertain authenticity in hadith is, thus, completely mitigated 
by an impenetrable validity which consolidates the Sunnaic law to the level of rigidity similar to 
that of Quranic law. 
Second, the validity of testimony as basis for action is proportional to the context of the 
testimony and the action to be taken.459 If a student tells his colleague that their revision 
session in college is cancelled the colleague may just take his word for it. If the testimony, 
however, was that an exam was cancelled, it is likely that the colleague will seek some 
verification before deciding not to go. Believing the word of others does not always depend on 
their supposed veracity, the gravity of what is being reported affects the level of credulity. 
Hadith, on the other hand, has a uniform methodology to check authenticity; disparity in the 
contents of hadiths does not entail variance in the authentication methods.460 A brief look at 
one of the major books of hadith will provide ample evidence for this. The musnad of Ahmad b. 
Hanbal relates from the narration of Abu Huraira that the Prophet said “should one of you put 
on his shoes let him start with the right one, and the left when taking them off; and if one’s 
shoe is torn up, let him not walk on a single shoe, either take off the pair or walk on them 
both”.461 Another hadith says “if a fly falls into the drink of one of you, he should dip it, for one 
of its wings has the disease and the other has the cure”.462 A third hadith says “Imams (leaders) 
should be from Quraish”.463 It is clear that the implications of these different hadiths vary 
 
458 This is what is called tarjīḥ in the case of taʿarud al-adillah ‘contradiction of evidence’. For example see: 
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greatly as the first hadith only teaches how to wear one’s shoes; the second can have 
considerable health implications; and the third draws serious limitations on the political system 
of Muslims. Despite the evident disparity in their potential outcomes, Ahmad b. Hanbal used 
the same methodology to check the authenticity of these hadiths, and since they have the same 
degree of authenticity, that is, they are all probable, they are thereby legally authoritative. Even 
if we suppose that the methodology used to critique hadith authenticity is the best possible, 
which it is not, in other words, if hadith criticism is uniformly adjusted to the highest level, 
satisfying thereby the required level of authentication for the important issues and being over-
critical to the trivial ones, the problem is still not resolved. The contention here is about the 
validity given to hadiths that fall short of perfect authenticity; why are disparate issues in 
hadiths given equal legal validity only on the basis of equal levels of authenticity? There is no 
danger in validating a rule that tells a Muslim how to wear his shoe based on a probable hadith; 
the danger lies, however, in considering the measure of authenticity as sufficient in validating 
any law (system of government for example), irrespective of its legal magnitude. More so when 
the authenticity justifying such validation is only probable. 
 Third, believing the word of others is essentially a subjective stance. The fact that all people 
accept testimony habitually and without extensive examination only indicates that they are 
economizing their time and effort by not being needlessly sceptical.464 It does not imply, 
however, that they are under any obligation to accept it. As absurd as the suggestion might be, 
it is more or less what is required in the case of Sunna. A hadith is, in essence, a testimony 
about what the Prophet said or did. Believing this testimony should be a personal position that 
relies entirely on the hearer. But hadith is a testimony that has been authenticated, i.e. 
believed to be true, by scholars of hadith, and the rest of the Muslim community can only 
submit to their assessment. In other words, most of the law that governs the whole Muslim 
community is based upon the faith of a few scholars on the truth of the testimony of a few 
others. On its own, this might not be a problem, since it is possible to have social norms or law 
based on similar grounds. These normative systems, however, do not rely solely on the 
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historicity for their validity; other factors play a role in determining law, not least its 
functionality.465 For this reason, even if some lawyers doubt the historicity of a certain 
document or testimony on which the law is based, they could still accept or challenge the law 
on the basis of more objective measures such as functionality or benefit to society. The 
subjectivity regarding testimony’s authenticity is neutralized by considering the validity of the 
law from different angles. Sunnaic law, on the other hand, is validated basically on authenticity; 
paying little regards to the subjective nature of this measurement. Furthermore, using the 
methodology of hadith criticism does not significantly objectify the authentication process since 
it depends mostly on the personal appraisal of the report deliverer made by the receiver. In 
other words, testimony about what the Prophet said depends essentially on testimony about 
the veracity and competence of the people who transmitted it. The methodology which is 
supposed to mitigate the subjectivity of the authentication process is, in itself, built upon the 
personal opinions of the people involved.466 
In light of the above examples, the paradox of the usulis position regarding the validity of 
hadith has become evident. The argument from reason is simply stating the reasonability of 
believing the word of others in the absence of strong reasons not to. In this, it differs not from 
normal testimony. The argument from traditions, on the other hand, suffers from begging the 
question as it justifies testimony using evidences from testimony. The usulis argue that 
traditions about the Prophet’s acceptance of testimony are certain on the basis of testimony 
that is concurrent in substance rather than form or letter, sometimes referred to as tawatur 
maʿnawi.467 The vague concept of tawatur maʿnawi falls under the suspicion of being used to 
conveniently provide certainty when it is jurisprudentially necessary.468  
But the argument from tradition has more pressing problems. Firstly, it only provides as 
evidence incidents when the Prophet or his companions used or accepted solitary testimony, 
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which can be countered by other incidents where they acted sceptically. The debate on which 
incidents overrule the others or how to reconcile between them is not easily settled in favour of 
either.469 Even when the acceptance of testimony is preferred, the debatable nature of the 
matter should undermine the universal validity given to solitary hadith. For, according to the 
usulis rules, fiqh of furuʿ can be based on probable sources, but the validity of solitary hadith 
belongs to usul, for which only certain evidence can be used.470 Secondly, hadith must be 
identified in relation to testimony. If hadith is indeed a form of testimony, the evidence given 
by the usulis to support its validity are redundant since the matter is uncontentious in the first 
place. At the same time, the usulis need to demonstrate how the shortcomings of testimony 
are circumvented in hadith, in other words, they need to explain their selectivity with regards 
to methodology. If, on the other hand, hadith is not a form of testimony – a questionable 
proposition in its own right – then the usulis need to identify it in an epistemological 
framework. Furthermore, they will need to provide evidence to support it as a unique source of 
knowledge. Using the evidence of historical incidents, in addition to being countered by other 
incidents as mentioned above, will only drag hadith back to the sphere of normal testimony. 
The usulis don’t have evidence to distinguish hadith epistemologically from testimony, nor have 
they arguments to explain why they consider hadith immune from the epistemological 
problems of testimony.  
Using authenticity as basis for validity: 
The relationship between the authenticity of hadith and its validity is a complicated one. In 
theory, authenticity causes hadith to be legally valid, but the relation is not correlative. Hadith 
authenticity varies continuously in a spectrum that ranges between false and authentic, while 
validity has a binary variability: valid/invalid. Once a hadith passes the 50% mark in authenticity 
it triggers its status to change from invalid to valid.471 This status remains constant while the 
authenticity keeps varying. Portraying the relationship between authenticity and validity in 
hadith as being in the form of probable-valid or improbable-invalid would be a misleading 
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simplification because it would miss the crucial point where the work of hadith scholars seems 
to continue on authenticity even when hadith is already considered legally valid.472 The 
question, therefore, becomes: what virtue is there in pursuing the authentication process 
further to the point of making the hadith valid? True, the study of hadith has grown to become 
an independent field of study rather than part of the study of law. But the tremendous efforts 
made by hadith scholars to authenticate reports about the Prophet to the highest degree 
possible would seem of little value if we take away hadith’s contribution to Sharia. The efforts 
made for authentication, in other words, seem disproportionate to the requirements of the 
law, while the law seems to be the main raison d’etre for the science of hadith.473 
Wael Hallaq, one of the few who addressed this problem, argues that the scholarly output 
concerned with the authenticity of hadith is pointless and that we need not squander our 
efforts critiquing authenticity when the scholars of hadith and the usulis alike acknowledge that 
hadith is only probable.474 The gist of Hallaq’s arguments seems to lie in his distinction 
between, on the one hand, the concept of ʿamal or the praxis aspect of the Prophet’s 
traditions, which is the central interest of the traditionists, and on the other hand, 
epistemological certainty, which is the central interest of the usulis. Conflating the two, created 
a ‘pseudo problem’ where Orientalist have needlessly focused their efforts on studying the 
works of the traditionists in an epistemological context. 
It is important to distinguish, however, between the concept of epistemic or literal certainty 
like that of Descartes and that of historical reliability or the ‘common-sense’ certainty of 
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Thomas Reid, according to Jonathan Brown.475 He argues that Hallaq’s work is misleading 
because “[i]t might lead us into thinking that the epistemological probability with which Muslim 
scholars viewed āḥād hadiths meant that they believed that these hadiths were only "probably" 
true in our conventional sense of the word, and that they harboured effective doubts about the 
reliability of these hadiths”.476 Brown is essentially arguing that the terminology in the literature 
of hadith (and possibly usul too) is not hermetically concise. The words ‘yaqīn , qatʿ,ʿilm’ all 
mean knowledge or certainty, but the semantics must be carefully distinguished. In this sense, 
what is probable in the epistemic sense can be certain in the historical, ‘daily life’ sense.477 This 
historical certainty was sufficient for matters of law and it found its way even in matters of 
theology which is pronounced by most usulis as a domain only for evidence that are 
epistemologically certain.478 This makes epistemic certainty an intellectual luxury that had no 
practical use or influence. Hadith, therefore, although epistemologically probable, is historically 
certain in the eyes of hadith scholars, according to Brown’s arguments. This helps explain, he 
argues, the universal validation of hadiths, even those that did not acquire the required 
soundness.479  
But the obsoleteness of the concept of epistemic certainty makes Brown’s rebuttal of Hallaq 
miss the point. If “that superior level of certainty simply does not exist for men” as Brown 
rightly notes from the writings of the Muslim scholars,480 then surely the hadith scholars were 
striving for the achievable historical certainty; therefore, when they say that hadith is sound 
‘saḥīḥ’, it is not a proclamation nor a negation of its historical certainty, it is simply an 
acknowledgement of its reliability as a source of knowledge about Islam.481 That is not to say, 
that they did not believe the hadiths to be true, it is only to say that this belief was not declared 
 
475 Brown, ‘Did the Prophet Say It or Not? The Literal, Historical, and Effective Truth of Ḥadīths in Early Sunnism’ 
262. 
476 ibid 
477 This is known in epistemology as contextualism. See ch.7 in Nagel 87–101. 
478 Brown, ‘Did the Prophet Say It or Not? The Literal, Historical, and Effective Truth of Ḥadīths in Early Sunnism’ (n 
145) n 34.  
479 ibid. 285 
480 ibid. 269 
481 Abu Rayyah citing Nawawi, Abū Rayyah 281.  and others in 287. See also: Zysow 23. “Sahih hadith should not be 
confused with certain hadith. Clear evidence that sahih is not to be taken in the sense of authentic is its frequent 
use in the elative”  
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in their methodology. In other words, their use of terminology is not arbitrary. What they 
conspicuously declared is the soundness or weakness of hadith; a terminology that deliberately 
avoids the trap of epistemology and is more geared towards the practical uses of hadith. 
To reiterate the problem in plainer terms, it can be presented as follows. Muslims who espouse 
Islam as a way of life will look to the Prophet as the ultimate exemplar for a life that truly 
adheres to the principles of Islam. The reports about the Prophet, thus, became significant in 
Islam as they depict a near-complete picture of the Prophet’s life, from the details of how to lie 
down for sleep to the rules of war and government. Naturally, scholars needed to check the 
truth of these reports as mistakes and fabrications were always expected and taking place. A 
system was developed to meet this very objective: to check the truth of the reports about the 
Prophet to the best possible degree in order for Muslims to find guidance in their lives. To this 
end, epistemic certainty was not required as it was unattainable. And although many scholars 
believed that a saḥīḥ  hadith yields the historical certainty that Brown described,482 the fact 
remains that most hadith scholars did not claim any sort of certainty to their methodology.483 A  
saḥīḥ  hadith is a hadith that meets the objective, that is, it can be used as a source of guidance 
to how the Prophet lived and what he taught. Against this background, we can better 
understand the problem at hand: why did the usulis and hadith scholars accept the conspicuous 
mismatch between the hadith authenticity which is measured in an infinitely gradable scale and 
the validity of hadith which is dichotomized into valid/invalid when validity is clearly subject to 
gradated authenticity? How can we appeal against the validity of a hadith that has high 
implications on Muslim communities while its probability is at the lower end of the scale of 
ẓann? How can Muslims change a Sunnaic law if its validity, under the pressures of changing 
times and circumstances, proves problematic while its soundness remains the same? 
A constructive analysis of Sunna and its role in Islam must critically analyse the two main 
constituents of its methodology, soundness and validity, and it must start with soundness as it 
 
482 The position of later Zahiris, see ibid 32.It is also one of the confusingly contradictory opinions of Ahmad b. 
Hanbal; see Brown, ‘Did the Prophet Say It or Not? The Literal, Historical, and Effective Truth of Ḥadīths in Early 
Sunnism’ 272–273. 
483 Abū Rayyah 277. 
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is a prerequisite for validity. For what is the point in examining hadiths that have no role in 
shaping the ideas and practices in Islam? In this light, we can credit the efforts of many 
Orientalists since the problem they discussed about hadiths, contrary to Hallaq’s argument, is a 
real one. It is fair to assume that their critique of hadiths is directed, as it should, towards its 
proclaimed soundness and validity. It is to challenge the concept of hadith being a reliable 
depiction of the life of the Prophet, and hence, a source of knowledge and law in Islam. It is 
difficult to perceive the likes of Goldziher, missing this basic concept.484 Nonetheless, in order 
to understand the dynamics of Sunnaic law, we need, further to examining the authenticity of 
hadith to which much effort has been put, to examine its curious relation to the legal validity it 
engenders. 
Firstly, the binary division of validity is not arbitrary. Methodologically, authenticity is also 
binary:  saḥīḥ /daʿif.485 Admittedly, there are many divisions identified under each of these two 
main types with different degrees of authenticity, but the criteria upon which hadith 
authenticity is classified makes it possible to rank hadiths in a continuum with no taxonomy 
able to capture the variety in their authenticity. A hadith might be better corroborated, or its 
chain of transmission might contain people more revered or it might have any other measure 
by which the notion of ‘sounder’ (aṣaḥḥa) can be assigned.486 To structure hadiths in a 
methodological framework, a limited but defined taxonomy was needed, thus, hadith was 
either sound or weak, hence, the corresponding valid/invalid classification. 
 
484 Hallaq maintains that Goldziher did not understand the usulis position regarding hadith. He argues “I for one do 
not believe that Goldziher, for instance, would have raised such a fuss over the reliability of the hadith as a 
historical source had he understood the traditional scholars to acknowledge that the hadith's veracity cannot be 
known apodictically and that its authenticity can be asserted only in probabilistic terms”, Wael B. Hallaq, ‘The 
Authenticity of Prophetic Ḥadîth: A Pseudo-Problem’ 81. 
485 A third category of ‘hasan’ (fair) was arguably introduced by al-Tirmithi but it did not gain popular usage as the 
original two categories. See Brown, ‘Did the Prophet Say It or Not? The Literal, Historical, and Effective Truth of 
Ḥadīths in Early Sunnism’ 278. n89. Ibn al-Salah shared the opinion of the trio categorization but Ibn Kathir argued 
that this categorization was superficial. See: ̣ ʻUthmān ibn ʻAbd al-Rahṃān Ibn al-Sạlāh, Muqaddamat Ibn Al-Salah 
Fi ’Ulum Al-Hadith (1972) 7. Ismāʻīl ibn ʻUmar Ibn Kathīr, Ikhtisạ̄r ʻulūm al-Hạdīth, aw, al-Bāʻith al-hạthīth ilá 
maʻrifat ʻulūm al-Hạdīth (Aḥmad Muḥammad Shākir and ̣ ʻUthmān ibn ʻAbd al-Rahṃān Ibn al-Sạlāh eds, [s.n] 1936) 
6. 
486 For more on the different types of Sahih and Da ͑if see Ibn al-Sạlāh 6. For a more critical analysis on the subject 




Secondly, this binary classification came at a cost. For had the taxonomy been more divisible, 
where the saḥīḥ  classification is divided into a greater number of gradated classes of 
authenticity, then a corresponding criteria for validation might have been possible where 
matters of low Sharia implications can be validated by lower grades of authenticity and vice 
versa. But a ubiquitous validation was in order as a result of an over-reductive classification of 
authenticity. Even the introduction of the hasan classification did not help since its difference 
from saḥīḥ was vague and thus did not annex any validation license of its own. 
Thirdly, a possible explanation for why the hadith scholars used a reductive dichotomy in their 
authentication methodology is that they were mostly setting the conditions for accepting 
hadith very high it could hardly be improved. Al-Bukhari allegedly, selected 4000 hadiths from a 
collection of 300,000.487 Any hadith that passes through their highly refined filters was 
considered worthy of validation. This presumption eliminates, supposedly, the need to further 
divide saḥīḥ into many sub-divisions because the lowest ranking saḥīḥ will still be authentic 
enough to be valid. The requirements of saḥīḥ, however, are considerably lower than those of 
al-Bukhari. This explains why the saḥīḥs of al-Bukhari, which are considered the most 
authentic488 as he had the most rigorous conditions for accepting a hadith to his book, are only 
as legally valid as the qualitatively inferior collections like those of Abu Dauud or Ahmad b. 
Hanbal. In other words, the clear preference of some hadiths to others and some collections to 
others in authenticity did not reflect strongly on legal matters. 
To further clarify our problematization of the relation between authenticity and validity, we can 
draw on H. L. A. Hart’s concept of ‘secondary rules’, in particular, the ‘rule of recognition’ and 
the ‘rule of change’.489 According to Hart, the ‘rule of recognition’ “will specify some feature or 
features possession of which by a suggested rule is taken as a conclusive affirmative indication 
that it is a rule of the group to be supported by the social pressure it exerts.”490 Put simply, it is 
the rule by which we validate a primary rule. The ‘rule of change’, on the other hand, 
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488 ibid 9. 
489 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press; 1994) 94–96. 
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empowers an individual or body of persons to introduce new primary rules or to eliminate old 
ones.491 Using Hart’s system, the soundness of hadith belongs to the rules of recognition in 
Sunnaic law or Sharia in general. A rule or a law (fiqh) based on a hadith will be ‘recognized’ as a 
rule or a law, i.e. validated, if it is sound (saḥīḥ). Moreover, soundness is the only, hence 
ultimate, rule of recognition for hadith.492 This means that a rule based on a saḥīḥ hadith 
cannot be invalidated by reason, consensus (parliament), or any other means of legislation. It 
has been argued that a hadith will not be accepted if it conflicts with language, certain historical 
facts, reason and common-sense, etc.493 But these considerations, to stay with the Hartian 
system, are subordinates to the conditions relating to sanad. In other words, form (sanad) is 
supreme to substance (matn), and even in its subordination, matn is only paid lip service.494 
Improvements to the system were always possible. Scholars of hadith could have given more 
weight to the substance of hadith, for example by giving reason primacy over sanad or at least 
parity with it. Similarly, the usulis could have introduced more rules for validating a hadith 
instead of being solely dependent on soundness. An obvious choice will also be the use of 
reason to measure the viability of a hadith as a source of law for a particular circumstance and 
the ability to change the rule accordingly. For example, the Prophet is reported to have 
prohibited the long-distance travel of women without a maḥram (unmarriageable kin). As has 
been argued by some modern scholars, the reasons for this prohibition (safety reasons) are 
absent in modern times, therefore, the validity of this hadith can be overturned to allow 
women to travel freely as long as it is safe to do so.495 In this case, reason is given primacy over 
soundness of hadith, thus, its validity, recognized for being circumstantial, is reversed allowing 
 
491 ibid 95. 
492 For Hart’s concept of ‘ultimate rule of recognition’ see: ibid 105. 
493 Khatịb̄ al-Baghdādī 472. Yūsuf Qaradạ̄wī, Kayfa Nataʻāmalu Maʻa Al-Sunnah Al-Nabawīyah : Maʻālim Wa-
Dạwābit ̣ (Dār al-Shurūq 2000) 100.These arguments were very brief if not superficial in the writings of hadith 
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for a change of rule. And to respond to the problems that might come up from giving total 
primacy for reason over soundness, a proportionate relation between authenticity and validity 
can be useful. If a report from the Prophet implies a rule, then the implications of this rule on 
the Muslim society must be weighed against the rules for its recognition. High implication rules 
must pass rigorous tests for validity: high authenticity, solid reasoning, social utility, etc.496 
But the way in which the usulis and the scholars of hadith have designed their methodologies is 
explicable in light of the quest to divinize Sunnaic law. Change and divinity do not go together in 
Islamic theology. Changing the taxonomy of hadith to accommodate more grades of 
authenticity allowing, thereby, more flexibility in validating or invalidating a particular rule will 
lead to a lesser number of hadith being legally valid or enjoying the same degree of rigidity. This 
is evidenced by the fact that in some cases even weak hadiths were made legally valid to fill 
certain lacunae.497 The implications of fiddling with the relationship between authenticity and 
validity of hadith were unacceptable in the usulis project for a divine Sharia. A greatly reduced 
corpus of hadith, which will result from a strengthening of its authentication methods, will 
greatly reduce the size of source material which underlies the divine nature of Sharia since the 
lacunae must then be filled with human legislation. Similarly, a corpus of hadith with a less rigid 
validity, will result in an occasional change in Sharia which again will undermine its divinity 
(Allah does not change His mind) as well as its legal certainty. 
It is fair to say that at least most of the work of hadith scholars was a genuine attempt to find 
the true reports about the Prophet of Islam. Some were rigorous in their methods, while others 
gave priority to quantity over quality, thus, amassing larger collections but with less recognition 
for authenticity. It was the usulis, however, who, driven perhaps by a juristic desideratum, 
issued a universal validity to the saḥīḥ. Of course, the fact that this license given by Shafiʿi 
predates the major works of hadith, underscores the argument that scholars of hadith always 
had fiqh in mind while collecting hadith. This may have jeopardized the objectivity of their 
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approach. But it was down to the usulis and jurists to decide how to use this raw material in the 
field of law and they used it indiscriminately.   
 
Legal authority of Sunna: 
What has been discussed so far is the arguments of the usulis on using hadith and Sunna as the 
basis for ʿamal (praxis), but we still need to discuss the validity of Sunna as law.498 Before a 
hadith can be legally binding for Muslims in all times and places, and as can be deduced from 
the different discussions of the usulis regarding the legality of Sunna, it must be examined with 
regards to a few points. First, it must be shown to be intended as law, that is, the Prophet must 
have intended the Sunna as a binding rule not a recommendation or a permission. Second, it 
must be absolute, that is, it must not be circumstantially valid for a particular person/s, time, or 
place and thus, inapplicable otherwise. Third, it must be a revelation not the ijtihad of the 
Prophet. These points can be discussed in more detail. 
Is hadith intended as law? 
With regards to whether an imperative form (ṣīghat al-amr) implies a binding rule, a 
recommendation or a permission, the usulis treat the Sunna in the same light as the Quran. The 
details of how the usulis found it very difficult to distinguish between a binding or non-binding 
imperative/prohibition without contextual evidence can be found in the previous chapter. The 
semantics, however, were confined to the verbal Sunna (al-Sunna al-Qawlīyyah), and thus, the 
usulis needed to consider the implications of the Prophet’s actions (al-Sunna al-fiʿlīyyah) and 
approvals (al-Sunna al-Taqrīrīyyah). If the Prophet, for example, performs a ritual in a certain 
way, does that become a binding form for Muslims? The answer will depend on a number of 
issues, as will the categorization of any Prophetic action as wājib, mandūb, or mubāḥ 
(obligatory, recommended, permitted). For example, his action might be accompanied by some 
evidence pointing the action towards one of the categories above; his action could be an 
elaboration (bayān) to an established rule (the details of performing a prayer); they might be 
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actions exclusive to him and prohibited to the rest of Muslims like his nine marriages and his 
extended fasting; and so on. None of these issues can be settled with certainty nor is there 
agreement among the usulis on the categorizations or their measures. The conclusion from this 
is that nothing from what the Prophet said or did can be certainly binding to all Muslims except 
with the aid of external evidences. The surety provided by the evidences to make the saying or 
action of the Prophet a binding rule is seldom objective, and the most effective surety used by 
the jurists is Ijmaʿ.499 
Circumstantial or absolute validity? 
There is, also, the possibility that when the Prophet order or prohibits something, that this 
order or prohibition is circumstantial, and hence, is not a universally binding rule. Many of the 
invalidations of hadiths are conveniently categorized by the usulis as abrogation. An example of 
this is the hadith where the Prophet prohibited the storing of sacrificial meat over three days, 
but when he knew later that people were having difficulty he explained that he only prohibited 
it because at the time there were nomads passing by Madinah and he wanted the people of 
Madinah to provide for them.500 The problem with the claim of abrogation, although 
convenient in terms of legal certainty, is that it nullifies the original ruling even if the causal 
circumstance recurs. There are instances, however, where circumstantial ruling is not claimed 
to be abrogated. For example, the Prophet is reported to have permitted kissing one’s wife 
during fasting for an older man, while he dissuaded a younger from the same act.501 This 
resulted in the act being permitted by some jurists and prohibited by others.502 Another 
example is that the Prophet is reported to have prohibited the writing of his sayings except for 
Quran but in a different hadith he allowed Abdullah b. Amr to write whatever he hears from 
 
499 For arguments on this topic see: Jasṣạs̄ vol 3.216; Zarkashī vol 4. 168; Āmidī vol 1. 228. 
500 Shāfiʻī, Al-Risala 177. 
501 Muḥammad Shams al-Ḥaqq ʻAẓīmābādī, ʻAwn al-maʻbūd : sharḥ Sunan Abī Dāwūd (Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr Ibn 
Qayyim al-Jawzīyah ed, Dār al-Kutub al-ʻIlmīyah 1998). Number 2384 
502 See the notes of Ibn al-Qayyim, ibid. For a detailed take on the differences between scholars on this see the 
notes of al-Nawawi on hadith number 62 in: Muslim ibn al-Hạjjāj Al-Qushayrī and Yahỵā ibn Sharaf Nawawī, Sharḥ 
Saḥīḥ Muslim (Khalil Al-Mees ed, 1st edn, Dar al-Qalam 1987). Muslim did not narrate this particular hadith where 
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him as he says nothing but truth.503 Scholars reconciled this by arguing that the exception was 
to avoid confusion with the Quran.504 And there are many other examples of the same nature; 
the question, however, is this: is there an objective method by which we can certainly assert 
that a Prophetic ruling is circumstantial or absolute? Here again the usulis seem reliant on 
context; and the contextualization of these hadiths is not usually a simple inference. This is why 
we find such disagreement among scholars regarding these problematic hadith. Furthermore, 
we cannot be certain that some of the absolute Sunnaic law which is not considered 
problematic was necessarily not circumstantial. The details of the circumstances of many 
hadiths are not known and the possibility that the ruling of the hadith is not absolute cannot be 
excluded. 
Revelation or ijtihad? 
Unlike the issue of circumstantial ruling which did not seem to trouble the usulis much, they 
paid considerable attention to the problem of how to distinguish between what the Prophet 
says by way of revelation and his own opinion (ijtihad).505 The importance of the matter comes 
from the indubitability of revelation as a certain source of law, as oppose to the ijtihad of the 
Prophet, on which their positions varied, but is mostly considered not binding.506 The most 
famous example of Prophetic ijtihad is the story where he saw the people in Madinah 
pollinating date palms and objected to the practice. When they stopped their pollination, the 
harvest was ruined and when they asked him about it, he explained that he only provided his 
opinion and that they know better their worldly affairs.507 A similar story is reported about the 
position he chose to camp for the Badr battle. A companion enquired him whether this position 
was a revelation or that is his military opinion; and when the Prophet told him it was only his 
opinion, the companion asserted that that was no place to camp and suggested a better 
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position to which the Prophet agreed.508 These and other similar reports, however, are 
sometimes said to be regarding only worldly affairs and thus, could not be used to evidence the 
fallibility of the Prophet’s sayings in matters of religion.509 Nonetheless, the majority of usulis 
agree that the Prophet did make ijtihad in matters of religion too when there is no revelation 
regarding the matter in question.510 Furthermore, it is even possible that he sometimes made 
mistakes in his ijtihad in religious matters but, and this is where the concessions stop, his 
mistakes will not pass uncorrected by revelation. Many examples are given in this regard. In the 
battle of Badr he decided to take ransom for the captives, but Quran was revealed to inform 
him that he should have killed the captives instead of taking ransoms.511 The usulis, under the 
pressure of historical evidences, admitted that the Prophet used his own opinion without the 
aid of revelation in matters of religion and that sometimes his ijtihad was religiously incorrect, 
but what evidence do they have that every Prophetic ijtihad is, by the end of the Prophet’s life, 
divinely sanctioned either by silent approval or by revealed corrections? Their only argument is 
the theological premise that the Prophet had delivered his message complete or that he had 
ʿisma from making mistakes in his divine message. This moves the issue, if we are to avoid a 
circular argument,512 from a demonstrated argument onto theology. Another questionable 
supposition is with regards to the rigidification of the Prophet’s ijtihad after his death. We know 
that the companions had liberty in questioning his ijtihad and he approved of this. Why can’t 
the Muslims after his death decide that Prophetic ijtihad is not binding and thus Sunnaic law 
can be changed? The general position of the usulis is that a binding Sunna, if sound, is binding 
absolutely, that is, it cannot lose validity for lacking Quranic eternal divinity. But a modern 
intellectual movement, with premodern roots, in South East Asia, Ahli al-Quran, argued that 
 
508 Abū Rayyah 44. 
509 The concept of ʿisma (infallibility) of Prophets in matters of religion is thoroughly discussed in usulis literature, 
see for example: Zarkashī vol 4. 170-175 . 
510 For example, the Prophet is reported to have said that Makkah was made forbidden by Allah and that its trees 
must not be cut. His uncle al-Abbas intervened saying “except the Idhkhir O Prophet of Allah! We use it for building 
our houses” and the Prophet said, “except the Idhkhir”. The fact that the Prophet said this was a prohibition by 
Allah shows it is a matter of religion, and the fact that he accepted the interjection of his uncle shows that he had 
discretion on the prohibition. See: Abū al-Nasṛ 139. 
511 ibid 146. And other examples in 145-155. 
512 Referring to ijma or Sunna to support the premise of the complete message will be a circular argument. 
166 
 
Sunna was not to be used as a source of law in Islam.513 Their justification included the concern 
over the unreliable authenticity of hadith, but it also had considerations for the questionable 
legal nature of hadith. This stems from the argument that portrays Muhammad as having a dual 
persona: Prophet and human, the former is infallible and whatever he said as a Prophet is 
divine, while the latter is fallible and his sayings and actions as a human are not religiously 
binding.514 The problem with this argument though, is that it does not give clear guidance on 
how to distinguish between what is Prophetic and what is human. The attempt by some to use 
a second dichotomy of ‘religious affairs and worldly affairs’515 would render the first dichotomy 
of the Prophet’s persona useless. In both cases, the need for an objective method to distinguish 
between the two poles of the dichotomy, Prophet/human or religious/worldly is not met. 
To sum up, hadith, after being made synonymous to Sunna, was too unreliable authentically to 
be considered certain. But it was quantitatively indispensable for the ubiquitous requirements 
of Sharia. Similarly, the sacredness of hadith was qualitatively indispensable for the divinity of 
Sharia. Thus, the usulis devised their arguments, in order to be able to benefit from the massive 
legal resource of hadith, around its validity. By avoiding the difficulties of an epistemological 
classification of ‘true’ or ‘certain’, and by resorting to the more affordable classification of saḥīḥ 
/da i͑f, they managed to validate a considerable amount of Prophetic traditions to complement 
and substantiate Quran. Together they provided Sharia with naṣṣ, divine words, that constitute 
the underlying platform for Islam as a whole. Shifting their arguments, however, from 
epistemology to validity, the usulis could only provide debatable evidence and the sense of 
their juristic desideratum was more evident. Shafiʿi managed to bridge, to some degree, the 
divinity gap between Quran and Sunna by his arguments that Sunna is a second form of 
revelation, but the authenticity gap was too large to bridge, engendering in the process weaker 
arguments for its inclusion with the Quran as a source of Sharia. And under the pressures of 
modernity and the increasingly questionable validity of Sunna, its resilience could, perhaps, be 
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mainly explained by its sheer vastness; for, as noted by Daniel Brown, what would be left of 
Islam without the Sunna?516 
 
2 
Certainty in Ijmaʿ  
 
 
With Ijmaʿ, usul al-fiqh departs from the divine sources of law to a form of consensus 
legislation; that is, from what Allah or his Prophet says to Muslims, to what the Muslim 
community itself establishes as law, with divine sanctioning to their consensus. This 
complicates the issue of certainty in Ijmaʿ further in comparison to Quran and Hadith. It is 
known that every rule or law in Islam must have some basis, some origin that makes it Islamic 
and justifies its religious character. The authority (hujjiyya) of Quran is based mainly on 
theology; it is dependent on one’s faith on the veracity of the Prophet.517 If one believes that 
Muhammad was indeed sent by God then one will believe what Muhammad says about God, 
namely, that the Quran is His word. The Sunnah follows easily since the Quran says in 
numerous occasions that Muslims should follow the instructions and guidance of the Prophet, 
in addition to the fact that the Prophet is the one who gave us the Quran in the first place. But 
with Ijmaʿ, the question of authority is not as straightforward. It must be demonstrated and 
demonstrated with certainty. Then there is the issue of epistemic certainty. In the case of 
Quran, epistemic certainty was the combination of certain authenticity and certain meaning. In 
hadith, the usulis did not rely on authenticity as it was unattainable, but they argued for the 
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certain validity instead. Why, then, shall Muslims consider Ijmaʿ as a source of certain 
knowledge of God’s will? 
While the two issues concerning certainty of Ijmaʿ, authority and epistemology, are different, 
they are treated in the literature of usul and to some extent the modern works, without 
distinction. The reason for this is perhaps that the material used to answer the problems is the 
same. For example, the hadith “my community does not agree upon an error” is used as basis 
for both authority and epistemology in Ijmaʿ.518 There seems to be a silent presumption that if 
Ijmaʿ is authoritative it must follow that it conveys a true message and vice versa. But we know 
that this is not the case since Quran is authoritative, but its ambiguous verses do not 
necessarily convey the true will of Allah. Similarly, an abrogated (mansūkh) text is not 
authoritative even if considered authentic and precise in meaning. Nevertheless, and regardless 
of the reasons for the lack of distinction between Ijmaʿ ’s authoritativeness and epistemological 
capacity, the arguments made for each case suffer from considerable problems as well as 
persistent disagreements between the usulis. This degree of disagreements in matters of Ijmaʿ, 
in sharp contrast to the high degree of agreement regarding authenticity of Quran and validity 
of Sunnah, does not sit well with the absolute certainty the usulis usually assign to Ijmaʿ, 
something that alludes perhaps to the juristic desideratum that inflicts Islamic legal philosophy 
throughout.  
Authoritativeness of Ijmaʿ: 
As is usually the case, the authority of Ijmaʿ as a source of law, is based on the higher sources, 
Quran and Sunnah, and on reason (ʿaql), with differences among the usulis on which sources 
offer the most reliable bases for authority. This has been troubling for the usulis as there is no 
clear text nor an argument from reason that explicitly gives Ijmaʿ its authority. The debates 
among the usulis about this problem are well documented and need not be repeated here.519 
 
518 Ijma is authoritative because the Prophet endorsed it by this hadith (and others with similar meaning). It is 
epistemologically certain by virtue of its immunity from error. ibid 221. 
519 See for example: Shāfiʻī, Al-Risala 309–312. Juwaynī, Al-Burhan Fi Usul al-fiqh 251–264. Ghazzālī, al-Mustasfạ̄ 
min ʻilm al-usụ̄l 219–228. Al-Samarqandi 321–331. ʻAlī ʻAbd al-Rāziq, al-Ijmāʻ fī al-sharīʻah al-Islāmīyah (Dār al-Fikr 
al-ʻArabī 1947) 25–47. Zysow 115–121.  
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But the very fact that it is a strongly debatable issue is something to be noted when considering 
the certainty of Ijmaʿ’s authoritativeness.  
Many of the major works on usul do not find the text used to support Ijmaʿ’s authoritativeness 
to be conclusive,520 yet, the position of Ijmaʿ as a certain source of Sharia remains unshaken. It 
was narrated that Shafiʿi was struck with the question of what is the evidence for Ijmaʿ’s 
authority from Quran. He remained in his house reading the Quran many times until he came 
up with the verse 4:115521 “And whoever opposes the Messenger after guidance has become 
clear to him and follows other than the way of the believers - We will give him what he has 
taken and drive him into Hell, and evil it is as a destination”. The connection of the verse to 
Ijmaʿ, however, is evidently weak that even Shafiʿi’s followers did not accept it.522 Nor did some 
usulis accept the hadith “my community will not agree upon an error” as it was not 
semantically explicit nor authentically certain,523 and the rule of the usulis was that usul must 
be based on certain text. Juwaini, for example, had no trouble in dismissing the textual and 
logical evidence for Ijmaʿ in a few paragraphs but he still sought to authorize Ijmaʿ because it 
was “Sharia’s main pillar and reliance”.524 His argument is that Ijmaʿ’s authoritativeness is based 
on common experience ( ͑ada).525 It is customary impossible that the whole of the community’s 
scholars agree on anything that is a matter of opinion (nazar), therefore, if we find them 
agreeing on something, it must be based upon a certain text which did not reach us. This 
follows the usulis’ argument that every Ijmaʿ must be based on text and it is possible that we 
will know the Ijmaʿ but not the underlying text. Insisting on knowing the text makes Ijmaʿ 
redundant.526  
 
520 Shafiʿi did not mention the hadith “my community…” at all; Juwaini rejected all texts for ijma; Ghazali rejected 
the Quranic verse but accepted the hadith and all that collectively supported ijma. n512. 
521 ibid 120. Another version of the anecdote can be found in the commentary of Khalid al-Sab ͑ al- ͑ilmi and Zuhair 
Shafiq al-Kubbi on footnote 2 Shāfiʻī, Al-Risala 268. 
522 Juwaini and Ghazali the notable examples, refer to n433 above. See also: Zysow 120 
523 This hadith is considered weak (daʿif), see the commentary of Nawawi on Muslim, number 1920 
524 Juwaynī, Al-Burhan Fi Usul al-fiqh 262. Āmidī 221. 
525 Juwaynī, Al-Burhan Fi Usul al-fiqh 263. 




This argument is simply saying that the authority of Ijmaʿ is based on its function as a medium 
for delivering lost texts. In other words, Ijmaʿ’s authoritativeness is transited from the authority 
of the unknown text the content of which is made known to us via Ijmaʿ. But the reliance of 
Ijmaʿ on a text, known or not, is a contentious issue in usul, meaning that Juwaini’s arguments 
can only be valid for those who take the position of conditioning Ijmaʿ on text. For those who 
do not share that opinion, however, those who argue that Ijmaʿ is authorized as a mechanism 
to sanction human opinion when there is consensus on that opinion, the hadith mentioned 
above was their strongest evidence.  
The fact that this hadith was āḥād, thus, uncertain, brought about the contentious issue of 
circularity in the arguments about Ijmaʿ’s authoritativeness. The problem is that Ijmaʿ cannot be 
based on an āḥād hadith as this will be basing an usul source on an uncertain text, which is not 
allowed in usul. Those who use the hadith as basis argue that it is widely accepted,527 but this, 
according to Juwaini who rejected the argument, is resorting back to Ijmaʿ, hence, the 
argument is circular.528 
The circularity problem: 
The gist of this problem is the following: 
• The main textual source which gives Ijmaʿ authority is the hadith.529 
• The hadith is āḥād which is authentically uncertain but nonetheless valid. 
• The validity of āḥād hadiths is based on Ijmaʿ.  
Some orientalists used this problem to refute the arguments for Ijmaʿ’s authority. Snouck 
Hurgronje argues that “[o]nly the infallible community can explain the Sunna and Quran 
accurately; it is then completely idle to claim to establish the infallibility of the community by 
the authority of the Quran and the Sunna”.530 George F. Hourani derives a similar conclusion 
 
527 For a discussion on this see: Al-Samarqandi 326–330. 
528 Juwaynī, Al-Burhan Fi Usul al-fiqh 262. 
529 This is based on the fact that the hadith “my community…” is the most accepted as evidence for ijma’s 
authority. But even if the Quranic evidences were considered, the interpretation of the verses in a way that 
qualifies them as evidences requires, as noted by Snouck Hurgronje, some form of agreement. See n532 below. 
530 Cited in: Hallaq, ‘On the Authoritativeness of Sunni Consensus’ 429. 
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from two premises: any basis for the authority of an infallible consensus must be based on 
textual evidence; and, no such basis, which can be considered authentic, can be found. He 
therefore concludes that Ijmaʿ has no sound basis in Islam.531 Hourani’s syllogism does not refer 
directly to a circularity problem, but his rejection of the existence of a sound textual evidence 
alludes to the claim that either, there is no consensus on the soundness of the available 
evidence (if Hourani is not referring to the consensus of scholars on the 
soundness/unsoundness of the text, he will be making this assessment upon his own judgment, 
which is unlikely); or, that there is consensus but using it will be question-begging. In each case 
the need to refer to consensus exists, which proves Hurgronje’s point. 
But Hourani was correct in pointing out that some usulis were aware of the circularity problem, 
and thus, tried to make their arguments around it as we mentioned in Juwaini’s defence of 
Ijmaʿ’s authority.532 His disciple, Ghazali, followed him at first in arguing that Ijmaʿ was based on 
common experience,533 but then, in his later Mustasfa, argued that the hadith about the 
community also supports Ijmaʿ.534 And although the hadith was āḥād, the meaning was 
mutawatir (tawatur maʿnawi). This was picked up by some orientalists who defended the 
position of the usulis regarding the circularity problem. Zysow argues that it was in fact tawatur 
which is paramount as the underlying concept of Islamic law, not Ijmaʿ as was argued by other 
orientalists.535 These arguments were shared by Wael Hallaq who asserts that the justification 
of Ijmaʿ’s authority was based on three concepts utilized by usulis. These were: tawatur 
maʿnawi, induction, and the originally theological concept of custom.536 
The main defence against the circularity problem was to remove Ijmaʿ in its strict sense from 
the possible bases for Ijmaʿ’s authority. But Ijmaʿ is such a fluid concept that it might be lurking 
in its own bases without appearing in its candid form. In order to understand the concept and 
functions of Ijmaʿ in essence, it is imperative to look beyond the formal definitions given by the 
 
531 George F. Hourani 225. 
532 See also: Al-Samarqandi 328. 
533 Zysow 120. 
534 Ghazzālī, al-Mustasfạ̄ min ʻilm al-usụ̄l 221. 
535 Zysow 155. 
536 Hallaq, ‘On the Authoritativeness of Sunni Consensus’ 449. 
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usulis, and analyse Ijmaʿ in a historical framework rather than be confined to a purely legal one. 
Only in this way can we better understand the trait which orientalists, Zysow included,537 assign 
to Ijmaʿ, namely that it is not productive but merely declaratory. Coulson gives an insightful 
analysis. He argues: 
The great bulk of the law had originated in customary practice and in scholars’ reasoning, that its precise 
identification with the terms of the divine will was artificial, and that the classical theory of the four usul 
was the culmination of a process of growth extending over two centuries, yet traditional Islamic belief 
holds that the four usul had been exclusively operative from the beginning. The elaboration of the law is 
seen by Islamic orthodoxy as a process of scholastic endeavour completely independent of historical or 
sociological influences. Once discovered, therefore, the law could not be subject to historical exegesis, in 
the sense that its terms could be regarded as applicable only to the particular circumstances of society at 
a given point in time. Moreover, the law was of necessity basically immutable, for Muhammad was the 
last of the Prophets, and after his death there could be no further communication of the divine will to 
man. Law therefore, does not grow out of, and is not moulded by, society as is the case with Western 
systems. Human thought, unaided, cannot discern the true values and standards of conduct, such 
knowledge can only be attained through divine revelation and acts are good or evil exclusively because 
God has attributed this quality to them.538 
A briefer description was given by Hurgronje who says: 
Much of what became law in this first disturbed period, was attributed to decisions of the Prophet by 
later traditions. On many important points, however, this was not possible, but nevertheless the relevant 
decisions were felt by the community to be as irrevocable as those which they were able to derive from 
Allah and His Messenger. Here too, practice came before theory, common-sense before system.539 
There is further evidence which support the argument that Ijmaʿ, contrary to Zysow’s 
objection,540 is indeed a form of general agreement given divine character. Firstly, many usulis 
only accept as Ijmaʿ issues which enjoy wide acceptance in the Muslim community where 
 
537 Zysow 117. 
538 Noel J Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh University Press 1994). 
539 Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje  1857-1936, Selected Works (Georges-Henri Bousquet  1900-1978 and Joseph 
Schacht  1902-1969 eds, 1957) 274. 
540 Zysow 156. 
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change is inconceivable.541 Such issues must have certain basis, so if no certain text can be 
found, Ijmaʿ is used.542 This makes Ijmaʿ an official status of certainty which is assigned to an 
existing norm. In other words, Ijmaʿ is subject to law rather than law being subject to Ijmaʿ. 
Secondly, Ijmaʿ seems to have been effective only during the first generations of Islam, namely, 
the generation of companions.543 This supports the idea that Ijmaʿ is only declaratory not 
productive. It is hardly the case that later generations could produce a legal opinion on a wholly 
novel matter and have the character of divine Ijmaʿ that was enjoyed by that of earlier 
generations. This, in turn, supports the idea that Ijmaʿ was used to sanction widely accepted 
concepts and practices which could not otherwise be sanctioned, i.e., where no certain text 
could be found. Thirdly, there are conspicuous commonalities between Ijmaʿ and tawatur.544 
Ostensibly, tawatur is the process whereby a report is transmitted via multiple chains of 
transmission where the possibility of colluding on a lie is omitted. This is made to differ from 
Ijmaʿ where Ijmaʿ is the consensus of scholars on a legal opinion. In essence, however, both are 
manifestations of opinions and practices the change of which (because of a possible error for 
example) seems inconceivable due to their overwhelming acceptance among the Muslim 
community. The perception of certain authenticity of Quran, for example, is manifested in the 
concept of tawatur. It is a method designed to justify an existing dogma. It all comes down to 
epistemology eventually. Ijmaʿ is basically the knowledge that a particular opinion is accepted 
by the great majority and/or the knowledge that there is no objection to this opinion. This 
knowledge is only available, in the historical context from which the usulis are looking at Ijmaʿ, 
via reports coming mainly from the past. Similarly, and bearing in mind the subjective nature of 
tawatur, any report considered mutawatir by a single scholar or a few, will not produce certain 
 
541 The extreme take on this is the exclusion of ijma to what is known of religion by necessity (maʿlūm min aldīn bi 
al-ḍarūrah), like the daily prayers and fasting. In this opinion, the usulis are only endowing Ijmaʿ with what is 
already certain in Islam just to preserve its status as a certain source. This view of ijma makes it in essence 
redundant. ʻAbd al-Rāziq 92. 
542 This is slightly less extreme where Ijmaʿ fills the gap of certain text. A fitting example is the definition of loans 
riba for which there is no text, but it enjoys a great deal of certainty in fiqh. This can be explained by Ijmaʿ. 
543 This according to Hourani, was the view of Shafiʿi, Ahmad b. Hanbal, and Ibn Taymiyyah. See: George F. Hourani 
194,208. It was also the opinion of the Zahiris; for a discussion of the topic see: ʻAbd al-Rāziq 42–46. Zysow 130. 
544 For a brief discussion on the comparison between Ijmaʿ and tawatur see: Knut S Vikor, Between God and the 
Sultan : An Historical Introduction to Islamic Law (Hurst) 77 (n11),81. And a brief mention of Ghazali’s favourable 
comparison in Zysow 121. Noldeke argues that al-Tabari furnished for the concept of tawatur by combining 
between the concepts of Ijmaʿ and naql (oral transmission), Nöldeke 571. 
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law. It is only when there is at least a majority of scholars who acknowledge the tawatur of the 
report, that it can be used as basis for certainty. 
If we consider Ijmaʿ and tawatur in their strict definitions, as Zysow did,545 we will see that the 
usulis avoided the circularity problem and resorted to base Ijmaʿ on other, apparently different, 
bases. But the circularity still exists in subtlety, and we are justified in looking beyond how Ijmaʿ 
is portrayed by the usulis in order to have a better understanding of it. Zysow would have been 
justified in drawing a distinction between Ijmaʿ and other forms of agreement if the usulis had 
made such a distinction in practice. But the usulis have always used Ijmaʿ as a rubric for general 
agreements and majority opinions in all matters of religion. In fact, many usulis were 
persistently sceptic about the possibility of knowing the occurrence of Ijmaʿ save that of the 
companions.546 Zysow contested some orientalists’ views for which we can find origins in usul 
literature. He rejected Gibb’s view which describes Ijmaʿ as underlying the whole structure of 
Islamic law by giving validity to Quranic authenticity and traditions.547 But this view was shared 
by Juwaini as mentioned above. Juwaini realized that Ijmaʿ in its essential nature was the main 
pillar supporting Sharia as a whole.548 This is why he rejected the textual evidence and founded 
Ijmaʿ on reason.  
To sum up the circularity problem we can say, any social conduct, to become a norm and 
supposing it was not enforced upon society, implies the acceptance of that society to that 
conduct or its underlying concept. There is reason to suspect that Ijmaʿ is a juristic formalization 
of socio-religious norms, therefore, any attempt to demonstrate its authoritativeness by what 
could resemble a social norm or consensus will inescapably produce a circular argument. How, 
then, does the circularity problem affect Ijmaʿ and the law? If we accept from the discussion 
above that Ijmaʿ actually follows the law rather than precedes it, then the normality of the law 
should not be affected by the weakness of Ijmaʿ’s authoritativeness. The certainty of the law, 
however, will be weakened as it was completely reliant on the authority of Ijmaʿ. It is the 
 
545 Zysow 156–157. 
546 ʻAbd al-Rāziq 13–24. 
547 Zysow 113. 
548 This was echoed by Ghazali, Ghazzālī, al-Mustasfạ̄ min ʻilm al-usụl̄ 223. 
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common view of many orientalists that Ijmaʿ is a mechanism to divinize a law that could not be 
divinized otherwise.549 It fills the gap left by the Prophet after he passed away. The underlying 
normality of the law of the seventh century would not have necessarily meant the absolute 
rigidity of that law to the end of time. Norms, and hence laws, change as societies change, but 
the perceived divinity of Sharia does not accept change since it will imply a change to God’s will, 
and Ijmaʿ acted as the divining tool of Sharia. Therefore, it was essential for the usulis to 
demonstrate its authoritativeness; but they could not do this with rigor, perhaps because Ijmaʿ 
was ultimately the product of their juristic, and more broadly, religious desideratum. 
The viability of Ijmaʿ: 
 
Uncertainty of Ijmaʿ is not exclusive to the question of authoritativeness; it engulfs every aspect 
of it making it so obscure that any claim of Ijmaʿ, supposing it is not to be considered in the 
generic sense of widely held opinions, will be questionable. If there is no clear idea of what 
Ijmaʿ is and how it can be achieved, what, then, will be the bases of any claim of it taking place? 
To show the difficulty regarding the determination of Ijmaʿ, consider the following points where 
the usulis have strong disagreements about Ijmaʿ: 
• Is Ijmaʿ possible? The most notable denier of Ijmaʿ was Ibrahīm al-Naẓẓam who denies 
the very possibility of Ijmaʿ taking place, for reasons such as the location of scholars in 
places far from each other they could not know the rule in order to have a judgment on 
it; or that if Ijmaʿ was based on certain text, the text would have been known to all, but 
if it was based on probable evidence the rule would be an opinion and that is impossible 
to be unanimously agreed. This total denial however was a sectorial minority’s opinion 
and so did not find support.550 
• Is it possible to know the occurrence of Ijmaʿ? Supposing that Ijmaʿ is possible, the usulis 
could not agree whether it was possible to know if it took place. It was famously 
 
549 Coulson, Conflicts and Tensions in Islamic Jurisprudence 80,85. Vikor 76.Hallaq, ‘On the Authoritativeness of 
Sunni Consensus’ 428. Zysow 114. 
550 ʻAbd al-Rāziq 10–13. Some scholars have tried to interpret al-Nazzam’s views to show that he did not deny ijma. 
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reported that Ahmad b. Hanbal said that whoever claims Ijmaʿ is a liar, for how does he 
know that people did not disagree? Considering the stature of Ibn Hanbal, this troubled 
the usulis as it amounted to a denial of Ijmaʿ.551 
• Whose opinion should be considered for Ijmaʿ? Is it everyone in the Muslim umma 
including laymen (al-ʿāmma) or just the scholars? Supposing it is only the scholars, is it 
the Ijmaʿ of the usulis or the jurists? Will specialists, like linguists or scientists have to be 
considered too? How is the qualification of any of the above determined? Who decides 
who qualifies as a scholar? All these issues are open-ended with no clear and agreed 
answers for them;552 and if some answer was dominant due to the agreement it enjoys, 
using this agreement as basis for accepting this answer will flag up the issue of 
circularity. Further problems are noted regarding the matter of qualification. Some 
scholars sought to reconcile between opposing opinions by arguing that there is an Ijmaʿ 
of scholars only which yields probable law. But the Ijmaʿ that yields certain law is the 
Ijmaʿ of everyone in the umma. Examples of this are the five daily prayers and the 
obligatory fasting of Ramadan.553 But how did the laymen contribute to this Ijmaʿ? It is 
not possible that they were all asked to contribute their opinion, nor could this be by 
their silent consent as the validity of it is contentious among the usulis, not to mention 
the impossible task of knowing even their silence.554  
• Is Ijmaʿ restricted to time or place? The restriction of Ijmaʿ to a particular place is most 
notably found in Malik’s argument who considered Ijmaʿ to be that of the people of 
Madinah (Ijmaʿ ahl al-Madīnah). Malik argued that the people of Madinah inherited the 
legacy of the Prophet’s way of life, which represent religion in its perfect form, in their 
social norms. Although this argument brings Ijmaʿ closer to its natural origin of extant 
social norms, Malik was alone among other schools in making this argument.555 
Similarly, Ahmad b. Hanbal was alone in arguing that for Ijmaʿ to happen, the age of the 
 
551 ibid 13–17. Zysow 129–130. 
552 ʻAbd al-Rāziq 50. Ghazzālī, al-Mustasfạ̄ min ʻilm al-usụ̄l 228–240. 
553 ibid 228. ʻAbd al-Rāziq 92. 
554 ibid 73–80. Zysow 125–131. 
555 ʻAbd al-Rāziq 69–70. 
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scholars making the Ijmaʿ must become extinct (inqirāḍ al-ʿaṣr).556 Ahmad was 
understandably trying to resolve serious difficulties in the concept of Ijmaʿ. For example, 
if a scholar who participated on a consensus of an opinion changed his mind, will he be 
breaking the Ijmaʿ? Those who argue that he will, have a very technical idea of Ijmaʿ. 
They see it as an event that, once occurred, will alter the course of law beyond 
reversibility. An opinion under consideration by scholars becomes absolute divine law 
the instant it satisfies the conditions of Ijmaʿ. In that sense, it is not possible for a 
scholar, even one who was part of the Ijmaʿ in question, to change his mind once Ijmaʿ 
occurred. Ahmad was trying to circumvent the absurdity of this notion of Ijmaʿ by 
making it more realistic in its viability just as Malik was trying to do with regards to the 
geographical restrictions that make Ijmaʿ truer to its objectives. 
• If there was only one scholar in the umma, would his opinion be Ijmaʿ? Would the 
opinion of two, if they are the only scholars, be Ijmaʿ? Is there a specific number of 
scholars to agree on an issue before Ijmaʿ can be said to occur? Some usulis argued that 
the number of scholars to agree on an opinion must reach that of tawatur before it can 
be considered Ijmaʿ.557 But the number for tawatur is undetermined; the only evidence 
the usulis had for the satisfaction of the required number of tawatur was the actual 
occurrence of knowledge. It is not clear, perhaps even to the usulis who made this 
argument, how this can be applied in the case of Ijmaʿ. How can the usulis determine 
whether the number of scholars in the Ummah at some point in time is sufficient to 
render Ijmaʿ on an opinion? Furthermore, some usulis argued that the report about an 
Ijmaʿ that occurred in the past or in another place must be mutawatir.558 In other words, 
if the report about an Ijmaʿ was transmitted via a solitary chain it will not be valid for 
Ijmaʿ, it must be a certain report, i.e. delivered via tawatur. This, of course, will only be a 
report about people’s claim of Ijmaʿ rather than about the actual occurrence of Ijmaʿ. 
For those, however, who do not consider tawatur necessary not for the number of 
scholars nor for the report about an Ijmaʿ, Ijmaʿ can be determined by the consensus of 
 
556 Zysow 138–142. ʻAbd al-Rāziq 84–87. 
557 ibid 72–73. Zysow 131. Ghazzālī, al-Mustasfạ̄ min ʻilm al-usụ̄l 236. 
558 ʻAbd al-Rāziq 73. 
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a small, probably unknown, number of scholars, and our knowledge of such consensus 
can be transmitted via uncertain reports. Still, Ijmaʿ should yield certain law. 
The above points are not exhaustive, but they show the degree of uncertainty regarding the 
constituting elements of Ijmaʿ. Yet, the fiqh is rife with legal issues where reference to Ijmaʿ is 
made as the certain basis. The fact that many of these issues are also areas of disagreement 
among the scholars, where some argue they stand on Ijmaʿ and others argue they don’t, only 
adds to the difficulties of Ijmaʿ. It is now clear that, notwithstanding the majority’s acceptance 
of Ijmaʿ as a certain source of law, there is mostly disagreement and uncertainty regarding its 
details. This being the case, any claim for Ijmaʿ will lack sound justification. 
Ijmaʿ as convention:  
If we reject, as the above discussion suggests, the arguments made by the usulis in defence of 
ijam’s authoritativeness; and if we accept the idea that Ijmaʿ is a mechanism developed in later 
generations to give divine authority to some religious rules, the question that naturally arises is: 
what are the rules that need divine authority, for which Ijmaʿ is used, more than others? The 
example that many usulis use to show Ijmaʿ at work is the five daily prayers. These prayers have 
the details of their form mentioned in many hadiths, but the hadiths are āḥād (solitary). This 
should mean that, notwithstanding their validity, they are of probable authenticity. But this is 
not accepted in the matter of prayers; they are absolutely certain, and their certainty is based 
on Ijmaʿ. So, the question can be reiterated as: why is Ijmaʿ used to assert some practices that 
have probable text about them, and not others, or all? Why is Ijmaʿ used to assure Muslims, for 
instance, of the number of raqʿāt (units) in each prayer,559 and not for the position of the hands 
during a prayer, when both are based on āḥād hadiths? Clearly, the claim of certainty, for which 
Ijmaʿ was used, needed qualification and not every juristic matter would qualify. 
 
559 ibid 95. 
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A quick glance at some of the literature on ‘Conventions’ or ‘legal conventionalism’ might help 
us understand how some religious matters qualify for Ijmaʿ. David Lewis in his influential book 
‘Convention: A Philosophical Study’ defines a convention as: 
A regularity R in the behaviour of members of a population P when they are agents in a 
recurrent situation S is a convention if and only if it is true that, and it is common knowledge in 
P that, in almost any instance of S among members of P, 
(1) almost everyone conforms to R; 
(2) almost everyone expects almost everyone else to conform to R; 
(3) almost everyone has approximately the same preferences regarding all possible 
combinations of actions;  
(4) almost everyone prefers that any one more conform to R, on condition that almost 
everyone conforms to R; 
(5) almost everyone would prefer that any one more conform to R΄, on condition that almost 
everyone conforms to R΄, 
where R΄ is some possible regularity in the behaviour of member of P in S, such that almost no 
one in almost any instance of S among members of P could conform both to R and to R΄.560 
 
If we consider the regularity R to be the number of raqʿāt in a prayer, the recurrent 
situation S to be the prayer, and the population P to be the Muslim community, we can 
easily see that (1), (2), and (4) fit the definition. (3) and (5) are based on the assumption 
that there is a number of alternatives from which the convention was arbitrarily chosen. 
This is obvious in some of the classical examples of convention in the modern sense like 
driving on the right or left of the road, but it is not quite fitting in the case of Ijmaʿ since 
it is very unlikely that the number of raqʿāt was an arbitrary matter. But we should not 
be deterred by the dissimilarity on this occasion as more similarities are found in the 
 
560 Raimo Siltala, ‘Legal Conventionalism: Law as an Expression of Collective Intentionality’, Law, Truth, and 




discussion of legal conventions, in addition to the fact that there is no agreement that 
the notion of arbitrariness is a necessary characteristic of legal conventions.561 
Further resemblance can be drawn from Lewis’s answer to the questions: How do 
conventions arise? And why do people conform to conventions? To the former Lewis 
argues: “agents initially select some equilibrium either by chance, agreement, or intrinsic 
salience. The equilibrium gradually becomes more salient through precedent, until it 
eventually becomes a convention”.562 To the latter question Lewis argues that “a pre-
existing convention is so overwhelmingly salient that agents expect one another to abide 
by it, an expectation that furnishes reason to conform”.563 We can apply this to the Ijmaʿ 
of prohibiting the fat of swine. The Quran specifically prohibited its meat564 but the fat is 
said to be prohibited by Ijmaʿ as there is no explicit text for that.565 A possible scenario is 
that some companion/s considered the issue in some occasion and decided, perhaps by 
his own analogical reasoning, not to use the fat. This was followed by other companions 
as they thought it was the right action. This can be considered as an agreement and/or a 
salient point566 which formed an equilibrium. Anyone who comes against the same 
question of whether the fat of the swine was prohibited or not will not find explicit text 
but now that there is a precedent he or she will find a nascent Ijmaʿ and, between the 
choice of conformity or non-conformity, he or she will be inclined to conform. This 
solidifies the prohibition further, furnishing the ground for yet more conformity, and so 
on, according to Lewis’s arguments, until the prohibition becomes a practice, a socio-
legal convention. The jurists who consider the matter in later times will find an 
overwhelming conformity to the prohibition, but they will have no idea how it came into 
 
561 Andrei Marmor, Legal Conventionalism (Oxford University Press 2001) 517 
<https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,shib&db=edsoso&AN=oso.9780198299080.0
03.0006&site=eds-live>. 
562 Michael Rescorla, ‘Convention’ in Edward N Zalta (ed), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008) 29. 
563 Ibid. 
564 2:173,  
565 ʻAbd al-Rāziq 21. 
566 According to Lewis, “A convention is salient (it is a focal point) if it “stands out” from the other choices. A 




being as there is no text. It is understandable, then, that they will think that this 
prohibition stands on very strong, although unknown to them, evidence and decide 
thereby to claim consensus as the bases of the prohibition. 
This hypothetical scenario can be supported by the notion of Historicism in conventions. 
According to Marmor, “[e]ven if there are relatively well-definable needs that a social practice 
is there to solve, as in the case of legal precedent, the practice which is actually constituted by 
conventions is normally underdetermined by those external needs. The practice's development, 
and its emergent grammar, is largely determined by historical contingencies”.567 From this, we 
can consider the idea that the roots of Ijmaʿ are found not in the aptitude of the legal opinion 
or a missing text but rather, on a historical circumstance that may or may not be related to a 
missing text. We have seen that Ijmaʿ is mostly referred to the past, particularly to the 
generation of the companions, and considering the rife uncertainties regarding the concept of 
Ijmaʿ, it is clearly difficult to use it at any present moment. Only when some practice has 
already become prevalent in society, i.e. becomes a convention, can Ijmaʿ be used as a 
declaratory tool to sanction this practice as law.568 This is somewhat echoed by Noel B. 
Reynolds and Thomas J. Lowery who argued that “[c]ustomary practices, …, are based on a 
historically evolving tradition the conventional character of which need not be consciously 
reflected in the community”.569 This differs from what they call ‘social conventions’ in that the 
latter is a consciously adopted conduct but both fall under ‘legal conventions’. 
However, while the above arguments might help shed light on the nature of Ijmaʿ from a socio-
legal perspective, they still do not explain the certainty of Ijmaʿ. Why must Ijmaʿ be absolutely 
certain as a divine law? The best explanation for this comes from considering the aspects of 
Islam for which Ijmaʿ is the main justification. We have already mentioned Juwaini’s comment 
on the primacy of Ijmaʿ above; he was followed by Ghazali who, in response to the possibility 
that someone could have disputed the reports about Ijmaʿ but reports about this dispute did 
 
567 Marmor 528. 
568 To this effect, Siltala argues that “Conventions are expressive of collective intentionality, i.e. common 
acceptance or recognition in a community to the effect that certain social phenomena are endowed with legal 
significance or, alternatively, there exist mutual expectations to the said effect in the community” Siltala 165. 
569 Quted in ibid 179. 
182 
 
not reach us, argued that it is impossible according to customary experience as Ijmaʿ is “the 
greatest among religion’s principals”570 (al-Ijmāʿ aʿẓam usūl al-dīn), therefore, should there be a 
dispute, it would have become known to all. The notion of Ijmaʿ as being ‘the greatest among 
the usul of religion’ is echoed by many usulis for what they know about its centrality in giving 
basis to essential aspects in religion.571 Orientalists have also noted this trait of Ijmaʿ. Hamilton 
Gibb wrote: 
Indeed, on a strict logical analysis, it is obvious that Ijmaʿ underlies the whole 
imposing structure and alone gives it final validity. For it is Ijmaʿ in the first 
place which guarantees the authenticity of the text of the Koran and of the 
Traditions. It is Ijmaʿ which determines how the words of these texts are to be 
pronounced and what they mean and in what direction they are to be 
applied.572 
Similar arguments were made by Anderson and Coulson: 
It is the paramount criterion of legal authority inasmuch as it is the Ijmaʿ alone 
which, in the ultimate analysis, guarantees the authenticity of the Quran and 
the hadiths as records of the divine revelation, the validity of the method of 
qiyas and, in short, the whole structure of the legal theory.573 
Considering Ijmaʿ in this light, it becomes clear that the certainty of Islam rests in great degree 
on the certainty of Ijmaʿ. If Ijmaʿ was to be considered probable, the whole structure of 
certainty in Islam will be undermined if not completely collapse. 
 
Structure of usul al-fiqh: circularity problem revisited: 
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Having analysed the certainty in the main usul, Quran, hadith, and Ijmaʿ, we can now consider 
the complete structure of these usul and how they are connected together to form the system 
of Islamic law. For something to qualify as a source in this system, it must first be authoritative, 
that is, there must be a justification for why this source or principal has any authority to tell us 
what Allah wants. Second, its content must be endowed with certainty. This ensures the rigidity, 
and thus divinity, of Sharia. The system is structured to start with Quran, and while the 
authority of Quran is considered a matter of theology and thus it is not discussed in usul al-fiqh, 
once its authoritativeness is premised, Quran then becomes the main authorizer for hadith and 
Ijmaʿ in a hierarchical system where hadith then also authorizes Ijmaʿ and other sources. 
However, and as will be shown below, there are feedback loops where the authorised 
contributes to the qualifications of the authorizer, namely, we find Ijmaʿ involved in some 
elements that constitute part of Quran and hadith qualifications as certain sources for Sharia 
like tawatur of qiraʾāt and validity of hadith. This structure can be shown in the following. 
1. Quran is the first and primary source of Sharia. 
1.1. Quran is authorized in theology not in usul al-fiqh. 
1.1.1. Even theology is sometimes referred to consensus. Ibn Hazm, for example, 
says: “There is no disagreement among the sects belonging to Islam, the Ahl 
al-Sunna, the Muʿtazila, the Murjiʾa, and the Zaydīyya as to the obligation of 
accepting the Quran nor as to the fact that the Quran is that very same one 
which is recited among us.”574 
1.2. Quran is a collection of different qiraʾāt (versions). The number of qiraʾāt was not 
known in the beginning but scholars then canonized a selected seven then ten, all 
said to be authentic.575 
1.2.1. Until the time of Ibn Mujāhid, qiraʾāt were authenticated by Ijmaʿ not 
tawatur.576 
1.2.2. Ibn Mujāhid chose his seven readers according to the Ijmaʿ of the reciters.577 
1.2.3. The legitimacy of the concept of qiraʾāt is based on hadith.578 
1.3. The authenticity of Quran is based on an oral transmission of concurrent reports 
(tawatur). 
 
574 ibid 8. 
575 See ch.3 above 
576 Nasser 51. 
577 ibid 54. Nöldeke 568. 
578 The hadith of the seven letters, chapter 3. 
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1.3.1. There are traces of the concept of Ijmaʿ in tawatur. Ibn Taymiyya argues that 
tawatur could be established among groups of experts who are entitled to 
judge the validity and authenticity of the reports related to their specialized 
field.579 
1.3.2. Al-Tabari was the one, according to Noldeke, who introduced the idea of 
tawatur by combining between Ijmaʿ and transmission (naql).580 
1.4. In addition to the oral transmission, Quran is also said to be authenticated by the 
transmission of its written transcripts. All written transcripts are said to be authentic 
copies of a master copy, al-Mushaf al-Imam, made under the auspices of Uthman. 
1.4.1. The legitimacy and accuracy of the master Uthmanic copy is said to be 
guaranteed by Ijmaʿ.581 
1.5. The certainty of Quran is complemented, in addition to authenticity, by accurate 
interpretation of Allah’s will. 
1.5.1. Some usulis argue that the semantics of language are known by Ijmaʿ.582 
1.5.2. According to Zysow, and with regards to uncertainty in the interpretation of 
legal text, Ijmaʿ is “the only way out of a paralyzing “hesitation.”” 583 
2. Hadith is the second principal source in usul al-fiqh. 
2.1. Hadith is authorized by Quran where numerous verses command Muslims to 
obey and follow the Prophet Muhammad. Ijmaʿ, being part of the qualification of 
Quran, is thereby part of the authorization of hadith.  
2.2. Hadith is only probable in terms of authenticity, but it is regarded as legally valid 
if it is sound.  
2.2.1. The legitimacy of this validity is based on Ijmaʿ. 
2.3. The soundness of hadith depends on a number of conditions, among which is the 
uprightness of the reporter. 
2.3.1. All hadiths must be reported on its first stage by a companion. 
2.3.1.1. All companions are considered upright by Ijmaʿ.584 
3. Ijmaʿ is the third principal of usul al-fiqh. 
3.1. The authoritativeness of Ijmaʿ is said by some usulis to be based on Quran. 
3.1.1. Quran is reliant on Ijmaʿ in many respects as shown above. 
3.2. Some usulis authorize Ijmaʿ on hadith. 
3.2.1. Hadith is reliant on Ijmaʿ as shown above. 
3.3. Some usulis authorized Ijmaʿ on custom, induction, or tawatur of content. 
 
579 Nasser 75. 
580 Nöldeke 571. 
581 Talib 135. 
582 See the discussion of the transmission of meaning in chapter 3 above. 
583 Zysow 154. 
584 Juwaynī, Al-Burhan Fi Usul al-fiqh 241–242. 
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3.3.1. It has been shown that traces of Ijmaʿ – in its abstract notion – can be found 
in the methods of custom and tawatur of content.585 
3.4. There are great differences among the usulis regarding most aspects of Ijmaʿ. 
This affected much of what is considered Ijmaʿ in the existing law, and impeded, 
almost to the degree of paralysis, the possibility of using Ijmaʿ to generate law anew. 
3.4.1. Any break through this impasse will need the consensus of the scholars, 
raising the dilemma of making Ijmaʿ self-legitimating. 
The above structure – and the illustrative diagram in figure 1 – elucidates the circularity 
problem in usul al-fiqh beyond the objections made by some usulis and orientalists mentioned 
before. The circularity, however, is not the sole problem of the usul system as it is a legal 
dilemma that can be found even in positive law theory. Luhmann and Teubner argue that the 
modern law is a self-referential, self-constituting, self-defining, self-regulating, self-legitimating, 
and self-justifying phenomenon.586 The circularity problem, according to R. Siltala, “strikes with 
equal force any consistent account of legal positivism, if the validity of law is justified by 
reference to the criteria found in that legal system itself”.587 Like a man who gets out of a 
swamp by pulling himself from his own hair.588 But the circularity or self-referential dilemma is 
not inexplicable in positive law systems as, by its nature, it is deprived of external sources of 
legitimacy and so can only turn inwards. This is not the case with Sharia. Sharia is clearly 
referred to God as its source of legitimacy, so why did the usulis fall into the trap of circularity? 
The quest for certainty is a likely cause for this. 
It has been shown before that certainty in Sharia is required to ensure its divinity, for a 
probable Sharia will not have the sufficient force to yield absolute law, and the law, according 
to the usulis, must be absolute if it is indeed divine. The usulis, however, could not sustainably 
justify certainty on theological grounds as this will throw the matter back in a vicious circle.589 
Certainty had to be justified by mundane methods: logic, reason, and historical evidence, 
putting Sharia back in equity with positive legal systems. This dilemma seems insoluble, for, 
according to Siltala “a system of would-be knowledge in which epistemic uncertainty is ruled 
 
585 See the section on ‘the circularity problem’ page 167 above. 
586 Quoted in Siltala 172. 
587 ibid. 
588 ibid. 
589 Theology itself lacks certainty. 
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out by means of the postulated infallibility of some scientific or, say, religious authority may 
well fulfil the terms of systemic closure and inner consistency. The status of the ultimate 
premises of such a system of knowledge or values cannot be effectively questioned without 
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*The number boxes refer to the structure of usul explained above. 
Figure (1) 
3 
The Effects of Certainty in Classical Usul al-fiqh on Islamic 
Financial Law 
 
It is possible, now that we have analysed all the sources of certainty in Islamic jurisprudence, to 
take a more holistic view of how Islamic financial law has been affected by the certainty in 
these sources. However, and since the texts related to Islamic finance are vast, we can only 
represent this effect by a sample of the law; most pertinently, the laws on riba. This will be 
done by looking at the hadiths and Ijmaʿ on the main event of Islamic finance, the prohibition of 
riba, and the main derivatives of this prohibition that had the most impact on Islamic finance. 
The analysis will require the recalling of the constituents of certainty in hadith and Ijmaʿ 
including authenticity, meaning, context, legality, etc.  We will also look at any claim for Ijmaʿ 
and the bases for that claim. 
It was shown in the previous chapter that the Quran explicitly prohibited riba but did not give a 
defined description of it. The problem of understanding what exactly is riba, is almost as old as 
the prohibition itself. It is known that the verses prohibiting riba were among the very last to be 
revealed to the Prophet and it seems that the Prophet died while the issue was not entirely 










clarified three things for them before he died, riba was one of them.591 Yet the jurists still 
managed to draw up a concept of riba based on the available hadiths and claims of Ijmaʿ, the 
effects of which affected modern Islamic finance. The most conspicuous manifestation of this 
effect is the identification of banks interest as riba. 
 
Is bank’s interest riba? 
Identifying banks’ interest as riba is one of the most certain rules in Islamic finance as well as 
the most influential. There has always been a minority opinion that did not accept the equality 
of the two concepts, but this opinion never succeeded in preventing the prohibition of interest 
from being the most important feature of Islamic finance.592 It is, therefore, odd, to say the 
least, that the evidence the jurists used to demonstrate this equality is far less certain than the 
law they produce. 
It is known that there are two types of riba: riba al-nasīʾa and riba al-faḍl. The former is 
described as the increase of value given in exchange of deferring repayments of a loan or of a 
purchase if the increase was a condition in the contract. The latter is the exchange of the same 
commodity but by different quantity or quality. 593 The jurists have always debated the strict 
prohibition of riba al-fadl but the nasīʾa was, for them, certainly prohibited.594 Yet, one finds a 
myriad of hadiths about riba al-fadl but very little text, if any, on the description of riba al-
nasīʾa, which is the one considered to resemble banks’ interest. Qaradawi, in a book written 
solely for this problem, argues that the primary source for identifying riba (as interest) is the 
Quran, which speaks, in the context of prohibiting riba, of permitting the repentant to have his 
‘capital’, indicating that riba is an increase over the capital. He acknowledges that the saying 
 
591 Muslim ibn al-Hạjjāj Al-Qushayrī and Nawawī (n 160). number 3032 
592 A known scholar who did not share the idea of equating interest to riba is Fazlur Rahman Malik. See ch3. Above. 
More on this below. 
593 This is not a formal definition but more of a description. This is the method used by Abdullah: to identify riba by 
describing it, because a definition always turns problematic. See his descriptions which resemble the one above in: 
Abdullah 27–33. More on this below. 
594 This was briefly mentioned by Qaradawi, see: Yūsuf Qaradạ̄wī, Fawa ͗id Al-Bunuk Hiya Al-Riba Al-Haram (5th 
edn, Maktabat Wahba 2001) 9. 
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“any loan that begets benefit is riba” is not sound as a hadith and cannot be used to define riba. 
But besides these arguments Qaradawi offers little to demonstrate how interest is the same as 
riba from a juristic perspective. He followed some of the scholars, who were interpreting the 
riba verses in the Quran, in referring to historical reports that described the concept of riba as 
an ancient practice known among the Arabs,595 i.e. a condition of increase in return for delaying 
payment. The jurists, however, accepted this description as a historical fact and this fact, in 
turn, as a certain law, without further qualification. In other words, it was not presented in an 
usuli framework, they simply said that this is the riba that was practiced by the Arabs in 
jāhilīyyah.596 This cannot be accepted, according to the usulis standards, as a certain source of 
law. Similarly, the description deduced from the Quran cannot be the basis for the prohibition 
of interest. The scholars acknowledge that not all increase over an original value is riba.597 It is 
narrated that the Prophet returned in some occasions what he borrowed in excess, teaching his 
companions that “the best among you are those who are better in repaying their loans”.598 Not 
to mention that selling itself involves an increase over capital, and although the Quran explicitly 
made a distinction between selling and riba, it did not give any details about how they are 
different. It is, therefore, not possible to extract a clear description of riba from the Quran, nor 
is there hadith that describes this loans riba; what, then, is the basis of the perception of riba 
al-nasīʾa? Some have argued that it is based on Ijmaʿ,599 but we have seen that it is impossible 
to demonstrate Ijmaʿ with certainty. True, there seems to be an agreement among the noted 
scholars on the form of riba al-jāhilīyyah, which was prohibited by the Quran, but, in a context 
of certainty, an apparent absence of disagreement which is based mainly on historical reports 
(not hadiths) is not Ijmaʿ. moreover, even when accepting the description of riba al-jāhilīyyah as 
founded, it still does not qualify as a prohibition of interest. 
Qaradawi, aware of the difficulty above, argued that interest was prohibited, in addition to the 
Quran, by the Ijmaʿ of all fiqh councils that convened to discuss interest since 1965 and, thus, 
 
595 ibid 53–55. 
596 ibid; Abdullah 34–39. 
597 Qaradạw̄ī, Fawa ͗id Al-Bunuk Hiya Al-Riba Al-Haram 54. 
598 Abdullah 30. 
599 ibid 60 
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dissuaded any scholar from breaking this Ijmaʿ. 600 He later acknowledged that an Ijmaʿ can be 
abrogated by Ijmaʿ if it was based on ijtihad, but there is no new Ijmaʿ, he argued, and for this 
current Ijmaʿ to be abrogated, a new Ijmaʿ by all these organizations should be established.601 
The problem with this argument is that, as is always the problem with the claim of Ijmaʿ, there 
never was an Ijmaʿ in the matter of interest in the first place. There has always been a number 
of scholars who did not see interest as riba including ones from al-Azhar, the alma mater of 
Qaradawi, namely, the grand mufti of Egypt in addition to prominent figures like Muhammad 
Abdu and Mahmud Shaltut, both Grand Imams of al-Azhar.602 It is a sign of confusion if not 
contradiction to acknowledge the right to contribute a new ijtihad in the matter while, with the 
same breath, prohibiting, or at best strongly dissuading, people from breaking an existing Ijmaʿ. 
Qaradawi’s whole book was a vehement condemnation, sometimes almost amounting to 
accusations, to those who tried to give different views on interest. This ‘kicking away the 
ladder’ attitude raises questions about the authenticity of the claims of Ijmaʿ and underscores 
the suspicion that the argument of Ijmaʿ is only used as tool to sanction a prevalent opinion and 
prevent change. 
The problem can be summarised as follows: 
1. Riba was explicitly prohibited in the Quran but it did not clearly define it. 
2. Descriptions of what riba is were given by scholars later on. These descriptions relied on 
a conventional conception about what was practiced in pre-Islamic times (jāhilīyyah). 
3. By induction from these practices, a rule was developed to prohibit any form of 
conditional deferred increase when exchanges of valuables take place. (with few 
exceptions). 
4. This universalization of the concept of riba affected the way banks interests were 
viewed in modern times, leading to its prohibition in mainstream Islamic finance. 
 
600 Qaradạw̄ī, Fawa ͗id Al-Bunuk Hiya Al-Riba Al-Haram 79. 
601 ibid. 
602 The Mufti is Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, ibid 86. Qaradawi discusses the fatwa of Shaltut in: ibid 110. 
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It remains to assert that none of the events or developments that led up to the prohibition of 
interest can lay claim to certainty. Yet, the rigidity by which interest is forbidden is disturbed 
only by the stratagems used by Islamic financial institutions under the pressures of the 
market.603 In addition to this, the identity of Islamic finance remains strongly defined by the 
prohibition of interest.604 
Who is a murābi (usurer)? 
The condemnation of riba in the Quran is put squarely on the lender not the borrower. The one 
who ‘devours riba’ is the one who benefits from the increase put over the capital, i.e. the 
lender. Similarly, the description of riba al-jāhilīyyah given by scholars seems to allude to the 
lender as the culprit in the demeaned act while the borrower is more of a victim. However, and 
as the definition of riba was broadened by the jurists beyond its Quranic context, identifying 
the guilty parties in the riba transaction was extended to include, besides the lender, everyone 
involved in the transaction. This was based on the hadith “Allah has cursed the one who 
consumes Riba, the one who gives it, the one who records it and the witnesses. They are all the 
same in guilt”.605 The language of this hadith is quite severe as it uses the threat of curse from 
Allah to the partakers in a riba transaction. The problem, however, is that this hadith seems to 
belong to a wider group of usul sources, other than the Quran, that work to broaden and 
extend the Quranic prohibitions making the rules stricter as well as to cement their legal form. 
This is clear in the case of using Ijmaʿ to prohibit the swine fat in addition to the Quranic 
 
603 The scope of this study does not allow for a detailed discussion of Islamic nominal contracts which are used as 
an alternative to interest-based banking. It is, however, the position of this study that these contracts – such as 
Murābaḥa, Mushāraka, and Muḍāraba – are used as stratagems (ḥiyal) to circumvent the prohibition of interest. 
See for a discussion of this problem: Haider Ala Hamoudi, ‘Jurisprudential Schizophrenia: On Form and Function in 
Islamic Finance [Article]’ 605 612 
<https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,shib&db=edshol&AN=hein.journals.cjil7.33&
site=eds-live>. For a general discussion of Islamic nominal contracts see: Mahmoud Amin Gamal, Islamic Finance : 
Law, Economics, and Practice (Cambridge University Press 2006) 64–80. 
604 Some of the arguments by Muslim scholars raise the suspicion that the adamant prohibition to interest has 
identity roots, that is, it is explained by the desire to maintain a distinct Islamic ideology for finance. Hints of this 
are found in Qaradawi’s arguments. See ibid 40,118,134. 
605 Muslim ibn al-Hạjjāj Al-Qushayrī and Yahỵā ibn Sharaf Nawawī, Sharḥ Saḥīḥ Muslim (Khalil Al-Mees ed, 1st edn, 
Dar al-Qalam 1987).number 1598 
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prohibition of its meat;606 using hadith to prohibit selling alcohol in addition to the Quranic 
prohibition of its drinking;607 and similar other cases. This phenomenon seems to broaden the 
scope of the moral injunctions of the Quran onto a dry and abstract law that is more detached 
from the original moral context which served as its rationale. This phenomenon can be 
explained as a precautionary measure whereby the Quranic injunction is the core prohibition in 
a multi-layered law. Other sources are used to expand the law in wider, outer, layers as added 
lines of prevention to protect people from falling into the core prohibition. This concept has 
grounds in fiqh. It is narrated that the Prophet said  
That which is lawful is clear and that which is unlawful is clear and between the 
two of them are doubtful [or ambiguous] matters about which not many people 
are knowledgeable. Thus, he who avoids these doubtful matters certainly clears 
himself in regard to his religion and his honor. But he who falls into the doubtful 
matters falls into that which is unlawful like the shepherd who pastures around a 
sanctuary, all but grazing therein.608 
In line with this juristic attitude, Imam Malik is known to have developed the concept of 
‘blocking the means’ (sadd al-dharāiʿ) whereby the means that lead to a prohibited thing are 
themselves prohibited despite not being essentially illicit.609 In such a multi-layered prohibition, 
the certainty tends to weaken as one moves from the core outwards. In the case of riba, the 
prohibition of riba in Quran becomes weaker when it is extended by hadith to include the 
borrower and witnesses. This is due to moving from the mutawatir Quran to the solitary hadith. 
The certainty is further weakened as the prohibition extends further using Ijmaʿ 
(undemonstrated) to include every conditioned increase over an original valuable in exchange 
of time. To locate the prohibition of banks’ interest in this schematic one needs to add at least 
another layer where, according to Qaradawi, there is Ijmaʿ in prohibiting interest for its 
correspondence to riba al-jāhilīyyah.610 Little effort is required to show that the absolute 
 
606 See n563 above 
607 Ibn Hạjar al-ʻAsqalānī, Fath ̣al-bārī sharh ̣Sạhịh̄ ̣al-Bukhārī number 1978 
608 ibid number 1946 
609 Wahbah Musṭạfá NV3 Zuhạylī, Usul al-fiqh Al-Islami, vol 2 (Dar al-Fikr 1986) vol 2. 873  
610 Qaradạw̄ī, Fawa ͗id Al-Bunuk Hiya Al-Riba Al-Haram 79. 
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prohibition of any involvement in transactions containing interest will lie at a considerable 
distance from the Quranic prohibition of riba; it enjoys no juxtaposition to the core in the multi-
layered law. Yet, it is the Quranic verses that are always cited as the main evidence for the 
prohibition of interest and all its derivatives. The claim of association to Quran gives these 
prohibitions the certainty of Quranic law. 
Riba al-Faḍl: 
Also known as riba al-Buyūʿ, is any excess in quality or quantity when the same article is being 
exchanged.611 It has little impact on today’s Islamic finance, but it serves as a good example of 
the problems in the law theory. 
The famous hadith narrated from the Prophet about this riba is "Gold for gold, silver for silver, 
wheat for wheat, barley for barley, dates for dates, and salt for salt - like for like, equal for 
equal, and hand-to-hand; if the commodities differ, then you may sell as you wish, provided 
that the exchange is hand-to-hand."612 This hadith was narrated in many slightly different 
versions all establishing the same idea: excess in the exchange of the same article is riba. The 
rationale of the transaction appears in one of the versions when the companion Bilal exchanges 
a quantity of bad dates with a smaller quantity of good dates, the Prophet told him this was 
riba and he should sell the bad dates then buy good dates with the money.613 From this 
context, it seems that the rationale from the prohibition is to avoid potential unfairness in the 
exchange, a form of gharar. The implied assumption is that the measurement of dates, which 
used the handful as a unit (mudd and saʿ), is less accurate than the measurement of money, 
which at that time was coinage (gold, silver, etc.). Moreover, it was perhaps easier to determine 
the value of dates with money than with a different quality of dates. However, and since this 
valuation is simply a declaration of price, the exchange of different quality articles can take 
place according to their monetary prices without having to exchange actual currency. 
 
611 Abdullah 71. 
612Muslim ibn al-Hạjjāj Al-Qushayrī and Nawawī (n 182). number 2978 
613 ibid number 1594 
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The idea from the hadith, assuming its authenticity, seems to be that the Prophet only wanted 
his community to be extra careful in their commercial transactions and avoid, as much as it is 
possible, injustices among them. Otherwise, the notion of exchanging the same quality and 
quantity of the same article at the same time would be nonsensical. The jurists however, 
consistent with their legal methodology, formulated the law with little regards to the objective 
of hadith and extended its effects using qiyas to include other commodities that were not 
among the six mentioned in the hadith whenever they found a common cause. Yet, they had 
difficulties in forming an absolute and consistent law. For one, there are contradicting texts 
where some prohibit riba al-faḍl as we saw, and some others allow it.614 The famous example 
for this is the sound hadith “there is no riba except in nasīʾa”615 for which much debate has 
taken place to circumvent the contradiction.616 Similarly, the hadiths prohibit the exchange of 
the ribawi commodities, even when different, unless it was hand to hand, i.e. immediate 
exchange. But it seems the conventional practice in the market was different, and the text, thus 
had to be circumvented. Therefore, some scholars claimed there was Ijmaʿ on the permissibility 
of exchanging different ribawi commodities in excess and with deferred payment.617 Once 
again, it is not, nor could it possibly be, clear how this Ijmaʿ was known. Other examples include 
hadiths regarding the permissibility of exchanging animals in excess and with deferred 
payments, with no clear explanation of the bases of this exception to animals, which are a form 
of wealth too.618 
 
Conclusion  
There is evidently little proportionality between the degree of legal certainty enjoyed by the 
main aspects of Islamic finance and the corresponding epistemic certainty of the sources on 
 
614 ʻAlī Jumʻah, Muḥammad Aḥmad Sirāj and Aḥmad Jābir Badrān (eds), Mawsūʻat fatāwá al-muʻāmalāt al-mālīyah 
lil-maṣārif wa-al-muʼassasāt al-mālīyah al-Islāmīyah (Dār al-Salām 2009) vol 15. 15,26 
615 Ibn Hạjar al-ʻAsqalānī, Fath ̣al-bārī sharh ̣Sạhịh̄ ̣al-Bukhārī number 2069; ibid. number 1596. 
616 See for example, Abdullah 68–70. 
617 ibid 78 
618 ibid 74 
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which they are based. The Quran is usually described (it describes itself) as a book of guidance 
(hidāya). In this regard, it is not usually explicit in its prohibitions, and ordinances are mostly 
inferred. Yet, even when the prohibitions are explicit as in the case of riba, there are not 
enough details to form a comprehensive body of law. The hadith is then used to complement 
for this purpose. But the hadith lacks, even in the eyes of the usulis, the certainty required for 
the divine law to be concrete and unsusceptible to change. This is the role for Ijmaʿ, to give 
divine sanction to juristic law. The problem with this methodology, of which an attempt of 
illustration was made in the analysis in this chapter, is that none of the arguments made by the 
usulis to demonstrate the soundness of hadith, the validity of a sound hadith, or any of the 
different aspects of Ijmaʿ can stand rigorous scrutiny. In this light, the certainty that seems to 
buttress issues like the prohibition of interest in modern finance becomes questionable. 
The prohibition of interest in particular seems interesting because, on the one hand, there is no 
textual description of the loans riba; the only source for defining it is the conventional pre-
Islamic practice that was reported by some scholars. It seems to have been at some stage a 
matter so well known it did not require questioning. But transiting this assumed knowledge to 
the modern day (i.e. to say that the question of what riba is, is absurd because we know how 
the Arabs practiced riba in jahiliyyah)619 is unjustified. On the other hand, the assertion that 
interest is the same as riba is based, at least according to Qaradawi who is a leading figure in 
the propagation of the legal foundation behind Islamic finance, on the Ijmaʿ of modern fiqh 
councils and institutions. It must be stressed here that many scholars have argued against the 
presumed equalization of interest and riba; what authority, then, do these councils have to 
propagate their decisions as a binding Ijmaʿ?  
Furthermore, the disproportionality in certainty is also found in other aspects of the law like the 
indictment as murabi to the one who pays riba and those who witness and write the contract. 
This is an expansion of the law based on hadith but serious questions about its validity in 
modern times are raised. There are other aspects of Islamic finance affected by hadith and Ijmaʿ 
with similar problems of disproportionate certainty which were not discussed here for want of 
 
619 Yūsuf Qaradạ̄wī, Fawa ͗id Al-Bunuk Hiya Al-Riba Al-Haram (5th edn, Maktabat Wahba 2001) 55. 
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space. Gharar for example is mainly based on hadiths that prohibit selling what one does not 
have, fish in the sea, birds in the sky, etc. The usulis used these hadiths to formulate the general 
principle of the prohibition of gharar. A combination of the prohibition of riba, gharar and 
maysir (gambling) resulted in the prohibition of whole industries like insurance and financial 
derivatives, with little success in developing Islamic alternatives that are distinct in form and 
substance. With an expense of this magnitude, it is essential to critically review the bases of 
these laws and try to formulate a new framework for legal analysis where the objectives of the 






















Is there a need to reform? 
The subtitle above is presented as a question to assert the fact that Sharia’s need for reform is 
not a foregone conclusion to Muslims. The word ‘reform’ is translated into Arabic as ‘iṣlāḥ’ to 
connote reparation, which, in turn, implies fault or brokenness. The concept of reformation, 
along with the terminology now used, seems to be a modern import from the Christian 
Reformation. The concept of ‘iṣlāḥ’ is associated with the 19th century movement of Gamal al-
Din al-Afghani – who is reported to have admired the work of Martin Luther –, Muhammad 
Abdu, and Rashid Rida.620 The problematic nature of the term is evident in the preference of 
many Muslim intellectuals for the term ‘tajdīd’ (renewal). Tajdīd, in addition to having origins in 
Prophetic traditions,621 avoids the negative connotation of faultiness and instead subtly implies 
lack of progress or dynamism. In either case, the focus of where Islam needs ‘action’ has mostly 
been in Sharia or, to be more precise, in fiqh even when the call for reform or tajdīd is generally 
used in relation to Islam. 
The fact that the reform movement is a modern one, points to a link between modernity and 
the need to reform.622 It is undeniable that modernity, particularly after the industrial 
revolution, has greatly changed the course of humanity in many aspects, social sciences as well 
 
620 For an analysis on the works of these thinkers see: Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798–1939 
(Cambridge University Press 1983) <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/arabic-thought-in-the-liberal-age-
17981939/7A4EC7064730DD272E74D76237EED2DE>. 
621 ʻAẓīmābādī. number 4291. 
622 For more on ‘reform’ and modernity, see Hallaq’s introduction: Wael B Hallaq, Sharīʻa : Theory, Practice, 
Transformations (Cambridge University Press 2009) 3–6. 
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as sciences. But as the main engine of modernity lies mostly outside the lands of Islam, 
traditional forms of Islam persevered longer and better than could the Christian traditions 
which bore the main waves of assault from modernity. Nonetheless, and with the invasion of 
Muslim lands by the colonial powers and furthermore by the phenomenon of Globalization, 
Muslims were exposed to the debates about religion and its place in the new era of human 
civilization. They became aware of the changes taking place with regards to politics, law, 
economics, and even values. 
Muslims believe that Islam is a way of life and life became very different with modernity. 
Muslims now lived under the political system of the nation-state and its concomitant state law 
which in turn formed the framework for all social life, a role that was played by Sharia before 
then. Muslims, like Christians before them, had to find a way to reconcile between science and 
their traditional understanding of scripture. Furthermore, they had to resolve issues like 
slavery, the status of women, freedom of speech and faith, crime and punishment, human 
rights, and many other issues where religion and modernity seem, at least ostensibly, to be in 
conflict. It is possible to argue that Sharia needs to change some of its rules regarding 
government or economics in response to the considerable change that occurred in the 
institutions of these domains under modernity. In this domain, the traditional school would 
claim, the notion of ijtihad is relevant and sufficient. Muslims can use the same law theory, usul 
al-fiqh, to make minor changes or additions to regulate societal affairs under the new 
structures. It becomes, however, more complicated when it comes to issues of morality. It is 
important to emphasise here that the Sharia is a moralistic law in the first place. Values sit at 
the heart of Sharia and they form the substance of God’s message to humanity. Therefore, any 
attempt to change the values framework is a move beyond the periphery into the core of 
Sharia. This cannot be labelled as tajdīd. This is an admission that we got it wrong all along, 
hence, reform is more pertinent and duly needed. When someone calls for the preclusion of 
polygamy she is not practising tajdīd, she is fixing a fault in Sharia. A fault attributed to the 
effects of a male-dominated society where revelation was interpreted through its masculine 
lens. The law was wrong from the beginning and modernity only made it possible to change the 
lens of interpretation. According to this argument, a distinction between tajdīd and iṣlāḥ is 
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important and Sharia is evidently in need for both. The problem with this argument, however, is 
that it entails an endorsement of modernity’s values and institutions. Conversely, commitment 
to traditional Sharia entails a rejection of modernity in some degree, and this apparent 
relativeness of morality is inevitably reflected in the debate about Sharia reform. In other 
words, if reforming Sharia as a law was dependent on a particular moral stance, it will only 
move it from serving one dogma onto serving another. 
Wael Hallaq, who is a strong critic of modernity and the modern nation-state, is adamant that 
Sharia has been distorted, not reformed, by modernity.623 On the other hand, we find a 
plethora of literature, as will be discussed below, exposing aspects of Sharia which they think is 
unethical according to their espoused modern standards. Apologists writings on how to 
reinterpret the text on women, slavery, and hudud are vast and growing. Identifying a certain 
action on moral grounds is, in many instances, relative to a number of different factors; culture 
and time being the most obvious. Therefore, when assessing Sharia as a system of law, one 
should try and avoid the relativity trap.  
A less subjective ground for assessment can be the changeability of Sharia. Regardless of where 
one stands with regards to Sharia, it is undeniable that it will need some degree of flexibility in 
order to allow for adaptation and revision. The mechanism of how this can be done is a 
technical issue that can be decided objectively. Muslims will want different outcomes from 
Sharia depending on how they see the world in terms of right and wrong, good and bad. But at 
least they can agree that a system of law that is efficient in producing or changing law when 
needed is always desirable. If we consider the question of whether or not Sharia is in need of 
reform in this light, it will be easier to answer in the affirmative. There is no contention that the 
whole legal theory in Islam is riddled with polemics, debates, and disagreements, thus, it will be 
desirous to find a system that can settle differences efficiently in order to produce law. This on 
its own will merit the call for reforming Sharia. But efficiency and adaptability are more pressing 
 
623 Hallaq, Sharīʻa : Theory, Practice, Transformations 500. Passim. Hallaq furthers his critique on the State and 
argues that Sharia, being essentially an ethical project, cannot work under the modern state. This is the upshot of 
his latest book ‘The Impossible State’ see: Wael B Hallaq  1955-, The Impossible State : Islam, Politics, and 
Modernity’s Moral Predicament (Columbia University Press 2013). 
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issues that require reform in Sharia. We have seen in the previous chapters that the arguments 
made by the usulis to prevent change are questionable at best and the rigidity they caused 
have only maintained a superficial form of law where the ethical substance of the law have, in 
many cases, been tarnished if not lost. And for a system that is essentially ethical, this is a 
change for the worse. Reform, therefore, is required. 
 
How to reform Sharia? 
What can/should be reformed? 
To generate law, jurists need the sources, Quran and Sunna, and the tools to derive law from 
these sources, like qiyas (Ijmaʿ sits in a curious position between the two). The complete 
process is ijtihad. Accordingly, calls for reform have differed with regards to the two aspects of 
ijtihad, being inversely correlated to certainty, that is, the more certain, the less exposure to 
reform, meaning, less changeable. Naturally, then, soft reformers only target the tools (qiyas, 
istisḥāb, istiḥsān, maṣlaḥa, etc.) The hard reformers further target the sources, namely the 
Sunna, as Quran’s authenticity is beyond the realm of ijtihad. A common target for reform 
among all scholars is hermeneutics, which suffices for the hard reformers as it renders the issue 
of Quranic authenticity obsolete. They can provide different readings of the verses to get 
different laws or dismiss the legal validity of the verse completely by arguing that it is 
temporally bound. For the Sunna, however, and as it is authentically only probable, both 
authenticity and interpretation fall within the domain of reform. 
Furthermore, reformers tend to focus on a particular aspect of Sharia that forms a general 
theme for their arguments. For some, it is hermeneutics,624 for others, it is maṣlaḥa (utility),625 
and a fashionable theme now is maqāṣid (objectives).626 But these distinctions are not strictly 
applicable as reformers sometimes, and in spite of their particular focus, broaden their 
 
624 Like Shahrur and M. Abu al-Gasim Haj Hamad, see below. 
625 Like Abdul Wahab Khallaf and Muhammad Rashid Rida, see: ibid 508–512 for an analysis of their works. 
626 Like Muhammad al-Tahir b. Ashur, see below. Also, ʿAllāl al-Fāsi in: Wael B Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal 
Theories : An Introduction to Sunnī Usụl̄ Al-Fiqh (Cambridge UP 1997) 224–226. 
201 
 
arguments to include different aspects of Sharia. For the purposes of this research, however, 
reform will be considered according to how it relates to the concept of certainty. In this regard, 
we can distinguish two groups of reform arguments: one is the argument that Sharia contains 
certain/absolute law and the objective of the reform is to structure a system capable of finding 
this law from revelation. This group can also be described as textualists since text provides the 
framework of their legal theory. The other group argues that Sharia only gives us absolute 
values not laws and the reform objective in this case will be to objectively identify these 
absolute values and to formulate the methodology to derive law from them.  
In our discussion of the reform attempts to Sharia, we will try to keep our analysis of the 
applied aspect of the arguments, that is, how the suggested reform will produce practical 
changes of the law, focused on Islamic finance. Unfortunately, much of the discussion provided 
by the reformers is confined to the abstract and provide little, if any, discussion of the practical 
implications on the law. Moreover, and while finance is a very pertinent topic when it comes to 
Sharia reform, other topics such as family law, penal law or politics are also hotly debated and 
have taken some of the attention of some reformers,627 which might imply a slight variation on 
our discussion of the law. 
First line of argument for reform: Sharia has absolute law, how to find it: 
The traditionalist school:  
This school is mainly formed by the conservative reformers who do not think Sharia is in need 
of reform in the sense that entails considerable change from classical Sharia. They rather 
espouse for tajdīd where Sharia is mostly concerned with novel issues and the change of 
established classical fiqh is seldom considered.  
A more elaborate idea about this group and how it differs from others is given by Qaradawi 
who identifies himself with a middle current (tayyār wasaṭī) of Islam. According to him, this 
 
627 For example: Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name : Islamic Law, Authority and Women (Oneworld 
2001) ch 7. 209-263 focus on women, while Turabi (below) focus on politics in his discussion of usul al-fiqh and 
dedicates a separate book for the issues of women in Islam ‘Hassan Turabi, Al-Mar’a Bain Al-Usul Wa Al-Taqalid 
(Markaz Dirasat al-Mar’a 2000). See also: Ashmāwī 117-129 for a discussion of hudud among other things.  
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current takes a centre ground between what he called al-Zāhirīyya al-judud (New Zahirists) and 
al-Muʿaṭṭila al-judud (New Suspenders). The former group abide strictly to the letter of the text 
and do not consider the context nor objective when they interpret the text and extract law 
from it. The latter school suspend the text in its specificity and claim, according to Qaradawi, to 
consider Sharia in its spirit and objectives claiming religion to be essence rather than form. They 
are ignorant of Sharia, presumptuous about their knowledge of it, and they are followers of the 
West. Both schools are wrong, he asserts, and truth lies in moderation.628 The Wasatīyya school 
adheres to the text but understands that there is always reason and wisdom (ḥikma) that 
underlies any legal text.629 The main contention of the school is that there can be no 
contradiction, even if it appeared otherwise, between a certain text and a certain utility 
(maṣlaḥa).630 If the text was authentically and semantically certain, it is impossible that it will 
contradict a certain utility; if it seems to be so, then we either misunderstood the text, or the 
maṣlaḥa is not really beneficial for Muslims. 
The most notable problem in Qaradawi’s arguments is, once again, the relativeness of the 
classification. Qaradawi posits his school in the middle while in our discussion of reform he 
belongs more to the traditional schools. Despite the fact that he wrote extensively on issues of 
Sharia’s validity in modern times, he was not included in Hallaq’s discussion of the topic in two 
books.631 This omission cannot be explained by the stature of Qaradawi as a scholar for he is 
too influential to be omitted, but perhaps by the limited relevance of his ideas to the topic of 
modifying Sharia. Nevertheless, it remains important to consider the contribution of this school 
for, while they offer little in the attempts to ‘modernize’ Sharia, they remain influential in 
critiquing these attempts while offering a vision for tajdīd instead.  
Furthermore, it is important to note that, while Qaradawi distinguished his school from the 
other two ‘extremes’, his position is not precisely central between them and it is clear that he 
 
628 Yūsuf Qaradạ̄wī, Dirāsah fī fiqh maqāsịd al-sharīʻah : bayna al-maqāsịd al-kullīyah wa-al-nusụs̄ ̣al-juzʼīyah (Dār 
al-Shurūq 2006) 39–42. 
629 ibid 137 
630 ibid 140 
631 Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories : An Introduction to Sunnī Usụ̄l Al-Fiqh (n 197) 207–254. and Hallaq, 
Sharīʻa : Theory, Practice, Transformations (n 194) 500–542. 
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sits further away from the ‘liberals’ whom he calls New Muʿaṭṭila, and much closer to the 
traditional school. Evidence for this can be found in the nature of differences he sees between 
his school and the others. In the case of his critique of the New Zahirīyya, the issues are more 
particular and superficial when compared to the issues in his critique of the New Muʿattila 
which are more methodological or, when he takes particular examples, more significant. For 
example, he criticizes the New Zahirīyya for:  
a. Their prohibition of photography and television. 
b. Their insistence that the zakat al-fiṭr (almsgiving after Ramadan) must be in grains not 
the cash equivalent. 
c. Their exemption of trade money from zakat. 
d. Their argument that modern paper money does not share the value characteristic of 
gold and silver, therefore, no zakat is due on it, nor does riba apply to it.632 
The first two points are clearly trivial. And while the second two are more significant, they 
remain particulars and do not address issues of theory and system. Qaradawi then offered his 
critique to the other school on the following points: 
a. Evading the hermetic texts while holding up the ambiguous. Here he discusses issues 
like the prohibition of alcohol, the debate on riba, and the sceptical position of this 
school on Sunna. 
b. Contradicting the pillars of Islam and hudud in the name of maṣlaḥa.633 
The point from presenting Qaradawi’s arguments above is to show that in comparison to his 
contentions against the New Zahirīyya, his contentions against the New Muʿattila are more 
fundamental and consequential to Sharia. The Islam of the latter school will look much more 
different if not repugnant in the eyes of Qaradawi than the Islam of the former, submitting he 
disagrees with both. In any case, Qaradawi’s identification of his school as a middle ground 
between two extremes is no identification at all. No school will identify itself as extreme and 
the problem of relativity will render this method of identification futile. Qaradawi represents an 
 
632 ibid 65–77. 
633 ibid 117-124 
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extreme position for both the other schools, only the directions differ. Nor would his attempt to 
offer a narrative elaborating the ideas of his school feature any better in giving a concise 
identity to it so long as this narrative is merely an emphasis on the idea of wasat (middle). He 
claims that his school believes in balance and moderation. It combines particular texts and 
holistic objectives, where it does not dogmatically follow the letter of the texts nor dismiss it 
completely. All the rules of Sharia, according to this school, are cause-driven and consistent 
with wisdom (ḥikma) and all its causes are directed towards the welfare (maṣlaḥa) of people. 634 
These arguments offer little in explaining how this school differ from classical schools of Sharia, 
how it can make Sharia better adapt to changing circumstances, and how the issue of certainty, 
for that matter, is considered. According to Qaradawi’s vision, the wasaṭīyya school offers 
nothing significantly different from classical Sharia. His assertions on texts, reason, causes, 
maṣlaḥa, and the dichotomy of changeable and unchangeable is the same as that of classical 
usul.635 The examples he gives to show how his school will deal with practical issues do not 
show departure of classical fiqh but rather a process of changing choices between the existing 
legal opinions on a particular matter. Even when he made some debateable fatwas on allowing 
mortgages for Muslim communities in the West under some conditions and allowing the 
women to take off head scarfs in some situations, he made the fatwas under the principle of 
ḍarūra,636 which means that, even when there is evident need for change, it remains an 
exception that does not necessitate a change in law or methodology. The classical methodology 
is equipped to deal with these novel issues by the principles of ḍarūra, maṣlaḥa, and the like. As 
a result of this vision, wasaṭīyya school suffers from the same classical problems of deciding 
who can, and how to, differentiate between the certain/unchangeable and 
uncertain/changeable in Sharia. It remains a matter of opinion and their proclaimed central 
 
634 ibid 137 
635 He gives a brief argument about the changeable and unchangeable in Sharia in his book: Yūsuf Qaradạ̄wī, Al-
Fiqh Al-Islami Bayn Al-Asala Wa Al-Tajdid (Maktabat Wahbah 1999) 83–86. 
636 On the issue of mortgages see: Qaradạ̄wī, Dirāsah fī fiqh maqāsịd al-sharīʻah : bayna al-maqāsịd al-kullīyah wa-
al-nusụs̄ ̣al-juzʼīyah 150. See also: Mahmoud Amin Gamal, Islamic Finance : Law, Economics, and Practice 
(Cambridge University Press 2006) 19.On hijab see: ‘Qaradawi’s Fatwa Regarding Hijab’ 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-_qj0vcYV1o>. last seen 25/10/2017 
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position is merely the result of differing in their opinion from others who use the same 
methodology.  
For example, it is known that Umar, after his armies conquered Iraq, did not distribute its land 
among the soldiers as decreed by the Quranic injunction “and know that whatever thing you 
gain, a fifth of it is for Allah and for the Apostle and for the near of kin and the orphans and the 
needy and the wayfarer, if you believe in Allah and what We revealed to Our Servant”.  
Qaradawi argues that Umar did not suspend the Quranic injunction, as the liberals argue, 
because he realized that the injunction was circumstantial and was no longer applicable.  
Rather, argues Qaradawi, Umar realized that the verse is a general rule that can be 
particularized, therefore he made it applicable only to ‘mobile’ booty instead of land.637 But 
Qaradawi rejected this same rationale when it was used by the ‘seculars’ who argue that the 
prohibition of riba in Quran did not apply to banks interest and that it was only the riba in the 
form that was practiced before Islam which is prohibited.638 In both cases the verses were 
understood to be referring to a particular prohibition which was not to be generalized without 
evidence. Umar did not offer evidence except his consideration of the maṣlaḥa of the Muslims, 
whereas the argument for limiting the scope of riba was substantiated by a number of evidence 
including the concomitance between riba and sadaqāt (almsgiving) when riba was mentioned in 
Quran, the notion of injustice with riba, and the notion of compounded repayments. Similar 
examples where given by Qaradawi when he argued that the paying of zakat al-fiṭr in kind only 
was a literalists opinion which fails to understand the historical context of the practice and 
made it a general rule. He asserted that it could be paid by kind or money and in many cases 
money is better.639 And he used the same rationale to argue that women are allowed to travel 
without a maḥram (unweddable companion) for the prohibition was for fear of safety which is 
now, mostly, not a serious concern;640 and he gave other examples of rulings that should be 
understood in their context and, hence, changed if necessary.641 He rejected, however, the 
 
637 Qaradạw̄ī, Dirāsah fī fiqh maqāsịd al-sharīʻah : bayna al-maqāsịd al-kullīyah wa-al-nusụ̄s ̣al-juzʼīyah 173. 
638 ibid 123. See also the general discussion in his book: Qaradạ̄wī, Fawa ͗id Al-Bunuk Hiya Al-Riba Al-Haram. 
639 Qaradạw̄ī, Dirāsah fī fiqh maqāsịd al-sharīʻah : bayna al-maqāsịd al-kullīyah wa-al-nusụ̄s ̣al-juzʼīyah 72–75. 
640 ibid 166 
641 ibid 77-82 
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same rationale of historical context in matters of hudūd. The liberal argument is that 
amputation for the thief and stoning for adulterers is an ancient practice that is not suitable to 
the less gruesome modern world and Islam can punish criminals with other means more 
suitable for the day. Qaradawi disagrees on the grounds that these rulings are certain (thābita) 
and cannot be changed or contextualized.642  
This is where the problem lies. The differentiation between what belongs to the changeable in 
Sharia and what does not belong is a practice that depends entirely on the usuli’s judgment. 
Most of the mentioned examples are based on Quran, so the text is authentic, but the 
hermeneutical process causes the diversion in opinions. Similarly, the context and validity of 
the text play a role in deciding what is changeable and all these factors are matters for ijtihad 
(opinion) which immediately negates any chance of certainty or thubūt (unchangeability). 
Qaradawi fails, despite his extensive writings on the matter, to show how Sharia will cope with 
the pressure of ever-changing times. His main goal seems to be the preservation of Sharia, not 
just the underlying theory, but even the law itself. The evidence he gives to prove the 
flexibility/changeability of the law are taken from historical authorities which means that 
flexibility lies only in choosing between existing classical legal opinions. And when a fatwa is not 
grounded in historical sanction it is based on necessity; rendering, thereby, all notions of tajdīd 
or adaptability of the law to be superficial. 
Political Islam school:  
Thinkers in this school have, naturally, tended to consider reform/tajdīd in Islam and Islamic law 
through a political prism. The state has been the dominant framework for their vision of a 
modern Islam, but since the Islamists have mostly been out of power in the Muslim world, their 
ideas have not undergone the test of reality. The clear exceptions here are the Khumaini in Iran 
and Turabi in Sudan. Focus here will be on the latter. 
Turabi had a reputation among his admirers, and perhaps among others as well, for being a 
radical thinker. He is known to use sarcasm and humour to ridicule traditional religious views. 
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This, in addition to his Western education, might explain why he is considered as atraditional if 
not anti-tradition. But a closer look at his work on usul al-fiqh might show a different picture. 
Turabi’s commitment to the principle of unchangeable Sharia (Quran and Sunna) is stated 
clearly in the beginning of his book ‘Tajdīd Usul al-fiqh al-Islami’ where he summarizes his vision 
of how Islamic legal methodology should function. The theoretical order of exercising ijtihad, he 
argues, should start with the text using the rules of hermeneutics and then expands using the 
other sources like maṣlaḥa and istiṣḥāb. But he qualifies this traditional statement by asserting 
the complexity of the process of ijtihad. It is unavoidable for a mujtahid to be influenced by his 
reality and by the traditional culture that shaped his learning. Further, the mujtahid should only 
consider the maṣlaḥa in light of his considerations of revelation in order to maintain the bond 
between revelation and reason. Every rule a mujtahid gets directly from Quran must be 
elaborated by the Sunna which represents the mundane manifestation of Quranic injunctions. 
It is imperative then to consider the real-life implications of applying the rule, for it could cause 
great difficulties or have outcomes that contravene other rules. Finally, it is the responsibility of 
the state to legislate, by the process of shura (council), the collection of ijtihadi opinions that 
are accepted by society to become proper law. 643  
Turabi’s traditional views on the changeable and unchangeable is emphasised further in his 
work. It is up to the community of believers, he argues, to make of Sharʿ an absolute reference, 
hence, Islam has an unchangeable legal reference that is the Quran as elaborated by the Sunna, 
and a renewable (changeable) positive reference in the practices of the Muslim community, 
which are also based on Sharia, throughout the ages. Shar ͑, which is the source of all sources, is 
validated directly by theology which is not the domain for lawyers.644 This way, after placing 
Shar  ͑beyond change, Turabi has put the arguments for this placement, that is, its rationale, in 
the domain of theology where it is difficult to distinguish what arguments are based on logic 
and what are based on faith only. Still, Turabi uses the same arguments used by the classical 
usulis without attempting to address its weaknesses. Quran, he confirms, is authentic and 
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preserved by God; this is imperative from believing the truth of its word since it declares its 
authenticity and preservation. We can further feel assured of its authenticity by the induction 
of its history. And while it was an address to the people of its time, it remains of timeless 
validity where one can interpret a historical original meaning or a renewed derivative (far ͑) 
meaning which arises to address a new reality.645 
Turabi’s political bent is evident in his views on Ijmaʿ. He asserts that Ijmaʿ is in the classical 
sense impossible and has never been achieved except during the time of the companions. True 
Ijmaʿ, however, he argues, is the consensus of the whole present Umma where a majority 
opinion would represent its will. He then ranks different types of Ijmaʿ according to legal 
certainty. Al-Ijmaʿ al-Istiftaʾi (Ijmaʿ based on popular referendum) is equivalent to constitutional 
consensus. Al-Ijmaʿ al-niyābi al-ʿām (Representative or parliamentary) comes next and is 
subordinate to the former after its subordination to Sharia. On the other hand, what Turabi 
calls ‘Ijmaʿ ittifāqi’ (agreement consensus) is only ẓanni (probable) in its validity. Turabi did not 
explain what he means by ‘Ijmaʿ ittifāqi’ but he clearly ranks it below the parliamentary and 
constitutional.646 Also, his emphasis on its probable validity alludes to the certain validity of the 
higher Ijmaʿs, albeit he never explains the grounds of this certainty. He maintains that the ‘Ijmaʿ 
ittifāqi’ can be changed by new fiqh that manages to establish new consensus to support it.647 
This again alludes to the unchangeability of the higher Ijmaʿs without making the case for this 
legal certainty. 
Turabi then adds what he calls ‘al-Amr’ (decree or ordinance) to the sources of Islamic law. This 
stands on legitimate authority and obligatory shura. Amr ranks third below Sharia and Ijmaʿ, 
and all decrees must be based on Sharia by one of the methods of interpretation.648 Turabi 
does not offer any idea on how Amr is classified in terms of its certainty, epistemic or legal, but 
one can infer from its rank that it belongs, in Turabi’s scheme, to the changeable domain. 
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With regards to the debate on the prioritization of ʿillah (ratio legis or effective cause) and 
ḥikma (wisdom or rationale), Turabi acknowledges that the usulis preferred ʿillah because it is 
objective and can be taken directly from the text (sometimes) whereas the ḥikma entails 
judgment and lacks the objectivity and clarity of the ʿillah. Yet, it is imperative that the ʿillah of 
fiqh is grounded by the rationale lest fiqh practice becomes abstract and ritualistic.649 Once 
again Turabi states the obvious in asserting uncontentious principles like balance, moderation, 
and reconciliation in case of ostensible conflict. On the other hand, he does not offer any 
scheme for the application of these established principles. He offered the idea of a ‘wider’ 
istiṣḥāb and a ‘wider’ qiyas, but did not elaborate on how this expansion can be carried out or 
on what basis.650 His inclusion of Amr to usul, while seems to be theoretically pertinent, lacks a 
clear explanation on how this will add or change the reality of fiqh or law. Obedience to state 
authority is a well-established principle in Islam, and Muslims are obligated by numerous texts 
and traditions to ‘listen and obay’ (al-samʿ wa al-ṭāʿa) to their governments (waliyy al-Amr).651 
Turabi does not make it clear how this can be improved or changed by adding this principle to 
usul.  
Like most political Islamists, Turabi’s thoughts were charged with hostility towards secular ideas 
even if it came from “ones who claim to belong to Islamic thought”.652 He considers the 
discourse that puts “objectives over texts”, “the spirit of religion instead of its letters” and 
similar arguments to lead to the suspension of what is certain in aḥkām (rulings).653 He criticizes 
the religious scholars who ‘patch’ (talfīqiyyūn) and cherry-pick (intiqāʾiyyūn) aḥkām to succumb 
to the pressures of reality, and others who permit what the masses want by over-
interpretation.654 Yet, Turabi submits that some of the traditional theories in usul will not 
suffice the requirements for a renaissance in fiqh nor suit the material, social, and cultural 
environment of the modern times. To address this, Turabi affirms the certainty of Quran, 
Sunna, and Ijmaʿ, asserting that these are not matters of disagreement. Hermeneutics, qiyas, 
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maqāṣid, influencing public opinion by shura, expressing public will by Ijmaʿ and ʿurf, and 
political authority, however, are all renewed matters (umūr mutajaddida).655 
It is difficult to see where in Turabi’s ideas, despite his various articulations of them, can a 
significant change be achieved in Islamic law. Again, the better test of theory can be made by 
exploring the practical implications on law, therefore, screening for his stance on some practical 
legal issues helps to observe how the theory have made change in practice. In this regard, 
Turabi does not seem significant. His ideas on Islamic finance are brief and traditional,656 and 
the entire experiment of Islamic finance in Sudan, which was developed under his intellectual 
auspices, is a failure according to Turabi himself.657 Turabi did not articulate a detailed opinion 
on Islamic finance but his position seems to be more political than intellectual. For the political 
Islamists in general, Islamic finance, particularly the prohibition of riba, is an identity issue.658 It 
gives Islam a distinguishing character in economics that sets it apart from the European 
dialectic of socialism and capitalism. The prohibition of riba is seen as the moral position of 
Islam against the secular wave coming from the West and their local agents. The moral position 
that has shaped the Islamists’ political discourse in their quest for popular support is the 
context in which to understand their positions on riba. Turabi condemned in an interview with 
al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper what he called ‘Muslim disciples and rabbis’ for making fatwas to 
meet the wishes of kings and emperors. They argued for the permissibility of riba on the bases 
of ḍarūra and put the consideration of ḍarūra at the hands of the government. He argued, 
“Allah did not allow riba for his Prophet even when they were in dire need and poverty in 
Madina”.659 
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Another Islamists, the Tunisian Rachid al-Ghannushi, who is a friend of Turabi, was less 
forthcoming when he was interviewed and asked about what his vision (as leader of al-Nahda 
party) for an Islamic finance was particularly whether he thought banks interests are riba or 
not. Ghannushi said he believed in what the Quran says, but understanding how it applies to 
current matters is ‘fiqh’, meaning, it needs to be studied carefully before making an opinion on 
it. One needs to know “what is riba precisely; where do the Quranic prohibitions apply; what is 
the precise economic practice carried out by the bank; what is this practice to which the 
Quranic ruling applies for being exploitative of the weak instead of assistive. When we know 
that this particular financial transaction practiced by the bank or any other institution is 
exploitative of the weak and we have an alternative at hand, then we will make a change”.660 
Ghannushi understands the complexity of the matter, on the one hand, prohibiting banks 
interest is not a simple task without consequences, on the other hand, abandoning the Islamists 
rhetoric is politically costly, hence the evasive response. 
We can still seek Turabi’s application of his methodology in other areas of the law, namely, his 
ijtihad on issues related to women. He argues that a Muslim woman should be allowed to 
marry a Christian or a Jewish man; that the testimony of a woman is equal to that of a man; and 
that a woman can lead men in prayers.661 All these arguments go against mainstream fiqh and 
were met with vehement rejection and condemnation from traditional scholars. Yet, and as was 
shown by some researchers,662 these opinions are not novel and were a minority opinion at 
some stage in the history of fiqh. This is not surprising if we acknowledge that Turabi’s 
methodology in usul is only superficially different. For the first two cases, he simply adopted a 
different interpretation to the Quranic verses, and to the Sunna for the third case. He had no 
clear use, in his well-known ijtihads like the above examples, to what is claimed to be his 
contribution in renewing usul al-fiqh, namely, the expansion of qiyas and istiṣḥāb and the 
notion of amr, testimony, perhaps, to their superfluity. This is not to deny Turabi’s rich insights 
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in usul, but it is one thing to provide critical analysis to usul, albeit deep and thoughtful; and it is 
quite another to claim a renewal of the legal theory based on some abstract concepts that can 
hardly be manifested in any form of application. 
The maqāṣid school: 
 The idea of having Maqāṣid (objectives of) al-Sharia as the framework of Islamic legal theory 
goes back to the classical writings of usul. The pioneer of this school, although not the first 
write on the subject, is Abu Isḥāq Shatibi whose ideas have been discussed briefly in chapter 
two. In terms of certainty, maqāṣid school has two main principles, the first is that the sources 
of Sharʿ, when taken individually, are not certain (ẓanniyya), for even the mutawatir sources 
depend for their certainty on probable postulates such as issues of semantics, transfer of 
original meaning, possibility of allegorical use, etc., rendering them, hence, essentially 
probable.663 The second principle is that general principles of Sharia (kullīyyāt al-Sharia) are 
certain, for these are based on induction which yields certain knowledge. These general 
principles form the objectives of Sharia which, according to the adherents of this school, have 
primacy over classic usul as the ultimate theory of Islamic law.664 
But the school of maqāṣid seems to suffer from the same problems faced by the traditionalists 
and the Islamists, that is, while the theory successfully articulates a sound critique of classic 
usul, it fails to show a significant change in practice. This is not to say that changing Sharia is 
necessarily the right course for reform in Islam, nor, indeed, to say that Islam must be changed 
in any way, but simply to assert that a change in the methodology of law must entail a change 
in law. Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din (d. 2001), a scholar of maqāṣid, confirms that a change 
in methodology must lead to a qualitative or quantitative change in results, otherwise, this 
‘tajdīd’ is “formalistic and superficial”.665 Shatibi’s work did not offer any such practical changes 
and this might explain why his work has gone unnoticed for centuries. It was only when 
modernity had exposed the urgent need for adaptation in Islamic law, that Shatibi’s work on 
maqāṣid gained prominence as it offered a new and fresh perspective on Sharia. Using 
 
663 Shātịbī 20. 
664 Muḥammad al-Tạ̄hir ibn ʻĀshūr, Maqāsịd Al-Sharīʻah Al-Islāmīyah (2nd edn, Dar al-Nafa ͗is 2001) 96. 
665 ibid 107 
213 
 
objectives as the theoretical framework for law allowed, at least in theory, for more 
adaptability in Sharia, thus, the prospect of validating Sharia in the modern world became 
achievable. Yet, it seems that the powerful appeal of a law taken directly from the word of Allah 
persisted as the dominant framework of Sharia despite the elegance of the maqāṣid 
methodology as, notwithstanding the vast literature written on maqāṣid, classical fiqh is still 
predominant and the modern attempts to change it are having little success. 
One of the pioneering figures in the modern school of maqāṣid is the Tunisian scholar 
Muhammad al-Tahir b. Ashur (d. 1973), and his book ‘maqāṣid al-Sharia al-Islamiyya’ is one of 
the first, if not the first, to be written on the subject in modern times.666 Like Shatibi, Ibn Ashur 
thought the determining factor for the validity of classical usul was whether or not it can be 
certain. The usulis, he argues, have tried to make usul al-fiqh certain like usul al-din (theology) 
only to realize that certainty in the former was very rare. Evidence for this is the fact that there 
is disagreement among scholars in most of usul. It is imperative, asserts Ibn Ashur, in order to 
have certain sources that help us understand religion, to rethink the known issues about the 
sources, scrutinize them, and remould the science to be named ‘Maqāṣid al-Sharia’. Usul al-fiqh 
must be left as it is but brought under the umbrella of maqāṣid. 667 He also follows Shatibi in 
arguing that induction can yield certain knowledge, and that an important concept to infer with 
certainty from Quran and sound Sunna is that rulings of Sharia are rationalized by the benefit to 
society and individuals.668 Having established that rulings are rationalized by certain wisdoms 
(hikam, sing. ḥikma); the task becomes to browse the sources to find these hikam and assert 
them as a maqṣad for Sharia. One way of achieving this is to find the rulings that have known 
causes, if we gather a sufficient number of causes that all seem to underlie a particular ḥikma, 
then we can discern from them one ḥikma and assert it as a certain maqṣad for Sharia.669 
Another way is to find the hermetic verses of Quran which meaning cannot be disputed. Quran, 
being mutawatir in word, is undoubtedly the word of the Lawgiver. However, since it is 
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semantically only probable, a Quranic text will need a lucid connotation where the possibility of 
another interpretation becomes unlikely. When this is added to the certainty of the text we can 
discern a certain maqṣad, as in the verse “and Allah does not love mischief-making” or “O you 
who believe! Do not devour your property among yourselves falsely”.670 A third way is to look 
at the mutawatir Sunna where it is possible to discern from the actions of the companions a 
certain maqṣad. Ibn Ashur gives a number of examples where the companions understand the 
maqāṣid of Sharia from their continuous communication with the Prophet and act upon that 
understanding. A companion, Abu Barza al-Aslami, stood to pray in one of his travels and his 
horse strayed away while he was praying, so he interrupted the prayer, went after the horse, 
then reperformed his prayer after getting the horse back. One man, unimpressed by this, made 
the comment that al-Aslami puts his horse before his prayer. al-Aslami justified his action by 
the fact that he lived far and would not have been able to get home before night had he lost his 
horse. But most importantly, he defended his action by saying that he had accompanied the 
Prophet before and observed his leniency, therefore, he understood that one of Sharia’s 
objectives was to make life easier not increase hardship.671 
Ibn Ashur divides maqāṣid into the usual certain/probable dichotomy. He urges the scholars 
studying maqāṣid to exert their efforts before determining a Sharia maqṣad as it will be the 
basis of many rulings in law. Nonetheless, the scholar will still find that the certainty of the 
maqāṣid he finds differ depending on the number of evidence available, something which is not 
necessarily dependent on the scholar’s efforts but, rather, on the circumstances surrounding 
the matter.672 Ibn Ashur, however, seems to recede from the ostensible advancement made by 
maqāṣid on usul when he bounds the certainty of the maqṣad to the certainty of the text.673 He 
argues that the maqṣad of ‘ease’ in Sharia is certain because it is evidenced by induction of the 
Quran where many verses point to the same meaning, as in “Allah intends for you ease and 
does not intend for you hardship”.674 On the other hand, the maqṣad of “do not inflict injury 
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nor repay injury with another” 675 is probable because, although many verses allude to the 
same meaning, this text remains an āḥād hadith, hence, probable. While Shatibi used the 
evidence to ascertain the probable hadith, Ibn Ashur did the opposite and argued that the 
maqṣad in this case can only be probable (albeit high probability close to certainty) because of 
the probable hadith.  
We can recall here that Shatibi did not think that individual evidence for the authenticity of the 
Quran or Sunna will yield certainty. This certainty will have to come from induction where the 
greater number of evidence taken together can provide the certainty that, when taken 
individually, cannot be provided. Tawatur will not prove authenticity nor would the rules of 
hermeneutics give the true will of Allah with certainty; it is only the collective epistemological 
force of the evidence that can give the certainty required. And since the individual evidence will 
be pointing to individual cases, the collective evidence will point to a general principle which 
forms the common denominator to these cases, thus, we have a certain maqṣad. This argument 
by Shatibi did two things: first, it recognized the weakness of the usulis arguments about the 
certainty of the sources; second, it avoided this weakness by expanding the legal framework 
from the sources to the objectives which can be taken from these sources by induction. Ibn 
Ashur did not seem to share Shatibi’s scepticism. He referred to Shatibi’s attempt to re-form 
the arguments for certainty in usul as “rhetorical and sophistic”.676 He therefore took a step 
back towards the traditional arguments of usul by maintaining that the certain maqāṣid are 
based on evidence from the Quran because its content (matn) is certainly authentic.677 The 
probable hadith, even when supported by Quranic verses but only as secondary evidence, will 
yield probable maqāṣid.  
This conservative position of Ibn Ashur regarding the certainty of maqāṣid gives an indication of 
how Sharia will change, or not, according to his methodology. He argues, for example, that 
tribal customs are accounted for in Sharia. Imam Malik said that a woman of high social status 
must not be forced to breastfeed her baby because this was the custom. The verse “mothers 
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should breastfeed their children for two years” is addressing women of lower social status 
only.678 He also argued that one must try to understand the reasoning of prohibitions in Sharia 
where no clear harm is evident. For example, when the Prophet cursed the women who put 
hair extensions draw tattoos, and other acts that “change Allah’s creation”; the rationale of this 
prohibition, as conceived by Ibn Ashur, is that women who performed these acts at that time 
were the less virtuous ones, hence, cursed by the Prophet who identified them by describing 
certain behaviour of theirs.679 Does this mean that these acts are not prohibited if culture 
changes and they become practiced by ordinary women in society without stigma? Ibn Ashur 
does not clarify this, but the hint is that he does not see a prohibition. This is important for it 
bares resemblance to the prohibition of riba as will be discussed below. Another important 
feature in Ibn Ashur’s arguments is his assertion that rulings of Sharia are based on meanings 
and descriptions not names and forms. He gives the example of the prohibition by some jurists 
of smoking cigarettes because when it was first introduced it was called ‘hashīsha’ (weed) and 
also the prohibition of coffee which was called ‘qahwa’, the name of khamr (alcohol). The 
prohibition was based on the name rather than the actual effect of the substance, hence, the 
fatwa is wrong.680 Nevertheless, Ibn Ashur stays mostly with the traditional Maliki fiqh as he 
considers ḥiyal to be wrong and gives examples from sales with deferred payments (buyūʿ al-
ājāl) which are used as means to riba; and similarly he argues in favour of blocking the means 
(sadd al-tharāʾiʿ).681  
 All this is classic Maliki fiqh and nothing here seems to benefit from the theory of maqāṣid Ibn 
Ashur has presented. His position regarding Islamic finance is not different either as his 
discussion of the riba verses in his tafsir (exegesis) of Quran named ‘al-Taḥrīr wa al-Tanwīr’ 
clearly shows. Ibn Ashur is evidently aware of the concerns and debates about riba. In his 
discussion of the difference between selling and riba, he sees the distinction in comparing the 
status of the seller to that of the lender, and the status of the buyer to that of the borrower. In 
the latter case, the borrower resorts to borrowing only to spend on himself and his family, he is 
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acting out of need; whereas the buyer is a well-off tradesperson. In the former case, the lender 
who lends money to the needy in order to benefit from the riba they will pay him, is only 
adding to their troubles, whereas the seller is someone who does hard work to avail goods for 
buyers. Selling, therefore, is a transaction between two financially capable parties, whereas 
there is disparity in a riba transaction. This is the rationale of prohibiting riba, acknowledges Ibn 
Ashur, it is, unlike selling, an exploitative transaction.682 One would think that this 
rationalization entails permitting the transaction if there is no exploitation; this would put the 
argument in line with the theory of maqāṣid and with the example of the wrong prohibition of 
hair extensions and tattoos. That is, the prohibition must be understood in its context and must 
not be generalized beyond serving its underlying purpose. But Ibn Ashur does not depart from 
traditional fiqh and circumvents this point by arguing that the lender should not take profit 
from helping the needy. And the one who looks to borrow money for trade and business, that 
is, not poor, should not be lent money. In case he was, then the lender has done so voluntarily 
and must not take riba from him.683  
Arguing that people should not lend money except for the needy or as a voluntary act is 
evidently problematic. But Ibn Ashur would rather abandon the routes which his maqāṣid 
methodology would naturally lead to, and adhere, to the traditional position of fiqh. Even when 
he maintained that riba was only in nasiʾa (deferred payment) and not in riba al-faḍl, he was 
only following Ibn Abbas, and the prohibitions of riba al-faḍl transactions still stand but under 
different headings.684 Ibn Ashur gives two reasons why he thinks riba is prohibited. One already 
mentioned, is to encourage the rich in the community to help the ones who may be in 
temporary need; a loan to ease emergent difficulties which is a form of sadaqa (almsgiving) 
below zakah (no payback in zakah). And since the custom goes, especially among the Arabs, 
that one only borrows for necessity, it is an obligation for the community to assist him/her, 
hence riba is prohibited as it exploits, rather than assists, the person in need. Moreover, the 
Sharʿ differentiated, argues Ibn Ashur, between lending to the needy and lending as a 
 





commercial practice, not by the status of the parties involved in the transaction, but rather by 
the essence of it. What Ibn Ashur is trying to achieve by this vague statement is to avoid 
identifying a riba transaction by its transacting parties, this way the prohibition of riba is not 
circumstantial and will not depend on the notion of exploitation. He then adds another maqṣad 
for the prohibition of riba, that is to encourage Muslims to invest in the real economy rather 
than finance. For this, they can enter into different kinds of partnerships and commercial 
activities to make legitimate profit. Ibn Ashur is not troubled by, perhaps not aware of, the 
complexities of the modern financial world and argued that Muslims should find alternatives. 
Muslims lived for long centuries without having to resort to riba and they were as wealthy as 
the rest of the world, he asserts, but once they ceased to be the dominant community in the 
world and had to deal in commerce and transactions with more dominant, non-Muslim 
societies which use riba, Muslims were bewildered and are asking for a solution. There is no 
circumvention for the prohibition of riba, argues Ibn Ashur, as the prohibition in Quran is lucid. 
The only solution he envisages to this problem is that Muslim countries should adopt in their 
financial institutions, sales, and contract, laws based on Sharia. 685  
It is evident that Ibn Ashur, notwithstanding his bold and pioneering book on maqāṣid, remains 
a traditional Maliki jurist. Like the other traditional school thinkers, he demonstrates insightful 
analysis of legal theory, issues of adaptability and the challenges of maintaining a legal system 
that is not void of meaning, reason, and ethical spirit; but he too fails to demonstrate the 
applicability of the theory in practice. It is quite possible that there are social, political, and 
psychological reasons why, despite the serious attempts to recognize and reform (even when it 
is not called reform) the problems in legal theory, the traditionalist did not follow through to 
change the law in any significant way, in the case of Turabi, or at all, in the cases of Qaradawi 
and Ibn Ashur. Such reasons, however, would lie beyond the scope of this research. 
The new hermeneutics school:  
Scholars of this modern school of thought have tried to bring Islam into the modern world by 
dichotomizing its legal sources into absolute and relative. Most of what is found in the Sunna is 
 
685 ibid 3:130-132 
219 
 
relative to its time and cannot be used to legislate for all times. Conversely, Quran is absolute, 
its meanings and rulings are eternal and are not bound by spatiotemporal factors. But for 
Quran to be the sole textual source, its traditional interpretational methods must be 
overhauled, and new hermeneutics must be brought in place. 
The most prominent figure in this school is the Syrian writer Muhammad Shaḥrūr (b. 1938). 
Originally a professor of Engineering, he turned his attention to Islamic thought and published 
an influential book ‘al-Kitāb wa al-Quran’ (The Book and The Quran) in 1990 where he laid out 
his vision of a different Islam, one more fitting to the modern world and more adaptive to 
changing times, based on a different methodology of understanding revelation. The first step in 
this new understanding is the differentiation between Quran and Kitāb where Quran is the part 
of revelation that speaks about the unseen, the universe, the laws of nature, and history; while 
Risala, the second component of Kitāb, is the part that contains the legal rulings and divine 
decrees in general. This furnishes his way to make another distinction between al-nabī (the 
Prophet) and al-rasūl (the messenger), where Quran relates to the former and Risala to the 
latter. Law is part of the Risala which is delivered by the messenger and the practice of Risala 
by the Prophet represents Sunna.686 
Shaḥrūr builds a theory of epistemology constructed from a typology of three types of 
knowledge: the first is what he calls the fuʾad knowledge (al-Maʿrifa al-fuʾadīyya) which is 
basically perception knowledge, particularly hearing and vision. Second, is testimony 
knowledge (al-maʿrifa al-khabarīyya) which comes from tawatur, either verbal or practical. 
Third is inductive knowledge (al-maʿrifa al-naẓarīyya “al-istintājīyya”) that depends on logic 
which he defines as ‘the inference of an unknown from a known by the rule of non-
contradiction’.687 This epistemology, however, does not seem to feed into a discussion about 
certainty of the sources. It is, rather, part of what Shaḥrūr calls jadal al-kawn wa al-insān (The 
Dialectic of the Universe and the Human) where he discusses issues like the origins of language, 
evolution, revelation, fate, etc.688 He seems to have little to say about certainty. Although his 
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whole theory is based on Quran,689 he did not dedicate any serious discussion to the topic of 
Quran authenticity and focused entirely on issues of interpretation. He briefly mentioned that 
Quran was preserved by Allah by tawatur. For, ever since the Prophet was alive and until this 
day there are people memorizing the Book continuously, in addition to the fact that it was 
transmitted to us by textual tawatur after the collection of the Muṣḥaf.690 It is not clear why 
Shaḥrūr does not see the need to discuss authenticity when his hermeneutics relies heavily on 
the accuracy and exactitude of the Quranic term. Not a syllable can be changed without 
changing the meaning significantly. This makes the level of accuracy required in authenticity all 
the more vital. Moreover, and unlike the usulis who did not discuss authenticity for the idea 
that it belonged to theology, Shaḥrūr did not shy from discussing theology. He discussed 
difficult subjects like the omniscience of Allah and his ‘qadaʾ’ (predestination), and he took 
unorthodox positions in these subjects,691 yet, he chose to completely ignore in his book the 
more pressing and difficult issues of Quran collection and transmission. The argument that 
Quran is preserved by Allah because that is what the Quran states, is clearly circular. One can 
only assume Shaḥrūr had no answers to these problems.692 
The dichotomy of changeable and unchangeable in Shaḥrūr’s legal theory is presented in what 
he calls the dialectic between istiqāma (straightness) and ḥanīfīyya (curvature). Istiqāma 
represents the straight limits (ḥudūd) in Sharia while ḥanīfīyya is the domain in which law can 
move (change) should change be needed, but this movement is limited by the straight limits of 
istiqāma.693 There are six types of limits – and movement within those limits – according to 
Shaḥrūr’s theory. First, the lower limit case. The example of this type is the prohibited 
marriages (mother, sister, daughter, etc.) where the prohibitions mentioned in the Quran form 
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a lower limit that cannot be reduced further, but there is no upper limit in this case, which 
means that should it be medically advised not to marry one’s cousin (not prohibited by Quran) 
it is possible to preclude cousins from marriage. This will not transgress the limits of Allah, and 
yet, will make it possible to change the law when necessary.694 
Second, the case of the upper limit. An example of this type is punishment of theft by 
amputation of the hand. In this case the punishment of amputation is an upper limit, meaning 
that a thief can be punished by other less severe punishments but not a harsher punishment 
(amputation of more limbs, or death, for example).695 Shaḥrūr does not explain, however, the 
basis of setting the amputation of the hand as an upper limit rather than a lower limit. It might 
seem by today’s standards as an extreme, perhaps even inhumane, punishment for theft and it 
is unthinkable to suggest a harsher punishment. But the designation of upper or lower limits to 
a punishment or a rule should be made upon objective theoretical grounds. Appeal to intuition 
or common sense seems unfitting to the divinity and exactitude proclaimed in Shaḥrūr’s 
concept of the unchangeable limits. 
This problem is made more evident by the arguments Shaḥrūr makes to address in his 
discussion of the inheritance law which is the third case of having an upper and a lower limit 
together.696 He took this from the verse “Allah instructs you concerning your children: for the 
 
694 ibid 453 
695 ibid 455 
696 Shaḥrūr’s theory of inheritance seems unstable. He made some changes to the theory discussed here in his 
book ‘Naḥwa Usul Jadīda’ and then he changed these too according to his website. He says that what he says in all 
his books about inheritance is cancelled and he acknowledges only the facebook posts he wrote about inheritance 
and the discussion on the television program ‘al-Nabaʾ al-ʿaẓīm’. He did however, offer a few points on the website 
to explain the main issues and he offered an online calculator to apply the theory. This study, however, will stay 
with the discussions given in his first book, this is for two reasons: 1. The critique here is focused on the problem of 
hudud, and although this has changed in later versions of the theory with regards to sons and daughters, it remains 
true for brothers and sisters, which means the analysis remains valid. 2. His amendments, presented in the website 
and the tv program (I have not seen the facebook posts) are not as elaborate and detailed as the ones in his book, 
hence, cannot be critically analysed without some speculations about the theory. In addition to this, and when 
applying his amended theory (confirmed by his calculator) he gave equal shares to son and daughter when there 
are only one sone and one or two sisters, but in the case of one son with ten sisters, for example, he gets five 
times the sister. The maximum ratio in the traditional theory, which Shaḥrūr wants to reform, is 2:1 for the 
brother. This cannot be an improvement. For his amended theory see: Muhammad Shahrur, ‘The Official Website 
for Dr. Muhammad Shahrur. The Distribution of Inheritence according to the Modern Reading’ 
<http://shahrour.org/?p=11985> accessed 29 November 2017. 
222 
 
male, what is equal to the share of two females. But if there are [only] daughters, two or more, 
for them is two thirds of one's estate. And if there is only one, for her is half. And for one's 
parents, to each one of them is a sixth of his estate if he left children. But if he had no children 
and the parents [alone] inherit from him, then for his mother is one third. And if he had brothers 
[or sisters], for his mother is a sixth, after any bequest he [may have] made or debt. Your 
parents or your children - you know not which of them are nearest to you in benefit. [These 
shares are] an obligation [imposed] by Allah. Indeed, Allah is ever Knowing and Wise”.697 From 
this, he infers that the limits correspond to the ratio of 2:1, or 66.6% to 33.3%, meaning that 
the male cannot take more than 66.6% of inheritance and the female cannot take less than 
33.3%. The shares can change according to the circumstances of the case but only within the 
limits: a maximum of two thirds to the male and a minimum of a third to the female. “what if 
someone asks” acknowledges Shaḥrūr “how do you know that 33.3% is the lower limit for the 
female and 66.6% is the upper limit for the male and that the curvature movement (al-ḥaraka 
al-ḥanīfīyya) is between these limits?”698 In other words, how did he know that it is a 
convergence rather than divergence? His answer was “if we ask a billion people on Earth 
relating to Islam and know the verse of inheritance, and a billion people who know nothing 
about the rules of Islamic inheritance, about the movement, within or without? The answer 
from all of them would be: the movement will be within (convergence)”.699 Clearly Shaḥrūr’s 
only grounds for the designation of upper and lower limits is intuition, and while his solution to 
the problem of how women are valued in relation to men in Islam is appealing, his rationale for 
it is wanting. 
There are other issues regarding Shaḥrūr’s theory of inheritance. First, he talks specifically 
about an upper limit for the male and not just an upper limit, similarly the lower limit is 
specified for the female and not a general limit; does this mean that there is no upper limit for 
the female nor lower limit for the male? This does not seem to be a sound proposition as it 
entails clear injustice. Second, even if we assume that Shaḥrūr was not precise in his wording 
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but what he intended was a general limit, that is, the upper limit he mentioned for the male will 
also hold the female, and likewise for the lower limit. This means that positions can be switched 
where the female can get twice as much as the male. Again, this does not seem sound as it 
renders the Quranic specification of the shares of male and female pointless. Third, if there was 
one female, she gets half as a lower limit. This means that she can get more but the male in this 
case will get less while the opposite does not hold. This, if intended by Shaḥrūr , needs 
justification. 
The same problem appears in the fourth case where he argues that the punishment of the 
adulterer according to the verse “The [unmarried] woman or [unmarried] man found guilty of 
sexual intercourse - lash each one of them with a hundred lashes, and do not be taken by pity 
for them in the religion of Allah, if you should believe in Allah and the Last Day. And let a group 
of the believers witness their punishment”700 is limited by a single point: a hundred lashes. The 
notion of not taking pity, he argues, points to the fact that it is also a lower limit, that is, it is not 
possible to reduce the number of lashes out of pity.701 But how did he assert that it is an upper 
limit? Why not increase the lashes if, for example, an adulterer does not show repentance and 
keeps going back to the act of adultery? If the fact that mentioning a number means a fixed 
punishment (single point), then the comment about the implication of not to take pity is 
redundant. 
Shaḥrūr  discusses the issue of riba as an example of his sixth case of limits, the case where 
there is a positive upper limit which is riba; a zero point which is a loan without interest; and a 
negative lower limit which is charitable giving (zakat and ṣadaqāt).702 That is, when one gives 
money with no return, he is in the negative domain, when he gives with equal return, he is at 
the zero point; and when he gives money and gets extra value to his principle loan he is in the 
positive domain. Zakat is the obligatory part of ṣadaqāt, this makes the lower limit. Yet, in 
order to accommodate ṣadaqāt (voluntary alms) in the scheme, Shaḥrūr makes this an open 
limit. Meaning that zakat is the least one must pay without return (negative), but there is 
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always the opportunity to pay more. The upper limit, however, does not have that 
characteristic as it is not allowed for anyone to receive more than double the original principle 
of his loan. This is taken from the verse “O you who have believed, do not consume usury, 
doubled and multiplied, but fear Allah that you may be successful”.703 
There are three types of people with regards to lending money. First, there are the poor and 
needy who need help and cannot repay even the principle. For those, one should pay zakat and 
ṣadaqāt; those who demand riba from this group should expect war from Allah and his 
messenger. Second, are people who can pay back the principle but without any interest. For 
this group, one should lend qarḍ ḥasan (loan without interest) but this is an upper limit, 
therefore, no return of more than the principle is allowed but any charitable giving is 
encouraged. Third is the group of active economic agents who occupy the productive part of 
the economy and are not considered poor. It is possible to lend to this group with interest but 
on the condition that the interest does not exceed the upper limit of double the principle. 704 
These, according to Shaḥrūr, are the principles of Islamic finance. If the financial institutions 
conform to these principles, it is possible for a Muslim to deposit his money with them and 
receive interest. The state has the exclusive right to set interest rates according to the 
conditions of the economy, and the financial institutions have the exclusive right to lend with 
interest.705 
The cases’ inconsistencies are not the only ones in Shaḥrūr’s theory, the foundation of the 
theory also suffers from inconsistency. It is not clear, what are the bases upon which he 
categorizes revelation or the verses of aḥkām and it is less clear how something would count as 
belonging to what he calls āyāt al-ḥudūd (verses of limits). The cases which Shaḥrūr  discusses 
in his book are:  
1. The prohibited marriages 
2. The prohibited foods 
3. Theft 
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4. Murder or unintended killing 
5. Inheritance 
6. Adultery 
7. The sexual relationship between male and female 
8. Issues of finance including riba, qarḍ ḥasan, and zakat and ṣadaqāt 
These are clearly choices which do not exhaust the verses of aḥkām in Quran (the Book) and 
Shaḥrūr makes it clear that not all verses containing ostensible commands are necessarily 
hudud.706 This raises the question: are the eight cases mentioned above the only hudud, and if 
so, on what basis did he identify them? And if these are not the only hudud but only examples, 
how do we identify the hudud? A problem that also applies to his other categorizations of Kitāb, 
Om al-Kitāb, Quran, etc. There does not seem to be a solid common denominator between the 
cases above to form a solid basis for hudud cases. They are not all crimes, nor are they 
mentioned in Quran by the word ‘hudud’ or ‘haram’. They do not all involve money or a 
relationship between male and female. In fact, the only thing they have in common is that they 
fit Shaḥrūr’s theory, and even there, not always neatly, as discussed above. Shaḥrūr 
acknowledges that people can set up their own limits as part of a positive law that seeks the 
benefit of society (maṣāliḥ mursalah).707 These remain changeable, however. But the divine 
limits (hudud Allah) are unchangeable and must be conformed to always, which makes it 
imperative to methodologically identify them with certainty. If a law is to be made 
unchangeable, its divine origin must be certain. With his theory of limits, Shaḥrūr managed to 
address many of the issues that troubled Islamic law in modern times by turning the traditional 
rulings of Sharia into limits whereby movement between these limits is possible, giving Sharia 
some degree of flexibility without discarding the traditional aḥkām. The problem, however, is 
that the certainty required as epistemological basis for these divine limits is missing from 
Shaḥrūr’s arguments because the methodology he uses to select them is obscure. He did not 
give a lucid explanation as to how he identified the cases he discussed as limits, nor did he 
assert the certainty which justifies his choices. 
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In general terms, Shaḥrūr’s treatment of certainty when it is relevant in his theory is casual if 
not wanting. He mentions the authenticity of the Quran in a few words in spite of the fact that 
his whole theory is based on ‘The Book’. One cannot say that Shaḥrūr  accepts traditional 
discourse about Islam easily, for he follows a radically different method of hermeneutics and 
vehemently rejects classical interpretations of the Quran, as he did reject classical 
jurisprudence in favour of his theory of limits. Shaḥrūr  did, however, allude to the issue of 
authenticity in his introduction by arguing that for the Book to be truly from Allah it must have 
the following characteristic: it must have the ‘divinely absolute’ in its content, and the 
‘humanistic relativity’ in the understanding of this content, a feat that only God can achieve.708 
This concept was the platform from which Shaḥrūr  went on to devise his arguments for 
unchangeable limits based on immutable text (naṣṣ) and a changeable, moving content. 
Furthermore, his position on the certainty of Sunna is similarly vague. He does not discard 
Sunna completely as he thinks it is a legal source in many cases, even hudud cases which are, 
presumably, certain, such as the 2.5% limit of zakat.709 He also calls for the review of the Sunna 
corpus to recategorize the hadiths to hadiths of Risāla and hadiths of Nubūwwa (message and 
prophecy) and other categorizations.710 Hadiths authenticity should be tested according to their 
conformity to Quran; if a hadith decrees some rule which is not in Quran, like the prohibition of 
music, its validity is bound by its time only and does not necessarily apply to all times.711 But 
suppose a hadith was ostensibly conforming to Quran, does that automatically qualify it as 
authentic? Do we only take what is considered by the major hadith collections? Shaḥrūr hinted 
at his scepticism in the authenticity of hadiths in general in a long discussion of the historical 
circumstances in which hadith was collected and he says that this process was politically 
motivated.712 He adds to this point the fact that most of the high-ranking companions who 
accompanied the Prophet most of his life narrated very few hadith, while Abu Huraira who 
accompanied him for only three years narrated more than any other one. This calls for 
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questioning, according to Shaḥrūr.713 But he did not pursue the questioning any further nor did 
he explain the basis of his use of hadith, considering his suspicions. Conformity to Quran will 
still leave many hadiths as authentic (some narrated by Abu Huraira). For example, in his 
treatment of riba, Shaḥrūr does not discuss the hadiths that prohibit the riba of commodities. 
These cannot be considered as non-conforming to Quran since they are considered by jurists as 
elaborations by the Prophet to the concept of riba, which is not too different a case from the 
Prophet’s determination of the percentage of zakat at 2.5%, which Shaḥrūr accepts. 
A final point to be mentioned about Shaḥrūr’s theory is regarding language. Shaḥrūr adopts a 
linguistic theory that rejects the concept of synonym ‘tarāduf’, from which he made his 
important distinction between Quran and Kitāb. He also relies heavily on the lexicographer Ibn 
Faris and his lexicon ‘Maqāīyys al-lugha’. According to this school, one word can have multiple 
meanings stemming from the same root, but no two words can share the exact meaning, 
hence, Kitāb, Quran, dhikr, rasūl, nabī, etc. are all semantically different. 714 This theory of non-
synonymy is debatable among linguists and using it as a foundation for the theory with the little 
qualification that Shaḥrūr offers only mounts to its difficulties.715 Moreover, he seems to take 
the use of words roots too far in finding a wider semantic field in order to aid his theory. For 
example, in the verse “Beautified for people is the love of that which they desire - of women 
[nisa ]͗ and sons, heaped-up sums of gold and silver, fine branded horses, and cattle and tilled 
land. That is the enjoyment [mata ]͑ of worldly life, but Allah has with Him the best return”716 
Shaḥrūr does not accept that the word nisa ͗ actually means ‘women’ because this would mean 
that Allah has made them as ‘enjoyment’ for men. This implies the dehumanization of women 
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into things of pleasure.717 Shaḥrūr went back to the root (n.s.a) and argued that it has two 
meanings, one is women and the other is delay, thus, anything new (comes later) is also ‘nisa ͗’, 
and, therefore, nisa ͗ in the verse means new things. People enjoy having new cloths, cars, etc. 
and these are all referred to as nisa ͗.718  
The semantic gymnastics in this rationale and methodology is evident. It strips the word from 
its usual use and context and manipulates the meaning to fit into the theory. His objective of 
arguing that the Quran treats women with the utmost respect is understandable but if the 
methodology of achieving this is not solid, the chances of success will not be good. 
Furthermore, Shaḥrūr does not seem to be aware of the problems of circularity in the use of 
lexicons (partly discussed in relation to Quran in Chapter One above). He relies mainly on Ibn 
Faris who lived and died in the fourth century (329-395 A.H.) by which time the Quran was 
already the most important document in the Arabic language and has shaped it in many ways 
not least by its reintroduction of the diacritical marks in writing. The common use of a word is a 
strong indicator of the intended meaning by the author. This is a tradition among the usulis 
who argue, and rightly so, that the obvious meaning is to be considered as the intended one 
unless there is evidence that it could be otherwise.719 Shaḥrūr ignores this principle and takes 
liberty in using the root to excavate an unorthodox semantic that is rarely, if at all, used in 
common language. This methodology would surely open up every text to unlimited possibilities 
of meaning rendering the text effectively meaningless.  
It remains to be said that, among the thinkers discussed so far and perhaps among the modern 
Islamic thinkers generally, Shaḥrūr is distinct in the fact that he made a serious attempt to offer 
a complete methodology to understand Islam and legislate for an Islamic law. He managed to 
provide, using the Islamic sources, a different concept of Islam that is adaptable and thus, more 
suited to the modern world. This would be viewed by some as the main reason for rejecting his 
work, but it shows how Shaḥrūr’s work contrasts to the other attempts of renewing Islamic law 
which could offer nothing new and remained in the abstract. One of the weaknesses in 
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Shaḥrūr’s theory is his insistence on an absolute source of law and religion in general that is 
timeless and unchangeable. This burdened Quran to the extent that Shaḥrūr resorted to 
unsound reasoning in many occasions to buttress the coherence of his theory. Nevertheless, 
the intellectual endeavour of departing from the traditional ways of thinking is surely beneficial. 
The second line of argument: Sharia has absolute values from which law is 
derived 
In this line of argument primacy is given to values rather than law proper, once the ‘Islamic 
values’ are known, then law can be derived from them in a manner that is temporally fitting. 
This argument is similar to what is found in the literature about maqāṣid. Shatibi’s thesis was 
based on the induction of the sources to discover the maqāṣid of Sharia, law, then, must 
conform to those maqāṣid. Similarly in this argument, Islamic values must be discovered, 
perhaps also by induction, then law must be subjugated to them. 
Fazlur Rahman (1919-1988), a renowned scholar of Islamic Studies, is a good example of this 
mode of thinking.720 For Rahman, the Quran is mostly “moral, religious, and social 
pronouncements that respond to specific problems in concrete historical situations”.721 Quran, 
therefore, does not decree direct legal injunctions but offers, rather, their underlying values, 
“moral and quasi-moral precepts not enforceable in any court”.722 The idea of fiqh, or even 
Islamic law, being law in the proper sense is inaccurate; fiqh only provides raw material for a 
legal system but does not constitute a legal system itself. Traditional jurists, having failed to 
understand the underlying unity of the Quran, had a more ‘atomistic’ approach to its verses 
leading to the derivation of law from verses that were not actually legal injunctions.723 
Rahman offered an alternative approach to derive law from the sources, namely, the Quran, he 
called it the ‘Double Movement’ theory. The first movement is “from the specifics to the 
eliciting and systematizing of its general principles, values, and long-range objectives, the 
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second is to be from this general view to the specific view that is to be formulated and realized 
now”.724 Put simply, Rahman’s theory is a combination of inductive and deductive processes 
where the former finds the underlying values and principles from revelation, and the latter uses 
these values as raw material from which law can be derived and formulated for the historical 
moment. Evidently, the second movement is positive legislation which can change and adapt 
according to the historical context. Yet, it is not entirely clear whether Rahman intended the 
first movement to be immutable. He assigns the first movement to the historian and the second 
to the social scientist, but he asserts that the “actual ‘effective orientation’ and ethical 
engineering are the work of the ethicist”.725 Whether this work of the ethicist belongs to the 
first or second movement, Rahman does not elucidate, but in either case it remains a human 
endeavour, that is, ijtihad. Nonetheless, Rahman still believes that there are absolute values to 
be discovered in the Quran. This discovery is an ijtihadi process, but their existence is divine and 
independent of human cognizance. In Rahman’s words, “[i]f the results of understanding fail in 
the application now, then either there has been a failure to assess the present situation 
correctly or a failure in understanding the Quran”.726 This implies that, although these values 
are divine, hence, immutable, the fallibility of the human understanding of them, the error-
prone inferences of humans put these values in the sphere of the changeable. In this light, the 
induction process to find the true Islamic values must be ongoing as long as reviewing the law 
involves reviewing the double movement in both directions. This is asserted by his argument 
that there is both room and necessity for new interpretations as it is, in truth, an ongoing 
process. And while it is possible that Rahman was only referring to legal interpretations for the 
second movement, it is fair to admit that the first movement is similarly an interpretation 
process, hence, too, ongoing.727 
 This does not mean that Rahman has abandoned the notion of certainty completely in his 
methodology. He argues that certainty “belongs not to the meanings of particular verses of the 
Quran and their content, but to the Quran as a whole, that is, as a set of coherent principles or 
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values where the total teaching will converge”.728 He, then, adds his assertion that the Quranic 
text is authentic evidencing this by the claim that no Western scholar has created doubt about 
the Quran’s integrity and authenticity,729 but did not seem to deem it necessary to further 
qualify his assertion by any detailed analysis. That is to say, Rahman completely rejected the 
long-standing view of Quran as a source of legal injunctions, yet he seems to have 
unquestionably accepted the authenticity of its text. Even if Rahman did not see parity in the 
certainty of the two concepts, he should have still been conscious of the problematic approach 
of rejecting established orthodox views on Quranic law, and accepting them on authenticity, 
with his analysis offered only to support the former. Rahman must have been well aware, 
despite his earlier claim, of the controversies surrounding some issues regarding the Quranic 
text like tawatur, qiraʾāt, the collection of the Quran, etc. He quotes a long passage from 
Shatibi where Shatibi rejects the traditional views of the certainty of tawatur and language, and 
opts instead for the certainty from induction even in the authentication of Quranic text.730 
Perhaps Rahman was assured by that passage that the certainty of the text was established one 
way or another and thought it, thereby, safe to take it as a given. 
A second comparison with Shatibi can highlight another issue regarding Rahman’s theory with 
respect to certainty. Shatibi was adamant that induction yields the certain maqāṣid of Sharia, 
therefore, he went on and emphasised the maqāṣid that were given by earlier scholars as the 
certain objectives of Sharia: the preservation of life, religion, intellect, wealth, and offspring. 
These are fixed concepts which were brought forth as a result of the process of the induction of 
the sources. The first movement in Rahman’s double movement theory, which resembles 
Shatibi’s induction, is not exercised by Rahman to offer a set of values that can represent a 
cornel for a Quranic value system that, in turn, underlies a legal system in the same manner 
that maqāṣid should underly Islamic law. Of course, this is not to suggest that Rahman should 
have necessarily taken that task himself; he could very well set the theory and leave its 
application to others. But this would leave us to only speculate, in terms of certainty, about 
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values inferred by the first movement. Will they be relative to the time or people who apply the 
theory? Or will the result of applying it always be the same, meaning that these values and 
principles are absolute? And in this case why did Rahman not name them? 
With regards to finance, Rahman wrote a paper in 1964 titled ‘Riba and Interests’ in which he 
argued for a distinction between riba and banks’ interest.731 For him, the prohibited riba was 
only the excessive usury where the original principal was doubled and redoubled in exchange 
for deferment.732 Rahman made a chronological analysis where he argued that riba was 
condemned as early as the 4th year of the Prophet’s mission (start of revelation). The practice of 
riba was a known and rife economic practice in the commercial setting of the Meccan society at 
that time. The Quran, in line with its mostly moral discourse of the Meccan period condemned 
riba; but the explicit prohibition was revealed later in Madinah. 733 The emphasis on this fact in 
Rahman’s analysis is, perhaps, an allusion to his conception of Quran as essentially a source of 
moral guidance rather than law. Rahman does not talk here about the double movement 
theory as he wrote this in his book ‘Islam and Modernity’ in 1982, eighteen years after his 
paper on riba; but it is quite possible that the basic ideas were present in his thinking since that 
time. By asserting the Quran’s condemnation of riba very early in Islam, Rahman affirms the 
essentially moral message of Quran, whereas the later prohibition is more of a confirmation of 
that early condemnation. Furthermore, and to understand the prohibition in the context of his 
thinking, Rahman shows the difficulty in assigning a precise definition of riba from the sources, 
Quran and Hadith, because there are clear contradictions, whether in understanding the riba 
verses in Quran or in the hadiths about riba. For instance, some hadiths say explicitly that there 
is no riba in animals while some others are explicit in stating the opposite.734 If law was to be 
taken directly from the sources, the ambiguity in the definition of riba would hinder this 
process; but the main message of the sources, Quran in particular, is to underscore the values 
behind the law. The prohibition in this context serves as an indication of the extended legal 
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dimension of the condemnation of riba, however, it is not the actual legal injunction since it 
lacks, in the Quran, a precise legal definition, and hadith is too unreliable to provide it. In other 
words, the Quranic injunction cannot be used in a court of law; for this, a law is derived, to use 
Rahman’s terminology, from the movement from the particulars to the general principles, 
followed by a formulation of law from these principles according to the present situation. In the 
case of riba, Rahman asserts that Quran prohibits an atrocious kind of riba which “went on 
multiplying in a manner that the poor debtor, in spite of his regular payments, could not pay off 
the usurious interest let alone the capital”.735 The riba system was “so exorbitantly usurious. 
Therefore, what had to be banned was the system as a whole”736 even if some individual cases 
were of a less usurious nature. Banks’ interest, therefore, should not be prohibited according to 
this Quranic rule since they belong to a different system. He, thus, defines riba as “an 
exorbitant increment whereby the capital sum is doubled several-fold, against a fixed extension 
of the term of payment of the debt”.737 Rahman here does not use the double movement 
theory for, as mentioned above, this was a later development of his ideas, however, the 
emphasis on the underlying values in the Quran is evident in his treatment of riba where his 
definition for it is clearly morally grounded. He is obviously referring to the exploitative nature 
of the pre-Islamic riba as the underlying vice for which the practice was prohibited; thereby, a 
clear distinction between riba and banks’ interest can be drawn. 
But we are still unclear about Rahman’s position regarding the certainty in his theory; whether 
any part in his scheme is not changeable. He offers very little with regards to epistemological 
certainty. He asserted the authenticity of the Quran with no discussion, and he gave hints of his 
scepticism regarding hadith, but again without detailed analysis. He showed the contradictions 
in the hadiths regarding riba but did not use that analysis to challenge the bases for certainty in 
hadith, this was not Rahman’s concern. In fact, he gave an emphatic ‘negative’ to the 
suggestion that having found the traditions about riba unauthentic they should be rejected ‘in 
toto’, for “they are sincere and performed attempts at interpreting and elaborating the Sunnah 
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of the Prophet and the Quranic injunctions”.738 In his discussion about hadith criticism, he 
remarks that it should remove a mental block of thinking about Islam.739 But he abstains from 
going so far as to suggest any critique of the Quranic text or history. This only confirms his 
position regarding the unquestionable immutability of the Quran even when its use is radically 
rethought, which again draws the question: is absolute certainty a necessary pre-requisite if 
Quran is to be understood as a whole unite and as providing only an ethical framework for law? 
Or is Rahman just unable to unchain himself from a dichotomy of changeable and 
unchangeable in Sharia that finds more bases in theology than in law? 
In summary, by elevating Quran from the domain of law to the domain of ethics, Rahman 
neatly formulates a system of combined induction and deduction of the sources to give a law 
that is dynamic and adaptable without losing its ethical spirit and divine connection. The 
arguments he provided for this methodology, however, were not demonstrative. He took 
positions regarding the epistemic certainty of the sources (authentic Quran, questionable 
authenticity for Sunna) without qualifying them systematically, and, considering that his 
discussion of riba preceded his articulation of the Double Movement Theory, he did not offer 
much applied examples of how his theory would change Islamic law. 
Institutionalizing Change: absence of effects on Islamic 
finance: 
The conspicuous fact is that none of the ideas that advocate anything other than the traditional 
views on Islamic finance could become institutionalized, that is, none were adopted by a major 
institution of standards or regulation in any legal jurisdiction. All the standards of the 
‘Accounting and Auditing Organization of Islamic Financial Institutions’ (AAOIFI) are based on 
the principle of prohibiting banks interest as a form of riba.740 It is also a founding principle of 
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other institutions such as the ‘Islamic Financial Services Board’ (IFSB)741 and of some sovereign 
legal frameworks of finance such as that of Sudan and Iran.742 Non-Islamic jurisdictions can only 
take Islamic finance as it is defined by Muslim authorities and legal jurisdictions. Judges in the 
UK did not venture, when ruling on a case of Islamic finance, to delve into the juristic details of 
what is riba or how to define it; their judgments were mainly based on the contracts between 
the parties.743 This was, for example, made clear by Lord Justice Potter in the Beximco 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd v Shamil Bank of Bahrain  
Finally, so far as the ʺprinciples of … Shariaʺ are concerned, it was the evidence of both experts 
that there are indeed areas of considerable controversy and difficulty arising not only from the 
need to translate into propositions of modern law texts which centuries ago were set out as 
religious and moral codes, but because of the existence of a variety of schools of thought with 
which the court may have to concern itself in any given case before reaching a conclusion upon 
the principle or rule in dispute. The fact that there may be general consensus upon the 
proscription of Riba and the essentials of a valid Morabaha agreement does no more than 
indicate that, if the Sharia law proviso were sufficient to incorporate the principles of Sharia law 
into the partiesʹ agreements, the defendants would have been likely to succeed. However, since 
I would hold that the proviso is plainly inadequate for that purpose, the validity of the contract 
and the defendantsʹ obligations thereunder fall to be decided according to English law.744 
 
Even in Muslim majority countries where judges may be less cautious with regards to discussing 
the issues of Sharia, references are made to common law, equity, and Sharia positions.745 The 
latter is usually classical opinions that form part of one of the canonical schools of fiqh, that is 
to say, judges usually choose from existing and established legal opinions and do not venture to 
rule on the basis of a controversial opinion that has not been established as a recognized 
constituent of the field. The works of people like Shaḥrūr and Rahman are not usually cited in 
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the litigation processes nor are they considered in standard-setting institutions. Nor are the 
different schools of thought, ones that contravenes the major religious establishments, 
represented in such institutions or sovereign legislative processes. In short, the new ideas in 
Islamic finance or Islamic studies in general, have failed so far to move from the peripheries of 
the intelligentsia to the mainstream institutionalized ideas, and thus, have failed so far to have 
any real impact on the development of the law.746  
One reason which may help explain this is the role Islamic finance play in forming the identity of 
the Muslim communities now. Unlike issues of clothing and food which form part of the Islamic 
identity and for which non-Muslims are mostly indifferent, Islamic finance, particularly after the 
financial crises, have presented an Islamic solution as a contender for an international problem 
and it has indeed gained the attention of the world. These recent developments, however, only 
amplified a historical development where Islamic finance have always been an indication of 
true identification to Islam.747 Therefore, any reconciliation between it and conventional 
finance would undermine that acclaimed distinction. Something that is further evidenced by 
the symbolic difference between conventional finance and the alternatives offered by Islamic 
finance in practice like murābaḥa, salam, bayʿ al- ͑īnah, and others. That is to say, Muslims are 
not necessarily keen to change Islamic finance in any way that might make it formally more like 
conventional finance even if this was demonstrated by objective reasoning from the sources, 
because it is that formal difference which serves as an identifier. Similarities in substance cause 
little worry in this regard. Rahman alluded to this issue when he argued that “[T]he pet issues 
with the neofundamentalists are the ban on bank interest, the ban on family planning, the 
status of women, collection of zakat, and so forth – things that will most distinguish Muslims 
 
746 In this regard, Hallaq makes the interesting following remark: “The religious utilitarianists succeeded in having 
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isolation from the centres of political power which is indispensable for the practical implementation of any idea” 
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from the West”.748 He then adds “while the modernist was engaged by the West through 
attraction, the neorevivalist is equally haunted by the West through repulsion”.749 These 
movements, argues Rahman, notwithstanding that they reoriented the lay Muslim emotionally 
towards Islam, did Islam a great disservice by their lack of positive effective Islamic thinking and 
intellectual bankruptcy.750 
In addition to the problem of identity, the resistance of Islamic finance to absorbing new ideas 
can also be attributed to the purported certainty of its fiqh; the stern prohibitions in the 
sources buttressed by centuries of consensus and a voluminous literature on nominal contracts 
that should provide an alternative to the proscribed transactions. The fact that banks were a 
new type of institutions to the Muslim world should have confined the debate to whether or 
not interest was riba. This would render the consensus about the prohibition of riba mostly 
irrelevant as it preceded the bank, and a new debate should have ensued after the banks were 
introduced to Muslim societies. But the certainty around the fiqh of finance was strong to the 
degree that jurists, rulers, and the Muslim societies in general preferred a secular approach to 
finance than a new thinking in fiqh. This attitude was not confined to finance, other aspects of 
the law like family law were also replaced by secularization rather than juristic renewal or 
rethink.751 Banks were introduced as part of the secular state that came with colonialism and 
they functioned accordingly.752 When the idea of Islamic finance started to take shape half-way 
through the twentieth century it was based on classical fiqh, little attempt was made to change 
fiqh to suit this new industry that belongs entirely to modernity and bears little resemblance, 
when it comes to lending and other forms of financial transactions, to what the Arabs were 
used to in the time when the schools of fiqh were formed and matured. 
It was easier to let Islamic finance develop as a separate field where it can adhere strictly to 
classical fiqh circumventing the need for change, while conventional finance is uninterrupted by 
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the parallel development of Islamic finance nor its conventional methods altered. It became a 
matter of choice for consumers, states, or financial institutions which mode to adopt; a setting 
preferred to the other option which would have meant change in both modes: the Islamization 
of conventional finance together with the rethinking of classical fiqh of Islamic finance. The 
difficulties of the task of changing the current financial system are evident as the troubles of 
conventional finance are still debated to this day without being nearly resolved. The latter task 
is a challenge for Muslims to rethink their whole system of law by questioning the basis of 
certainty that prevent change and adaptation when clearly needed. 
 
The false dichotomy of the changeable and 
unchangeable in Sharia: 
There is no contention that at least some part of Sharia is changeable, it is the unchangeable 
part, however, that requires attention. The most conspicuous feature of the unchangeable is 
that it is correlated, or perhaps even concomitant to the degree of correspondence, with 
certainty; if a rule is certain it is most likely unchangeable or if it is very resistant to change it is 
most likely considered certain by some measure, and both concepts, certainty and 
unchangeability, underscore divinity. In other words, for any law, rule, or other aspects of Islam 
to be divine, they must be rigid, which is an unfortunate inference from the idea of God being 
an Unchanging Deity. This concept can hardly be supported by Islamic sources and is likely an 
import from Greek philosophy as much of Islamic theology is.753 The Quran talks about a very 
active God who creates, talks, sends messengers, punishes, forgives, and basically, runs the 
universe as a whole. The Quran even associates change to God in the verse “Of Him seeks (its 
need) every creature in the heavens and on earth: every day in (new) Splendour doth He 
(shine)!”.754 Similarly, the concept of abrogation (naskh) is a concept of change in the divine 
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law; of course, it is divine change to the divine law, but it indicates that divine law is not 
absolute. 
Besides the possible, and likely, psychological desideratum for certainty, it is difficult to trace 
the origins of this dichotomy in Islam. Wael Hallaq points to the fact that it is an Aristotelian 
concept but he does not assert that Aristotle was the source of the idea in Islam.755 The verse 
“He it is Who has sent down to thee the Book: in it are verses basic or fundamental (of 
established meaning); they are the foundation of the Book: others are allegorical. But those in 
whose hearts is perversity follow the part thereof that is allegorical seeking discord and 
searching for its hidden meanings but no one knows its hidden meanings except Allah and those 
who are firmly grounded in knowledge say: "We believe in the Book; the whole of it is from our 
Lord"; and none will grasp the Message except men of understanding”756 is the verse that is 
mostly cited to imply a dichotomy of changeable and unchangeable. This follows from the 
rationale that verses of ‘established meaning’ will give certain law reflecting the true will of 
God, therefore, this forms a domain of unchangeable law, whereas, using the same rationale, 
the allegorical reflects probable divine will, thus, probable/changeable law. Similarly, the hadith 
“The halal (lawful) is clear and the haram (prohibited) is clear, and between them are unclear 
matters that are unknown to most people. Whoever is wary of these unclear matters, has 
absolved his religion and honour. And whoever indulges in them, has indulged in the haram 
(prohibited). It is like a shepherd who herds his sheep too close to a preserved sanctuary, and 
they will eventually graze in it. Every king has a sanctuary, and sanctuary of Allah is what He has 
made haram (prohibited)”757 is cited in support of the dichotomy of certainty. Neither the 
verse nor the hadith speaks of a clear demarcation of what is changeable and unchangeable in 
Islam but they allude to the concept by a division in terms of understanding and clarity. The 
lucidity of the verse or rule in Islam entails, it is understood, a rigidity of the meaning or the 
law, and the fact that there is a mention of a part that is obscure only affirms this 
understanding since it answers for the existing perplexity towards some parts of revelation. It is 
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an acknowledgement that not every part of revelation is lucid, direct in its discourse, or solid 
and unitary in its meaning, something that Muslims encounter regularly when reading the 
Quran and would have caused them great difficulty if Allah did not acknowledge it. Since He 
did, however, and having accepted this concept for the relief it affords Muslims, it follows then 
that there is a part which is indeed lucid, direct, and understandable in revelation, that is, 
certain, and thus, it must be adhered to with utmost strictness. In other words, the 
desideratum for the divine acknowledgement of obscurity in revelation geared the 
understanding of the text that speaks of clarity towards an interpretation that engendered the 
dichotomy of changeable/unchangeable. Scholars needed the license not to understand some 
parts of revelation, but they had to accept, in their guided interpretation, that other parts of 
revelation were hermetic. Once the concept of certainty is set, unchangeability will 
axiomatically follow. 
Having argued for the dichotomization of Islam into changeable/unchangeable, the jurists are 
left with the greater and more contentious task of deciding what belongs to each part. The 
classical usulis theory which was discussed in detail in the previous chapters concludes that 
Quran, hadith, and Ijmaʿ provide the certain aspects of Islam. Any idea or law that is derived 
from what is considered manifest Quran, sound hadith, or Ijmaʿ is certain and therefore 
unchangeable. Of course, when the interpretation of Quran or the soundness of hadith is a 
matter of disagreement between the major schools of fiqh, it is the degree of consensus which 
will ultimately set the degree of certainty and unchangeability of the matter in question. This 
classical theory of certainty is still the prevalent theory to date, which might in part explain the 
unchangeability of Islamic finance as discussed above; but there have been attempts 
throughout the history of Islam to review the certainty purported to the three sources where 
some have rejected Ijmaʿ and some rejected both Ijmaʿ and hadith maintaining that the only 
certain source is the Quran. The basis for rejecting the certainty of hadith and Ijmaʿ have been 
discussed in chapter four above, and although these arguments have not succeeded in 
becoming mainstream, they seem to be getting increasing attention as the movement of 
modernizing Islam seems to be gaining momentum recently. The effects that hadith had, or 
should have, on Islamic law were diluted in some way in the writings of Shaḥrūr, Fazlur 
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Rahman, Gamal al-Banna,758 Abdulkarim Surush,759 Muhammad Abulgasim Haj Hamad,760 and 
others. Even the more conservative thinkers such as Turabi try to minimize their use of hadith 
and rely almost completely on Quran.  
The critique of hadith certainty, however, does not amount to a rejection of the dichotomy of 
certainty, nor even a reduction of its effect. It is as if there is a fixed amount of certainty that 
must be achieved in usul regardless of how it is distributed. This was quite clear in the writings 
of Haj Hamad who thought hadith was unreliable and its reliability should be referred to Quran 
instead.761 But he ossifies Quran much more than what can be found in the traditional view of 
its certainty, as if he was giving Quran the share of certainty that was initially in Sunna. He 
argues that Quran is the written book of Allah (Kitāb Allah al-masṭūr) while the universe is the 
observed or witnessed book of Allah (Kitāb Allah al-manẓūr); and like the universe where a 
single change in the structure of its elements will disrupt its whole system, the Quran is 
absolute in its design and system, no syllable can be changed without disrupting the whole 
system of meaning.762 He cites the verse “Furthermore I call to witness the setting of the Stars. 
And that is indeed a mighty adjuration if ye but knew. That this is indeed a qur´an Most 
Honourable. In Book well-guarded”.763 This is a concretization of the text that leaves no room 
for plurality or uncertainty. He, therefore, rejects synonymy in the Quran and makes up for the 
lost flexibility by looking at the roots of the word to expand its semantic field,764 a methodology 
adopted later by Shaḥrūr and others. 
Attempts to rethink certainty in Islam have mostly kept at a distance from the Quran, there are 
two reasons to explain this. First, the Quran is considered to be, literally, the word of Allah. It is 
the only aspect of divinity that is part of this world, and after the Prophet’s death, it remains 
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the only bridge to the unseen. It must, therefore, be certain in order to keep the connection to 
the unseen and to Allah active. Uncertainty in Quran would entail a disruption or a breakdown 
in that connection. This is the certainty concomitant to divinity; a psychological surety for the 
believer who is dealing with subjects that lie, literally, out of this world. 
The second reason is the concept that any system of thought must be rooted in fixed, 
unchanging postulates;765 this gives a sense of stability and certainty usually required for such a 
system, particularly a legal system, to function properly.766 The usulis, considering the divine 
dimension in their system of law, adopted this concept with fervour. Naturally, the Quran ranks 
highest in the structure of usul since it is the most divine as it is evidently the most authentic. 
Therefore, even if there were bases to raise questions regarding the certainty of the Quran, this 
is mostly avoided for the simple fact that it stands as the only remaining certain source. Casting 
doubt over the Quran, it is thought, will bring down the entire edifice of Sharia and possibly 
Islam as a whole. 
But this school of thought cannot but admit that this certainty does not include interpretation 
for the entire Quran; it is a certainty that is confined mostly to authenticity. So, the question is: 
how does a certainly authentic Quran with probable meaning constitute an improvement in the 
dichotomy of certainty or in the definition of what is unchangeable? The improvement in 
authenticity comes, when Sunna is rejected, at the price of elaboration; one would have a 
qualitatively more certain text that tells much less. From a jurisprudential perspective, the 
lacuna must be filled by less certain methods and the law cannot be absolute. When a lesser 
part of the law becomes more authentic, this will not, overall, make the law more 
unchangeable. If riba was prohibited only by the Quran, the prohibition will be certain but the 
definition of riba will remain probable, and the same would apply to any legal matter as it is 
simply not viable to construct a comprehensive body of law from Quran alone. So, what benefit 
is there in redistributing certainty between the usul, giving more certainty to Quran at the 
expense of Sunna and Ijmaʿ? The arguments regarding the problematic authenticity of Sunna 
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are valid; however, the focus on Quran will only emphasise the concept of certainty but will not 
yield certain unchangeable law. It will satisfy the psychological need for certainty in religion 
even if it was not possible to identify what, in particular, is certain or unchangeable. The very 
idea of an existing, albeit unidentifiable, certainty is a good enough platform, it seems, to 
embark on religious ijtihad and proclaim unchangeability for its results (which might explain the 
multitude of different opinions that make the same claim); in Rahman’s words “[t]he 
contention that certainty belongs not to the meanings of particular verses of the Quran and 
their content, but to the Quran as a whole, that is, as a set of coherent principles or values 
where the total teaching will converge”.767 Although Rahman here is alluding to an induction of 
values, his reference to certainty, nonetheless, is towards Quran as a unit, that is, he is not 
referring to anything in particular in Quran, which, in practical terms, means that certainty is 
definitely associated with Quran but the question of how we can utilise it, remains unanswered. 
Similar arguments were made by the Iranian philosopher Abdul Karim Surush who argues that 
“there are essentials and non-essentials, changeables and unchangeables, but exactly what 
those changeables and unchangeables are, is at the mercy of the faqih”.768 Surush seems to 
reject this dichotomy arguing that the distinction is, rather, epistemological. Therefore, what is 
changeable or unchangeable will be relative, it will depend on “the context of interpretation” 
but it does not have an independent ontological existence.769 Likewise, there is no objective 
method by which we can distinguish between the Quranic verses that use metaphors and those 
that must be read in their literal meaning; it depends on the context of interpretation.770 Yet, 
on other occasions, Surush’s arguments seem to reflect the same idea that he rejected 
elsewhere, that is, a distinction between certain and uncertain parts of Islam, religion, or 
Sharia. He argues that there is “one absolute essential and one unchangeable. That is the Kitāb 
(book) and the Sunna”.771 Surush’s main thesis is a distinction between religion and religious 
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knowledge (al-dīn wa al-maʿrifa al-dīnīyya). Religion – which he also denotes as Sharia – is a 
collection of pillars, sources, and branches which were revealed to the Prophet; religious 
knowledge, on the other hand, is the people’s methodological and systematic understanding of 
Sharia. Religious knowledge is a human effort, he argues, while “pure Sharia” exists only with 
The Lawgiver.772 But this implies that in this life, there cannot be unchangeables. He alludes to 
this idea on a number of occasions where he argues that in spite of the constant changes in 
general human knowledge, there can still be thawābit (constants, or unchangeables) in 
religious knowledge, but he qualifies this, paradoxically, by arguing that the unchangeability of 
religious knowledge is dependent on external factors which might change, then adds “chicks 
are counted after hatching, and the unchangeables are known at the end of history”.773 This 
indicates that these unchangeables are present but cannot be known, only when the veil of the 
unseen is lifted can our knowledge become complete and we can then know the true religion 
which might very well be present now without, for the shortcomings of our knowledge, being 
recognized with certainty, that is, by everyone with sound reason and cognitive ability. How do 
we reconcile this with Surush’s rejection of there being, ontologically speaking, things 
changeable and others unchangeable? He sums up his arguments by the simple sentence “Islam 
is nothing but a series of interpretations of Islam”;774 but talks elsewhere about the pure Sharia 
and the revelation of truth on the Day of Judgement. It seems that Surush is taking a peculiar 
middle ground between accepting and rejecting the idea of dichotomizing Islam into 
changeables and unchangeables. He seems to argue that the dichotomy is indeed there but the 
unchangeable branch of it can only be revealed in the afterlife. The concept of this 
unchangeable is present in the mundane, even the tangible Sharia, Quran and Sunna, is 
present, but these remain abstract and passive elements of certainty. Their effects on life are 
only possible through interpretation which belongs to the uncertain, changeable domain. 
Surush’s arguments only confirm the idea that the dichotomy of certainty in Islam is a false one. 
The fact that the unchangeable is absolutely beyond our knowledge is effectively the same as, 
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in the context of jurisprudence, its non-existence. In other words, by arguing that it is 
unreachable it is rendered unusable, and we are only left with the relative, uncertain, and the 
changeable.  
Other writers were more blunt with regards to the issue of unchangeability. Asma Barlas argued 
that unchangeability of the Quran only means that it is “unalterable”, that is, it cannot change 
after it was uttered by the Prophet.775 She then adds that the Quran teaches us “that 
everything will perish but the face of God” thus, God “is the only unchangeable in Islamic 
thought and practice – all else is changeable and will pass, whether we will it or not”.776  
Viewing the issue of unchangeability from a more legally-oriented perspective, Muhsin Kadavi 
argues that traditional Islam has compulsory criteria and standards for formulating legal 
opinions that “cannot be cast aside without departing from the whole framework”.777 
Therefore, reading the Quran according to these criteria can only lead to accepting unequal 
rights for Muslims and non-Muslims, and for men and women, etc., in short, the traditional 
faqih has to admit to the conflict between Sharia and human rights.778 Kadavi then brings home 
the main problem of the dichotomy, he argues that “the problem that traditional fiqh is facing 
today, i.e. disparity with the notion of human rights, falls squarely in the realm of the precepts 
that traditional Islam considers unchanging. Hence, the division of precepts into two categories 
of unchanging and changing does not solve the problem”.779 
This is evident in the case of Islamic finance. The problem of defining riba using the traditional 
framework of law have always yielded the same results: any increase over the original principal 
is riba. The primacy of ʿilla over ḥikma (effective cause over wisdom) will always ignore the 
context of the prohibition and pay heed to the form. Alcohol is prohibited for the mere effect of 
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intoxication not for the vices that might occur due to the loss of reason; interest is prohibited 
for the mere fact of increase, not for the exploitative nature of the transaction. This rationale is 
sometimes faced with difficulties; for example, in the case of gharar (uncertainty). It is admitted 
that gharar is impossible to omit completely in any commercial or financial transaction, thus, 
the jurists, in line with the original concept of the dichotomy of certainty, divided gharar into an 
acceptable yasīr (light) gharar, and unacceptable fāḥish (exess) gharar,780 and it is down to the 
jurists to identify which transaction belongs to which type. These difficulties instigated the 
development of a host of legal trickery (ḥiyal) in fiqh to circumvent their effects in law without 
having to change the traditional paradigm. The permissibility of transactions such as murābaḥa, 
salam, ʿinah, and takaful on the one hand, and the prohibition of interest and insurance on the 
other, in spite of the fact that the differences between the two groups are mostly 
insignificant,781 can only be explained by the classification of the latter as unchangeable in form 
rather than substance, an attitude which is deeply rooted in the conception of certainty in usul 
al-fiqh. However, and while the juristic output of the traditional school is seemingly coherent 
with its precepts, the clinging of some of the modern Muslim thinkers to the dichotomy of 
changeable/unchangeable is less explicable and possibly less coherent. For them, the 
unchangeable was too sacred and too certain to tamper with its unchangeability, so they 
resorted to isolating its effects in law and religion generally to the degree of obsoleteness. 
Shaḥrūr turned the particular limits into ranges where movement within the range was 
possible; Rahman side-lined the particularity of the Quranic discourse in favour of a holistic, 
value-oriented reading where certainty associates only with the whole rather than the 
particular; and Surush, while accepting the existence of a pure and unchangeable Sharia, 
rejected the possibility of knowing it before the Hereafter. 
In short, there seems to be a dogmatic dichotomization of Islam into changeable and 
unchangeable. To circumvent the rigidity caused by the unchangeable in law, the traditionalists 
resorted to legal trickery, while the modernists reduced its domain of effectiveness to the 
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minimum. The logical bases for this dichotomy are unsound and its effects are either minimal or 
negative. However, and due to its inextricable connection to the concept of certainty, it 




















Certainty has always been extremely difficult if not impossible to prove since it was equally 
difficult if not impossible to refute the arguments of scepticism.782 Nonetheless, humans have 
learned to live with the uncertain knowledge their limited cognitive capacities have allowed 
them. Muslim jurists and theologians, however, have always attempted to demonstrate their 
religious propositions to be absolute certainties. This was the underlying concept of Islamic law 
theory, usul al-fiqh, which aims to understand God’s true will from revelation and other 
sources. The methodology produced mixed results as revelation itself was not uniform in terms 
of its authenticity, semantics, context, etc., leading to a taxonomy of the sources classifying 
them according to their certainty. The certainty of the source, in turn, defined to a great degree 
the rigidity of the law engendering, thereby, a dichotomy of changeable and unchangeable law, 
the latter being portrayed as pronouncements of the true will of Allah. The argument of Muslim 
jurists and usulis is that only a small section of the law is considered unchangeable and most of 
it is open for ijtihad giving Sharia the required flexibility to adapt and evolve. But the problem 
with this argument is that the methodology of law is classified as unchangeable; therefore, 
even if a law is considered changeable and jurists use the present elements of the matter in 
question to legislate a new law, using the same methodology will not yield significantly 
different results. Between the pressures of modernity and the weight of the over-revered 
tradition, some Muslim communities, under the auspices of the nation-state resorted to 
secularism. With the exception of a few countries that chose to uphold traditional fiqh against 
the modern wave, and at the price of being outsiders to the modern day, most Muslim 
countries chose to abandon Sharia and secularize their laws. The heavy weight of traditional 
fiqh and its inability to change was to the degree that it was easier for Muslim countries to stop 
its practice and choose a foreign legal system than to make changes in it. There were other 
ways to circumvent the law other than secularism which predated the nation-state going back 
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to the classical era. Judges were given high discretion in suspending hudud under any shred of 
doubt especially in adultery where it is almost impossible to meet the conditions for conviction. 
In finance, the form of the law was upheld while its substance was diluted to near obsoleteness. 
In some cases, even the form is not maintained, and the violation is passed under the rule of 
necessity (ḍarūra) which, in general, was used by the jurists as a get-out-of-jail card whenever 
applying the law caused difficulty. Throughout the history of their legal endeavours, the jurists 
and usulis avoided resolving the legal difficulties by changing the law, it was shielded by the 
certainty of its divine origin. 
The objective of this research was to investigate the basis of certainty in usul al-fiqh and 
understand the extent of its influence on the ability of Islamic law to change and adapt. 
Examples of the analysis focused on Islamic finance law. The findings can be summarized as 
follows: 
First, Sharia, which is the main motif behind the arguments for certainty, is an obscure, difficult 
to identify concept. The scholars have always tried to attach a sense of certainty to Sharia but 
that was impeded by the obscurity of the concept. Sharia has two dimensions, first, its 
mundane status where it represents law and identity for the Muslims, and second, its divine 
status where it represents, through its sources, a connection to God and the unseen (ghayb). 
Sharia as a concept has not evidently been at the heart of the Islamic discourse from the 
beginning; it has, in fact, developed through the ages until it became in recent times almost 
synonymous to Islam itself. With its status as a symbol of identity for Muslims, it acquired a 
sense of sacredness which made it difficult to critique or question its certainty. 
Second, notwithstanding the centrality of certainty in Islamic legal theory, justifying the quest 
for it is inexplicably rare. The usulis seem to treat the question of why certainty is necessary for 
law as if it was either too evident to merit a discussion or that it belonged to a different field of 
scholarship. Justifying the quest for certainty becomes more pressing when considering its 
effects on the law. Certainty induces the development of legal ruses to circumvent laws that are 
too difficult to apply but too certain to change. A number of Islamic financial contracts are good 
examples of this phenomenon. The few arguments which attempted to justify the quest for 
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certainty were based on the idea that God has forbidden us from following assumptions (ẓann) 
and the idea that God has promised to preserve Sharia which is not possible if doubt is 
accepted in its asl (origin) since doubt implies changeability. By contrast, legal certainty in 
Western legal theory has a clear justification, that is, stability and predictability. It allows people 
to know what to expect from the law. But this certainty must be counter-balanced by 
adaptability when social standards change, admit legal theorists. Furthermore, the concept of 
certainty, like that of Sharia, suffers from obscurity of meaning and definition; and the usulis 
who did make a systemic analysis of certainty chose to define it in the absolute sense, 
furnishing the way for unchangeability in the law. 
Third, the Quran, which is considered the highest source of Sharia in Islam, is thought to have 
been preserved by concurrent testimony (tawatur) and a written record that was made during 
the life of the Prophet and under his auspices, both methods were considered to have delivered 
the Quran with perfect accuracy. In addition to this, and to complete the delivery of God’s will 
intact, the usulis devised a methodology of interpretation (bayan) which guarantees, they 
argue, the true intent behind the text, at least for what they considered as hermetic verses. 
None of the authoritative manuscripts of Quran, the Hafsa collection, the Uthmanic master 
copy or any of the companions’ manuscripts is extant today and the analysis shows that the 
writing of the Quran was done in very difficult conditions that it is difficult to ascertain that it 
was transmitted flawlessly. Similarly, the concept of tawatur, which is the main argument for 
the perfect transmission of Quran, relied mostly on the epistemological idea that concurrent 
and independent testimony produces certain knowledge such as the knowledge of the 
existence of Baghdad. But the argument that this concept readily applies to Quran is not water-
tight and the existence of different ‘readings’ (qirāʾāt) of Quran suggest that some changes did 
occur during the transmission. Furthermore, and supposing the text was authentic, it was very 
difficult to demonstrate that the interpretation could be achieved with absolute certainty. With 
these results in mind, analysing the verses of riba shows that its prohibition was not a matter of 
contention, but its definition was very contentious. The Quranic context strongly associates riba 
to exploitative lending which is known in the modern sense as usury. Therefore, it is not 
possible to prove the prohibition of banks interest from the Quran.  
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Fourth, the usulis acknowledge that Sunna in the form of the major hadith collections does not 
qualify for the status of certainty enjoyed by the Quran. Nevertheless, it remains valid and 
legally binding if it is authentically sound (saḥīḥ), which is a reliable degree of authenticity but, 
nonetheless, only yields probable knowledge. Hadith, however, provided the bulk of legal 
material for Sharia and the usulis could not dispense with it on basis of epistemological 
imperfection. Their argument for its validity relied on the fact, which was known with certainty, 
that the Prophet and his companions all acted upon solitary testimony without insisting on 
corroboration. Here again, the usulis use an epistemological concept with questionable 
applicability as their arguments for the validity of solitary hadith failed to justify the degree of 
legal rigidity engendered by hadith. The scope of financial restrictions and alternative nominal 
contracts was greatly expanded by hadith but with much reduced certainty in comparison to 
Quran. Still, with the assertions of the usulis of the certain validity of hadith, the Sunnaic 
injunctions remain upheld despite their internal contradictions and impeding effects on finance. 
The final source of certainty in usul al-fiqh was the concept of Ijmaʿ (consensus). Every aspect of 
Ijmaʿ was a moot point among the usulis; its definition, scope, validity, certainty, etc.; yet, Ijmaʿ, 
in the broad sense of scholars’ consensus, forms the main pillar upon which certainty in Islam 
stands, in spite of the fact that its own authoritativeness as a source and its capacity to yield 
certainty are matters of debate and extensive disagreements. 
Fifth, considering the enormous changes modernity brought on human societies, Muslim 
scholars and jurists had the challenge of reviewing the classic law and legal theory in order to 
allow them to adapt to these changes. However, certainty in Sharia makes the task of changing 
the law all the more difficult. The modern scholars and thinkers who attempted to articulate 
new methodologies which will facilitate change and adaptability for Sharia could not depart 
from the established dichotomy of changeable and unchangeable in it. It seems they felt a need 
to preserve a place for at least the concept of certainty if not substantive certainty in Sharia. 
None of the new ideas, however, managed to find popular acceptance or institutional 
sanctioning. This is conspicuous in Islamic finance since a number of modern thinkers have 
offered ideas that will give it more flexibility and perhaps improve its competitiveness. Yet, 
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Islamic finance has not departed in its main premises from classical fiqh as it applied the same 
prohibitions and nominal contracts. Even the little variety that can be found in different 
jurisdictions is only a product of the variety that was found in classical fiqh, and the challenge 
for the modern scholars has become to use legal trickery to maintain the competitiveness of 
Islamic finance even if its adherence to its principles becomes superficial. It is concluded that 
the dichotomization of Sharia as changeable and unchangeable is unfounded and possibly 
injurious to Sharia. 
It is now possible to draw some conclusions and recommendations from the findings of this 
research. 
First, having established that certainty could not be successfully demonstrated in usul al-fiqh, 
the justification for it should be critiqued and reconsidered. One of the main concepts 
underlying the quest for certainty in usul is the divinity of Sharia, but the association of Sharia 
to the divine is vague, therefore, and to facilitate a rigorous critique for the justification of 
certainty, a clear understanding of Sharia’s divinity is essential. Questions that need to be 
answered in this regard include: what is the nature of the relationship between morals and law 
in Sharia and is it possible to draw distinctions between them? Is revelation to be understood as 
both moral and legal injunctions or only as a moral guide? Does divinity necessarily entail 
absoluteness? Is it not possible to have a law – supposedly divine – which God has only 
intended for certain time or circumstance? If Muslims can have a better understanding of what 
the imperatives of divinity on the law are, it will be possible to understand the quest for 
certainty in law in a better context. 
Second, the arguments of the usulis fall short of precluding at least some doubt from the law 
and its sources, even the Quran. Epistemologically speaking, absolute certainty, which is the 
goal of the usulis, is unattainable because radical scepticism is almost impossible to refute. But 
this level of scepticism is not needed to refute the arguments of the usulis since none could 
demonstrate for usul the level of certainty attributed to, for example, the senses. Nothing in 
usul enjoys the certainty of one’s knowledge of the colour of an object he sees or of our 
knowledge of the existence of Australia. The usulis have sought absolute certainty for, inter 
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alia, theological reasons but this quest must be abandoned because it only engenders 
unjustifiable dogma, legal rigidity, and legal ruses. Even the most established of scientific 
theories maintains some degree of uncertainty, not just because it is inevitable, but also 
because it keeps an open path to criticism, revision, and improvement. It is much better, 
therefore, to embrace a reasonable degree of uncertainty in mundane matters than to adhere 
to an artificial certainty. 
Third, certainty in Sharia is not only unjustified and unproven, it is also injurious to Sharia and 
to Muslim societies. It ossified Sharia in its classical form precluding, thereby, the possibility for 
revision and improvement. To circumvent the drawbacks caused by this rigidity, the jurists 
developed a host of legal trickery or used the fiqh of ḍarūra with more frequency than the 
concept permits. This undermines the integrity of Sharia and reflects an image of a pseudo-
Sharia that conforms only superficially to its professed values. Maintaining a strict conformity to 
Sharia, on the other hand, entails applying a law that was applicable more than fourteen 
centuries ago to the modern day, which is not less injurious to Sharia than circumvention. The 
current argument of Sharia scholars is that societal welfare (maṣlaḥa) cannot contradict a 
certain law. The cases of law where arguments have been raised to change the law such as 
cases of hudud, or banks interest are dismissed on the basis that the certainty underlying the 
classical fiqh outweigh the perceived maṣlaḥa. This balance can be changed if certainty is 
reviewed according to the arguments forwarded by this research. Of course, more detailed 
research will have to be conducted on particular issues where the sources on the specific issue 
are studied with more focus since the certainty will vary between different issues. It is possible 
that not all classical fiqh will be changed but the objective is to open up these legal issues for 
fresh discussion of their validity and keep an open mind to the outcome of these discussions. 
Fourth, the religious discourse is generally oriented towards certainty. This stands against the 
wave of scepticism unleashed by the revolution in science and the scientific method of inquiry. 
But in a globalized, inter-connected world like today’s world, it is impossible to prevent the 
exposure of young generations to these different discourses and methods of knowledge. 
Insistence on the traditional discourse will either drive people away from religion or away from 
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modernity. In the latter case, the rift between modernity and religiosity will only exacerbate 
existing problems of extremism and tribalism within and between societies. Therefore, and 
considering the importance of education in improving social awareness as emphasised by 
thinkers like Rahman and Muhammad Arkoun, it is imperative to educate young Muslim 
generations on the ideas of epistemology and religious history from an objective standpoint. 
Skills of critical thinking must not be confined to scientific higher education but taught 
abstractly as a learning skill and embedded in early education curricula. Furthermore, education 
about epistemology in religion must be linked to the history of ideological differences in Islam. 
Just as students are taught how jurists, when interpreting the sources differently, produced a 
variety of juristic opinions which were all accepted within the one sect (the Sunni sect for 
example); they should also be taught that the same differences in perceptions and 
understandings can lead to the differences between different sects in Islam like Sunna and 
Shiʿa. The disarming of dogma as a state of mind will be conducive in the field of law. It will 
raise the standard of required proofs for any proposition and will, thereby, make purporting a 
proposition more rigorously substantiated.  
Fifth, to succeed in the above recommendations or in achieving any significant change in areas 
of religious sensitivity as the ones discussed in this research, arguments must come from within 
the Islamic intellectual reserves, because Muslims, and people in general, will be very defensive 
against external impositions on culture or religion. Fortunately, the Islamic intellectual history is 
vastly rich and diverse that none of the required changes will have to be based on foreign ideas. 
The magnitude and range of variety start from the very concept of God and down to the minute 
details in the fiqh of ṭahāra (ablution and cleaning). Issues raised in this research about the 
fallibility of human knowledge, uncertainties regarding Quranic manuscripts, tawatur, Quranic 
readings (qiraʾat), authenticity of hadith, authoritativeness of Ijmaʿ, and many other issues of 
certainty in usul have all been discussed in pre-modern Islam with a great range of diversity in 
opinions which are not represented in mainstream traditional Islam. It will be a healthy practice 
to unearth some of the classical ideas from the school of Muʿtazila regarding Quran and taklīf 
(religious obligation). And considering the primacy given by Muʿtazila to the methods of reason 
and the value of ʿadl (justice), their perspective might give some fields of modern significance 
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like Islamic finance a new frame of reference from which Muslims can improve their ideas on 
finance without succumbing to conventional finance or ‘Islamic’ ruses. Thinking about riba in 
the context of justice, to give one example, while easing the unnecessary rigidity of the 
traditional views will furnish a review of the current prohibition of banks interest. This does not 
necessarily imply an endorsement of interest, but it recommends a revision under a new, less 
rigid, framework where factors considered will not be confined to the literal and 
uncontextualized interpretations of texts. And considering the problems caused by the interest-
based system or the speculative nature of the industry, some prohibitions might still stand or 
be imposed anew under a more rational or morally structured system. 
Sixth, the structure of fiqh institutions is currently improving by the inclusion of professionals as 
a qualitative addition to traditional fiqh scholars. However, their role is still secondary to that of 
the scholars when there is disagreement. Economists cannot use economic reasoning to, say, 
allow conventional insurance nor can pharmacologists allow pig fat in pharmaceutical products. 
Professors of astronomy are usually present in fiqh councils, and they can, and do, determine 
the exact time of Ramadan or Eid but it is down to the scholars to decide the matter, either 
based solely on visual observation of the crescent or based on a correspondence between the 
scientific opinion and, at least the possibility of, visual observation. If the scholars are not 
advantaged by the certainty of their sources and methods, a better balance between the 
professional opinion and the ethico-religious one can be achieved. 
Finally, certainty in Islam is an extremely complex issue. It is underscored by fourteen centuries 
of a tradition of submission and acceptance, is deeply rooted in theology, and is entangled in a 
mesh of other complex issues such as identity, morality, and politics. Opening up a debate on it, 
therefore, will be vigorously resisted. But under the overwhelming pressures of modernity, no 
system of thought can be protected by dogma, and religions in general, and Islam in particular, 
will have to take the challenge of questioning some of their long-established beliefs. For this, 
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